Applying MESE processes to Improve Online E-Voting Prototype System with PTC Web Services - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Applying MESE processes to Improve Online E-Voting Prototype System with PTC Web Services

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... it is probabilistic and homomorphic. 10. Hakan Evecek/SE2Evote. 5 ... Homomorphic ... Homomorphic. E(M1 M2) = E(M1) x E(M2), E(k x M) = E(M)k. Self-blinding. D(E ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Applying MESE processes to Improve Online E-Voting Prototype System with PTC Web Services


1
Applying MESE processes to Improve Online
E-Voting Prototype System with PTC Web Services
  • Master Project Defense
  • Hakan Evecek

2
Outline of the Talk
  • Introduction
  • Document overview prepared for this project.
  • Related Work
  • Paillier Threshold Cryptography (PTC)
  • PTC Web Services
  • Online E-Voting System
  • Suggested Improvement
  • Encryption/Decryption Optimization
  • User Interface
  • Future Directions
  • Conclusion

3
Introduction
  • The online E-Voting system generated within this
    project was based on an idea put forward in the
    Future Suggestions section of the Masters
    Thesis of Mr. Brett Wilson. (http//cs.uccs.edu/g
    sc/pub/master/bswilson/doc/)
  • As a result, augmentation of the demo
    application for PTC Web Services was undertaken.

5/29/2007
Hakan Evecek/SE2Evote
3
4
Continued
  • Scope of E-Voting
  • The world is heading in this direction as
    currently many nations and large companies are
    seeking E-Voting solutions.
  • Similar to manual voting - only much faster and
    cheaper, however
  • Is the voter confident with the process?
  • Can Administrators monitoring verify that one
    vote is recorded for each voter?
  • How trustable is the tally process?
  • Is it socially acceptable?

5
E-Voting Requirements
  • Basic requirements for electronic voting
  • Privacy All votes should be kept secret
  • Completeness All valid votes should be
    counted correctly
  • Soundness Any invalid vote should not be
    counted
  • Unreusability No voter can vote twice
  • Eligibility Only authorized voters can cast a
    vote
  • Fairness Nothing can affect the voting

6
E-Voting Requirements
  • Extended Requirements for electronic voting
  • Robustness faulty behavior of any reasonably
    sized coalition of participants can be tolerated.
    In other words, the system must be able to
    tolerate to certain faulty conditions and must be
    able to manage these situations.
  • Universal Verifiability any party can verify
    the result of the voting
  • Receipt-freeness Voters are unable to prove the
    content of his/her vote
  • Incoercibility Voter cannot be coerced into
    casting a particular vote by a coercer.

7
The categorization of voting system
8
MESE Processes Applied for Online E-Voting System
  • Project Proposal and Plan
  • Software Requirements Document (SRS)
  • Software Design Specification (SDS)
  • Testing Document
  • Defects List
  • Project Report

9
Related Work
  • Some of the Encryption Schemes
  • Goldwasser-Micali Scheme (1984)
  • It is probabilistic cryptography. Their scheme
    has the ability to encrypt the same text in many
    different ways without changing the modulus. It
    is very slow compared to the other schemes.
  • Blum-Goldwasser Scheme (1985)
  • This scheme is comparable in speed to another
    public key scheme, RSA. Unfortunately it is not
    as robust as RSA.
  • The Paillier cryptosystem (1999)
  • a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public
    key cryptography. A given cleartext message can
    be encrypted into any one of a very large set of
    possible encryption values
  • homomorphic
  • deterministic

10
Continued
  • Uses of Paillier Cryptography
  • Electronic Voting
  • Anonymous Mix Nets (due to self-blinding
    property)
  • Electronic Auctions
  • Electronic Lotteries
  • Damgard-Jurick Scheme (2000)
  • Just a modification of Paillier's scheme. It is
    also called Generalized Paillier System. It
    allows a user to increase the size of the
    encrypted value. Like Paillier it is
    probabilistic and homomorphic.

