CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism: A Risk-Based Multi-Hazard Approach to Vulnerability Assessment - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Loading...

PPT – CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism: A Risk-Based Multi-Hazard Approach to Vulnerability Assessment PowerPoint presentation | free to download - id: 1bac36-ZDc1Z



Loading


The Adobe Flash plugin is needed to view this content

Get the plugin now

View by Category
About This Presentation
Title:

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism: A Risk-Based Multi-Hazard Approach to Vulnerability Assessment

Description:

Develop Critical Infrastructure as a Focus for and Demonstration of the ... Spare transformer vaults at the South Street Seaport provided energy to damaged areas ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:106
Avg rating:3.0/5.0

less

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism: A Risk-Based Multi-Hazard Approach to Vulnerability Assessment


1
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Protecting Critical
Infrastructure from Terrorism A Risk-Based
Multi-Hazard Approach to Vulnerability Assessment
  • Reducing the Risks and Consequences of
  • Terrorism
  • CREATE Conference
  • November 18, 2004
  • Professor Rae Zimmerman
  • New York University/Wagner Graduate School of
    Public Service

2
Research ObjectivesElectric Power Case
  • Develop Critical Infrastructure as a Focus for
    and Demonstration of the Assessment of Risk,
    Consequences, Emergency Response and Economic
    Impact
  • Provide Inputs from Electric Power Case to Risk
    and Economic Modeling, including
  • electric power system configuration
  • common mode failures
  • indicators for interdependencies with other
    infrastructure

3
Why Infrastructure?
  • Attention of Federal Policy 1996-2004
  • Public Concern Contributes about 10 to Gross
    Domestic Product (Henry and Dumagan 2004)
  • Highly Interdependent Centralized Production
    Systems and Networked Distribution Systems
  • Large Consequences of an Attack Extensive Number
    of Users Exposed
  • Proven Targets of Terrorism
  • Interconnections that Magnify Impacts

4
Attention of Federal Policy CHRONOLOGY OF
SELECTED FEDERAL INITIATIVES INCORPORATING
INFRASTRUCTURE
  • 1996 Executive Order 13010
  • 1997 Presidents Commission on Critical
    Infrastructure Protection
  • 1997 U.S. Department of Commerce Critical
    Infrastructure Assurance Office
  • 1998 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63
  • 2001 USA Patriot Act Section 1016
  • 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Protection
  • 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive
  • (HSPD)7 and 8
  • 2003 National Strategy for the Physical
    Protection of Critical Infrastructures
  • 2004 National Incident Management System (NIMS)

5
Proven Targets of Terrorism or Sabotage TRANSIT
and WATER
  • TRANSIT
  • 1900s Hundreds of Subway Attacks Outside
    U.S.(Mineta Institute)
  • 1995 Tokyo Sarin Gas on 3 Separate Lines
  • 1995 Subway Car Bombings - St. Michel-Notre Dame
    Station
  • 1995 Derailment of Amtraks Sunset Limited (AZ)
    (vandalism)
  • 2001 Destruction of Lower Manhattan Subway Lines
    (WTC)
  • 2004 Madrid Subway Bombings
  • WATER
  • 2003 break-ins at water systems in 5 states and
    Canada
  • Poisoning threats in Turkey, Germany and Malta
  • Source R. Zimmerman, Water in Digital
    Infrastructures, edited by R. Zimmerman and T.
    Horan (Routledge 2004).

6
Proven Targets of Terrorism or Sabotage ELECTRIC
POWER
  • Domestic attacks on power plants 70 percent of
    energy and power companies experienced at least
    one severe cyber attack. ( U.S. GAO 2004 12)
  • Transmission Towers Vandalism occurred in
    October 2004, when two bolts were removed from a
    transmission tower in Milwaukee, WI disrupting
    power and rail service when the tower fell on to
    the lines (USA Today 2004).
  • Crude oil and gas pipelines Between June
    2003-September 2004, in Iraq, over one hundred
    attacks on oil and gas pipelines were reported.

