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The financial stability implications of increased capital flows for emerging market economies

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Title: The financial stability implications of increased capital flows for emerging market economies


1
The financial stability implications of increased
capital flows for emerging market economies
  • Dubravko Mihaljek
  • Bank for International Settlements
  • Presentation at the Economics Institute Zagreb
  • Zagreb, 11 November 2008
  • The views expressed are those of the author and
    not necessarily those of the BIS.

2
Outline
  • Data description
  • Recent trends in capital flows to/from EMEs
  • Financial stability implications of increased
    capital flows
  • Focus on bank-intermediated capital inflows and
    CEE
  • Policy responses
  • Financial stability implications of debt
    portfolio outflows

3
Data description
  • Focus (mostly) on private capital flows
  • Gross vs. net flows
  • Gross flows to study financial integration,
    financial stability issues composition of flows
    important for macroeconomic management
  • Net flows key for macroeconomic (demand)
    management
  • Sample
  • Mostly 2001-2006
  • Some comparisons with 1990s
  • 3 EM regions Asia and Latin America, CEE
    (Baltics, central Europe, SEE)

4
Data description (2)
  • Data sources
  • BoP data (IMF, International Financial
    Statistics)
  • BIS locational and consolidated statistics
  • Look at average of countries in the region, and
    regional totals

5
Recent trends gross inflows
of GDP, regional totals
6
Recent trends gross inflows (2)
of GDP, regional totals
7
Recent trends regional distribution
8
Gross inflows and outflows for CEE
Inflows
Outflows
of GDP, unweighted country average except net
flows (regional average).
9
Net flows to CEE - latest data
10
Recent trends breakdown of gross inflows
11
Recent trends breakdown of gross outflows
12
Portfolio outflows- mostly for purchases of
foreign debt securities - mostly from China (70
of Asian total, 140 bn. from 2002-06)-
private sector probably includes SOCBs
of gross outflows
13
Two main developments from FS perspective(a)
other investment inflows (b) portfolio
outflows Other investment flows to banks and
to other sectors non-financial corporations,
NBFIs, households
of gross inflows/gross outflows of other
investment unweighted country average for
2004-06.
14
Other investment flows increased very strongly in
CEE
15
The increase was most pronounced in the past
three years
Cross-border claims of BIS reporting
banksvis-à-vis emerging markets Changes in
amounts outstanding at end-period, as a
percentage of GDP Cumulative increase in CEE
since 2005 7.5 of
GDP
5.7 of GDP
Source BIS, Locational Banking Statistics IMF,
World Economic Outlook.
16
Cross-border loans account for a large share of
domestic credit in CEE
Cross-border and domestic bank creditin emerging
market economies As a percentage of total bank
credit
Sources IMF national data BIS locational
banking statistics.
17
Financial stability implications of cross-border
loans
  • In the past, pure cross-border loans
  • Latin America in 1980s ? debt crisis
  • Asia in 1990s ? 1997/98 crisis
  • Now parent banks ? loans to subsidiaries in EMEs
  • Pure cross-border loans mainly to large
    corporations from EMEs

18
Financial stability implications of cross-border
loans (2)
  • Parent banks ? loans to subsidiaries
  • Most pronounced in CEE and Mexico, where banking
    systems are 80-95 foreign-owned
  • In CEE, cross-border loans are convergence flows
    economic, financial, institutional integration
    with EU, which is different from Asia in the
    1990s
  • Cross-border loans were taking place in
    financially repressed banking systems in Latin
    America in the 1980s and Asia in the 1990s
    banking systems in CEE are competitive and open
  • Cross-border loans were financing
    import-substituting development in Latin America,
    not the case in CEE

19
Financial stability implications of cross-border
loans (3)
  • Risk of a solvency crisis smaller
  • Parent banks large, well-capitalised, well
    supervised, focus on traditional commercial
    banking, did not invest in subprime/structured
    products
  • But the risk to sustainability of cross-border
    flows still large
  • Underestimation of credit risk during credit boom
  • High targets for ROE (to exploit franchise value)

20
Financial stability implications of cross-border
loans (4)
21
Financial stability implications of cross-border
loans (5)
  • Risk of regional contagion
  • Parent banks pursue similar strategies across
    regions (eg, lending to households)
  • Transmission of shocks from home countries (eg,
    via funding in wholesale markets)
  • Asymmetry of host country vs. parent bank
    exposures
  • Other channels short maturity of cross-border
    loans, concentration of foreign creditors, common
    creditors across region

22
Financial stability implications of cross-border
loans (5)
23
Risks at the current juncturesudden
stop/reversal of bank intermediated flows
24
Risks at the current juncturesudden
stop/reversal of bank intermediated flows (2)
25
Risks at the current juncturesudden
stop/reversal of bank intermediated flows (3)
26
Risks at the current juncturesudden
stop/reversal of bank intermediated flows (4)
27
Policy responses how to deal with these risks?
  • Macroeconomic policies
  • Allow greater exchange rate flexibility
    trade-off between the consequences of ER
    appreciation and sterilisation
  • Reduce policy rates trade-off between the
    consequences of capital inflows and domestic
    objectives (inflation target, domestic credit
    growth)
  • May have limited room for manoeuvre on ER, IR
  • Relax controls on capital outflows eg, for
    institutional portfolio investors
  • Fiscal tightening best approach should focus
    on expenditure restraint

28
Policy responses (2)
  • Macroprudential and microprudential responses
  • Tighten oversight of banks management of credit
    risk (to make sure banks hold sufficient capital)
  • Improve quality of creditor information (accurate
    company financial reports, credit registry for
    households, tighter debt/income debt service/
    income ratios, etc)
  • Diversify sources of bank funding
  • Temporary capital controls

29
Policy responses (3)
  • Funding sources of EME banks are poorly
    diversified

30
Policy responses (4)
  • Home-host supervisory cooperation
  • International scope of banking institutions vs.
    national scope of regulation and supervision
  • Conflict between macroeconomic and financial
    stability concerns in small economies hosting
    large international banks
  • Divided responsibilities for financial stability
    and financial sector supervision within home and
    host countries

31
Policy responses (5)
  • Home-host supervisory cooperation (contd)
  • Subsidiaries vs. branches
  • MOUs, supervisory colleges, joint supervision
  • Resolution of cross-border bank failures

32
Are there any financial stability implications of
EME investments in foreign portfolio capital?
  • Redirecting FX inflows helps macroeconomic policy
    (no need to deal with impact of capital
    inflows)
  • But is it good investment?
  • Interest rate differential vis-à-vis US
  • Assets denominated in depreciating currency (USD)
  • If investments are made by SWFs, additional
    issues
  • Protectionist backlash
  • SWFs might not be subject to supervisory
    oversight in their home jurisdictions
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