Building Great Organizations A Review of Important Literature

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Building Great Organizations A Review of
Important Literature
By A V Vedpuriswar
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Objectives

• Much has been written about organizational
  excellence. Here, we look at some of the most
  cited works and try to capture the essence.

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Part IThe 4 principles of enduring success
By Christian Stadler Harvard Business Review,
July - 2007
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Defining greatness

• Research by Stadler reveals that in terms of
  total return for shareholders, top companies did
  62 times better than the general market.
• An investment of 1 in 1953 would be worth
  4,077 today.
• By contrast, the comparison companies beat the
  general market by a factor of eight, and 1
  would have reaped 713.

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Stadlers four principles of enduring success

• Exploit before you explore.
• Diversify your business portfolio.
• Remember your mistakes.
• Be conservative about change.

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Exploit Before You Explore

• To measure exploration, Stadler used RD spending
  as a percentage of sales and patents issued as a
  percentage of sales. For exploitation, he used
  return on equity, return on sales, and return on
  investment.
• Though they did not neglect exploration, as a
  strategy the winners consistently preferred
  exploitation efforts to exploration initiatives.
• Companies can compensate for insufficient
  exploration capabilities by being more efficient
  exploiters. But they are not able, over the long
  run, to make up for a lack of exploitation
  capabilities through better exploration.
• In other words, great companies dont only
  innovate. They grow by efficiently exploiting the
  fullest potential of existing innovations.

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Glaxo vs Wellcome

• When Henry Wellcome started his business together
  in 1880, he wanted to make a name for himself as
  a medical pioneer. In pursuit of this aim, he
  sponsored much of the field research then under
  way in tropical medicine.
• Glaxos story was very different. Founder Joseph
  Edward Nathan, started a new subsidiary in 1905
  to commercialize a patent he had purchased for
  manufacturing dried milk. Thanks to a
  well-organized marketing campaign waged by his
  son Alec, the company quickly became Britains
  leading supplier of dried infant milk.

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• Seventy-six years later, Glaxo repeated the trick
  with Zantac, the ulcer medication it introduced
  in 1981. At the time, the leaders were
  SmithKline, Pfizer, and Eli Lilly. Glaxo was a
  latecomer, launching Zantac five years after
  SmithKlines best-selling ulcer medication,
  Tagamet.
• Zantac had no remarkable scientific or medical
  advantage over Tagamet. The only difference was
  that Zantac was packaged in such a way that fewer
  pills were required each day.
• SmithKline continued to invest heavily in RD,
  but Glaxo fared much better in terms of sales and
  profitability so much so that it was eventually
  able to purchase its more innovative competitor
  in 2000.

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Ericsson Vs Nokia

• Ericssons strong army of researchers had made
  the company a pioneer with its GPRS wireless data
  communication and third-generation mobile
  technology standards. Unfortunately, these
  advances came at a high price large-scale
  duplication of research efforts, hefty RD
  expenditures, and big, risky bets on the future
  direction of mobile technology. When the telecom
  industry entered into recession in 2001, Ericsson
  was hit hard. It laid off approximately 60,000
  people and closed many research centers.
  Eventually it decided to combine its mobile
  business with Sonys.
• Nokia, on the other hand, focused on
  exploitation. With margins under pressure in the
  mid-1990s, Nokia streamlined operations, cut
  inventories, and renegotiated component prices
  and delivery terms. When the telecom industry
  entered a recession, Nokia was far better
  prepared than Ericsson, and it remains a leading
  global competitor in mobile telephony.

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Diversify Your Business Portfolio

• Few people today would dispute that
  conglomeration is a poor strategy. But firms
  focusing on a single business or set of
  capabilities too do not seem much better when
  viewed from a long-term perspective.
• Single-business companies perform very well in
  the short run, but over several decades, a
  different picture emerges.
• Many of the single-business firms simply cease to
  exist. Once their primary offering reaches the
  end of its life span, the only possible next
  steps are decline, merger, or sale.
• Which is why great companies are as suspicious of
  focusing too narrowly as they are careful about
  diversifying.

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Alliance vs AM Product diversification

• The story of the German insurance giant Allianz,
  is a study in how to build a broad customer base.
  From its creation in 1890, the company had a
  strategy of diversifying its business portfolio.
• On the other hand Aachener und Münchener (AM),
  founded in 1824, showed little ambition to become
  a broadly based insurance provider. While Allianz
  went from strength to strength, AM struggled.

