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Section 10 Red Team Report


NMP EO-1 MISSION READINESS REVIEW. EO-1 Project approved March 1996 ... the laminate repairs, the disassembly, cleaning, testing, and re-assembly ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Section 10 Red Team Report

Section 10 Red Team Report
. . . Ronald L. Thomas EO-1 Red Team Review
May 9, 2000
Management Council
. . . Ronald L. Thomas EO-1 Red Team Review
  • EO-1 Project approved March 1996
  • EIRR formed to review EO-1 Project in June 1999
  • Participated in Orientation, Pre-Environmental,
    SAC-C, Hyperion Pre-ship, and EO-1 Pre-ship
  • Red Team formed to review the EO-1 Project in
    March 2000
  • Initial Review held March 28-31, 2000
  • Red-Team met on April 11 to review findings
  • Red Team Summary Report presented to Bill
    Townsend on May 9, 2000
  • Thermal Vacuum II Readiness Review held on June
    11, 2000
  • Red Team meeting held on June 13, 2000 to
  • Probabilistic Risk Management
  • Failure Mode Effects Analysis
  • Fault Tree Analysis
  • Delta Pre-ship Review held August 9-10, 2000
  • Co-chaired by C. Vanek and R. Thomas

Team Membership
Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks
The Red Team evaluated the 13 Project Specific
Areas below (as contained in the Charter) on a
scale of 1-10 (with 7 being nominal) for each of
the Major Project Elements
  • Technical Performance Reviews the level,
    competence, and independence
  • System Level Reviews the performance, level,
    and independence
  • Test and Verification Program the level and
    thoroughness implemented include VV and IV V
    used on software
  • Product Assurance level imposed on each project
    element. Includes parts usage, workmanship
    standards imposed, and software assurance
    processes used
  • Systems Management level imposed on project.
    Includes the performance and thoroughness of
    analyses, requirements management, documentation
    and technical-record keeping and workmanship and
    test process management.
  • Verification Matrix that shows the verification
    of the pre-launch requirements, and addresses the
    fidelity and type of verification.

Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks (continued)
  • 13 Project Specific Areas (continued)
  • Staffing the experience of the implementing
  • Test and Integration all hardware and software
    element results. Include information on review
    and assessment of all failures and anomalies, and
    their resolution
  • Failure-free and Total Operating Time consider
    for all mission critical hardware and software
  • Technical Review Process consider the results,
    and an assessment of all significant RFAs. Also
    consider the Projects responses to these RFAs
  • Mission Simulations and Launch/Operations
    consider the amount, level, and fidelity that has
    been done, or planned to be done
  • FMEAs, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic
    Risk Assessment Consider the use of these tools
    in quantifying the residual risk of EO-1,
    focusing on the Minimal Mission (as defined in
    the EO-1Mission Success Criteria).
  • Single-point Failures consider all, and provide
    a subjective assessment of the probability of
    each such failure mode causing a mission failure.

Specific EO-1 Red Team Tasks (continued)
  • In evaluating these 13 items, the Red Team was
    asked to do the following
  • Evaluate EO-1 in terms of the likelihood of it
    completing the validation requirements for the
    Minimal Mission
  • Document the 13 evaluation items for each Mission
    Element on a score of 1-10 with 7 being nominal
  • Ascertain and document all residual risks, and
    provide recommendations for mitigation
  • Assess all single-point failure mechanisms, and
    provide recommendations on their acceptability or
    non-acceptability, and the rationale for each
    conclusion. The WARP is to be specifically
  • Assess the FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis, and the
    Probabilistic Risk Assessments
  • Provide a full Report of the above to the GSFC
    PMC at the EO-1 MRR
  • Provide an overall mission risk statement, along
    with justification for the statement.
  • Each member is to provide a written report to the
    Chairman within 6 days after each review.
  • The Chairman is to provide a verbal report to the
    GSFC Dep. Center Director within 10 days after
    each review.

Red Team Findings for theEO-1 Project Specific
  • EO-1 Team is to be commended for excellent Red
    Team Reviews
  • All information very well presented in the
    required Red Team format
  • All speakers knew their subjects and were very
    open and responsive to detailed questions
  • All Red Team RFAs were very well addressed and
    documented Web-based responses were very
  • EO-1 was implemented as a NMP Faster, Better,
    Cheaper Technology Program
  • Few NASA standards imposed on the program
  • Primary focus to deliver the technology for the
    cost and schedule proposed
  • Project not required to have an FMEA or Risk
  • To reduce cost, S/C is single-string design and
    has inherent risk.
  • EO-1 Project has had numerous Technical Peer
    Reviews and Systems Level Reviews

