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Micro-economics of Innovation V

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Title: Micro-economics of Innovation V


1
Micro-economics of Innovation V
  • The Core Competence of the Corporation
  • Prahalad Hamel (1990)

2
GTE vs. NEC 1
  • In the early 1980s, GTE was poised to be a major
    player in IT industry, with a variety of
    businesses including telephones, switching and
    transmission systems, semiconductors, satellites
    and defense systems.
  • GTEs entertainment products group produced
    Sylvania color TVs display technologies.
  • In 1980 GTEs sales were 9.98 billion and net
    cash flow was 1.73 billion.

3
GTE vs. NEC 2
  • In 1980 NECs sales were 3.8 billion.
  • It had comparable technological base and computer
    business, but no experience as telecom operating
    company.
  • In 1988, GTEs sales were 16.46 billion and
    NECs were 21.89 billion.
  • GTE became a telecom operating company, with
    positions in defense and lighting products. It
    divested all other businesses.
  • NEC emerged as a global leader in semiconductors
    and in telecom products and computers. In telecom
    it went beyond switching systems to mobile
    phones, fax, etc.

4
GTE vs. NEC 3
  • NEC bridged the gap between telecom and office
    automation.
  • NEC was the only company in the world to be in
    the top five in revenue in telecom,
    semiconductors and mainframes.
  • Why these differences between GTE NEC?
  • NEC conceived of itself in terms of core
    competencies, and GTE in terms of strategic
    business units (SBU).

5
Rethinking the Corporation 1
  • In the past, a diversified corporation could look
    at its business units at particular end product
    markets and try to become world leaders in those
    businesses.
  • With the market boundaries changing ever more
    quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at
    best temporary (e.g. digital cameras, mobile
    phones).

6
Rethinking the Corporation 2
  • In 1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to
    exploit the convergence of communications and
    computing (CC).
  • NEC constituted a CC Committee of top managers
    to oversee the development of core products and
    core competencies. It created the organizational
    architecture to implement its strategy
    successfully. Semiconductors to be the core
    product.
  • Identified three inter-related streams of
    technological and market evolution 1) computing
    will evolve from mainframes to distributed
    processing 2) components from simple ICs to
    VLSI and 3) communications from mechanical
    cross-bar exchange to digital systems (ISDN).

7
Rethinking the Corporations 3
  • NEC reasoned, the computing, communications, and
    components businesses would overlap blurring the
    distinction between them.
  • NEC entered into strategic alliances (over 100 in
    1987) aimed at building competencies rapidly and
    at low cost, with a goal of internalizing partner
    skills.
  • Exhibit 1 Competencies the roots of
    competitiveness.
  • The diversified corporation is a large tree. The
    trunk and major limbs are core products, the
    smaller branches are business units, the leaves,
    flowers, and fruits are end products. The root
    system that provides nourishment is the core
    competence.

8
Core Competencies 1
  • Core competencies are the collective learning in
    the organization, especially how to coordinate
    diverse production skills and integrate multiple
    streams of technologies.
  • For example, Casio must harmonize know-how in
    miniaturization, microprocessor design, material
    science and ultra-thin precision casing the
    same skills it applies in its miniature card
    calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.
  • CC is also about the organization of work and the
    delivery of value (e.g. to bring miniaturization
    to its products, Sony must ensure that
    technologists, engineers and marketers have a
    shared understanding of customer needs and
    technological possibilities).

9
Core Competencies 2
  • CC is communication, involvement and a deep
    commitment to working across organizational
    boundaries. It involves many levels of people and
    functions.
  • CC does not diminish with the use, but it still
    needs to be nurtured and protected.
  • CC is an engine for new business development.
    Patterns of diversification and market entry may
    be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness
    of markets (e.g. 3Ms competence with sticky
    tape led to Post-it notes, magnetic tape,
    photographic film, pressure-sensitive tapes, and
    coated abrasives).

10
Core Competencies 3
  • Three tests can be applied to identify core
    competencies in a company
  • 1) A CC provides potential access to a wide
    variety of markets (e.g. competence in display
    systems).
  • 2) A CC should make a significant contribution to
    the perceived customer benefits of the end
    product (e.g. Hondas engine expertise).
  • 3) A CC should be difficult for competitors to
    imitate. A rival may acquire some of the
    technologies that comprise the CC, but it will
    find it difficult to duplicate more or less
    comprehensive pattern of internal coordination
    and learning.
  • Few companies are likely to build world
    leadership in more than 5 or 6 fundamental
    competencies.

11
Core Competencies 4
  • Chrysler, unlike Honda considered its engines and
    power trains as simply another component and
    started outsourcing. It became dependent on
    Mitsubishi and Hyundai for engines (from 252,000
    in 1985 to 382,000 in 1987 outsourced engines).
  • The tangible link between core competencies and
    end products is the core product the physical
    embodiments of one or more CCs.
  • Core product thinking forces a firm to
    distinguish between the brand share it achieves
    in end product markets and the manufacturing
    share it achieves in any particular core product
    (Cannon has 84 of world manufacturing share in
    desktop laser printer engines, while its brand
    share for laser printers is miniscule).

12
Core Competencies 5
  • SBU thinking leads to
  • 1) underinvestment in developing CCs and core
    products
  • 2) imprisoned resources (a CC remains within the
    business unit)
  • 3) bounded innovation.

13
Core Competencies 6
  • Developing Strategic Architecture
  • A strategic architecture is a road map of the
    future that identifies which CCs to build and
    their constituent technologies (think of the firm
    like a tree). It provides a logic for product and
    market diversification.
  • Learning from alliances can reduce the time and
    costs (e.g. NEC).
  • Resource allocation priorities should be made
    transparent to the entire organization.
  • How long could we preserve our competitiveness in
    the business, if we did not control this
    particular CC? How central is this CC to
    perceived customer benefits? What future
    opportunities would be lost if we lose this CC?

14
Core Competencies 7
  • Redeploying to Exploit Competencies
  • CC should not be held hostage by any particular
    business. SBU should bid for a CC the same way it
    does for capital (top management).
  • Send a signal to middle managers that CCs are
    corporate resources and could be reallocated by
    the corporate management.
  • SBUs are entitled to the services of individual
    employees so long as they show effective pay-off.
  • The key employees should be weaned away from
    thinking that they permanently belong to a
    particular SBU.
  • Exhibit 2 Cannon.
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