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Identity, Privacy and Security perspectives on Ontario's proposed enhanced drivers licence EDL

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Secure Flight.. ICEPIC.. Passenger Protect. Protective Sleeve. convenient cheap. fast. Passport. bulky. costly. slow. RFID reader. SPP. RFID vendors ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Identity, Privacy and Security perspectives on Ontario's proposed enhanced drivers licence EDL


1
Identity, Privacy and Security perspectives on
Ontario's proposed enhanced drivers licence (EDL)
ltlt

Andrew Clement Identity, Privacy and Security
Initiative Information Policy Research
Program Faculty of Information University of
Toronto
  • Ontario Government Access
  • Privacy Workshop 2008
  • Toronto
  • Oct. 8, 2008

2
Overview
  • Introduction to Surveillance, Identity, Privacy
    and Security
  • Unpacking Ontarios DL proposals
  • Facial recognition screening
  • RFID for border crossing
  • Design alternatives
  • Passport RFID-less EDL
  • Next steps

3
Living in a Surveillance Society
  • Surveillance
  • Any focused attention to personal details for
    the purpose of entitlement, influence or control
    David Lyon
  • Fast becoming the dominant organizing principle
    of late modern society.
  • May be benign or harmful
  • Raises thorny issues of privacy, security and
    identity

4
The New Transparency project Surveillance and
social sorting
  • Questions
  • What factors contribute to the general expansion
    of surveillance as a technology of governance in
    late modern societies?
  • What are the underlying principles, technological
    infrastructures and institutional frameworks that
    support surveillance practice?
  • What are the social consequences of such
    surveillance both for institutions and for
    ordinary people?

http//www.surveillanceproject.org/
5
Subprojects
  • IRSP 1 The Role of Technology Companies in
    Promoting Surveillance Internationally
  • IRSP 2 Digitally Mediated Surveillance From the
    Internet to Ubiquitous Computing
  • IRSP 3 Surveillance Consequences of 9/11
  • IRSP 4 Surveillance and Population Management

6
Coming events
  • Workshops
  • Population Management in Conflict zones (IRSP 4)
    Cyprus
  • Surveillance Games, Vancouver
  • Surveillance Technology Companies (IRSP 1) Open
    University
  • Cyber surveillance (IRSP2) Toronto,
  • Surveillance Ten Years After 9/11, (IRSP 3)
    Kingston
  • Conference on Canadas Surveillance Society,
    Ottawa 2011

7
Identity, Privacy Security in a
Surveillance Society
Security
Privacy
Identity
Surveillance Society
8
Introducing IPSI the Identity Privacy and
Security Initiative
  • IPSI aims to carry out a pioneering,
    interdisciplinary program of research, education,
    outreach, and industry collaboration, combining
    technological and policy perspectives. Supported
    by U of Ts Academic Initiatives Fund (AIF).
  • Management Committee
  • Dimitrios Hatzinakos (Chair)
  • Professor, Dept of Electrical and Computer
    Engineering (ECE)
  • Andrew Clement
  • Professor Faculty of Information
  • Kostas Plataniotis
  • Associate Professor, Dept of Electrical and
    Computer Engineering (ECE)
  • Leslie Dolman (Exec Dir)

9
Introducing IPSI Advisory Board
  • Ann Cavoukian (Chair)
  • Commissioner, IPC
  • Ken Anderson
  • Assistant Commissioner, IPC
  • Richard Alvarez
  • President and CEO,
  • Canada Health Infoway
  • Dean Barry
  • Senior Policy Advisor,
  • International Affairs Directorate,
  • Public Safety of Canada
  • Stefan Brands
  • CEO Credentica, Microsoft
  • Yim Chan
  • Global Privacy Executive, Chief Privacy Office,
    IBM Canada