Red Team Findings for theEO-1 Project Specific
  • Accelerated Minimal Mission has been baselined
    and increases opportunity for mission success
    (can be achieved in 120 days)
  • Combining high technology in the S/C subsystem
    (WARP) to get large amounts of data from the
    instruments, adds risk (WARP must work to get
    data from instruments)
  • WARP has worked very well throughout all testing
    with exception of a low-voltage power supply
    failure (heritage hardware)
  • WARP operated flawlessly during the second T/V
    observatory test.
  • MAP heritage was to be flowed into EO-1, but EO-1
    overtook MAP
  • There appears to be an imbalance between the
    completeness of the environmental test program
    for the various components.
  • The 3 instruments, 2 of which are not mission
    critical, were subjected to a more complete
    environmental test program which included T/V and
    sine vibration.
  • WARP, ACDS, and PSE (which are single-string, and
    are critical to the success of the program) were
    subjected to ONLY random vibration and thermal
    cycling (but not T/V). These operated flawlessly
    during a second T/V test.

General Observations
  • This is Swales first time as a S/C integrator
  • They have experienced staff
  • They appear to have done a good job.
  • Some of the GSFC supplied GFE (WARP) received
    minimum QA processes
  • Resulted initially in a low program specific
    assessment rating of 6 that the team believed
    could not be rectified. (However, very few
    failures occurred during subsequent observatory
    level testing)
  • As the Red Team investigated the GSFC hardware,
    particularly the WARP, it was found that the QA
    was better than initially believed to be.
  • Note, the Red Team did not reach consensus on a
    rating of 7, but most of the team believed a 7
    more accurately represented the QA then the 6.
  • Although the FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis and
    Probabilistic Analysis was done after S/C
    development, they were done well and added value
  • Appropriate staffing of the EO-1 Project Office
    (number and experience base) came on late in the
  • No Chief Engineer function assigned continuously.
  • Continuity of personnel was an issue (Minimal
    Mission helps this)

Red Team Rollup of Project Specific Assessments
for Each Element
  • WARP is required for mission success
  • Combining high technology in the WARP to obtain
    large amounts of data from the instruments,
    introduces risk.
  • WARP technology functions high data rate, high
    density storage, working well
  • Only failure has been the 5-volt power supply
    (random failure of a diode)
  • Lack of an ETU for WARP made troubleshooting very
  • Boards required much re-work, jumpers, etc.
  • Data Interface Board had to be replaced parts
    unavailable to replace Data Boards
  • Red Team conducted an independent assessment of
    the quality and analyses of the WARP Boards
  • The boards had been re-worked, but were found to
    be in satisfactory condition
  • Parts Level Stress Analysis was assessed by Red
    Team and found to be satisfactory.
  • Red Team requested Project provide thermal
    analysis of the WARP hardware configuration to
    determine thermal stresses of parts at their
    maximum power operating mode. (Analysis was found
    to be satisfactory).
  • Red Team endorsed Projects plan for proceeding
    with a design for using empty board slot in WARP
    to provide a backup WARP function for meeting the
    minimal mission requirements.
  • With the additional T/V testing successfully
    completed, Red Team agrees that project should
    proceed with WARP as originally designed.

Red Team Findings for the EO-1 Project Specific
AssessmentsS/C Subsystems - WARP
  • Since Preliminary Red Team Report in May 2000,
    the following work has been completed
  • All operations training
  • Technical Peer Review of safe mode on-orbit test
  • Security Review
  • Close out of critical and urgent discrepancy
  • End-to-end test of flight S/W load /dump and
    compare S/W
  • Installation of launch version of ground software
  • Spacecraft users guide and constraints and
    restrictions document
  • All contingency procedures
  • Remaining work to be completed by launch
    simulation on 10/11-12/00
  • Installation and verification of launch database
  • Final testing of launch version of ground S/W
  • Verification of all constraints and alerts
  • Completion of all end-to-end tests and
  • With successful completion of launch simulation
    on 10/12/00 and planned freeze of software and
    database, Red Team believes that operations is
    ready to support launch.

Red Team Findings for the EO-1 Project Specific
AssessmentsSummary Findings for Operations
Red Team Findings for theEO-1 Project Specific
  • Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors
  • The launch vehicle was evaluated in the context
    of a commercial launch services contract
  • Emphasis was placed on evaluating mission unique
    and L/V to S/C interfaces the core vehicle was
    reviewed to a lesser degree
  • Major mission-unique item (Dual Payload Attach
    Fitting (DPAF)) was reviewed in detail
  • The Red Team assessment was based on a
    presentation and action items answered by KSC no
    contractor presentations were made
  • Observations
  • There is no integrated mission document signed by
    the two flight projects attesting to their
    concurrence that their respective interface
    requirements have been met and verified
  • KSC signs Boeing Mission Specification for NASA
  • Although EO-1 depends on KSC to ensure correct
    integration of all interface requirements with
    other primary and secondary spacecraft, no signed
    documentation exists which assigns clear
    accountability for potential incompatibilities
    between the two primary spacecraft
  • EO-1 dependent on KSC for updates
  • Compliance is heavily dependent on MIWG process

