Session I. International Reference Points The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the OECD Efforts on Promoting Corporate Governance Reform - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Session I. International Reference Points The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the OECD Efforts on Promoting Corporate Governance Reform

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Title: Session I. International Reference Points The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the OECD Efforts on Promoting Corporate Governance Reform


1
Session I. International Reference PointsThe
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the
OECD Efforts on Promoting Corporate Governance
Reform
  • Motoyuki YUFU
  • Principal Administrator, OECD
  • Karachi, Pakistan
  • 29 May 2006

2
Before we start the OECD as global
standard-setter
  • OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
    Development) is a group of 30 developed countries
    sharing a commitment to the market economy.
  • Consultation and co-operative programmes with
    75-100 countries (non members) in nearly all
    regions of world.
  • Corporate governance work is a good example five
    regional roundtables (e.g. Asia, Latin America,
    Eurasia, Russia and Southeast Europe).

3
Outline presentation
  1. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
    (revised in 2004)
  2. The OECD Guidelines on CG of State-Owned
    Enterprises (2005)
  3. The Asian Roundtable on CG and the White Paper
    (2003)
  4. The Policy Brief on CG of Banks in Asia (2006)

4
1. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
(OECD Principles)
  • Originally drafted in 1999, among others in
    reaction to the Asian financial crisis
  • Revised in 2004 following high-profile cases of
    CG failure
  • One of the 12 Key Standards of the Financial
    Stability Forum (FSF)
  • Provide basis for multinational efforts on
    improving CG
  • The World Bank country review on CG (ROSC)
  • The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
    Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking
    Organisations

5
1.1 What is the OECD Principles?
  • Represent common basis that OECD countries
    consider essential for the development of good CG
    practices (best practices)
  • Principles and annotations
  • Non-binding. Intended to assist OECD and non-OECD
    governments, and to provide guidance for stock
    exchanges, investors, corporations and others
    related to CG
  • Mainly focus on publicly traded (listed)
    companies, both financial and non-financial
  • Also useful to non-listed companies (e.g. family
    owned or state-owned companies)

6
1.2 A working definition of corporate governance
  • Corporate governance involves a set of
    relationships between a companys management, its
    board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.
  • CG also provides the structure through which the
    objectives (i.e. strategies) of the company are
    set, and the means of obtaining those objectives
    and monitoring performance are determined
  • Moreover
  • Good CG should provide proper incentives for the
    board and management to pursue objectives that
    are in the interests of the company and
    shareholders, and should facilitate effective
    monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use
    resources more efficiently

7
1.3 Core elements of the OECD Principles
  • Six chapters
  • Ensuring the basis for an effective CG framework
  • The rights of shareholders
  • The equitable treatment of shareholders
  • The role of stakeholders including creditors
  • Disclosure and transparency
  • The responsibilities of the boards

8
1.4 What are the major new issues addressed by
the revised Principles?
  • New chapter for ensuring effective enforcement
  • Stronger role of shareholders
  • Controlling conflicts of interest and self
    dealing
  • Preventing abuse of related companies
  • and others

9
1.5 New chapter for ensuring effective enforcement
  • (Principles I.B) The legal and regulatory
    requirements that affect CG practice should be
    consistent with the rule of law, transparent and
    enforceable
  • (I.C) The division of responsibilities among
    different authorities should be clearly
    articulated and ensure that public interest is
    served
  • (I.D) Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement
    authorities should have the authority, integrity
    and resources to fulfill their duties in a
    professional and objective manner

10
1.6 Controlling conflicts of interest
(of external bodies)
  • (II.F.2) Institutional investors acting in a
    fiduciary capacity should disclose how they
    manage material conflicts of interest that may
    affect the exercise of key ownership rights
  • (V.F) The provision of analysis or advice by
    analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others
    should be free from material conflicts of
    interest that might compromise the integrity of
    their analysis or advice
  • (V.C) An annual report should be conducted by an
    independent, competent and qualified auditor in
    order to provide an external and objective
    assurance that the financial statements fairy
    represent the financial position and performance
    of the company

11
1.7 Controlling conflicts of interest (of
boards, mgt. shareholders)
  • (VI.C, VI.D.7) The board should apply high
    ethical standards. It should also ensure that
    appropriate system of control are in place (e.g.
    systems for compliance with the law and relevant
    standards)
  • (VI.D.6) The board should monitor and manage
    potential conflicts of interest of management,
    board members and shareholders, including misuse
    of corporate assets and abuse in related party
    transactions
  • Contd.

