Operational Doctrine Strategic Fire Operations William A. Stewart FIFireE, CFO, CMM, AdeC Fire Chief

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Operational Doctrine Strategic Fire Operations
William A. StewartFIFireE, CFO, CMM,
AdeCFire Chief Toronto Fire Services
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Demand For Operational Doctrine

• Destructive reality of 9/11
• Negative consequences of Blackout
• SARS affect on economy and threat of future
  pandemics
• Extreme weather and environmental issues

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Demand for Operational Doctrine

• 1. HUSAR team for Toronto, Ontario, Canada
• 2. CBRN team for Toronto and Ontario
• 3. Operational Doctrine for Fire Services because
  of potential damage of hazards to life and
  environment

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Strategic Operational Doctrine

• However, demand impacted as memories fade of the
  September 11, 2001 heroic effort of first
  responders rescuing people from the World Trade
  Centre
• Does time erase the memories of first responders
  and their importance of being trained and
  equipped to respond to disasters such as the
  World Trade Centre?

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Strategic Operational Doctrine

• United States and Canada realize that we are not
  protected by vast oceans to the east and west as
  in the past and that planes and cargo ships can
  bring terrorist attacks or viruses to our front
  door
• Reminds all leaders dealing with security issues
  that we need to develop first responders to
  protect the homeland from terrorists threats and
  natural disasters

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Strategic Operational Doctrine

• The importance of lessons learned and finding
  efficiencies is highlighted by the Auditor
  Generals office when they state it is
  unreasonable to expect that the government can
  gather sufficient intelligence to protect Canada
  from attacks

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Strategic Operational Doctrine

• What is reasonable to expect is that after any
  significant incident, an organization will
  analyze how it responded, identify the lessons it
  learned, and apply those lessons in the future
  (Auditor General, 2004)

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Case Study Big Box Warehouses Trussed Roof
Fires

• Nine Firefighters Die In Charleston Sofa Super
  Store Fire and Collapse
• Two Firefighters Dead in Chesapeake Auto Parts
  Store Fire and Collapse

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AMERICAN FIREFIGHTER CASUALITIES-STRUCTURAL
COLLAPSE

• Between 1994 and 2002 63 Fatalities
• 65 Involved in fire attack
• 85 Caught or Trapped
• 42 By Asphyxiation

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Metal Gussets Fail _at_ 1100f
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How Trussed Roof Fires Are Able To Grow

• Hidden heat and smoke due to height of ceilings
  and voids created by renovations
• May be sprinklered below trusses, fire code
  doesnt always protect concealed spaces
• Time lag from start of fire, detection, alarm,
  response, location and finally application of
  water

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LESSONS LEARNED
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Preplanning

• Risk analysis not done or incorrect
• Fire conditions observed outside are not relayed
  to interior crews
• Inadequate Incident Command system

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Preplanning

• Lack of yearly Fire Prevention Inspection
• Absence of a Fire Plan
• Fail to establish a collapse zone
• Commit too many Firefighters to interior attack
  or to the roof

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Preplanning

• Conduct pre-incident planning and inspections to
  identify structures that contain truss
  construction
• Inspect buildings during construction phase to
  assess type of construction, materials, etc.

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Preplanning

• Determine vehicle response and special apparatus
  required
• Area hazards such as overhead wires or parking
  garage roofs
• Access and Egress problems

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Incident Management System

• Incident Command at all incidents
• First arriving Officer assumes Command
• First arriving Chief establishes Command Post
• Implement Accountability System

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Incident Management System Strengths

• Operations Officer Allows the incident
  commander to focus on strategy for the incident
  as well as long range planning
• The operations officers role is to ensure the
  strategy is implemented through assigned tasks

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Incident Management System Strengths

• Training in its use Training is conducted
  through quarterly training as well as FETN
• Maday Extensive mayday training is done through
  the RIT training
• We are disciplined in its use Appropriate level
  of IMS is used at all calls and it is expected to
  be used
• Resources available for the structure Toronto
  Fire has the ability to build a very large and
  complex command structure if the event warrants
  it or it can be simple as one truck call

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Incident Management System Strengths

• Entry and Elevator Control Toronto Fire is very
  strict on the use of entry control and elevator
  control to ensure personnel are accounted for at
  all times
• Lobby Control Lobby control is established
  early even when in the investigative mode, to
  instruct residents on the nature of the call and
  actions currently being done by the fire
  department ie investigating. Fire on their 3rd
  floor, etc.

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Incident Management System Strengths

• Sectoring Sectoring is a very important part of
  our IMS as with the number of firefighters at
  the scene. Radio traffic can become problematic
• Sectoring reduces this as well as assists in
  controlling the movement of firefighters for
  rehab as the initial rehab is done within the
  sector if possible

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Incident Management System Strengths

• Command Presence The arrival of more senior
  command officers increases and strengthens the
  command presence on the fire ground
• Unified Command The working relationship with
  other emergency services as well as other
  agencies allows for a very strong and supportive
  unified command system

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Incident Management System Strengths

• Base and Staging TFS resources are brought to
  the scene and put into base to decrease the
  response time and to ensure adequate resources
  are immediately at hand if needed
• Rehab with cooling chairs/heat slide rule, Box
  12, Support 7 Rehab has become an important
  sector and one that the TFS continues to develop
  through cooling chairs, the heat slide rule and
  air management systems

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SIZE-UP AND TACTICS

• Conduct a Risk-Benefit analysis before deciding
  on Tactics
• Estimate how long fire has been burning
• Evaluate the potential for survivors
• Dont risk personnel to save property

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TRAINING

• Incident Command and Tactical Operations training
  for all Officers
• Train all Firefighters on safety and survival,
  risk and air management, lost disoriented
  firefighters
• Provide Safety Officer training
• Train all firefighter to NFPA Firefighter II

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SAFETY CONCERNS

• 92 of Firefighter deaths due to structural
  collapse may have been avoided by a risk-benefit
  analysis
• IC must understand smoke indicators and know the
  fires timeline
• Must re-evaluate tactical mode (offensive vs.
  defensive) every 10 minutes

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SAFETY CONCERNS

• Anticipate collapse and set up defensive
  positions
• Firefighters must not work under involved area
  and stay close to support walls
• When heavy smoke is discovered, stay out of and
  off of building

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SAFETY CONCERNS

• Plastics produce dense smoke which can obscure
  impending collapse
• Look for weakening of masonry
• Listen for unusual sounds
• Commit too many Firefighters to interior attack
  or to the roof

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Strategic Operational Doctrine

• Development of the HUSAR/CBRN programs and Fire
  Services as First Responders are now recognized
  as a key policy decision to protect cities in
  their homeland
• The question remains is this adequate motivation
  for policy makers to support funding to sustain
  Fire Services and specialized teams?
• IMS is foundational for Operational Doctrine

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Operational Doctrine Strategic Fire Operations
Questions William A. StewartFire Chief
FIFireE, CFO, CMM AdeC Toronto Fire Services