10
Hakan Evecek/SE2Evote
5/29/2007
11
Continued
  • Homomorphic Encryption
  • A special type of cryptography in which the
    sum of two encrypted values is equal to the
    encrypted sum of the values.
  • Public Key Cryptography
  • Asymmetric cryptography, is a form of
    cryptography in which each user will have a key
    that didnt have to be kept secret.
  • Threshold Cryptography
  • A cryptographic function can be distributed
    amongst several participants in such a way that
    the operation can be performed only through
    cooperation of a specified subset of the
    participants. In addition, if less than the
    required number of participants attempts to
    perform the action, no useful information can be
    constructed or obtained.

12
Cryptographic Techniques Implemented by Brett
Wilson to PTC Web Services
  • Paillier CryptoSystem 15
  • Trapdoor Discrete Logarithm Scheme
  • c gMrn mod n2
  • n is an RSA modulus (modulus of 2 safe primes)
  • Safe prime - p 2q 1 where q is also prime
  • g is an integer of order na mod n2
  • r is a random number in Zn
  • M L(c?(n) mod n2)/L(g?(n) mod n2) mod n
  • L(u) (u-1)/n, ?(n)lcm((p-1)(q-1))
  • Important Properties
  • Probabilistic (randomness of E(M))
  • Homomorphic
  • E(M1 M2) E(M1) x E(M2), E(k x M) E(M)k
  • Self-blinding
  • D(E(M) rn mod n2 ) m

Continued
13
Cryptographic Techniques Implemented
  • Threshold Encryption 15
  • Public key encryption as usual
  • Distribute secret key shares among i
    participants
  • Decryption can only be accomplished if a
    threshold number t of the i participants
    cooperate
  • No information about m can be obtained with less
    than t participants cooperating
  • Shamir Secret Sharing
  • Lagrange Interpolation formula
  • f(X) Sti0 aiXi
  • a0 is secret, ai are random, f(X) are secret
    shares
  • X is share index (1 to number of servers)
  • If enough f(X) available it is possible to
    recover a0

14
Operation of E-Voting System 15
2. SOAP/XML Request for PTC Parameters
5. Paillier Public Key
3. SOAP/XML Response containing RSA encrypted
PTC Parameters
6. Paillier Encrypted Vote
8. Partial Decryption Shares of Vote
Tally/Proofs of Correct Decryption
4. RSA Encrypted Secret Key Shares
  • Election Authorities
  • RSA Public Keys

7. Paillier Encrypted Vote Tally
14
Hakan Evecek/SE2Evote
5/29/2007
15
15
16
User Login Page
  • Assumed that users has registered previously and
    has secure login credentials provided.
  • Admin Users
  • Voters
  • Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
    Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA)

17
Admin Page
  • Election Creation
  • Ballot Creation
  • Tally Vote
  • Encryption/Decryption
  • Generate Safe Prime Numbers

18
Election Form
18
5/29/2007
Hakan Evecek/SE2Evote
19
Continued
19
Hakan Evecek/SE2Evote
5/29/2007
20
Ballots Form
5/29/2007
20
Hakan Evecek/SE2Evote
21
Voter Page
  • Voter can access to the elections and complete
    the voting process.
  • Automatically loads the voting page.
  • Allows vote, then doesnt allow user to vote
    again

22
Database Schema
23
Suggested Key Generation, Encryption/Decryption
Optimization
  • Safe Prime Numbers Pre-Computation Process.
  • Chinese Remainder Theorem to calculate p,q
    separately and then multiply for n.
  • Paillier Scheme Pre-Computation for decryption.

