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Title: On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion


1
On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion Mary
Anne Warren
2
HUMANITY AND MORALITY I
  • How are we to decide whether or not a fetus is to
    be considered a member of the moral community -
    the set of beings with full and equal moral
    rights?
  • What sort of entity is entitled to full moral
    rights?
  • If we want to say that a being entitled to full
    moral rights is a human being, then we are left
    with the problem of defining what a human being
    is.

3
HUMANITY AND MORALITY II
  • Warren What reason is there for identifying the
    moral community with the set of all human
    beings? - however human is defined?
  • This just suggests that a fetus may qualify as a
    human but not as a member of the moral community.
  • And if it is not a member of the moral community,
    then it is not entitled to the rights of that
    community - including protection from killing it.

4
TWO SENSES OF HUMAN
  • The genetic sense. Any member of the species
    homo sapiens is a human being, and no member of
    any other species could be. (This is a
    necessary condition of being human in the genetic
    sense.)
  • The moral sense. A being is human if it is a
    full-fledged member of the moral community.
    (This is a sufficient condition of being human in
    the moral sense.)
  • Both senses are contested in philosophy. On some
    definitions of human or person, an entity could
    be a person without being a member of the species
    or having a human genetic code. Also, a being
    might be a member of the moral community without
    being human.
  • In any case, Warrens point is that a being could
    qualify as human in the genetic sense without
    being human in the moral sense, as these senses
    are defined above. Then a fetus might be
    genetically human but not be morally protected.

5
AN ANTI-ABORTION ARGUMENT I
  • a. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings (1.
    genetic sense. 2. moral sense.)
  • b. A fetus is an innocent human being. (1.
    genetic sense. 2. moral sense.)
  • c. Therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses.
  • We can either think of human in a and b in the
    genetic sense or in the moral sense, where either
    1 is connected in a and b, or 2 is connected in a
    and b.
  • If we do that then the conclusion follows, but we
    beg the question (assume to be true what we are
    trying to prove.)
  • It was the point of the argument to prove the
    conclusion but it is assumed in the premises.
    And so nothing is proved.

6
AN ANTI-ABORTION ARGUMENT II
  • a. It is wrong to kill innocent human beings (1.
    genetic sense. 2. moral sense.)
  • b. A fetus is an innocent human being. (1.
    genetic sense. 2. moral sense.)
  • c. Therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses.
  • If we mean human in one sense in a and the
    other sense in b, then the conclusion does not
    follow without further argument.
  • For instance, to say that it is wrong to kill
    any being that is a member of the moral
    community, and then to say that any fetus is
    human genetically (connecting 2 and 1 in a and b)
    does not protect it.
  • One would have to be able to show that being
    human in the genetic sense is enough to be human
    in the moral sense, and so to have rights and be
    morally protected.

7
WARREN AND NOONAN I
  • Warren can accept John Noonans view that a fetus
    is a human being in the genetic sense. However,
    for abortion to be immoral, the fetus has to be
    proved to be human in the moral sense - a member
    of the moral community, as adult humans are.
  • Genetic humanity and moral humanity are two
    different things, and one needs to be human in
    the moral sense to have rights, including the
    right to life.
  • Warren thinks that Noonan cannot prove that
    abortion is wrong unless he can prove that
    whatever is genetically human is also morally
    human. And he has not done this.

8
WARREN AND NOONAN II
  • Although a fetus is not conscious from conception
    - as it has a genetic code from conception -
    Noonan says that the genetic code gives the fetus
    the potential to be conscious and to have
    rational thought in the future.
  • But Warren says that the potential capacity for
    rational thought can at most show that an entity
    has the potential for becoming human in the moral
    sense.
  • It is not the case then that it is human in
    virtue of having that potential.

9
DEFINING THE MORAL COMMUNITY
  • Warren doubts that genetic humanity - being a
    member of the human species - is sufficient for
    moral humanity. Or, we need a better way to
    define the moral community.
  • Warren makes a distinction between human beings
    and persons and maintains that only people - and
    not human beings - make up the moral community.
  • She says that we have no right to assume that
    genetic humanity is necessary for personhood.
    Thus a creature from outer space may qualify as a
    person even with a very different biology from
    ours.