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Lafarge vs Ciments Francais Geographic
diversification

• Geographic diversification is as important as
  product range, as the contrasting experiences of
  the two leading French cement producers show.
• Lafarge began as a family-controlled cement
  producer in southern France. Lafarge felt that it
  could not rely on its home market alone and
  diversified internationally at an early date.
• The first step abroad was a large contract to
  deliver 110,000 tonnes of lime for the
  construction of the Suez Canal in 1864.
• After World War II, Lafarge used the cash
  generated by post war growth to speed its
  internationalization and diversify into related
  industries, such as aggregates and ready-mix
  concrete.
• When the first oil crisis ended the building boom
  in France in 1973, Lafarge was doing business in
  15 countries. Growth opportunities in the
  developing world thus compensated for the
  slowdown in France.
• Originally, in 1846, a producer of Portland
  cement in northern France, Ciments Francais
  operated almost exclusively in France for the
  next 100 years.

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Ericsson vs Nokia Vendor diversification

• Supply-side diversification also matters. On
  March 17, 2000, a fire in a Philips factory in
  Albuquerque, New Mexico, disrupted the global
  mobile-phone supply chain.
• Nokia had alternative suppliers in the U.S. and
  Japan, which were able to deliver most of the
  components destroyed in Albuquerque.
• Ericsson, on the other hand, had no backup
  suppliers. In an early cost-cutting exercise, the
  company had decided to concentrate on a single
  supplier and paid the price. While the
  Albuquerque incident had no lasting negative
  effect for Nokia, it marked the beginning of
  Ericssons steady decline in mobile telephony.

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Remember your mistakes

• What really separates the great companies from
  the good ones is that the great companies also
  remember their mistakes.
• They take learning from mistakes very seriously,
  taking care not to make the same mistake again.

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Shell vs BP

• Take the case of Shell. Henri Deterding had led
  the merger in 1907 of his Royal Dutch Petroleum
  Company with Shell Transport and Trading to form
  the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. Deterdings strong
  personality and impressive record gave him a
  position of unchallenged power inside Shell.
  Unfortunately, it also put him in a position to
  consider financial and moral support for Adolf
  Hitler, whom Deterding saw as the man most likely
  to preserve Europe from the Communists. Luckily
  for Shell, he retired in 1936, before he could
  make any commitments that would have embarrassed
  the company later on.
• The company did not forget its narrow escape
  Deterdings successors were never allowed to be
  so powerful. In 1964, the board rejected advice
  from McKinsey Company to install an
  American-style chief executive officer, whose
  official powers would have matched those
  Deterding once wielded. Instead, the board
  installed a Committee of Managing Directors as
  the top executive authority in the company. Its
  chairman was only marginally more responsible
  than its other members.

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• These arrangements stayed in place for decades,
  and only recently following a crisis triggered
  by the companys overstatement of its proven oil
  and gas reserves has Shell opted for a classic
  CEO leadership model. Still, even now, it has
  remained remarkably careful to avoid placing an
  authoritarian leader at the top.
• BP, in contrast, appears not to have drawn any
  lessons when in 1951 Iran nationalized its
  assets, which accounted for fully 75 of the
  companys oil supply.
• After receiving compensation two years later
  following a coup, BP failed to diversify its
  asset base significantly in the ensuring decades,
  ending up heavily dependent on a small number of
  sites in Alaska and the North Sea.
• As oil prices plummeted toward the end of the
  1990s, those assets lost value, and BP found
  itself caught short again. BP is now as heavily
  dependent on sites in Russia and other former
  Soviet states as it was on its Iranian assets.

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HSBC vs Standard Chartered

• The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
  was set up in 1865 by the merchant community in
  Hong Kong to finance international trade. A close
  relationship with the banks main customers
  guaranteed a strong start, but there were also
  drawbacks.
• Financing investments in fixed assets in China
  turned out to be riskier than anticipated, and
  access to London capital was more complicated for
  HSBC than it was for its UK-based competitors.
  HSBC was badly affected when a severe recession
  struck in 1873.
• The bank decided to adopt a more balanced
  management approach.
• In 1876, it established a second executive board
  in London, creating a balance of power between
  the trade finance business in the East and the
  capital allocation center in London.
• The bank also continued to build up reserves and
  made sure that senior managers no longer had
  business interests outside the bank.