Red Team Findings for theEO-1 Project Specific
  • Concern
  • The absence of S/C project signature gives the
    impression of a lack of accountability by GSFC in
    the verification of their payload requirement
  • Recommendation
  • Require that the two spacecraft projects clearly
    document their accountability for all interface
    requirement verifications
  • KSC continues to authorize Mission Specification
    with current signature process

Payload Fairing
  • Fairing collision with overpass
  • During transportation of the payload fairing from
    Pueblo to VAFB, the fairing shipping container
    was driven into an overpass, resulting in minor
    damage to fairing
  • Fairing has been repaired
  • Fairing contamination concern
  • Review of Globalstars 5 and 7 post-flight video
    indicated that some particulate debris had been
    generated, most likely originating from the
    Fluoroglide lubricant applied to the fairing
    separation rail bellows
  • The EO-1 Project determined that this risk was
    not acceptable because some spacecraft
    instruments were located near the fairing split
    line and were, therefore, potentially susceptible
    to this contamination
  • The fairing contractor, Boeing, disassembled the
    fairing and cleaned all the lubricate. GSFC
    personnel inspected the cleaned parts and
    confirmed that they satisfactorily met the EO-1
    project requirements.
  • The fairing is being reassembled and will be
    shipped to the launch site.
  • The Red Team will review the KSC ERB actions
    concerning the laminate repairs, the disassembly,
    cleaning, testing, and re-assembly of the fairing
    in the very near future.

Red Team Findings for theEO-1 Launch Vehicle
  • Launch Vehicle Residual Risk for EO-1 Mission Is

Red Team EO-1 Residual Risks Recommendations
for Mitigation
  • S/C is a single-string design
  • WARP is an advanced technology data processor and
    storage device that is necessary for Minimal
    Mission success
  • Obtain at least 300 hours of system failure-free
    T/V operation
  • Successfully completed except for S-band
  • Implement around the clock, 3 shifts per day,
    on-orbit operations this allows Minimal Mission
    to be completed in about 120 days
  • Minimal mission has been base-lined
  • Probabilistic Risk Assessment shows probability
    of success for the Minimal mission to be 0.9
  • Obtain at least 300 hours of WARP failure-free
  • Successfully achieved in T/V II
  • Need Stress Analysis that shows acceptable parts
  • Stress Analysis completed acceptable parts
  • Define backup solution that utilizes the empty
    slot in the WARP, or a new box that matches the
    baseplate footprint, to meet the requirements of
    the ALI only
  • Design successfully completed, but not
    implemented because of successful operation in
    T/V II.

Red Team EO-1 Residual Risks Recommendations
for Mitigation
  • Conduct walk-throughs of all mission critical
    ground and flight software, and freeze software
    no later than start of baseline functional
    testing for T/V exercise this software during
  • This was successfully implemented
  • Project should assess how they will conduct EO-1
    operations utilizing the existing test bed with
    an acceptable level of risk to the mission
  • Project successfully addressed this in the
    Pre-ship Review Presentation.
  • Requires failure-free operating time on S/C and
    accelerated operations plan
  • Failure-free operating time achieved (except for
    S-band transponder), and Minimal-mission
  • Red Team members did review some GSFC supplied
    hardware and QA paper work and found that they
    were better than the Red Team originally thought
    they were.
  • Flight software still undergoing change and has
    minimal failure-free operation time
  • High fidelity hardware / software test bed does
    not exist for supporting on-orbit operations
  • The QA process as chosen by the Project for the
    Goddard GFE has resulted in a level of program
    risk that cannot be quantified.

Red Team EO-1 Residual Risks Recommendations
for Mitigation
  • Require that a worst case analysis be done that
    quantifies the amount of margin that may be used
    before launch
  • Project determined margin and has taken steps to
    insure that margin does not erode.
  • Perform thermal analyses of hardware to determine
    thermal stresses at maximum power operating mode.
    Evaluate performance in upcoming S/C T/V
  • Successfully completed
  • Problem could not be determined, but identical
    unit from the TRIANA Mission is being
    substituted. These transponders have a good
    history and the TRIANA unit has completed
    acceptance testing. Additional failure-free
    hours will be put on the unit to achieve a total
    500 hours of operation in TV and an additional
    300 hours in ambient integrated with the S/C.
  • The amount of He required to use up the Gyro
    margin is unknown. The concern is that the Gyro
    margin may be exceeded before launch.
  • Critical S/C hardware, WARP, PSE ACDS, received
    only thermal cycling (not T/V).
  • S-band transponder suffered an intermittent
    failure during S/C TV II Testing

