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Title: PPt SURREY KEYNOTE 12 6 07 Nationalism and National Identities Today: Multidisciplinary Perspective


1
  PPt SURREY KEYNOTE 12 6 07Nationalism
and National Identities Today Multidisciplinary
PerspectivesCRONEM, University of Surrey, 12-13
June 2007 A radical response to the
intractability of ethno-national
conflictPartition, consociation or
border-crossing democracy?   
  • James Anderson
  • School of Geography and
  • Centre for International Borders Research
    www.qub.ac.uk/cibr
  • Queen's University Belfast
  • 1. The Intractability Problem Territoriality
    and its limitations -
  •        nationalism, ethnicity, sovereignty,
    representative democracy
  •  
  • 2. Conflict Management Territorial 'solutions'
    partition, internal
  • integration or consociation?
  • 3. Conflict Resolution Through other conflicts,
    crossing borders,
  • participatory democracy, divided cities?

2
  • The Arguments
  • The paper, informed by Ireland's national
    conflict and 'peace process, is a critique of
    the problems underlying such conflicts and the
    difficulties transforming externally-imposed
    conflict management into self-sustaining conflict
    resolution.
  • It is argued that the intractability of these
    problems is deeply rooted in a thoroughly modern
    complex of nationalism, ethnicity, sovereignty
    and representative democracy. These are knotted
    together in a common denominator of
    territoriality, and the nub of the problem is the
    double paradox of representative democracys
    undemocratic origins in the present.
  • Territoriality, the use of bordered geographical
    space, is a powerful and ubiquitous mode of
    social organisation which simplifies social
    control. But it can grossly over-simplify and
    distort social realities, particularly at borders
    and especially where territory is contested, and
    thereby it reinforces other distorting
    simplifications typical of ethno-national
    conflict.
  • Deep-rooted problems demand radical remedies.
    Rather than relying on the pieties of remembrance
    and reconciliation, making ethno-national peace
    paradoxically requires forgetting and making
    conflict over other issues.

3
1. The Intractability Problem Territorialitys
limitations nationalism, ethnicity,
sovereignty, democracy
  • All conflicts have their own particularities, so
    any comparisons (or lessons from Ireland) work
    best at the more abstract level of general
    structures.
  • Ethno-national problems are often explained in
    terms of the resurfacing of primordial
    ethnicities and atavistic hatreds'. But the
    main causes are rooted in contemporary society
    modern state and state-related territoriality.
  • Territoriality - the use of bordered geographical
    spaces to 'control, classify and communicate' is
    a powerful and widespread mode of social
    organisation.
  • It simplifies issues of control, management and
    administration, and makes power relationships
    more tangible materially and symbolically -
    whether in the home, the workplace, or with
    respect to the state and the nation.
  • But its advantages can become serious
    disadvantages - over-simplifying, reifying and
    distorting social realities, de-personalising
    social relationships, obscuring relations of
    power, erroneously equating physical space with
    social space, and arbitrarily truncating social
    processes at territorial borders.
  • Territoriality (with roots related to 'terror)
    actively encourages conflict, generating rival
    territorialities in a competitive 'space-filling'
    process.
  • It directly encourages the 'zero-sum game' of
    national conflict - territory is a finite
    resource with a fixed total where more for one
    side really does mean less for the other. But
    this equation is then inappropriately applied to
    'goods' (e.g., economic wealth, cultural capital,
    political democracy) which do not have a fixed
    total. Positive-sum games where both sides gain
    are blocked and we actually get a negative-sum
    game where both lose (though often unequally).  