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• Standard Chartered, in contrast, did not learn
  from its biggest mistake, which was creating a
  centralized London-based management system, which
  had a limited understanding of the China market.
• It lost major business to HSBC on numerous
  occasions in the mid-1860s, for instance, it
  lost out because repayment periods for trade
  bills were shortened by London against the advice
  of local managers.
• Nonetheless, the company stuck to the old system.
  In the following decades, the firm survived
  despite, not because of, its centralized
  management. Local branch managers simply ignored
  orders from London, which they saw as unfit.

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Be Conservative About Change

• Great companies go through radical change only at
  very selective moments in their history.
• Jumping onto every new management wave is not for
  them.
• These companies use their core values and
  principles as guidelines and approach change in a
  culturally sensitive manner that requires
  patience to work through.

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Siemens

• Siemens took a very deliberate approach to its
  changes, initiating them only when it could see a
  clear strategic case for restructuring the
  business portfolio and then taking its time over
  implementation to make the transformation as
  painless as possible for the workforce.
• Change came to Siemens for four reasons, any one
  of which would on its own have provided ample
  justification.
• First, management recognized that the
  long-standing separation between its high-current
  (power generation) and low current
  (telecommunications) technologies was no longer
  appropriate.
• Second, as the group faced pressure to merge
  these two subsidiaries, management was also aware
  that the companys long-standing consumer
  business was fitting less and less well with the
  high- and low-current activities, which were
  driving growth.
• Third, on top of these strategic considerations
  was the fear of what would happen when
  then-chairman Ernst von Siemens retired.
• Finally, the German government was preparing
  legislation that would force the corporation to
  reveal sensitive information about its operations
  unless it consolidated its subsidiaries.

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• Siemens was very deliberate in the way it
  responded to those pressures. It began laying the
  groundwork for the disposition of its consumer
  businesses in 1957, when it brought its radio,
  TV, and appliances businesses together to create
  a new subsidiary, Siemens Electrogeräte. Over the
  following years, it closed or sold off the radio
  and TV production businesses, leaving it with a
  rump appliance business, which it spun off into a
  joint venture with Robert Bosch, a leading
  appliance maker, in 1967, a full decade after it
  had begun the process. Initially, BSH Bosch und
  Siemens Hausgeräte was hardly more than a joint
  sales force, and only over the years did it start
  to integrate production.
• The company was no less deliberate in its
  response to the pressure to integrate the low
  current and high current subsidiaries. Halske and
  Schuckert. The decision to merge them was
  announced in 1965, but it was not until 1969 that
  the two subsidiaries were formally replaced by
  six divisions components, data technology,
  energy technology, installation technology,
  medical technology, and telecommunications.
• Culturally, the change took even longer.
  Management left many of the traditional
  arrangements and practices in place for as long
  as 20 years after the reorganization had been
  formally completed. Arguably, the convergence was
  not completed until the late 1980s, when another
  transformation process was initiated. In
  contrast, silver medalist AEG took a far hastier
  and less sensitive approach.

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Part IIGood to GreatBy Jim Collins
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Good to Great

• Jim Collins makes some pertinent observations, in
  his book, based on extensive research
• Larger-than-life, celebrity leaders who ride in
  from the outside are negatively correlated with
  taking a company from good to great.
• The good-to-great companies do not focus
  principally on what to do to become great. They
  focus equally on what not to do and what to stop
  doing.
• Technology and technology-driven change have
  virtually nothing to do with the transformation
  from good to great. Technology can accelerate a
  transformation, but cannot cause a
  transformation.
• Mergers and acquisitions play virtually no role
  in igniting a transformation from good to great.
  Two big mediocre entities joined together never
  make one great company.

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• The good-to-great companies pay scant attention
  to managing change, motivating people, or
  creating alignment. They create the right
  conditions so that the problems of commitment,
  alignment, motivation, and change do not have to
  be dealt with separately.
• The good-to-great companies have no name, tag
  line, launch event, or program to signify their
  transformations. Indeed, some were unaware of the
  magnitude of the transformation at the time. Only
  later, in retrospect, did it become clear. They
  produced a truly revolutionary leap in results,
  but not by a revolutionary process.
• The good-to-great companies are not, by and
  large, in inherently attractive industries. In
  fact, some are in terrible industries. Greatness
  is not a function of circumstances. Greatness, is
  largely a matter of conscious choice.
• Compared to high-profile leaders with big
  personalities who make headlines and become
  celebrities, the good-to-great leaders are
  self-effacing, quiet, reserved, even shy. These
  leaders are a paradoxical blend of personal
  humility and professional will.