12
1.7-1 Controlling conflicts of interest (of
boards, mgt. shareholders)
  • (III.C) Members of the board and key executives
    should be required to disclose to the board
    whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf
    of third parties, have a material interests in
    any transaction or mater directly affecting the
    corporation
  • (VI.E.1) The board should consider assigning a
    sufficient number of non-executive board members
    capable of exercising independent judgement to
    tasks where there is a potential for conflict of
    interest.
  • (II.C.3) Effective shareholder participation in
    key decisions (e.g. nomination election of
    board members) should be facilitated.

13
1.8 Preventing abuse between related companies
  • (V.A.3 annotation) Public disclosure should
    include material information on major share
    ownership (i.e. ownership structure). It should
    also extend to information about the structure of
    a group of companies and intra-group relations.
    In cases where major shareholdings are held
    through intermediary structures or arrangements,
    information about beneficial owners (i.e. real
    owners) should be obtainable.
  • (V.A.5) Public disclosure should include
    material information on related party
    transactions
  • Contd.

14
1.8-1 Preventing abuse between related companies
  • (VI.A) Board members should act, in good faith,
    with due diligence and care, in the best
    interests of the company and the shareholders
    (not to the controlling company of the group)
  • (VI.E annotation) Board independence from
    controlling shareholders and other controlling
    body will need to be emphasized. Some
    jurisdictions calls for some board members to be
    independent of dominant shareholders (not only of
    management
  • (VI.E.1) Boards should consider assigning a
    sufficient number of non-executive board members
    capable of exercising independent judgement to
    tasks such as review of related party
    transactions

15
2. The OECD Guidelines on CG of State Owned
Enterprises (SOE Guidelines)
  • Dveloped in 2005. Do not preclude privatization
    policies
  • Non-binding. General advice to governments to
    improve the performance of SOEs
  • Based on, and complementary to the OECD
    Principles (fully compatible)
  • Specific challenges of SOEs
  • - Relationship with owners
  • - Dilution of accountability

16
2.1 Scope of the SOE Guidelines
  • Primary target SOEs
  • using a distinct legal form
  • having a commercial activity (i.e. with a bulk of
    income from sales and fees), either non-financial
    or financial
  • may/may not pursue a public policy objective as
    well (except those mainly pursue these
    objectives)
  • either in competitive or non-competitive markets
  • The state has significant control through full,
    majority or even significant minority ownership
  • owned by central government
  • Also useful to SOEs other than above

17
2.2 One of the suggestions by the SOE Guidelines
  • The state as an owner should clearly set
    policy objectives of the SOEs according to the
    law, refrain from intervening in their day-to-day
    management, and instead, fully utilize company
    structure of the SOEs
  • for this purpose,
  • Empower the SOE board
  • Independent external audit in addition to the
    state audit
  • The state should act as an active owner

18
3. The Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance
  • The OECD and the World Bank Group promotes policy
    dialogue on CG and established the Asian
    Roundtable in 1999.
  • The Roundtable comprises policy-makers,
    regulators, academics and business leaders from
    13 Asian jurisdictions including Pakistan.
  • In 2003, Roundtable participants agreed on the
    White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia
  • Please see
  • http//www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/55/
    25778905.pdf

19
4. The Policy Brief on Corporate Governance of
Banks in Asia
  • One of the six priorities of the White Paper
  • Governments should intensify their efforts to
    improve the regulation and corporate governance
    of banks.
  • The Roundtable established a Task Force (2004)
  • Both banking supervisors and capital market
    authority
  • Both Asian and OECD countries
  • The Task Force developed the Policy Brief on CG
    of Banks in Asia (2006)
  • Non binding
  • Based on, and fully compatible with the guidance
    of the Basel Committee (Enhancing Corporate
    Governance for Banking Organisations)

20
4.1 What is the Policy Brief ?
  • Main chapters
  • The responsibilities of the board and board
    members
  • The composition and committees of the board
  • Preventing abusive related party transactions
  • Banking groups
  • Banks autonomy in relation to the state
  • Banks monitoring of the CG structure of their
    corporate borrowers

21
4.2 One suggestion of the Policy Brief
  • Banking supervisors (or related institutions), in
    conjunction with capital market authorities,
    should develop national codes of CG of banks
    (i.e. template)
  • Banking supervisors should provide incentives for
    banks to improve their CG (e.g. the rating of CG
    of banks)

22
4.3 Further discussion in Asia
  • OECD/BIS Joint Seminar on CG of Banks in Asia
    (Hong Kong, June 19-20)
  • Inviting banking supervisors in Asia from 26
    jurisdictions including Pakistan.
  • Not an event, it is a process

23
Thank you. For more information,
  • www.oecd.org/daf/corporate-affairs
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