4
Nationalism and ethnicity 
  • Nationalisms tend to essentialise ethnic
    identities as natural, timeless and
    unchangeable. But they are always socially
    (re)produced and changeable.
  •  
  • However, contrary to the post-modern emphasis on
    a free choice between multiple identities',
    there is limited freedom to choose or change
    identities in conflict situations, where much
    effort is expended on reproducing existing
    identity you change your identity at your
    peril.
  • Such effort has to be expended, especially where
    the opponents are very similar and closely
    intermingled (fixating on the 'narcissism of
    small differences as in Ireland). Ethnic and
    territorial conflict may be more a means of
    creating/maintaining difference than a simple
    reflex of difference.
  • Conflicts supposedly due to ancient ethnic
    hatreds are more likely contemporary struggles
    to consciously reproduce ethnic differences. And
    they are rooted in the distinctly modern and
    often benign phenomena of national sovereignty
    and democracy.

5
The doctrine of nationalism
  • Nationalism's happy ideal of nation and state
    coinciding geographically in the particular
    territory of a 'nation-state' has powerful
    appeal, linking home, freedom, democracy and
    sovereign self-determination without 'outside
    interference'. But nationalism 'promises
    to deceive
  • Geographic realities conspire against its happy
    ideal - the often different/ intermingled
    distributions of ethnic groups, nations and
    states mean the ideal is not attainable, or
    trying to make reality fit the ideal is not worth
    the cost in human lives, misery, the
    foreclosing of other more fruitful options.
  •  
  • The ideal itself is 'two-faced' -
    unifying/divisive, including/excluding,
    forward-looking/backward-looking (to an invented
    past?) - only variably progressive.
  •  
  • In class-divided societies the 'national
    interest' is inevitably an ideological and
    illusionary unity, often serving the reactionary
    interests of dominant groups and classes and used
    for internal control against enemies within.

6
Limitations of national sovereignty
  • National sovereignty is also elusive, applying -
    and as a claim more than a reality - mainly in
    the political sphere, while most of the
    economic sphere - multinational branch plants,
    foreign direct investment - is conveniently and
    necessarily excluded from the claim.
    Self-determination is at best partial.
  •  
  • While recognising nationalism's democratic
    associations, and differentiating between
    oppressed and oppressor nations, the resolution
    of national conflict requires a critical stance
    to nationalism nationalist doctrine.
  • But this critical stance is just what conflict
    managers lack - coming from other national
    governments of great(er) powers, they are
    caught in the same national 'territorial trap as
    the protagonists they try to 'manage'.
  • They pander to them and their shared presumption
    that ethno-national identities have over-riding
    importance over all other types of identity.

7
Limitations of territorial representative
democracy
  • The most basic problem in ethno-national
    conflicts is not some easy archaic or atavistic
    target, but modern and valued representative
    democracy.
  • National territorial conflicts are not amenable
    to 'normal' democratic resolution because at
    issue is the territorial framework or shell for
    democracy.
  •  
  • These conflicts repeat the paradox of
    'democracy's undemocratic origins' in the present
    in effect there is a double paradox
  • 1. Democracy depends on democratic institutions
    and is absent until they are established, but
    they cannot be established democratically because
    initially there are no democratic institutions.
  • 2. For democracies to have legitimacy there is
    'normally' a politics of forgetting their
    undemocratic origins (in, e.g., war, conquest,
    genocide.). But in national conflicts forgetting
    is impossible historical origins are a 'live
    issue' ('The past is not dead. It's not even
    past - Wm. Faulkner) and the paradox is
    repeated in any contemporary (or proposed)
    re-drawing of borders..

8
More limitations of conventional democracy
  • Normally 'the electorate decides', but the prior
    question here is who decides the electorate? What
    is the appropriate territorial framework? (eg.,
    in the Irish-British conflict is it NI,
    BritainNI, NI R of I, or all three territorial
    entities?)
  • How the borders of the institutional shell are
    drawn will determine the outcome of a democratic
    majority vote, but the contested borders cannot
    themselves be decided by this democratic means.
  • Instead we get an infinite regression who
    decides who decides who decides which in
    conventional terms can only be terminated
    undemocratically
  • Either one of the protagonists decides (e.g.,
    by unilateral action, in the extreme creating a
    'democratic' majority by ethnic cleansing -
    which Michael Mann shows to be 'the dark side of
    democracy')
  • Or external conflict managers pragmatically
    enforce a 'solution' (e.g., partition, or more
    likely internal power-sharing) - though
    perhaps with marginal plebiscites, or subsequent
    legitimation by democratic ratification.
  •  
  • Conventional territorial, representative
    democracy politicises demography (e.g., Northern
    Ireland, Israel) and this gives territory added
    political significance. But representative
    democracy cannot itself resolve the ensuing
    conflict.