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• Good-to-great leaders first get the right people
  on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the
  right people in the right seats. Then they figure
  out where to drive it.
• Every good-to-great company embraces unwavering
  faith that it will succeed, regardless of the
  difficulties. At the same time, such companies
  have the discipline to confront the hard reality,
  however unpleasant it might be.
• Going from good to great implies a better
  understanding of competence. Just because
  something is a companys core business, or
  because it has been doing it for years does not
  necessarily mean it can be the best in the world
  at it. And if it cannot be the best in the world
  in its core business, then its core business
  cannot form the basis of a great company.
• All companies have a culture, some companies have
  discipline, but few companies have a culture of
  discipline. When there is discipline, hierarchy,
  bureaucracy and excessive controls are not
  needed. A culture of discipline combined with
  entrepreneurship, leads to great performance.

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• Let us examine some of these points in a little
  more detail.

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Level 5 Leadership

• Compared to high-profile leaders with big
  personalities who make headlines and become
  celebrities, the good-to-great leaders seem to
  have come from Mars. Self-effacing, quiet,
  reserved, even shy these leaders are a
  paradoxical blend of personal humility and
  professional will. They are more like Lincoln and
  Socrates than Patton or Caesar.

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First who Then What.

• Good-to-great leaders first got the right people
  on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the
  right people in the right seats and then they
  figured out where to drive it.

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Confront the Brutal Facts (Yet Never Lose Faith)

• Good-to-great companies embrace the Stockdale
  Paradox.
• They maintain unwavering faith that they can and
  will prevail in the end, regardless of the
  difficulties,
• AND
• at the same time have the discipline to confront
  the most brutal facts of their current reality,
  whatever they might be.

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The Hedgehog Concept (Simplicity within the Three
Circles)

• To go from good to great requires transcending
  the curse of competence. Just because something
  is a core business just because the company has
  been doing it for years or perhaps even decades
  does not necessarily mean the company can be
  the best in the world at it.
• And if the company cannot be the best in the
  world at its core business it absolutely cannot
  from the basis of a great company.
• It must be replaced with a simple concept
  that reflects deep understanding of three
  intersecting circles.

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A Culture of Discipline

• All companies have a culture, some companies
  have discipline, but few companies have a culture
  of discipline.
• When a company has disciplined people, it does
  not need hierarchy.
• When there is disciplined thought, bureaucracy
  is not needed. Disciplined action obviates the
  need for excessive controls.
• A culture of discipline combined with
  entrepreneurship leads to great performance.

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Technology Accelerators

• Good-to-great companies think differently about
  the role of technology.
• They never use technology as the primary means
  of igniting a transformation.
• Yet, paradoxically, they are pioneers in the
  application of carefully selected technologies.

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The Flywheel and the Doom Loop

• Those who launch revolutions, dramatic change
  programs, and wrenching restructuring are
  unlikely to succeed.
• No matter how dramatic the end result, the
  good-to-great transformations never happened in
  one fell swoop.
• There was no single defining action, no grand
  program, no one killer innovation, no solitary
  lucky break, no miracle moment.
• Rather, the process resembled relentlessly
  pushing a giant heavy flywheel in one direction,
  turn upon turn, building momentum until a point
  of breakthrough, and beyond.

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Part IIIBuilt to lastBy Collins and Porras
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Built to last
By Collins and Porras

• According to Collins, the Good-to-Great ideas lay
  the groundwork for the ultimate success of the
  Built to Last ideas.
• Good-to-Great provides the core ideas for getting
  a flywheel turning from build up through
  breakthrough, while Built to Last outlines the
  core ideas for keeping a flywheel accelerating
  long into the future and elevating a company to
  iconic stature.
• Each of the Good-to-Great findings enables all
  four of the key ideas from Built-to-Last. Those
  four key ideas are
• Clock Building, Not Time Telling. Building an
  organization that can endure and adapt through
  multiple generation of leaders and multiple
  product life cycles as opposed to being built
  around a single great leader or a single great
  idea.

