Vietnam

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Vietnam

• Operation Starlite
• NS 410 Amphibious Warfare
• University Of Arizona NROTC

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OUTLINE

• Time Line and Background
• Geographic Location
• Type of Amphibious Op
• Key Players
• Summary of events
• Key Considerations
• Lessons Learned

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Timeline / background
Korean Armistice
U.S. aid French
French Leave Vietnam
July 1956
July 1953
May 1950
Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Ford Vietnam is over
Operation Starlite
Kennedy Assasinated
My Lai
Aug 1965
Mar 1968
1975
Aug 1964
1963

• May 1950, President Harry S. Truman authorized a
  modest program of economic and military aid to
  the French
• The United States entered that Vietnam war
  incrementally, in a series of steps between 1950
  and 1965.
• 7 February 1965 Viet Cong Units attacked the
  American Advisory compound at Pleiku in the
  Central Highlands of South Vietnam. The attackers
  killed nine U.S. servicemen and wounded 128
  others. For the first time, American advisors had
  died in a deliberate enemy attack.

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Several units were available to move to Vietnam
on short notice. The Army's 173rd Airborne
Brigade was an elite unit that could be
transported by air from Okinawa to Vietnam in a
matter of hours. The 25th Infantry Division was
stationed in Hawaii and could be transported by
ship to Saigon in a matter of weeks. Finally, the
3rd Marine Division, also based in Okinawa, could
deploy a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Vietnam
in a matter of days. All these units had
advantages and disadvantages to their
deployments. Finally, after careful evaluation,
the Marines were ordered in. Although many of the
politicians thought they were too large a unit,
they were self-contained, which made them
attractive for deployment to Vietnam.
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GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION
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Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 7 (Captain
Mckinney) (3,000)
Type amphib operation
ASSUALT
Vietcong (VC) 1st VC Regiment (1,500)

• 7th Marines (Colonel Peatross)
• - 2/4 (Lieutenant Colonel Fisher)
• - 3/3 (Lieutenant Colonel Muir)
• Reserve afloat Special Landing
• Force 3/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Bodley)
• Fire support ships USS Orleck,
• USS Prichett, USS Galveston
• Air support Marine Air Group
• (MAG) 11, MAG-12

• 60th Battalion
• 80th Battalion
• 52d VC Company
• Co., 45th Weapons Battalion

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Key players

• General Walt (III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF))
• Admiral Sharp (Commander Amphibious TF)
• Colonel Peatross (7th Marines)
• LtCol Fisher (2/4)
• LtCol Kelley (1/7)
• LtCol Charles Bodleys (3/7)

Walt / Peatross / Bodley
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summary of events

• 7 February 1965 VC attack U.S. support base
  near Pleiku Air Base, U.S. begins air war in
  response
• 8 March 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB),
  arrives at Danang
• 6 May LOI from Gen Westmoreland restricts III
  MAF to reserve/reaction missions supporting Army
  of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

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summary of events

• July Intelligence reports VC buildup (1st VC
  Regiment) and operations in southern I Corps,
  indicating likely attack on U.S. enclave at Chu
  Lai
• 30 July General Westmoreland instructs General
  Walt to undertake offensive operations in I Corps
• 8 August RLT-7 embarks for Chu Lai

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summary of events

• 14 August RLT-7 arrives Chu Lai
• 15 August Intelligence locates 1st VC Regiment
  at Van Tuong Village, 12 miles south of Chu Lai
• 16 August Units at Chu Lai alerted
• 17 August Co. M leaves Chu Lai to establish
  blocking position

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summary of events

• 18 August Main assault
• 19 August Area around Landing Zone (LZ) Blue
  secured
• 20 August Operation begins final sweep
• 24 August Operation terminated