Red Team Assessment ofEO-1 Single-Point
Failures, FMEA, FTA, PRA
  • Red Team Charter focuses on single-point failure
    mechanisms as a major source of residual risk.
  • Three system engineering tools have been used (at
    the NASA Administrators request) to estimate the
    likelihood of occurrence and overall mission risk
    associated with the predominate failure modes
  • Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA)
  • Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
  • Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA)
  • These tools were not used to develop the EO-1
    design, but were performed as part of the Red
    Team process after the design was completed
  • Single string design by policy (redundancy was
    largely out-of-bounds)
  • Selective redundancy utilized where possible
  • These tools have been used in a complementary way
    to evaluate the likelihood of successfully
    completing the EO-1 Minimal Mission
  • Included the Flight, Ground System and Launch
    (mission unique)
  • Utilizing these tools, the Probabilistic Risk
    Assessment yielded a mission success probability
    of 0.90 for the Minimal Mission (120 days)

Red Team Assessment ofEO-1 Single-Point
Failures, FMEA, FTA, PRA
  • EO-1 S/C does have selected redundancy and not
    all hardware is required to meet the Minimal
  • Solar Array Loss of a string can be tolerated
  • Solar Array Drive Not required for Minimum
  • PSE some internal work-arounds available
  • 1773 Data Bus Redundant fibers, Star Couplers,
    and Transceivers
  • Propulsion Not required for Minimum Mission
  • WARP Some internal partial redundancies
  • X-Band Transmit Not required for Minimum
  • ALI Some internal partial redundancies
  • Not all instruments/hardware are required to meet
    the Minimal Mission
  • Hyperion, LAC
  • X-Band Phased Array Antenna, Lightweight Flexible
    SA, Pulse Plasma Thruster, GPS, Warp X-Band
  • Launch Vehicle Mission-Unique FMEA
  • EO-1 Separation from DPAF Bolt Cutters and
    Wiring are redundant
  • Ground System FMEA
  • Spares and alternative data paths
  • Safe Hold will keep EO-1 unharmed during Ground
    System outages

Red Team Assessment ofEO-1 Single-Point
Failures, FMEA, FTA, PRA
  • WARP as a Single-Point Failure
  • Is a single string component
  • Has an S-Band back-up to the X-Band Channel
  • Memory chips can fail without any impact to the
    WARPs operation
  • Can map around large areas of failed memory
  • Entire memory board can fail without impact to
    the other memory board
  • WARP reliability prediction is 0.896 for one year
    and 0.950 for 120 days
  • Red Team believes the WARP represents an
    acceptable risk for EO-1
  • Received in-depth assessment from Red Team
    (examination of boards, stress and thermal
    analyses reviewed)
  • Red Team concerned there was no breadboard or
    engineering model, but examination of boards
    showed all re-work done well. (Memory Interface
    Board was replaced)
  • Has never had a design failure and only one
    hardware fix (defective part in LVPC)
  • Has had no software modifications
  • Over 2000 hours of operation, over 750 hours of
    T/V operation, and over 500 hours since the
    replacement of the LVPC regulator board

Red Team EO-1 Overall Mission Risk Statement
(with Justification)
  • The Red Team assessment is that EO-1 is a low
    risk for achieving success for the Minimum
  • Major risk is the single string design
  • Power System, ACS, WARP, and ALI must operate
    properly or mission is a complete loss
  • S/C systems and ALI instrument do have selected
  • Mitigation
  • Selected redundancy and many operational
    work-arounds do exist
  • Loss of Star Tracker can be mitigated by use of
    three-axis magnetometer (TAM)
  • Loss of IRU can be mitigated by use of the Star
  • S-Band transmitter can backup the X-Band
    capability (not vice-versa)
  • Housekeeping RSN essential only through Solar
    Array deployment
  • WARP can lose a whole memory board (or parts of
    both boards) and still meet mission requirements.
  • Failure of one of the ALI SCA channels can be
  • The ALI and S/C systems have a high number of
    operating hours
  • The Flight Operations Team participated fully in
    all S/C testing
  • The Delta is a proven LV
  • Minimal Mission Success can be achieved in only
    120 days at a probability of success of 0.90
    (0.75 if spread over one year)

Back-Up Charts
Instruments ALI (Rating 7)
  • The ALI is necessary to meet the Minimal Mission
  • Lincoln Lab developed the instrument
  • Lincoln Lab had good management involvement and a
    long history of building this type of hardware.
  • They also had good peer reviews.
  • They had a good test program with good factors of
  • The ALI has selective redundancies in the
    mechanisms to reduce the possibility of failure
  • Red Team found all processes for the ALI to be a
    7 (nominal) or above. However, the re-occurring
    contamination that occurs in the focal plane
    needed to be addressed. (Addressed at the Delta
    Pre-Ship Review)
  • On-board reference lamp tracks contamination
  • Heating of focal plane drives off contamination
  • On-orbit decontamination process included in
    mission planning
  • Failures in the ALI occurred early, were
    successfully repaired, and were well documented.