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• Genius of AND. Embracing both extremes on a
  number of dimensions at the same time. Instead of
  choosing A or B, the built to last companies
  figure out how to have A and B purpose and
  profit, continuity and change, freedom and
  responsibility, etc.
• Core Ideology. Instilling core values and core
  purpose as principles to guide decisions and to
  inspire people throughout the organization over a
  long period of time.
• Preserve the Core/Stimulate Progress. Preserving
  the core ideology as an anchor point while
  stimulating change, improvement, innovation, and
  renewal in everything else. Change practices and
  strategies while holding core values and purpose
  fixed. Set and achieve Bhags consistent with the
  core ideology.

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Part IVIn Search of ExcellenceBy Peters and
Waterman
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The 8 attributes of excellent companies

• Peters Waterman identified eight attributes
  that characterised excellent, innovative
  companies
• A bias for action. These companies like to get
  on with it. Even though these companies may be
  analytical in their approach to decision making,
  they are not paralyzed by endless analysis. In
  many of these companies the standard operating
  procedure is Do it, fix it, try it.
• Close to the customer. These companies learn from
  the people they serve. They provide unparalleled
  quality, service, and reliability things that
  work and last.
• Autonomy and entrepreneurship. These companies
  foster many leaders and many innovators
  throughout the organization. They dont try to
  hold everyone on so short a rein that they cant
  be creative. They encourage practical risk
  taking, and support good hires.

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• Productivity through people. The excellent
  companies treat the rank and file as the root
  source of quality and productivity gain. They do
  not regard capital investment as the fundamental
  source of efficiency improvement.
• Hands-on value driven. CEOs walk the plant floors
  and regularly visit retail outlets and assess
  them on the factors the company holds dear.
• Stick to the knitting. While there were a few
  exceptions, the odds for excellent performance
  seem strong to favour those companies that stayed
  reasonably close to businesses they know.
• Simple form, lean staff. The underlying
  structure, forms and systems in the excellent
  companies are elegantly simple. Top-level staffs
  are lean.
• Simultaneous loose-tight properties. The
  excellent companies are both centralized and
  decentralized. Even as they push autonomy down
  to the shop floor or product development team,
  they are fanatic centralists around the few core
  values they hold dear.

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Part VUnderstanding the new paradigm
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The Individualised corporation Ghoshal
Bartlett Transformation of management roles
tasks
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Management competencies for new roles
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Part VIGetting into action mode
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The importance of purposeful action Creating a
bias for action Ghoshal Bruch

• Most managers know roughly if not exactly what is
  to be done but few get around to action mode.
• People who exhibit purposeful action possess two
  critical traits energy and focus.
• Energy implies a high level of personal
  involvement and effort, engaged, and self-driven
  behavior.
• Focus requires discipline to resist distraction,
  overcome problems and persist in the face of
  unanticipated setbacks.

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Four kinds of managerial behaviour

• The Frenzied They are highly energetic but very
  unfocused and appear to others as frenzied,
  desperate, and hasty.
• The Procrastinators They postpone the work that
  really matters to the organization because they
  lack both energy and focus. They often feel
  insecure and fear failure.
• The Detached They are disengaged or detached
  from their work altogether. They are focused but
  lack energy and often seem aloof, tense, and
  apathetic.
• The Purposeful They get the job done. They are
  highly focused and energetic and come across as
  reflective and calm, amidst chaos.

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Motivation and Willpower

• Motivation might suffice in helping managers
  sustain organizational routines. But the more
  important tasks are usually complex and require
  creativity and innovation. When dealing with
  ambitious goals, high uncertainty and extreme
  opposition, managers have to rely on a different
  force, the power of their will.
• Willpower goes beyond motivation. It enables
  managers to execute disciplined action, even when
  they are disinclined to do something, uninspired
  by the work, or tempted by other opportunities.
  Willpower gives managers an insatiable need to
  produce results.
• Willpower enables managers to overcome barriers,
  deal with setbacks, and persevere to the end.
  Wilful managers resolve to achieve their
  intention, no matter what.

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The Three Traps of Nonaction

• The trap of overwhelming demands
• The trap of unbearable constraints.
• The trap of unexplored choices.

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The trap of overwhelming demands.

• Purposeful action-takers manage their demands by
• developing an explicit personal agenda
• practicing slow management
• structuring contact time
• shaping demands and managing expectations.

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The trap of unbearable constraints.

