Essential Features: Speed, Lethality and Surprise within a Joint Framework at the CINCs disposal.

1
Light Reconnaissance Strike Group
THE US ARMYs VANGUARD FORCE IN THE RMA
Essential Features Speed, Lethality and Surprise
within a Joint Framework at the CINCs disposal.
The US Armys Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups
are designed to be on the leading edge of the
revolution in military affairs and provide the
blueprint for future ground force development
into the next century.
2
Kosovo Lessons U.S. Army Example is a Warning!

• Must adapt force structure to future security
  environment within a new Joint Operational
  Architecture
• Army After Next looks too much like the Army
  today
• Division Organization Too Slow, Too Centralized
  Not organized for rapid deployability within JTF
• A Combination of Strategic Air and fast Sea Lift
  can move reorganized Army Forces faster!
• Must be organized to conduct any mission the NCA
  assigns including both peace support operations
  and warfighting

Improve Armys agility punch through
organizational change to achieve rapid
deployability and real Joint Warfighting
Capability.
3
During the Kosovo Crisis, a Light Recon Strike
Group would have been a flexible deterrent force!
In JAN 99, an LRSG could have deployed to
demonstrate US readiness to intervene and
threaten the Serb position in Kosovo. Army
Prepositioning Afloat could have rapidly
reinforced within days if released to the CINC by
the JCS. This action would have influenced
Belgrade!
SFOR
BOSNIA -
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SARAJEVO
HERZEGOVINA
AOR


BULGARIA
JFLCC CLOSE COMBAT CDR
JFC
SOFIA
MONTENEGRO
PRISTINA
KOSOVO
KOSOVO
JFACC
JFLCC CDR
ALBANIA
SKOPJE
JFLCC DEEP COMBAT CDR
TIRANA
JFLCC REAR CBT CDR
FYROM
THESSALONIKI
4
This Light Reconnaissance Strike Group is
designed to be moved by existing USAF aircraft
anywhere in the world in 24 hours with 162 C-17
Sorties!

• 3 Groups should be Conus-based and ready on a
• rotational basis for immediate global deployment.
• Equipment sets could be leased for 7-8 years.

5
Light Recon-Strike Group
Medium Weight Brigade
REQUIRED C-17 SORTIES 162
REQUIRED C-17 SORTIES 168
Troops 4,741 Equipment 584 vehicles (100)
463L Pallets 114 AGS 105mm gun with adv munitions
(30 tons) 200 Light Strike Vehicles (18 tons)
35mm LOSAT (27) 120mm Adv.
Mortar system 24 M9 ACE Engineer Vehicles
7 Fox Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Vehicles 9
MLRS rocket launchers 160 HUMMV Vehicles (various
configurations) 70 Trucks (medium weight) 40
Hughes 600 Armed Helicopters 12 UH 60 (Armed
and Transport Helicopters
Troops 3,600 Equipment 600 wheeled armored
vehicles armed with 25mm and 90mm cannon plus
either TOW or LOSAT additional equipment. No
stabilized gun platform cannot fire on the move.

• Colonel Commands Conventional Brigade Combat Team
  within the existing ten division structure. No
  new Joint Operational Architecture.
• Not structured for independence. Without
  significant reinforcement, exclusively Small
  Scale Conflict Force (peacekeeping).
• Equipment sets are purchased with enormous sunken
  costs and little salvage value. Technology is
  moving too fast to buy in most cases. Old RD
  process cannot keep up! Civil leads Military!

• Brigadier General with seasoned staff commands a
  ready, cohesive, all arms Battlegroup capable of
  real Independent Warfighting Operations within
  the Joint Task Force!
• Equipment sets are leased for eight years to
  support the establishment of three Light
  Recon-Strike Groups on rotational readiness!

Note Software system for determining individual
plane loads is the Air Load Planning System
(ALPS) and equipment information comes from FM
55-15 Transportation Reference Data.
6
THE LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE GROUP COMMAND
AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
7
THE C4I BN CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE JOINT C4ISR
OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE.
(C4I Battalion Structure in a Close Combat Group
configuration of Deep Rear C4I BNs will be
similar, but tailored to different needs.)
600 Troops
HHC

• GROUP HEADQUARTERS COMPANY Administration and
  
  
• Maintenance activities

NLOS BATTERY

• NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT

(NLOS) CO/BATTERY Tactical UAVs/ Over-the
horizon attack systems (EFOGM).

I
ISR/IW CO

• ISR/INFO WARFARE CO Intelligence/Info Opns

• Command and Control CO Designed for dispersed,
• mobile communications

• AIR DEFENSE BATTERY Short-range Air Defense

• CHEMICAL CO Recon, Detection and limited Decon
  support

• MILITARY POLICE SECURITY DETACHMENT Added or
  integrated as necessary for deployments and
  training.

Breaking the Phalanx, pages 71-73.
8
Reorganization creates a larger pool of ready,
available Army Forces!

• In the Group-based structure, Army Forces are
  involved in one of three 180 day operational
  readiness cycles in peacetime. This reduces
  personnel tempo, makes deployments and costs
  predictable.
• Training Cycle (six months) Unit and Individual
  Training under Service control.
• Deployment Cycle (six months) Units are ready
  for deployment to Joint Command and Control and
  become part of the pool that responds to Major
  Theater of War or Lesser Theater of War
  contingencies.
• Reconstitution Cycle (six months) Unit returns
  to home station for re-fitting, modernization (if
  required) and leave.
• This approach creates a pool of 35-40,000 ready,
  CONUS-based Army Expeditionary Forces that can
  deploy 24 hours a day, seven days a week to
  fight, deter or conduct any mission the National
  Command Authorities decide to assign.

9
Ground Force Deployment Readiness in the
Group-based Force Structure
CONUS
10
Light Reconnaissance Strike Group

• To make a difference in the 21st Century, the US
  Army should field three Light Reconnaissance
  Strike Groups. Fielding one LRSG is just
  tinkering on the margins!
• Adopting the Combat Group organizational
  structure is the first step toward leveraging
  specialized modules of Army combat power within a
  training and readiness system that ensures the
  Army is relevant to Joint Operations across the
  spectrum of conflict.
• Compression of division and brigade into new
  echelon to achieve fewer C2 nodes,
  deep/close/rear functionality and the
  consolidation of CSS into JTF Support Group
  structures are critical steps in this broader
  strategic process.
• Implementing new Joint C4ISR architecture to
  facilitate the employment of Army Ground Forces
  within the JTF is vital!