7
System Interconnectedness (Macro and Micro
Effects)
  • ENERGY
  • TRANSPORTATION WATER
  • TELECOMMUNICATIONS

8
Macro Interdependencies 2003 Total Energy
Consumption by SectorSource Drawn from U.S.
Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, October
2004
9
Micro Interdependencies Energy use at the East
Bay Municipal Utilities District OAKLAND, CA
Energy Inputs
Onsite Power Generator 2.6 MW
Western Area Power Authority 4.16 MW
Pacific Gas and Electric
EBMUD
Surplus Power
Oxygenation Plant 27
Activated Sludge Mixing 22
Headworks 18
Lighting, Losses, Misc. 12
Solids Handling 10
Activated Sludge Pumping 7
Other Motor Loads 4
Energy Outputs
Diagrammed from Hake, Bray and Kallal (2004)
10
Types of Potential Disruption and Vulnerability
Associated with Interdependencies
  • GENERAL EFFECTS
  • Single System Effects
  • Multiple System Effects (e.g., J. Peerenboom, R.
    Fisher, R. Whitfield) Common-Cause Cascading
    Escalating
  • GENERIC ELECTRIC POWER CASE Disruption by
    Terrorism
  • Multiple modes of attack possible
  • Numerous cascading effects
  • Many second and third level consequences
  • Enormous economic impacts of sustained regional
    electricity disruption

11
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE U.S. and Canadian Blackout
of August 14, 2003
  • One set of initiating events cyber failures
  • Series of cascading failures of electrical
    systems
  • Interdependencies transportation, water,
    sanitation, communications failures
  • Economic and social impacts health and
    recreation job disruption disruption and
    redistribution of economic sectors
  • Numerous analogies to consequences of a terrorist
    attack

12
Selected Major Blackouts in the U.S. Source
Graphed from North American Electric Reliability
Council (NERC) data
13
Research Approach Electric Power
  • 1.Identify Event Case Databases (all-hazards
    approach) U.S. DOE, U.S. DHS, websites, etc.
  • 2.Case Diagnosis of Failures Identify and code-
  • characteristics of failures
  • Interdependencies with other infrastructure
  • vulnerable components and consequences
  • 3.Develop and Apply Indicators of Infrastructure
    Interdependency
  • 4.Identify Risk Reduction Options

14
Number of Incidents(U.S. DOE Database)Source
New York University Critical Infrastructure
Project, CREATE
15
Indicator Application and Preliminary Analysis of
Interdependencies and Failures
  • Type of Infrastructure Ratio of
    Times
    Infrastructure Causes Failures
  • vs. is Affected
    by Failure
  • Water mains 3.4
  • Roads 1.4
  • Gas lines 0.5
  • Electric Lines 0.9
  • Fiber Optic/Telephone 0.5
  • Sewers/ sewage treatment 1.3
  • Source R. Zimmerman, Decision-making and the
    Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure,
    Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on
    Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2004. Based on an
    illustrative data set of approximately 100 cases.

16
Risk and Consequence Reduction Options for
Electricity Post 9/11 (WTC) Examples
  • Redundancy/Service Alternatives
  • Spare transformer vaults at the South Street
    Seaport provided energy to damaged areas
  • Use of Slack Resources
  • Ability to access portable generators provided
    temporary power
  • Decentralization and Decoupling
  • Alternative, portable energy sources used

17
Decentralize/De-Couple Energy Renewable Energy -
Trends Compared With Other Resources, 1973-2001
(Quadrillion Btu)
  • Source Department of Energy, Energy Information
    Administration Monthly Energy Review September
    2002 http//www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/pdf/pages/se
    c10_2.pdf (Accessed 30 October 2002).

18
Conclusions
  • Electric power is a key driver of other
    infrastructure and impacts other infrastructure
    in extreme events
  • Grid configurations, common component failures
    and their consequences guide risk estimates of
    terrorist attacks
  • Risk reduction alternatives exist that can alter
    vulnerability of energy service configurations to
    attack
  • Outputs of case-based diagnostic methods and
    indicators provide inputs to risk and economic
    models

19
ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND DISCLAIMER
  • This work is supported by the U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) through the University of
    Southern California for CREATE and several grants
    from the National Science Foundation (NSF). Any
    opinions, findings, and conclusions or
    recommendations expressed in this document are
    those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
    reflect the views of the U.S. DHS or the NSF.
  • The staff at NYU-Wagner are also acknowledged for
    their valuable assistance with the data, namely
    Carlos Restrepo, Nicole Dooskin, Ray Hartwell,
    Justin Miller, and Wendy Remington.
About PowerShow.com