Instruments Hyperion (Rating 7)
  • This is a TRW developed instrument
  • Not required to meet the Minimal Mission
  • Based on existing designs, good technical
    reviews, and test and excellent calibration
  • Implemented excellent risk management and product
    assurance program.
  • Built on schedule within 12 months and quality
    was not cut or reduced.
  • Selected redundancies to increase probability of

Instruments LAC (Rating 7)
  • This is a Goddard developed instrument which
    implemented Goddard workmanship and quality
    control standards.
  • They conducted all the appropriate environmental
    testing, including T/V at the box level
  • LAC is not required for the Minimal Mission
  • There have been no residual problems noted on
    this hardware

Spacecraft Subsystems
  • 1. Technical Peer Reviews (Rating 7)
  • Hardware
  • All S/C Subsystems have documented peer reviews
  • Software
  • Some software was peer reviewed by the MAP
  • RFAs submitted to identify all mission critical
    software, and formal code walk-throughs have been
    conducted for all critical software
  • Code walk-throughs completed for all critical

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 2. System Level Reviews (Rating 8)
  • Total of 32 Reviews completed between EO-1
    Primary Configuration Review in May 1997 and Red
    Team Preliminary Report in May 2000
  • 403 RFAs assigned
  • 6 Reviews to launch (including Red Team Reviews)
  • Review Sponsorship
  • 20 Reviews for Office of Flight Assurance (code
    300) conducted
  • 17 External Reviews (EIRR, Littles Committee,
    Senior Managers Review, Red Team)
  • 2 Engineering Directorate Reviews (AETD, Code
  • 5 NMP/EO-1 Project Office Reviews
  • Cross-involvement of all review teams in many
  • Additional GSFC and Red Team Reviews held since
    May 2000 include
  • Thermal Vacuum II Readiness Review
  • Red Team Review of RFAs and EO-1 Risk Analyses
  • Delta Pre-Ship Review

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 3. Test and Verification Program (Rating 7)
  • The observatory functional and environmental test
    program was complete and included all the
    appropriate testing required
  • The philosophy of the Project was to defer
    testing (in some cases) to observatory level by
    limiting the box level testing -- Red Team
    believes that this has resulted in additional
  • Lack of Engineering test units is a residual risk
    to program, trouble shooting difficult on ground
    and on orbit
  • Red Team recommended a min. of 300 hours of
    failure-free operating hours be obtained in T/V
    on all hardware to obtain sufficient hardware
  • This was successfully achieved except for a
    failure of the S-band transponder (heritage
  • Project obtained a replacement transponder from
    the Triana Program and will achieve sufficient
    hours of operation on it and in the system prior
    to launch.
  • Software project utilizes 7 RSNs and 2 Mongoose
    V Processors
  • Software has some heritage from SAMPEX, XTE, TRMM
    and MAP.
  • Part of the software had formal IVV
  • Software operated successfully during final 300
    hour T/V testing of the observatory

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 4. Product Assurance (Rating 7)
  • The contractor elements ALI, Hyperion, etc.,
    seemed to have a more rigorous quality process
    than the GSFC elements.
  • Inconsistent across all of the hardware by the
    Project / Institution. A serious consequence is
    that it is difficult if not impossible to put
    Product Assurance back into the hardware
  • Red Team initially concerned that a minimal
    effort was performed on the GSFC hardware
    regarding Product Assurance
  • Independent assessments of the GSFC hardware,
    particularly the WARP, showed that the PA was
    better then initially believed.
  • Successful completion of the 300 hour T/V testing
    at the observatory level (except for the
    transponder) adds confidence that the PA is

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 5. Systems Management (Swales) (Rating 8)
  • The Swales Systems Manager provided a good review
    of their Systems management of the S/C
  • Good traceability of lowest level requirements
    back to Level 1 (EO-1 Project Plan)
  • Each of the lowest level requirements, for a
    given function, was verified by Analysis, or Test
    and Evaluation
  • Critical S/C resources were well managed Mass,
    Telemetry, Power, etc.
  • Configuration Management processes in place for
    drawings and IT Procedures
  • Excellent work order process utilized
  • Excellent IT Management

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 6. Verification Matrix (Rating 7)
  • The Project provided a complete verification
    matrix for all the elements/subsystems.
  • The Verification Matrix was reviewed by each
    presenter for his particular subsystem/area
    during all subsequent reviews and was found to be

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 7. Staffing (Rating 7)
  • Project staff which presented to the Red Team
    were knowledgeable and competent.
  • Swales provided names/experience of their project
  • Swales has excellent subsystems experience, but
    this was their first S/C integration
  • Swales key personnel had extensive S/C
    integration experience
  • The present GSFC staff has extensive experience
    in their respective areas. We were informed that
    the project staffing did get off to a very slow
    start and had a high turnover rate. In fact, B.
    Cramer and D. Schulz are the only two remaining
    from the original EO-1 Team.
  • The project manager has extensive S/C experience.
  • The current software manager has excellent
    experience, but has only been on board since late
  • The GSFC supplied WARP, LAC, and Formation Flying
    teams all appear to have well-qualified staff.