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Losses

• U.S. - 45 KIA, 203 WIA
• VC - 645 confirmed KIA,
• 1,000 estimated

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Key considerations

• First major U.S. offensive operation in Vietnam
  first important U.S. tactical victory
• Entire operation conceived, planned, and launched
  within 3 days
• Use of heliborne
• ship-to-shore assault
• in a combat environment

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Key considerations

• Attempt at envelopment using ground, air, and
  amphibious operations in combination
• The significance of planning, intelligence, and
  doctrine in an amphibious operation

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political considerations

• U.S. to support democratic RVN from Communist
  aggression after defeat and withdrawal of French
• U.S. increases commitment of troops, but intends
  to minimize combat operations restraints on
  military operations (6 May LOI)
• Morale factor if U.S. suffers serious loss to VC,
  such as loss of Chu Lai

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Political considerations

• Limitations on Marine Corps manpower in the
  region
• Massing of VC forces (1st VC Regiment) in the
  region surrounding Chu Lai indicates attack
  imminent
• General Westmoreland orders operations to destroy
  VC forces in region

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operational considerations

• III MAF options
• Await and prepare for VC attack on Chu Lai
• Spoiling attack requires additional forces to
  defend Chu Lai
• Arrival of 7th Marines on PHIBRON 7 ships
  provides
• Needed additional forces
• Shipping which allows for amphibious option in
  conjunction with ground attack

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operational considerations

• Benefits of amphibious option
• Allows attack from multiple directions
• Amphibious landing allows heavy equipment to be
  brought into engagement
• Logistical support easier and more secure over
  beach as well as secure at sea
• Chance for surprise
• Avoids moving on difficult terrain
• Improved operational mobility by sea

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operational considerations

• Intelligence
• Beach reconnaissance done by UDTs in May when Chu
  Lai base was established identifies two possible
  locations
• Northern (Nho Na Bay) Good beach, location poor
  for cooperation with the heliborne assault
• Southern (vicinity An Cuong Village) Good
  beach location beneficial for the overall
  assault plan allows cutting off enemy escape to
  south
• Personal helicopter reconnaissance by Colonel
  Peatross, battalion commanders

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operational considerations

• Availability of ships, helos for assault
• Command relations various individuals worked
  together in training exercises
• Surprise
• Immediate departure of PHIBRON 7 ships after
  disembarking 7th Marines did not arouse enemy
  suspicion
• Ships head east over horizon before turning south
  toward objective area

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tactical considerations

• Terrain in the region
• Flat, few wooded knolls
• Many streams
• Many hamlets surrounded by rice paddies
• Little to no infrastructure besides river systems
• VC tactics
• Use of helicopters in assaults and as weapons
  platforms

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tactical considerations

• Three-prong scheme of maneuver to trap enemy
  against coast vicinity of Van Tuong village
• 3/3 by amphibious landing to south
• 2/4 by helo from west
• 1 co. (M/3/3) south from Chu Lai by land
• Base at Chu Lai allows for use of artillery in
  support of operation

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technical considerations

• Standardized doctrine for conduct of amphibious
  ops available to all services
• Speed, flexibility of helicopters for
  ship-to-shore movement
• Availability of specialized recon forces and
  information in planning
• Use of specialized amphibious and armored vehicles

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Lessons learned

• Operation spoiled planned VC attack on Marine
  Base at Chu Lai
• Illustrates ability to act quickly and
  effectively on good intelligence
• Doctrine allowed rapid planning and execution
  content unique to "in-country" fighting
• Navy-Marine command relations very important in
  ensuring successful mission

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Lessons learned

• Operation was successful, but the VC soon
  reoccupied the area
• Became the model for a series of similar
  amphibious attacks against VC positions along
  coast
• Tank and engineer regiments especially effective
  against enemy fortifications
• Firepower superiority a definite factor
  (artillery, NGFS, and CAS)

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Lessons learned

• Continuous, consistent logistics support critical
• Civilian factor must be considered, to avoid
  casualties in the private sector
• Press coverage also a factor in subsequent
  modern-day operations

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Questions?