Yves Sintomer, Carsten Herzberg, Anja R

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Yves Sintomer, Carsten Herzberg, Anja Röcke
Participatory Budgets in Europe Between Civic
Participation and Modernisation of Public
Administration Some comparative elementsApril
2006
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Team

• Research director Yves Sintomer
• Researchers Carsten Herzberg, Anja Röcke
• In collaboration with 14 researchers from 8
  countries
• Belgium Ludivine Damay, Christine Schaut
• France Marion Ben-Hammo, Sandrina Geoffroy,
  Julien Talpin
• Great Britain Jeremy Hall
• Italy Giovanni Allegretti (coordinator), Pier
  Paolo Fanesi, Lucilla Pezzetta, Michelangelo
  Secchi
• Netherlands Hugo Swinnen
• Poland Elzbieta Plaszczyk
• Portugal Luis Guerreiro
• Spain Ernesto Ganuza
• Administrative director Hans-Peter Müller,
  Humboldt University (Berlin)
• Source of funding Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Marc
  Bloch Centre (Berlin)

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Introduction

• There is a dynamic development of participatory
  budgets (PBs) in Europe. This presentation aims
  at
• giving information about the conditions for and
  the context of European PBs
• discussing the impact of PBs on administrative
  reform, politics and social justice
• Nota bene
• Though we give examples of concrete impacts of
  PB, these results cannot be generalised because
  a) experiments are still very young
• b) the lack of quantitative data. Impacts going
  beyond single cases therefore present hypotheses
• Concrete procedures and ideal-typical models are
  presented without further explication, additional
  PP presentations exist

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Contents
I. Development II. Context III.
Typologies IV. Effects and hypotheses Appendi
x. Additional material by country
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I. Development
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Development
PB was invented in Porto Alegre at the beginning
of the 1990s. Since then, it has been adopted in
hundreds of other Brazilian and Latin-American
cities In Europe, the first experiments started
in Italy (Grottammare 1994), Great Britain
(Salford 1996) and Germany (Mönchweiler 1998) The
World Social Forum, first organised in Porto
Alegre in 2001, contributed to the exponential
spread of PBs in Europe Countries with most
examples of PB currently are Italy (15), Spain
(14), France (11) and Germany (10). There exist
also cases in Great Britain (2), Portugal (2) and
Poland (1) The population of cities with
participatory budgets increased from 14.723 in
1994 to 4.8 million in 2005 Broadest scope in
Spain 2 Mio. citizens (5,2 of the population)
are concerned. Increasing tendency
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II. Context
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Size of cities
PBs exist in cities of different size PBs develop
increasingly in larger cities of more than
100.000 inhabitants, their number doubled in the
last two years examples are Salford (GB), Plock
(Pl), Bonn (D) More and more European capitals
start at the district level with PB Berlin,
Paris, Roma, London perhaps Madrid in Oslo in
the future
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Population of cities/districts with participatory
budget in Europe (2005)
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Social context

• The social context has no direct influence on the
  set-up of PBs. It varies considerably
• Unemployment rate between 3,8 (Salford) and 23
  (Córdoba)
• Percentage of foreign nationals between 0,9
  (Plock) and 26,2 (St. Denis)

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Political context

• Current situation most PBs in cities with
  left-wing government (85,5), mostly
  social-democrats (nearly 50 of all 55 cases)
• Differences in political affiliation between
  countries
• consensual in Germany (all parties involved)
• post-communist majority in France
• communist/social-democrat balance in Spain
• social-democrat majority in Italy
• Voting turnout between 32,5 (Plock) and 87
  (Mons) generally declining voting tendency
• PBs at the intersection between a legitimacy
  crisis of representative democracy and the search
  of left-wing parties for a new profile?

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• Political affiliation of mayor and procedure of
  PB
• No correlation between political affiliation and
  selection of a specific procedure of PB
• Analysis country by country
• Germany mayors of all parties support the
  procedure Consultation on public finances.
  Post-communists tend to introduce voting
  procedures and to strengthen the feedback
• France only post-communist and social democrat
  mayors support PB, both favour Proximity
  procedure
• Spain mostly post-communist and social democrat
  mayors are engaged in PB. Initially, the former
  tended to favour the POA procedure (Corcoba,
  Figaro), whilst the latter tended to prefer a
  mixed procedure between POA and Organisation
  of organised interests (Albacete, Almansa).
• Italy mainly social democrats and
  post-communists introduce PB. They chose either
  the procedure of Proximity or of POA, there
  are no clear party preferences

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Electoral participation in selected
cities/districts
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Dynamics of participation (I) Is there a
bottom-up process?