10
WHAT IS A PERSON?
  • Warren does not propose to settle the question of
    what a person is. But the traits most central
    to the concept of personhood, or humanity in the
    moral sense, are, very roughly
  • 1. Consciousness/feeling (feeling pain in
    particular).
  • 2. Reasoning.
  • 3. Agency.
  • 4. Language.
  • 5. Self-awareness.

11
WHAT IS A PERSON? II
  • She recognizes that there are problems in giving
    precise definitions of these things. For
    instance, can consciousness be defined? How?
    What terms are more fundamental that would not
    presuppose the notion?
  • It would also be hard to know when the concepts
    can be applied to beings other than human if we
    do not have perceptual criteria for when they
    apply. Thus a being might be conscious and we
    wouldnt recognize it.

12
WHAT IS A PERSON? III
  • Warren says that a being need not have all five
    to be human.
  • Maybe consciousness and reasoning are enough.
  • Perhaps these are necessary too in that we would
    not call a being a person that was not conscious
    and could not reason.

13
FETUSES AND PERSONS
  • For Warren, all we need to do to show that a
    fetus is not a person is to show that it does not
    have these five traits, or even the first two
    that may be enough to possess to be a person.
  • She says that anyone who would claim that a being
    that lacked all of these things was a person
    would not understand the concept of a person.
  • A being with a human genetic code may be human,
    but that does not make it a person unless it has
    the traits listed above, or at least 1 and 2 -
    consciousness and reasoning.

14
WHAT IS A PERSON? IV
  • We do not have any of these traits while we are
    asleep, under heavy sedation, or in a coma. Do
    we cease to be a person then?
  • If we want to say that we nevertheless have the
    capacity for these things, and only temporarily
    lack them, then the notion of time, and the
    future in particular, becomes important.
  • How long would we have to be in a coma before we
    ceased to be a person in not having traits 1-5?
  • If it could be years, then the fetus might
    develop the capacities in the same amount of time
    that a comatose person could recover them.

15
FETUSES AND PERSONS II
  • Genetic humanity does not make an entity a
    person. This is because something like a fetus
    can be genetically human but not have
    consciousness, reasoning, agency, language, and
    self-awareness.
  • That is, it may lack the characteristics that are
    required for an entity to be a person. And so
    some beings that qualify as human beings
    genetically are not persons.
  • A being may be a person that is not human - it
    lacks a human genetic code, but is conscious, can
    reason, act, use language, and is self-aware.
  • A computer that satisfied conditions 1-5 would be
    a person, but not a human.

16
PERSONS AND MORALITY
  • Warren says that the concept of a person is in
    part a moral concept since all and only people
    have full moral rights.
  • The moral community is composed of persons
    beings possessed of consciousness, reasoning,
    agency, language, and self-awareness.
  • If a computer were a person it would be entitled
    to all the moral rights of persons.

17
FETUSES AND PERSONS III
  • For Warren, a fetus is a human being that is not
    a person.
  • Because a fetus is not a person, it is not
    entitled to the rights of protection afforded to
    the members of the moral community.
  • She thinks that it is absurd to say that an
    entity that is not a person has the full moral
    rights of persons.
  • She thinks that this is as absurd as to say that
    non-persons have moral responsibilities.

18
THE RESEMBLANCE OF FETUSES TO PERSONS I
  • If a fetus is not a person - and so not a member
    of the moral community - could it have a right to
    life at some point during its development because
    it resembles a person?
  • Warren says that although a fetus at later stages
    resembles a person in some respects, in feeling
    and responding to pain, and perhaps in having
    rudimentary consciousness, it is not like a
    person in the relevant respects.
  • It is not fully conscious, as we are.
  • It cannot reason.
  • It has no language.
  • It does not engage in self-motivated activity.
  • It has no self-awareness which may demand some
    level of conceptual thought.