• To unshackle themselves from this trap,
  purposeful action-takers adopt strategies like
• Mapping relevant constraints
• Accepting trade-offs
• Selectively breaking rules
• Tolerating conflicts and ambiguity

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The trap of unexplored choices

• The third trap of non action is unexplored
  choices.
• Many managers concentrate on immediate needs and
  requirements.
• They do not perceive or exploit their freedom to
  make choices about what they would do and how
  they would do it.

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Unleashing Organizational Energy for Collective
Action

• The real challenge for most organizations is to
  tap their energy and channelise it into
  purposeful action.

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Comfort Zone

• Corporations that have succeeded for long
  periods in a relatively stable environment often
  settle into the comfort zone.
• Characterized by weak but positive emotions
  such as calm and contentedness, they lack the
  internal vitality, alertness, and emotional
  tension necessary for initiating bold, new
  strategic initiatives.
• Inertia stems from the belief that they have
  found the ultimate success formula.

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Resignation zone

• Companies in the resignation zone have the same
  low-energy intensity as those in the comfort
  zone.
• But these people find themselves in the grip of
  weak emotions, such as frustration and
  disappointment.
• Typically, they suffer from low levels of
  emotional commitment, alertness, and effort.
• Persistent mediocrity makes people lose their
  confidence in dealing with problems or
  challenges.
• Believing that nothing they can do would make any
  difference, they passively resign themselves to
  their fate.
• Companies in the resignation zone believe that
  they are simply not good enough to succeed.

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Corrosion Zone

• Companies in the corrosion zone show a high
  degree of energy, intense levels of activity and
  emotional involvement.
• They draw that intensity from strong emotions,
  such as anger, fear, or hate.
• The interplay of high energy and destructive
  responses is one of the most debilitating energy
  states in which a company can find itself.
• With much of the companys energy dedicated to
  internal conflicts, rumors, micropolitics, or
  other destructive activities, the effort needed
  to cope with fear, suspicion, and rivalry drains
  peoples vitality and stamina, leaving little
  left for productive work.

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Productive Zone

• Unlike companies in the corrosive, resignation
  and comfort zones, those in the productive zone
  display high emotional tension, alertness, and
  activity.
• Employees work with a sense of urgency, driven by
  enthusiasm, positive excitement, joy, and pride
  in their work rather than anger, fear, or
  internal rivalry.
• Typically, these companies strive for challenges
  that surpass the routine, the obvious, and the
  normal.
• While low-energy companies look for
  standardization and institutionalization,
  avoiding surprises and risks whenever possible,
  companies in the productive zone thrive on
  surprises, the excitement of the unknown, and
  novel opportunities.
• A sense of urgency and alertness, allows them to
  process information and mobilize resources
  rapidly.
• Inevitably, these organizations also have leaders
  who direct their people toward shared purposes,
  channeling the companys potential by aligning
  its collective perception, emotions, and
  activities to pursue business-critical
  activities.

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Slaying the dragon and Winning the princess

• Companies that achieve truly radical change have
  leaders who adopt one of three approaches for
  focusing the energy of their organizations and
  moving them into the productive zone.
• Some adopt the slaying-the-dragon strategy,
  driving their people out of the comfort zone by
  focusing their emotion, attention, and action on
  a crisis or a threat to overcome.
• Others pursue a winning-the princess strategy,
  moving their organizations into the productive
  zone by building peoples enthusiasm for
  realizing a specific, motivating dream.
• A few others use a combination of these strategies

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Strategies for summoning willpower

• There are six strategies that leaders can use to
  help managers summon their will power
• Strategy 1 Help managers visualize their
  intention
• Strategy 2 Prepare managers for obstacles
• Strategy 3 Encourage managers to confront their
  ambivalence
• Strategy 4 Develop a climate of choice
• Strategy 5 Build a self-regulating system
• Strategy 6 Create a desire for the sea

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Building employee loyalty

• Broad loyalty to an organization is increasingly
  difficult to achieve and sustain.
• Besides, such general commitment, even if
  achieved, does not necessarily lead to purposeful
  action on specific tasks.
• A diffused sense of organizational loyalty often
  creates a taken-for-granted kind of relationship
  between managers and the company that actually
  dulls the edge of execution.
• The best way leaders can build effective
  organizational commitment, is through a bottom-up
  style that emphasizes personal ownership and
  commitment to specific initiatives and goals.