The Design and Implementation of a Next Generation Name Service for the Internet - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 31
About This Presentation
Title:

The Design and Implementation of a Next Generation Name Service for the Internet

Description:

DoS attacks high up in the hierarchy can affect the whole system ... high (O(1)) lookup performance. configurable target. continuous range, better than one-hop ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:67
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 32
Provided by: ram56
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: The Design and Implementation of a Next Generation Name Service for the Internet


1
The Design and Implementation of a Next
Generation Name Servicefor the Internet
  • Venugopalan Ramasubramanian
  • Emin Gün Sirer

Computer Science, Cornell University
2
introduction
  • SIGCOMM announcement in the lobby
  • There is a problem with DNS.

3
DNS problems
  • failure resilience
  • performance
  • consistency
  • large scale survey
  • 593160 domain names from Yahoo! and DMOZ
  • 164089 nameservers

4
failure resilience (1/2)
  • 75 of names at large have a delegation
    bottleneck of only two nameservers

5
failure resilience (2/2)
  • even the top-500 web sites have small delegation
    bottlenecks

6
physical bottlenecks
  • majority of names bottlenecked on a single
    network link

7
DoS attacks
  • delegation and network bottlenecks make DoS
    attacks feasible
  • january 2001 attack on Microsoft nameservers
  • DoS attacks high up in the hierarchy can affect
    the whole system
  • october 2002 attack on root servers
  • roots are already disproportionately loaded
    Brownlee et al. 01a, 01b
  • root anycast helps but does not solve the
    fundamental problem

8
performance
  • lookups can be expensive
  • 20-40 of web object retrieval time spent on DNS
  • 20-30 of DNS lookups take more than 1s
  • Jung et al. 01, Huitema et al. 00, Wills Shang
    00, Bent Voelker 01
  • updates conflict with timeout-driven caching
  • an emergency remapping/redirection cannot be
    performed unless anticipated
  • fundamental tradeoff between lookup and update
    performance
  • 86 of records have TTLs longer than 0.5 hours
  • 95 of records have TTLs shorter than 1 day, only
    0.7 of records modified every day

9
consistency
  • manual configuration can lead to inconsistencies
  • 0.8 of the delegations for the name system at
    large are lame
  • 2 lame delegations among the top-500 hosts
  • legacy DNS records do not closely track
    nameserver failures
  • 0.6 of nameservers unreachable at any one time
  • less diversity and robustness than intended
  • possibly masked until failure

10
problems
  • failure resilience
  • DoS attacks
  • performance
  • lookup latency
  • update propagation
  • consistency
  • lame delegations
  • monopoly power
  • lookup redirection at TLDs

11
Cooperative Domain Name System (CoDoNS) approach
  • supplement and/or replacement for legacy DNS
  • based on distributed hash tables (DHTs)
  • self-organizing
  • failure resilient
  • scalable
  • worst-case performance bounds
  • naïve application of DHTs fails to achieve
    performance comparable to legacy DNS

12
prefix-matching DHTs
object 0121 0121 hash(www.cnn.com)
  • map all nodes into an identifier space
  • map all objects into same space based on key
  • logbN hops
  • several RTTs on the Internet

2012
13
key intuition
  • tunable latency
  • adjust extent of replication for each object
  • fundamental space-time tradeoff

0021
0112
0122
2012
14
proactive caching
  • proactive, model-driven caching can provide low
    latency with low overhead
  • optimization problem
  • minimize total number of replicas, s.t., average
    lookup performance ? C
  • for zipf-like query distributions
  • number of queries to rth popular object ? 1/r?
  • commonly encountered in practice
  • dns is Zipf with ? 0.9 Jung et al. 01
  • high (O(1)) lookup performance
  • configurable target
  • continuous range, better than one-hop

15
optimization problem
  • minimize (storage/bandwidth)
  • x0 x1/b x2/b2 xK-1/bK-1
  • such that (average lookup time is C hops)
  • K (x01-? x11-? x21-? xK-11-?) ? C
  • and
  • x0 ? x1 ? x2 ? ? xK-1 ? 1
  • i object replicated at level i shares i digits
    with its servers
  • b base
  • K logb(N)
  • xi fraction of objects replicated at level i

16
optimal closed-form solution
, 0 ? i ? K 1
xi
, K ? i ? K
1
where d b(1- ?) /?
K is determined by setting xK-1 ? 1 ?
dK-1 (K C) / (1 d dK-1) ? 1
17
latency vs. overhead tradeoff
x106
18
CoDoNS vision
  • a cooperative cache for DNS data
  • composed of local resolvers and DNS nameservers
  • serves the same namespace as legacy DNS
  • supports the same interface as legacy DNS