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 8. Integration and Test (Rating 8)
  • Technically sound Integration and Test program
  • CPT to test every function and to measure
    performance of every subsystem.
  • Contains about 100 individual tests
  • All nominal and critical commands tested (about
  • Performed non-CPT Performance Tests
  • End-to-End optical for instruments, X-Band
    pointing tests, GPS Constellation Tests, Solar
    Array mechanical deployment, Heater tests, etc.
  • MOC simulation tests
  • Thermal Vacuum Tests of complete S/C
  • Conducted CPT at both hot and cold plateaus
  • Functional tests conducted during pump-down and
    at end before chamber break.
  • Conducted post-environmental CPT in Dec. 1999
  • Good procedures for checking out all systems and
    for reporting problems (RFA submitted).
  • 300 hour T/V test successfully completed at
    observatory level prior to Delta Pre-Ship Review
    (except for transponder)

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 9. Operating Time (Rating 7)
  • Red Team initially concerned that there was not
    enough failure-free hours in T/V at the
    observatory level due to
  • disassembly of S/C,
  • software not completed or frozen,
  • WARP power supply board had been changed, and
  • many mission critical boxes did not undergo T/V
    after re-work
  • Project alleviated this concern by successfully
    completing a 300 hr. T/V test (except for the
    transponder) prior to the delta pre-ship review.
  • During these tests the observatory was exercised
    through its thermal, power, and data handling
  • New Transponder will have sufficient operating
    time at the box level and system level prior to

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 10. Technical Review Process (Rating 7)
  • Project has initiated actions to close RFAs
    generated by Red Team.
  • The project has addressed RFAs from all the
    reviews and is close to having them all closed
  • Web-based system for reviewing and closing out
    RFAs worked well
  • Project presented many of the critical Subsystem
    RFAs and how they were closed during the Red Team

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 11. Mission Simulations and Launch/Operations
    (Rating 8)
  • Red Team has found the mission simulations plans
    and implementation to be good.
  • Project has accomplished flight operations team
    training using classroom techniques, the actual
    vehicle, and training simulators. This training
    plan is very thorough and complete.
  • ORR scheduled for October 3, 2000 and there are
    still a number of actions that are not complete.
    It is expected that the open actions will be
    closed, but if not the rating of 8 will be

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 12. FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic
    Risk Assessment
  • The FME, FTA and PRA were completed after the
    design and development of EO-1 was nearly
  • Project conducted a special review for the Red
    Team to review these Risk Analyses
  • The Risk Analyses appear to have been done well
    and have added confidence that EO-1 is a low risk
    for meeting the minimal mission of 120 days.

Spacecraft Subsystems (continued)
  • 13. Single-Point Failures (Rating 7)
  • Single string systems have a long successful
    history at Goddard, but hardware must have a
    robust design and good quality.
  • Red Team recommended a minimum of 300
    failure-free operation hours in T/V to mitigate
    the S/C changes and the single-string risk.
  • Red Team supports the Project recommendation to
    accelerate Operations so the Minimal Mission can
    be verified as quickly as possible (120 days).
  • EO-1 is single-string, but some hardware has
    selected redundancies
  • Mechanisms for the solar array deployment,
  • ALI and Hyperion Instrument cover actuators
  • Solar array parallel strings
  • X-band antenna can fail gracefully due to
    multiple SSPAs
  • X-band and S-band communication modes.
  • WARP has redundant memory boards, each of which
    can fail gracefully
  • 1773 data bus, and power harness
  • ACS Separate safehold processor, main computer
    memory, and propulsion heater.
  • All non-essential loads have fuse protection

Spacecraft Technologies
  • The S/C technologies are all rated 7 or above in
    all the specific assessment areas they are
  • Enhanced Formation Flying, EFF
  • Light-weight Flexible Solar Array, LFSA
  • Carbon-Carbon Radiator, CCR
  • X-band Phased Array Antenna, XPAA
  • Global Position System, GPS
  • Pulsed Plasma Thruster, PPT
  • The above technologies with the exception of EFF,
    XPAA and PPT can not jeopardize the Minimum
  • PPT will not be activated until after the Minimal
    Mission requirements are satisfied.
  • EFF software can be changed from the ground if
    problems arise.
  • XPAA has many redundant SSPAs, and is backed up
    by S-band.

