Title: On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion
1On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion Mary
Anne Warren
2HUMANITY AND MORALITY I
- How are we to decide whether or not a fetus is to
be considered a member of the moral community -
the set of beings with full and equal moral
rights? - What sort of entity is entitled to full moral
rights? - If we want to say that a being entitled to full
moral rights is a human being, then we are left
with the problem of defining what a human being
is.
3HUMANITY AND MORALITY II
- Warren What reason is there for identifying the
moral community with the set of all human
beings? - however human is defined? - This just suggests that a fetus may qualify as a
human but not as a member of the moral community. - And if it is not a member of the moral community,
then it is not entitled to the rights of that
community - including protection from killing it.
4TWO SENSES OF HUMAN
- The genetic sense. Any member of the species
homo sapiens is a human being, and no member of
any other species could be. (This is a
necessary condition of being human in the genetic
sense.) - The moral sense. A being is human if it is a
full-fledged member of the moral community.
(This is a sufficient condition of being human in
the moral sense.) - Both senses are contested in philosophy. On some
definitions of human or person, an entity could
be a person without being a member of the species
or having a human genetic code. Also, a being
might be a member of the moral community without
being human. - In any case, Warrens point is that a being could
qualify as human in the genetic sense without
being human in the moral sense, as these senses
are defined above. Then a fetus might be
genetically human but not be morally protected.
5AN ANTI-ABORTION ARGUMENT I
- a. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings (1.
genetic sense. 2. moral sense.) - b. A fetus is an innocent human being. (1.
genetic sense. 2. moral sense.) - c. Therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses.
- We can either think of human in a and b in the
genetic sense or in the moral sense, where either
1 is connected in a and b, or 2 is connected in a
and b. - If we do that then the conclusion follows, but we
beg the question (assume to be true what we are
trying to prove.) - It was the point of the argument to prove the
conclusion but it is assumed in the premises.
And so nothing is proved.
6AN ANTI-ABORTION ARGUMENT II
- a. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings (1.
genetic sense. 2. moral sense.) - b. A fetus is an innocent human being. (1.
genetic sense. 2. moral sense.) - c. Therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses.
- If we mean human in one sense in a and the
other sense in b, then the conclusion does not
follow without further argument. - For instance, to say that it is wrong to kill
any being that is a member of the moral
community, and then to say that any fetus is
human genetically (connecting 2 and 1 in a and b)
does not protect it. - One would have to be able to show that being
human in the genetic sense is enough to be human
in the moral sense, and so to have rights and be
morally protected.
7WARREN AND NOONAN I
- Warren can accept John Noonans view that a fetus
is a human being in the genetic sense. However,
for abortion to be immoral, the fetus has to be
proved to be human in the moral sense - a member
of the moral community, as adult humans are. - Genetic humanity and moral humanity are two
different things, and one needs to be human in
the moral sense to have rights, including the
right to life. - Warren thinks that Noonan cannot prove that
abortion is wrong unless he can prove that
whatever is genetically human is also morally
human. And he has not done this.
8WARREN AND NOONAN II
- Although a fetus is not conscious from conception
- as it has a genetic code from conception -
Noonan says that the genetic code gives the fetus
the potential to be conscious and to have
rational thought in the future. - But Warren says that the potential capacity for
rational thought can at most show that an entity
has the potential for becoming human in the moral
sense. - It is not the case then that it is human in
virtue of having that potential.
9DEFINING THE MORAL COMMUNITY
- Warren doubts that genetic humanity - being a
member of the human species - is sufficient for
moral humanity. Or, we need a better way to
define the moral community. - Warren makes a distinction between human beings
and persons and maintains that only people - and
not human beings - make up the moral community. - She says that we have no right to assume that
genetic humanity is necessary for personhood.
Thus a creature from outer space may qualify as a
person even with a very different biology from
ours.
10WHAT IS A PERSON?
- Warren does not propose to settle the question of
what a person is. But the traits most central
to the concept of personhood, or humanity in the
moral sense, are, very roughly - 1. Consciousness/feeling (feeling pain in
particular). - 2. Reasoning.
- 3. Agency.
- 4. Language.
- 5. Self-awareness.
11WHAT IS A PERSON? II
- She recognizes that there are problems in giving
precise definitions of these things. For
instance, can consciousness be defined? How?
What terms are more fundamental that would not
presuppose the notion? - It would also be hard to know when the concepts
can be applied to beings other than human if we
do not have perceptual criteria for when they
apply. Thus a being might be conscious and we
wouldnt recognize it.
12WHAT IS A PERSON? III
- Warren says that a being need not have all five
to be human. - Maybe consciousness and reasoning are enough.
- Perhaps these are necessary too in that we would
not call a being a person that was not conscious
and could not reason.
13FETUSES AND PERSONS
- For Warren, all we need to do to show that a
fetus is not a person is to show that it does not
have these five traits, or even the first two
that may be enough to possess to be a person. - She says that anyone who would claim that a being
that lacked all of these things was a person
would not understand the concept of a person. - A being with a human genetic code may be human,
but that does not make it a person unless it has
the traits listed above, or at least 1 and 2 -
consciousness and reasoning.
14WHAT IS A PERSON? IV
- We do not have any of these traits while we are
asleep, under heavy sedation, or in a coma. Do
we cease to be a person then? - If we want to say that we nevertheless have the
capacity for these things, and only temporarily
lack them, then the notion of time, and the
future in particular, becomes important. - How long would we have to be in a coma before we
ceased to be a person in not having traits 1-5? - If it could be years, then the fetus might
develop the capacities in the same amount of time
that a comatose person could recover them.