LegacyDNS
19
CoDoNS operation
  • home node initially populates CoDoNs with binding
    from legacy DNS
  • replication level modified in response to
    distributed solution of the optimal formula
  • every node periodically checks the relative
    object popularity, estimates ?, discards replicas
    or pushes records to neighbors
  • with hysteresis

www.cnn.com
20
CoDoNS name management
  • explicit cache management
  • records stored until invalidated by updates
  • TTLs used only for clients, not necessary for
    consistency in the ring
  • upon TTL expiration, the home node checks binding
    for change
  • local names treated specially
  • a copy of the record retained at the local
    nameserver in addition to the home node
  • queries can be resolved locally without
    introducing load into the ring
  • server-side computation supported
  • low-TTL records not cached, replaced with
    forwarding pointers
  • supports Akamai and other CDN trickery
  • updates can be disseminated quickly at any time
  • the home node initiates a multicast using entries
    in DHT routing tables

21
CoDoNS name security
  • all records carry cryptographic signatures
  • if the nameowner has a DNSSEC nameserver, CoDoNS
    will preserve the original signature
  • if not, CoDoNS will sign the DNS record with its
    own master key
  • malicious peers cannot introduce fake bindings
  • delegations are cryptographic
  • names not bound to servers

22
CoDoNS implications
  • name delegations can be purchased and propagated
    independently of server setup
  • naming hierarchy independent of physical server
    hierarchy
  • domains may be served by multiple namespace
    operators
  • competitive market for delegation services

23
CoDoNS deployment
  • incremental deployment path
  • uses legacy DNS to populate resource records on
    demand
  • completely transparent to clients
  • can operate without legacy DNS
  • deployed on planet-lab
  • 50 to 100 hundred nodes at any given time
  • planned expansion to ISPs (e.g. CNNIC)

24
evaluation
  • MIT trace
  • 12 hour trace, 4th December 2000
  • 281,943 queries
  • 47,230 domain names
  • Planetlab deployment
  • 75 nodes
  • Lookup performance
  • Adaptation to flash crowds
  • Load balance
  • Update propagation

25
CoDoNS lookup performance (1/2)
26
CoDoNS lookup performance (2/2)
Legacy DNS CoDoNS
median 39 ms 2 ms
mean 382 ms 199 ms
90th 337 ms 213 ms
27
CoDoNS flash crowds
  • CoDoNs adapts to sudden surges

28
advantages of CoDoNS
  • high performance
  • low lookup latency
  • updates can be propagated at any time
  • secure
  • resilient against denial of service attacks
  • load balances around hotspots
  • self configures around host and network failures
  • consistent
  • no manual configuration, no lame delegations

29
future directions
  • system interface
  • currently, populated through legacy DNS
  • ultimately, name bindings manipulated directly
  • admission control
  • limit the number of objects any given entity can
    insert
  • wider deployment

30
conclusions
  • proactive, model-driven caching enables DHTs to
    support latency-sensitive applications
  • CoDoNS can serve as a self-configuring, failure
    and DoS-resilient, automatic system for
    disseminating DNS records
  • can act as a safety net for legacy DNS
  • prototype deployed on Planetlab
  • http//www.cs.cornell.edu/people/egs/beehive/

31
CoDoNS servers
planetlab3.cs.duke.edu 152.3.136.3
planetlab01.ethz.ch 129.132.57.2
planetlab03.ethz.ch 129.132.57.4
planetlab1.netmedia.gist.ac.kr203.237.53.170
planet1.cc.gt.atl.ga.us 199.77.128.193pli2-br-1.h
pl.hp.com 192.170.103.20planet1.ics.forth.gr
139.91.70.61 planet1.cavite.nodes.planet-lab.org2
03.177.76.242
planet1.leixlip.nodes.planet-lab.org
192.198.151.98 planetlab1.postel.org 206.117.37.4
planetlab1.netlab.uky.edu 206.240.24.20
planetlab1.eecs.umich.edu 141.213.4.201
planetlab3.csail.mit.edu 128.31.1.13
planetlab5.csail.mit.edu 128.31.1.15
phys0bha-5a.chem.msu.ru 212.192.241.155soccf-pla
net-001.comp.nus.edu.sg 137.132.80.104
planet1.att.nodes.planet-lab.org 192.20.225.130
planetlab1.ias.csusb.edu 139.182.137.141
planlab1.cs.caltech.edu 131.215.45.71planetlab-1
.cmcl.cs.cmu.edu 128.2.198.188 planetlab-3.cmcl.c
s.cmu.edu 128.2.198.199 planetlab1.cs.cornell.edu
128.84.154.49 planetlab2.cs.cornell.edu
128.84.154.71 planetlab1.ewi.tudelft.nl
130.161.40.153
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com