Spacecraft Technologies (continued)
  • XPAA is rated 7 or above in all the specific
    assessment areas.
  • XPAA is not necessary to meet the Minimal Mission
    (ALI data only and using the S-Band), but is to
    communicate the large amount of data from the
    three instruments.
  • The Red Team believes the XPAA has a low risk of
  • Designed and built by Boeing under fixed-price
    contract with GSFC
  • NASA GRC provided independent evaluation of RF
    Modules, packaging and array communications
    performance using Boeing EM hardware.
  • Three formal contract reviews conducted.
  • Experienced design / development team
  • Has more than 350 hrs. on-time since integrated
    on S/C
  • No open items
  • Very redundant design except for the RSN

  • 1. Technical Peer Reviews (Rating 7)
  • 2. System Level Reviews (Rating 7)
  • Operations included in the Project system
  • 3. Test and Verification (Rating 7)
  • Test and Verification approach is sound.
  • Verification of the flight and ground database
    expected before ORR
  • Implementation and verification of constraints
    and restrictions (CR) are nearly complete (
    Review at ORR on 10/3/00)
  • Project has limited test bed for on-orbit anomaly
    investigation and for trouble- shooting problems
    but by combining MAP and EO-1 hardware all the
    software can be tested on the ground
  • 4. Product Assurance (Rating 7)
  • Operations products (procedures, database, CR)
    are now under CM

Operations (continued)
  • 5. Systems Management (Rating 7)
  • Systems management approach and plans are sound
  • Team has done a good job of documenting problem
  • Operations documentation is Web-based
  • 6. Verification Matrix (Rating8)
  • Project provided an Operations testing matrix
    showing status/plans for all operations tests.
  • 7. Staffing and Experience (Rating 8)
  • Operations Team appears to be adequately staffed
    with experienced personnel.
  • Team presented detail plans on how it would
    implement 24 hour, 120 day Minimal Mission

Operations (continued)
  • 8. Test and Integration (Rating 8)
  • Project uses same ground system for operations
    training and IT
  • By launch, the operations ground software will
    have 600 hours with the S/C
  • 9. Failure Free and Total Operating Time (Rating
  • Red Team recommended and EO-1 achieved a minimum
    of 300 hrs. of failure-free S/C operation for T/V
    tests prior to delta pre-ship review.
  • 10. Technical Review Process (Rating 7)
  • Project has some open Operations RFAs assigned
    by the Red Team (ORR item)
  • 11. Mission Simulations Launch/Operations
    (Rating 8)
  • Project has conducted many mission simulations to
    date, final plans TBD for ORR
  • Most of the operations staff have participated in
  • Contingency planning was well done and nearly
    complete (ORR Review)

Operations (continued)
  • 12. FMEA, FTA, PRA (Rating 7)
  • Appropriate documents were supplied to Red Team
    for review
  • 13. Single-Point Failures (Rating 7)
  • Both S-Band and X-Band communication available
    from S/C to ground.
  • Ground can communicate through at least two
    ground stations and through the TDRSS System

Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors
  • Dual Payload Attach Fitting (DPAF)
  • DPAF comments based on review of documentation
    and splinter meeting with DPAF program office
    management team
  • DPAF documents reviewed
  • Design Certification Review (9/28/99)
  • Design Certification Review Update (3/7/00)
  • Delta L/V Design Certification Review (9/29/99)
  • Requirements Verification Matrix
  • Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
  • Specification Control Drawing (1D89290)

Launch Vehicle Evaluation Factors (continued)
  • Overall DPAF Observations
  • DPAF program was well planned and executed
  • Mission Success was top priority throughout
    program (no cut corners)
  • DPAF design was heavily based on Ariane
    4/MMS/SPELDA design and process heritage
  • Critical flight items were fully redundant and
    thoroughly tested
  • Matra Marconi Space (MMS) and Boeing have
    significant relevant flight experience
  • Very Low Residual Risk
  • Lack of modal survey prevents reduction of small
    uncertainties in predicted loads
  • Load/deflection was used to verify structure and
    interface stiffness
  • Modal survey is more rigorous

Launch Vehicle
  • 1. Technical Peer Reviews - 8
  • DPAF (Dual Payload Attach Fitting)
  • DPAF major new development item
  • DPAF reviewed more extensively than the few other
    mission unique elements
  • Several independent peer reviews held for DPAF
  • Independent reviews attended by relevant
    subsystem experts (considerable breadth)
  • Other Mission Elements
  • Level, competence and independence of KSC
    resident teams very good
  • Continuity of KSC review function stable
    throughout transition of mission
  • KSC Delta specific depth limited

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 2. System Level Reviews - 7
  • DPAF
  • Standard set of system level reviews
  • Additional Design Certification Review held
  • Many different organizations involved in reviews
  • NASA KSC, NASA OLS, Boeing,etc
  • Vested interest in mission success by all parties
    (potential future capability)
  • Other Mission Elements
  • Standard set of system level reviews
  • Experienced background for MIT (mission
    integration team)
  • limited experience in current roles
  • above average experience in other aspects or
    other launch vehicles
  • For mission unique items, KSC conducts some
    independent reviews
  • KSC has contractual right to approve/disapprove
    or right to review all mission unique or mission
    specific analyses, testing and reports
  • Heavy dependence, with KSC participation, on
    Boeing review process for core vehicle items
    Aerospace under contract for pedigree reviews