9
2. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT National solutions to
national problems reproduce divisions -
Partition or territorial integrity
  • National solutions (usually not endorsed by
    external conflict managers) include the murder,
    removal and/or forced assimilation of ethnic
    minorities.
  • Less malign management strategies include 1. the
    territorial (re-)partitioning of states, and 2.
    internal power-sharing or consociation (ethnic
    partitioning)
  • Both in different ways emphasise the management
    virtues of separation/ segregation, whereas
    conflict resolution requires contact
    co-operation.
  • But partition has limited application
    subdividing existing territories with completely
    new borderlines has mostly applied to
    defeated/collapsing multi-national empires (e.g.,
    Austria-Hungary after WWI the USSR and
    Yugoslavia), or retreating empires (the British
    from Ireland, Palestine, India).
  • Since the 1940s, partition has been out of favour
    for national states because
  • it is often impossible to (re)draw national
    borders where ethnicities are geographically
    intermingled it can invite ethnic cleansing
    temporary expedients (extensions of divide
    rule, or divide run) become permanent,
    perpetuating conflict (eg., Indias partition
    200,000 deaths, 5 million migrated, several wars,
    and now nuclear threat) and
  • the partition of national states (unlike
    multi-national empires) threatens the
    territorial integrity of national states in
    general (hence Biafra not supported), though
    internal federalisation may be an option.
  • Thus consociational power-sharing in various
    forms became the international communitys
    preferred conflict management strategy.

10
Consociation versus Integration
  • Consociational power-sharing contains and
    regulates conflict, but by institutionalising,
    and therefore cementing, ethnic divisions.
  • The main 'consociational model'
    (Lijphart/Netherlands) has 4 non-majoritarian
    devices a coalition government by
    representatives of all the ethnic groups
    representation proportional to their relative
    sizes autonomy in their group organisation and
    mutual vetoes to protect particular ethnic group
    interests.
  • The case for consociation it accepts the harsh
    reality of conflicting groups and succeeds in
    stopping or preventing their open/violent
    conflict it is fair and secures the trust of the
    groups by giving them guarantees about their
    future it provides stable democratic government.
    It is more realistic than wishful thinking
    integrationist illusions about creating a single
    unified society - which would not stop the
    fighting, and which some groups would see as an
    assimilationist threat to their own ethnic
    identity and interests.
  • The integrationist case against the
    integrationists mirror-image the
    consociationalists, arguing that the latter
    enshrine a bleak view of humanity seeing distrust
    and antagonism are as inherent irredeemable.
    Power-sharing mechanisms guarantees produce
    expensive cumbersome gridlock, and static rather
    than stable government. Secretive elitist dealing
    replaces open political debate, and blocks
    effective opposition/alternative government.
    Consociation is counter-productive

11
Consociation versus integration (contd.)
  • Consociation further entrenches ethnic divisions,
    increases polarisation and reproduces the basis
    of the conflict. Its keeps/forces people into one
    or other ethnic camp, and excludes other more
    fruitful bases of political mobilisation (eg.,
    gender, class) which cross-cut ethnic divisions.
  • It further erodes the so-called 'middle ground'
    of compromise, or 'other grounds' for alternative
    politics. It conservatively accepts the primacy
    and permanency of ethno-national categories
    rather than questioning how and why they are
    sustained and how they might be superseded. It
    ignores identity (re)production, and in effect
    supports ethnic essentialisms.
  • Comment Both cases are typically over-stated,
    and presented as a static either/or choice of two
    mutually exclusive strategies or ideal
    end-states.
  • This is unfortunate because both have some valid
    points, and they need to be seen dynamically, not
    as alternatives but as complementary elements or
    stages in an historical process of transforming
    externally-imposed management into
    self-sustaining conflict resolution the key
    post-cease fire challenge but it needs to
    built-into peace-processes from the start.