19
THE RESEMBLANCE OF FETUSES TO PERSONS II
  • I cant understand, or agree with, Warrens
    statement that in the relevant respects, a
    fetus, even a fully developed one !, is
    considerably less personlike than is the average
    mature mammal, indeed the average fish.
  • In any case, for Warren, the resemblance of a
    fetus to a person in some respects is not enough
    to make abortion immoral.
  • She says that whatever rights a fetus may have
    based on this resemblance does not outweigh the
    right of the woman to have an abortion - at any
    stage of her pregnancy. (Although she does admit
    that there may be arguments other than
    resemblance that would place limits on when an
    abortion could be legally performed.)

20
RESEMBLANCE AND EMOTION
  • For Warren it is not an argument against abortion
    that we are more emotional about abortion in the
    later stages of pregnancy.
  • This is the idea that, as a fetus more closely
    resembles an infant, we react with revulsion to
    the idea of abortion.
  • Mere emotional responses cannot take the place
    of moral reasoning in determining what ought to
    be permitted. (Some ethicists would say that
    the emotional responses that we have here are
    relevant to the morality of the issue.)

21
THE MORALITY OF LATE ABORTIONS
  • For Warren, abortion is not immoral at any stage
    of pregnancy because a fetus is not sufficiently
    personlike to make it immoral.
  • Because it is not immoral, a woman may have an
    abortion at even a late stage of pregnancy, and
    for any reason, even to take a trip to Europe.
  • She says that some people may find this indecent,
    whatever that means, but it would not be
    immoral since it would not be killing a person.

22
POTENTIAL PERSONHOOD AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE I
  • Even if we agree with Warren that a fetus is not
    a person, what about its potential to become a
    person?
  • Could a fetus have a right to life because it has
    the potential to become a person, that other
    things, like a dog or an ashtray, do not?
  • Warren says that this may be a reason to consider
    not aborting it, but that we cannot conclude from
    a fetuss potential to become a person that it
    has a right to life in virtue of that potential.

23
POTENTIAL PERSONHOOD AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE II
  • Her argument for this is that whatever rights we
    may assign to a potential person cannot outweigh
    the rights of an actual person, and the mother is
    an actual person.
  • Because the woman is an actual person her rights
    have precedence over that of a potential person,
    including her right to abort a potential person.
  • For Warren, neither a fetuss resemblance to a
    person or its potential to become a person can
    outweigh the right of an actual person to abort
    it.
  • A womans right to protect her health,
    happiness, freedom, and even her life, by
    aborting an unwanted fetus, will always override
    whatever right to life it may be appropriate to
    ascribe to a fetus, even a fully developed one.

24
POSTSCRIPT ON INFANTICIDE I
  • An objection to Warrens view is that it would
    justify infanticide since an infant does not
    qualify as a person under Warrens definition of
    person.
  • This could be a problem for her theory since even
    people who are pro-choice consider infanticide
    murder.
  • While she accepts the criticism that a newborn
    infant is not a person on her definition, and so
    killing it would not be murder, she says that it
    does not follow from this that infanticide is
    permissible.

25
POSTSCRIPT ON INFANTICIDE II
  • Infanticide would be wrong because, even if the
    parents do not want the infant, they could give
    it away to someone who does, who would get
    pleasure from having it.
  • She says that most people in this country at this
    time in history would favor putting the infant in
    an orphanage rather than killing it.
  • And because these are the views of most people,
    Warren says that they ought to be respected.

26
POSTSCRIPT ON INFANTICIDE III
  • Wouldnt this make abortion wrong for the same
    reason, namely that many (most?) people are
    opposed to it and would prefer that society
    provide for the fetus even at some cost to them?
  • Warren says no. The crucial difference is that
    the fetus is in the womb of a woman and the
    infant is not.
  • As long as the woman has this relationship to the
    fetus it would violate her rights to freedom,
    happiness, and self-determination to tell her
    that she cannot have an abortion when that is
    what she wants.

27
POSTSCRIPT ON INFANTICIDE IV
  • Her rights the rights of the woman override
    the rights of those who would like to see the
    fetus preserved.
  • But once the fetus is born then this changes, and
    its preservation no longer violates any of its
    mothers rights.
  • The birth of the child then changes the mothers
    relationship to it, and she can no longer simply
    do what she wants with it since it is outside her
    body, and she has the option of giving it away.
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