• In no case mere bottom-up process
• In Albacete, Cordoba, Grottammare combination of
  bottom-up and top-down process
• In most cases (16 of 19 selected cities)
  top-down process

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Dynamics of participation (II) Which social
classes participate?
In most cases (12) Combination of upper working
class and middle class Middle class participation
in all 3 selected German towns, in Plock and
Albacete In some cases mostly upper working
class participation Bobigny, Pont de Claix Open
question In PB more working-class participation
than in other participatory devices?
Berlin-Lichtenberg to early for evaluation
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Bobigny is counted twice working class and
joint working/middle class for different
instruments
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Dynamics of participation (III) Type of
participating citizens
In more than 50 of cases (11 of 20),
participation is directed towards both active and
organised citizens Mostly active citizens
Bobigny, Saint Denis, Rheinstetten Only
organised citizens Albacete Sectors of
population Youth and/or children Pont de Claix,
Sevilla (attempts), Cordoba (6-12 years-old
children) in 2005 All citizens No referendum in
the framework of PB Partly ordinary citizens
(random selection) Emsdetten, Hilden,
Berlin-Lichtenberg, Pont de Claix Use of random
selection is a European specificity with respect
to Latin America!
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Financial situation

• Financial situation of city/district has no
  direct influence on development of PB
• Part of municipal budget per citizen varies from
  42 Euros (Plock) to 3869 Euros
  (Venezia)
• Municipal debt in relation to total municipal
  budget varies from 5,6 (Morsang) to 169,5
  (Salford)
• Public enterprises manage high amount of
  additional resources (which dont appear in
  municipal budget reports)
• Hilden (85 of the city budget), Emsdetten (75),
  Sevilla (50) and Plock (45)
• Are public enterprises included into
  deliberations within PB?
• Yes Puente Genil
• To some degree Groß-Umstadt (during one year,
  the duties, income and expenditure of public
  enterprises were transparently presented and
  discussed within PB)

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III. Typologies
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Typology of procedures
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Global Typology
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IV. Effects and hypotheses Remember New
experiments! Concrete impacts difficult to
evaluate!
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Modernisation of administration

• European PBs do not develop mostly in the most
  modernised cities
• PB as a way of  nachholende  modernisation?

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Modernisation of administration 5 main trends (I)

• 1. Improvement of services via Feedback of
  citizens/use of associations expertise (9 cases)
  
• Pont de Claix Improvement of proximity
  services
• Pieve Emmanuele Improvement of communication
  (front office), local police and social-cultural
  services (youth) ...
• Albacete Analysis of urban infrastructure and
  of infrastructure needs made by federation of
  neighbourhood initiatives
• Other examples in Córdoba, Salford, Puente
  Genil, Sevilla, Plock
• 2. More transversal links between services (7
  cases)
• Pont de Claix 4 multitask teams created in
  neighbourhoods
• Cordoba Coordination between secretaries which
  are linked to PB
• Puente Genil Transversal commission and
  working groups of different secretaries,
  implementation of transversal programmes
• Other examples in Pieve Emmanuele, Venezia,
  Palmela, Albacete, Sevilla

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Modernisation of administration 5 main trends
(II)

• 3. Acceleration of administrative procedures (6
  3 at proximity-level)
• Salford different services at neighbourhood
  level
• Grottammare reform and application of urban
  master plan
• Albacete repartition of investments on
  infrastructure between neighbourhoods
• Other examples in Puente Genil, Bradford,
  Palmela
• 4. Problem solving citizens elaborate solutions
  for important community problems (5 4 at
  proximity-level)
• Bobigny problems of cleanliness discussed and
  ameliorated
• Salford problems of every day live in
  neighbourhoods
• Albacete PB council elaborated propositions for
  resolving conflict about water prices
• Other examples in Roma XI, Venezia

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Modernisation of administration 5 main trends
(III)

• 5. More transparency on local finances
• More transparency about projects (14 of 19) than
  about municipal budget (11 of 19). 8 of 19 cases
  transparency about projects and budget
• Weak tendency to deepen information on municipal
  budget
• No capacity of budget control. Little information
  about controversial projects. Main decisions are
  often taken outside PB (exception some Italian
  experiments?)
• Transparency is an aim in itself
• Difficult to evaluate whether transparency is
  linked to other modernisation effects

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Role of citizens

• Two main roles consumer and stakeholder
• Consumer sometimes only at proximity-level
• Stakeholder often either weak or only at
  proximity-level (most notably in France)
• Little co-realisation
• Little control
• Citizen are nearly not involved as municipal
  employees
• Attempts in Saint-Denis, otherwise not at all

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Autonomy of civil society (countervailing
power) No general tendency. Analysis needs to
be made country by country In Germany nearly no
autonomy. Some procedural autonomy in
Berlin-Lichtenberg Examples of global autonomy
(procedural and social) only in Spain (Albacete,
Cordoba, Sevilla) In selected Italian cases
autonomy is either mostly procedural (Pieve E.,
Roma XI) or mostly social (Grottammare,
Venezia) Weak autonomy in France, no general
tendency for Great Britain In nearly all selected
cases with autonomy of civil society, at least
medium effects on social justice (Albacete,
Cordoba, Sevilla, Grottammare) What is the exact
relationship between autonomy of civil society
and various effects?
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Impact on social justice