23
24
Results
  • 128 bit Encryption
  • 256 bit Encryption

24
25
Lessons Learned
  • The SE processes applied in this project has set
    precedence which can be used for the future
    projects.
  • Ensure that the SRS, SDS and test documents can
    be easily modified and any future enhancements
    can be made with ease.
  • Security issues involved in E-voting systems.
  • CRT is a very useful theorem that can be applied
    on other theorems to improve the efficiency and
    increase the speed of the computations.
  • Pre-computation is always an improvement to the
    systems as long as they are designed and
    architected properly like running a thread on the
    background to generate prime numbers in this
    case.
  • Setting up read/write access permissions for the
    folders is important in ASP .Net. It is very
    important to follow the processes on this setup.
  • Certificate registration and confirmation
    requires additional processes for the internet
    solutions.

25
26
Future Direction
  • Implement the suggested CRT improvement into the
    code.
  • Implement constant value pre-computation for
    decryption process.
  • Fix XML solution in the code.
  • Add more web application security protocols and
    processes.
  • Implement registration and voter identity
    verification process.
  • Authenticity of election parameters/ballots not
    currently guaranteed
  • Implement signing of election parameters/ballots
    by admin

27
Conclusion
  • Encryption parameters creation process
    improvements with the application of
    pre-computation to the web services.
  • Alternate processes are also available to improve
    the efficiency further, such as CRT Theorem,
    applying pre-computation to other constants in
    the Pailliers scheme and also using 3rd scheme
    instead of the 1st scheme as explained in many
    researches.
  • The online E-Voting system with Paillier
    Cryptosystem Web Services implemented in this
    project brings a more secure e-voting environment
    one step closer.
  • Online E-Voting systems need to be considered as
    an enterprise solution when security, from the
    registration till the end of the Tally process,
    is to be considered.

27
28
References
  • 1 http//cris.joongbu.ac.kr/publication/evoting_
    implementation-APIEMS2004.pdf
  • Implementation issues in a secure e-voting
    schemes, Riza Aditya, Byoungcheon Lee, Colin Boyd
    and Ed Dawson.
  • 3 http//www.cs.virginia.edu/pev5b/writing/aca
    demic/thesis/thesis.html
  • Vote Early, Vote Often, and VoteHere A Security
    Analysis of VoteHere, Philip E. Varner, May 11,
    2001.
  • 5 http//www.trustycom.fr/pdf/FoPoSt00.pdf P.
    Fouque, G. Poupard, J.Stern, Sharing Decryption
    in the Context of Voting or Lotteries, Financial
    Cryptography 2000 Proceedings.
  • 6 http//www.captcha.net/ , the Official
    CAPTCHA web site.
  • 7 http//www.vote.caltech.edu/reports/alv-nag_lo
    yola.pdf R. Michael Alvarez, Jonathan Nagler, The
    Likely consequences of Internet Voting for
    Political Representations.
  • 15 B. Wilson, C. E. Chow, Paillier Threshold
    Cryptography Web Service Users Guide,
    University of Colorado Colorado Springs
    Masters Project, 2006.
  • 16http//www.cs.rit.edu8080/ms/static/spr/2005/
    4/kar1141/report.pdf , Progress on Probabilistic
    Encryption Schemes, Kert Richardson, July 2006.
  • 17 http//www.cs.umd.edu/jkatz/THESES/staub.pdf
    .gz An Analysis of Chaums voter-verifiable
    election scheme, Julie Ann Staub, 2005
  • 18 http//www.brics.dk/RS/00/45/BRICS-RS-00-45.p
    df Ivan Damgard and Mads J. Jurik, A
    Generalization, a Simplification and Some
    Applications of Pailliers Probabilistic
    Public-Key System, PKC 2001.
  • 20 http//www.rsa.com/rsalabs/cryptobytes/Cryp
    toBytes_January_2002_final.pdf CryptoBytes, Dan
    Boneh, Hovav Shacham, Spring 2002.
  • 21 http//www.gemplus.com/smart/rd/publications/
    pdf/Pai99pai.pdf Public-Key CryptoSystems Based
    on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes, Pascal
    Paillier, 1999
  • 22 http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paillier_cryptos
    ystem , Paillier Crytosystem from Wikipedia, the
    free encyclopedia.
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