15FETUSES AND PERSONS II
- Genetic humanity does not make an entity a
person. This is because something like a fetus
can be genetically human but not have
consciousness, reasoning, agency, language, and
self-awareness. - That is, it may lack the characteristics that are
required for an entity to be a person. And so
some beings that qualify as human beings
genetically are not persons. - A being may be a person that is not human - it
lacks a human genetic code, but is conscious, can
reason, act, use language, and is self-aware. - A computer that satisfied conditions 1-5 would be
a person, but not a human.
16PERSONS AND MORALITY
- Warren says that the concept of a person is in
part a moral concept since all and only people
have full moral rights. - The moral community is composed of persons
beings possessed of consciousness, reasoning,
agency, language, and self-awareness. - If a computer were a person it would be entitled
to all the moral rights of persons.
17FETUSES AND PERSONS III
- For Warren, a fetus is a human being that is not
a person. - Because a fetus is not a person, it is not
entitled to the rights of protection afforded to
the members of the moral community. - She thinks that it is absurd to say that an
entity that is not a person has the full moral
rights of persons. - She thinks that this is as absurd as to say that
non-persons have moral responsibilities.
18THE RESEMBLANCE OF FETUSES TO PERSONS I
- If a fetus is not a person - and so not a member
of the moral community - could it have a right to
life at some point during its development because
it resembles a person? - Warren says that although a fetus at later stages
resembles a person in some respects, in feeling
and responding to pain, and perhaps in having
rudimentary consciousness, it is not like a
person in the relevant respects. - It is not fully conscious, as we are.
- It cannot reason.
- It has no language.
- It does not engage in self-motivated activity.
- It has no self-awareness which may demand some
level of conceptual thought.
19THE RESEMBLANCE OF FETUSES TO PERSONS II
- I cant understand, or agree with, Warrens
statement that in the relevant respects, a
fetus, even a fully developed one !, is
considerably less personlike than is the average
mature mammal, indeed the average fish. - In any case, for Warren, the resemblance of a
fetus to a person in some respects is not enough
to make abortion immoral. - She says that whatever rights a fetus may have
based on this resemblance does not outweigh the
right of the woman to have an abortion - at any
stage of her pregnancy. (Although she does admit
that there may be arguments other than
resemblance that would place limits on when an
abortion could be legally performed.)
20RESEMBLANCE AND EMOTION
- For Warren it is not an argument against abortion
that we are more emotional about abortion in the
later stages of pregnancy. - This is the idea that, as a fetus more closely
resembles an infant, we react with revulsion to
the idea of abortion. - Mere emotional responses cannot take the place
of moral reasoning in determining what ought to
be permitted. (Some ethicists would say that
the emotional responses that we have here are
relevant to the morality of the issue.)
21THE MORALITY OF LATE ABORTIONS
- For Warren, abortion is not immoral at any stage
of pregnancy because a fetus is not sufficiently
personlike to make it immoral. - Because it is not immoral, a woman may have an
abortion at even a late stage of pregnancy, and
for any reason, even to take a trip to Europe. - She says that some people may find this indecent,
whatever that means, but it would not be
immoral since it would not be killing a person.
22POTENTIAL PERSONHOOD AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE I
- Even if we agree with Warren that a fetus is not
a person, what about its potential to become a
person? - Could a fetus have a right to life because it has
the potential to become a person, that other
things, like a dog or an ashtray, do not? - Warren says that this may be a reason to consider
not aborting it, but that we cannot conclude from
a fetuss potential to become a person that it
has a right to life in virtue of that potential.
23POTENTIAL PERSONHOOD AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE II
- Her argument for this is that whatever rights we
may assign to a potential person cannot outweigh
the rights of an actual person, and the mother is
an actual person. - Because the woman is an actual person her rights
have precedence over that of a potential person,
including her right to abort a potential person. - For Warren, neither a fetuss resemblance to a
person or its potential to become a person can
outweigh the right of an actual person to abort
it. - A womans right to protect her health,
happiness, freedom, and even her life, by
aborting an unwanted fetus, will always override
whatever right to life it may be appropriate to
ascribe to a fetus, even a fully developed one.
24POSTSCRIPT ON INFANTICIDE I
- An objection to Warrens view is that it would
justify infanticide since an infant does not
qualify as a person under Warrens definition of
person. - This could be a problem for her theory since even
people who are pro-choice consider infanticide
murder. - While she accepts the criticism that a newborn
infant is not a person on her definition, and so
killing it would not be murder, she says that it
does not follow from this that infanticide is
permissible.
25POSTSCRIPT ON INFANTICIDE II
- Infanticide would be wrong because, even if the
parents do not want the infant, they could give
it away to someone who does, who would get
pleasure from having it. - She says that most people in this country at this
time in history would favor putting the infant in
an orphanage rather than killing it. - And because these are the views of most people,
Warren says that they ought to be respected.
26POSTSCRIPT ON INFANTICIDE III
- Wouldnt this make abortion wrong for the same
reason, namely that many (most?) people are
opposed to it and would prefer that society
provide for the fetus even at some cost to them? - Warren says no. The crucial difference is that
the fetus is in the womb of a woman and the
infant is not. - As long as the woman has this relationship to the
fetus it would violate her rights to freedom,
happiness, and self-determination to tell her
that she cannot have an abortion when that is
what she wants.
27POSTSCRIPT ON INFANTICIDE IV
- Her rights the rights of the woman override
the rights of those who would like to see the
fetus preserved. - But once the fetus is born then this changes, and
its preservation no longer violates any of its
mothers rights. - The birth of the child then changes the mothers
relationship to it, and she can no longer simply
do what she wants with it since it is outside her
body, and she has the option of giving it away.