• Major difference with respect to situation in
  Porto Alegre (inversion of priorities)!
• No impact at all in half of the experiments (9 of
  19)
• In other half some weak effects (8 of 19)
• Albacete and Bradford (re-)integration of
  minorities
• Emsdetten tax on enterprises
• Cordoba enhancement of deprived districts
• Pieve Emmanuele some infrastructure projects
  for peripheral districts
• Sevilla, Puente Genil social justice criteria
  for prioritisation of projects/distribution of
  resources
• Plock Support for social associations
  (working with handicapped or homeless people..)
• (Roma XI more justice regarding distribution of
  resources between neighbourhoods)
• Only one case of strong impact
• Grottammare (I) reintegration of two districts
  with strong social problems

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Process in Berlin-Lichtenberg too young for
including data
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Impact on gender-relations

• No articulation between PB and gender
  mainstreaming/gender budget analysis
• Strong (though not always equal) participation of
  women. Trend towards a more equal participation
  of both sexes within participatory democracy?
• In some cases, measures conceived particularly
  for women
• Pieve Emmanule Child-caring
• Sevilla Child-caring, additional mobilisation
  of women, participation procedures for women
• In the huge majority of cases, no special
  participatory procedures for women. A contrast
  with Latin-America, where gender issues are
  integrated in some experiments

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• Impact on municipal employees
• Attention towards needs of public employees
• Training for Participation Berlin-Lichtenberg,
  Emsdetten, Bobigny, Bradford, Pieve Emmanuele
  and Palmela
• Payment of additional work Cordoba, Puente
  Genil (Sevilla?)
• No attention at all Ten of nineteen cases
• Almost no role of trade-unions
• In Germany some influence in Albacete, unions
  are part of the participatory budget council in
  Italy some influence perhaps in the future
• Participatory procedures for administration
• In the huge majority of cases, no participatory
  procedures

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• Deliberative quality of PB
• Low quality in 5 of 19 cases
• All 3 German cases, 1 case in France (St. Denis),
  1 in Great Britain (Salford)
• Medium quality in 12 of 19 cases
• Germany 1 case Berlin-Lichtenberg
• France 2 cases Bobigny, Pont de Claix
• Spain 2 cases Puente Genil, Sevilla
• Italy all 4 cases Grottammare, Pieve E., Roma
  XI, Venezia
• Great Britain 1 case Bradford
• Further cities Plock, Palmela
• High quality only in two cities
• Albacete, Cordoba

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• Influence on elections
• No influence of PB on electoral turnout
• The exact relationship between turnout and PB
  difficult to evaluate
• In some cases process is too young for comparing
  turnout
• Increase of turnout only in Roma
• No general trend regarding the confirmation/better
  results for governing party
• PB is often part of of a global transformation
  process Spain, Italy, France
• Germany no impact. In some cases, negative
  results for governing party, but no clear
  relation with PB
• Some impact in France and Spain (Bobigny, St.
  Denis, Albacete)
• Strong impact in 2 Italian cases Grottammare,
  Pieve E. (in Roma XI, some impact)

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Political culture of civil society

• Civil society changed to some degree (medium) in
  majority of cases (12 from 20 cases)
• Better knowledge of municipal budget above all
  German cities, Pont de Claix, Salford
• More propositions for citizens Emsdetten,
  Bobigny, Pont de Claix, Bradford, Salford,
  Spanish towns
• More coordination between associations/civil
  society Albacete, Bobigny, Hilden
• Only one case with strong change of civil society
• In Albacete, coordination between most important
  associations is institutionalised through
  PB-council which meets weekly

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Political culture of political system

• Political system changed to some degree (medium)
  in majority of cases (15 of 20)
• Most effects in France, Italy and Spain. Single
  effects and modest change in Germany (Emsdetten)
  and Great Britain (Salford)
• France and Spain participation in political
  parties weakens, participation in PB as a
  substitution? A general trend?
• France, Spain, Italy, Germany visibility and
  new legitimacy for post-communist parties. PB
  contributes to changing the political culture of
  post-communists
• (Selective) listening in places where there was
  no communication before

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Effects by country Germany weak effects.
Modernisation strong discourse, weak effects
(only some impacts on budget transparency). No
social effect, some modest political effects
Great Britain and France some effects (medium)
on modernisation at the neighbourhood level. No
general change of political culture, few or no
effects on social justice Spain and Italy
strongest effects, above all concerning
modernisation and change of political culture.
Impacts on social justice are possible but remain
modest, except in a few cases (Grottammare,
possibly Pieve E.)
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Conclusion (1) No correlation between political
party and chosen procedure of PB. Party
preference for procedures needs to be analysed
country by country (see details) Some correlation
between deliberative quality and modernisation
effects The use of random-selection is not
enough for reaching a representative group of
participants, though there are some ameliorations
Which procedure leads to the highest number of
participants? Which procedure produces highest
variety of effects? Is there a best procedure
of PB?
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Conclusion (2)

• Empirical tendencies difficult to assess most
  cases are very
• recent ones
• What relationship between procedural/global
  typologies and
• concrete results? Empirical dynamics do not
  correspond to single
• procedures
• Elective affinity between modernisation and PB?

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Appendix. Additional material by country
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Cases of participatory budgets in Germany
Berlin
Kommunaler BHH NRW (2000-2004)
Kommunen der Zukunft (1998-2002)
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