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 3. Test and Verification Program (for mission
    uniques) - 9
  • DPAF
  • DPAF Test and Verification very complete and
    detailed very high standard
  • Although subcontractor had exceptional heritage
    on SPELDA program, DPAF still re-tested as a new
  • LCCD systems subjected to both SPELDA and US
    conventional Lot Acceptance Testing
  • DPAF LCCD gets the benefit of MMS standard
    practices and US testing philosophy
  • LCCD Lot Acceptance Testing and Margin testing
  • Second Proof Test after pathfinder activity
    eliminates risks
  • Small residual risk due to lack of Modal Survey
  • Other Mission Elements
  • PAF Fit check and shock testing with flight PAF
  • GN2 purge standard mission specific item
    numerous flights standard design
  • Independent KSC review of standard Boeing vehicle

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 4. Level of Mission Assurance - 8
  • DPAF
  • GSFC Code 300 performed DCRs and provided
    important continuity
  • Experienced NASA FA individual continuous on DPAF
    throughout program
  • Transitioned with program to KSC
  • Additional KSC mission assurance capability still
  • Consistent NASA Project Office involvement
    throughout DPAF program
  • Boeing and NASA mission assurance present
    throughout development of DPAF
  • DPAF received greater scrutiny as a development
  • MMS quality control processes appear to be quite
  • Other Mission Elements
  • Boeing mission assurance processes above average
    for DPAF, average in general
  • KSC mission assurance limited but growing

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 5. Systems Management for Mission Uniques - 7
  • DPAF
  • NASA DPAF team constant throughout life of system
  • Minimum Boeing Personnel turnover
  • Minimal Boeing subcontractor personnel turnover
  • Detailed configuration control implemented by
    Boeing through Specification Control Drawing
  • Other Mission Elements
  • KSC focus on mission unique and integration items
  • Mission Specification (a.k.a. Interface Control)
    Document not formally signed by spacecraft
    projects (see special topic)

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 6. Staffing - 8
  • DPAF
  • Experienced NASA project office personnel
  • Boeing and MMS team have considerable previous
  • Other Mission Elements
  • Experienced KSC resident team at Boeing
  • Stable Boeing workforce reported by KSC
  • Limited Delta-specific contractor and civil
    servant experience at KSC
  • Technical depth improving with experience

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 7. Integration and Test - 9
  • DPAF
  • Thorough integration and test program for DPAF
  • Good waiver/nonconformance process
  • Rigorous tracking of non-conformances
  • Most waivers issued against documentation
  • Other Mission Elements
  • Strong ERB System review by KSC Systems
    Engineering and Flight Assurance
  • Well defined system tests
  • Well defined PAF Fit and Shock Tests
  • NASA telemetry lab participates in Delta testing,
    allowing detailed analysis

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 8. Operating Time - 7
  • DPAF
  • DPAF does not contain any active electronic items
    (i.e.. black boxes)
  • Other Mission Elements
  • No mission unique electronic configurations
    required for mission..
  • 9. Technical Review Process - RFAs - 8 (Above
  • DPAF
  • All RFAs tracked and answered
  • All DPAF independent review team RFAs were
  • Other Mission Elements
  • RFAs tracked and answered

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 10. Mission Simulations/Testing - 7
  • DPAF
  • S/C PAF Fit checks shock testing performed
  • Pathfinder activity performed
  • Prepared launch site personnel for DPAF
  • Validated facility capabilities and
  • Other Mission Elements
  • KSC Delta experience recently exercised on Image
    launch campaign
  • Other recent DS-1, Landsat-7
  • Detailed mission dress rehearsal

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 11. Assess FMEA, FTA and PRA for Completeness - 7
  • DPAF
  • FMECA and Separation Reliability Analysis
  • Other Mission Elements
  • FMECA, FTA, PRA tools not formally used for
    launch vehicle
  • FTA used for post-failure analysis
  • KSC active participant, with approval authority,
    in all phases of mission unique development and
  • FMEA, PRA, FTA not required for vehicle mission

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 12. Mission Requirements Verification Matrix - 8
  • DPAF
  • DPAF detailed verification matrix completed
  • Launch Vehicle specific requirements for DPAF
    also tracked and documented
  • Other Mission Elements
  • Heritage GSFC and Boeing verification processes
  • The Boeing Mission Specification (nominal
    interface control document) not signed by
    spacecraft projects (see special topics)
  • Boeings formal verification process for their
    mission specifications occurs very late in the
    integration process
  • Not an early program process or document
    (end-game process)
  • KSC developing independent verification database
    EO-1/SAC-C first use
  • KSC process improvement

Launch Vehicle (continued)
  • 13. Single Point Failures - 7
  • DPAF
  • Single point failures limited to high reliability
    item (i.e. structures)
  • DPAF is quite simple (mostly structure), and
  • LCCD fully redundant
  • Other Mission Elements
  • Core vehicle not reviewed
  • No Single point failures identified for EO-1
  • standard Delta 37 Clampband with dual 37 pin
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