12
Consociation and then integrative
border-crossing
  • To achieve cease-fires/end to hostilities, the
    consociationalists are generally realistic in
    insisting that elaborate, guaranteed and hence
    rather static power-sharing arrangements are
    essential for establishing initial, at least
    minimal, cooperation. However consociation is
    necessary but not sufficient.
  • The integrationists have the valid point that
    consociational arrangements reinforce divisions
    and perpetuate or at the very least fail to
    supersede - the conditions of the conflict. And a
    telling point (from a supporter) consociation is
    crucially dependent on continuing external
    enforcement for its maintenance on its own has
    no realistic prospect of becoming self-sustaining
    (in N. Ireland, Lebanon, Bosnia?). It is thus
    dependent on the priorities and pace of external
    forces whose interest/lack of interest varies but
    whose main interests are always elsewhere. As
    external managers it is they who have the
    limited ambition of stopping the worst of the
    violence or keeping it to acceptable levels
    (acceptable to whom?) and their continuing
    overall responsibility may encourage continuing
    irresponsible brinkmanship by rival
    ethno-national leaders.
  • Such problematical external help further
    supports the argument that the post-cease-fire
    focus should increasingly be on developing
    cross-ethnic and cross-border contacts and
    co-operation.

13
3. CONFLICT RESOLUTION Through other conflicts,
crossing borders, participatory democracy,
divided cities
  • Self-sustaining conflict resolution requires two
    moves From ethnic territorial separation to
    border-crossing co-operation and
    transnationalism and from ethno-national
    conflict to more productive struggles over other
    issues.
  • Cross-border co-operation, whatever its
    socio-economic advantages, will only lead to
    conflict resolution if it creates trans-ethnic
    and cross-border 'political communities' and
    non-territorial forms of democratic
    participation.
  • Rather than emphasising reconciliation, truth
    commissions or identity issues (when usually
    only one type of identity is recognised and
    remembering can be a continuation of conflict
    by other means), it may be more productive to
    mobilise around (more?) important issues (e.g.,
    of class, gender, and the environment) which
    cross-cut ethnic and territorial borders (though
    ethno-national forces will continue to try and
    draw people back into their particularist and
    zero-sum moulds).
  • The emphasis here is not on building the
    integrationists dream of a single unified
    society' which does directly threaten (minority)
    ethnic identities, but instead is on transcending
    them, by under-cutting and weakening the
    divisions of the conflict and shifting the whole
    political terrain away from ethno-national or
    territorial issues per se to enable some
    forgetting.
  • Here border crossing activities which are valued
    in and of themselves, without any conflict
    resolution motivations, may paradoxically prove
    to be the most important in resolving
    ethno-national conflicts.
  • And for this divided cities are a promising
    locale.
  • A. To achieve cease-fires/end to hostilities,
    the consociationalists are generally realistic in
    insisting that elaborate, guaranteed and hence
    rather static power-sharing arrangements are
    essential for establishing initial, at least
    minimal, cooperation. However consociation is
    necessary but not sufficient a prerequisite
    for B
  • B. The integrationists have the valid point that
    consociational arrangements reinforce divisions
    and perpetuate or at the very least fail to
    supersede - the conditions of the conflict. And a
    telling point (from a supporter) consociation is
    crucially dependent on continuing external
    enforcement for its maintenance and has no
    realistic prospect of becoming self-sustaining
    (in N. Ireland, Lebanon, Bosnia?). It is thus
    dependent on the priorities and pace of external
    forces whose interest/lack of interest varies but
    whose main interests are always elsewhere. As
    external managers it is they who have the
    limited ambition of stopping the worst of the
    violence/keeping it to acceptable levels
    (acceptable to whom?) and their continuing
    overall responsibility may encourage continuing
    irresponsible brinkmanship by rival
    ethno-national leaders. Such problematical
    external help further supports the argument
    here that the post-cease-fire focus should
    increasingly be on developing cross-ethnic and
    cross-border contacts (but not on the
    integrationist/assimilationist goal of a single
    identity see below). As A works against such
    contact, the move to B needs to start sooner
    rather than later and be programmed in from the
    start.

14
City life versus territoriality
  • Theres a dialectic between the urban social
    space of mixing, sharing, co-existing (incl. in
    inter-city networks), and its antithesis in the
    state state-related territoriality of
    ethno-national separation and control.
  • Cities depend on border crossings there are
    inherent pressures to (re-)assert urban space
    over state and ethnic territorialities. Cities
    are amenable to agon or urban traditions of
    channelling and negotiating conflict see
    www.conflictincities.org
  • Border-crossing activities can achieve their
    highest density within divided cities (and
    between cities) - whether contested state borders
    actually run through the city (e.g., Jerusalem,
    Nicosia, pre-1989 Berlin), or are contested
    symbolically at local territorial borders of
    ethnicity (eg., in Belfast or Mostar).
  • Conflict is often most intense in cities due to
    density, proximity and symbolism, making them
    dysfunctional, or terminally threatening their
    viability as cities.
  • But, by the same token, there is always
    resistance and border-crossings (e.g., Berlins
    'wall jumpers divided Nicosias single sewage
    system war-torn Mostar retaining one tiny shared
    area (modelled on divided Berlin).
  • Hence the potential of city life for creative
    border crossings, whether in leisure groupings
    (e.g., 'Goths' in Belfast), or in political
    struggles for non-national goods (e.g., higher
    wages, or gender emancipation, or adequate public
    services), as alternatives to the pre-occupations
    of ethno-nationalists.

15
Some Conclusions
  • Ethnicity, nationalism, democracy and
    territoriality all have powerful appeal. All are
    problematical, and especially so in
    ethno-national conflicts where the resulting
    problems are intractable and sometimes lethal.
  • Resolving or transcending them demands a
    critical, radical stance, instead of accepting
    the presumptions of nationalism, essentialism and
    territorial integrity or concentrating on
    democracys territorial shell and neglecting
    democracy itself or confining democracy to its
    conventional (and stunted) territorial
    representative form all of which is what
    conventional conflict management generally does.
    It manages rather than resolves conflict, and
    sometimes fails even to manage because of
    built-in contradictory tendencies to reproduce,
    even exacerbate, rather than reduce divisions and
    conflict (as in partition undiluted
    consociationalism).
  • But for governments trying to manage these
    conflicts, consociationalism has the great
    advantage of not being radical just change some
    of the political institutions and deal with
    elites, rather than re-structure state and
    society. Deal with symptoms more than causes.
  • The powers who manage and impose solutions
    are typically caught in same nationalist
    'territorial trap and share the same flawed
    assumptions as the nationalists they are
    managing may indeed provide them with models
    of 'national success. They are in a weak
    position to 'preach or teach.

16
Some more conclusions
  • But we should not simply counterpose resolution
    to management, or integration to
    consociation in both cases the latter is a
    prerequisite for the former.
  • Peace-processes are better seen and planned
    dynamically, as moving from an emphasis on
    consociational measures to end the more serious
    violence and conflict, towards concentrating on
    politics which encourage the growth of political
    communities which straddle, cross-cut, under-cut
    or transcend ethnic divisions and territorial
    borders.
  • The resolution of ethno-national conflict will
    not come from moral appeals to agree a
    compromise or an integrated identity.
    Paradoxically, it will only come through other,
    more productive disagreements and conflicts about
    other issues on a non-ethno-national,
    non-territorial basis.
  • Good fences do not make good neighbours. But nor
    can weak fences. Only the neighbours themselves
    can.
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