Richard Owens Partner Blake Cassels and Graydon
LLP Angela Power Senior Privacy Consultant,
Bell Canada Art Smith Founder and CEO, GS1
Canada George Tomko Biometrics Scientist, I PSI
Expert-in-Residence Lynne Zucker Director,
Education and Research, Sun Microsystems
10
Introducing IPSI Activities
  • Public lectures series
  • Graduate course and specialization
  • JIE1001 Seminar in Identity, Privacy Identity
  • Other events
  • Public Information Forum on Ontarios proposed
    EDL, FI, July 16, 2008 (with IPC, FI, IPRP)
  • Identity Rights Colloquium, Fac. of Law, October
    31, 2008 (with CILP)
  • Research round tables (Spring 2009)
  • Research Day (May 2009)

11
The Performing Identity project
Security
Privacy
Identity
Surveillance Society
12
Evaluating the EDL/ID proposals - the Oakes Four
Part Test
  • The burden of proof must always be on those who
    claim that some new intrusion or limitation on
    privacy is necessary. Any proposed security,
    identity measure must meet a four-part test
  • Necessary It must be demonstrably necessary in
    order to meet some specific need
  • Effective It must be demonstrably likely to be
    effective in achieving its intended purpose. In
    other words, it must be likely to actually make
    us significantly safer, not just make us feel
    safer.
  • ProportionateThe intrusion on privacy must be
    proportional to the security benefit to be
    derived.
  • Minimal and it must be demonstrable that no
    other, less privacy-intrusive, measure would
    suffice to achieve the same purpose.
  • Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Nov02,
    derived from Oakes

?
?
?
?
13
The actor-network of my Ontario DL

14
The actor-network of Ontarios DL
Others
Others
Bars
Others
Couriers
Merchants
Post office
Ontario DL Facial Image DL Number Name,
Address Date of birth Sex, Height Dates of
issue/expiry more numbers
15
The actor-network of Ontarios DL
MTO
ServOnt
Others
Vendors
Others
Bars
Highway Traffic Act
Card devices
FIPPA
Others
Wallets
Couriers
85.6mmx54mmx0.76mm
Drivers DB
Merchants
Police
Post office
CPIC
Ontario DL Facial Image DL Number Name,
Address Date of birth Sex, Height Dates of
issue/expiry more numbers
CBSA
AAMVA
CBP
16
Main DL Actors
  • Human Actors
  • Canadian
  • Ontario Min. Of Transportation (MTO)
  • Service Ontario
  • Police officers
  • Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA)
  • Vendors
  • Bars
  • Post offices
  • Couriers
  • Merchants
  • other orgs that ask for the DL
  • Can/US
  • American Association of Motor Vehicle
    Administrators (AAMVA)
  • US
  • US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
  • Non-Human Actors
  • Documents
  • Highway Traffic Act R.S.O. 1990
  • Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
    Act R.S.O. 1990
  • Devices
  • Drivers Licence (DL)
  • Image capture and card production devices
  • Wallets
  • Databases
  • Drivers DB
  • Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC)

17
Unpacking the EDL/ID proposal in Bill 85,
Photo Card Act, 2008 (June)
Current DL
Proposed DL
FRT
18
Unpacking the EDL/ID proposal in Bill 85,
Photo Card Act, 2008 (June)
Current DL
Proposed DL
Proposed EDL
FRT
MRZ
For WHTI deadline (June 2009)
19
Unpacking the EDL/ID proposal in Bill 85,
Photo Card Act, 2008 (June)
Current DL
Proposed DL
Proposed EDL
FRT
MRZ
For non-drivers (2010)
Photo ID
Photo ID
20
Unpacking the EDL/ID proposal in Bill 85,
Photo Card Act, 2008 (June)
Current DL
Proposed DL
FRT
21
The actor-network of Ontarios DL
MTO
ServOnt
Others
Vendors
Others
Bars
Highway Traffic Act
Card devices
FIPPA
Others
Wallets
Couriers
85.6mmx54mmx0.76mm
Drivers DB
Merchants
Police
Post office
CPIC
Ontario DL Facial Image DL Number Name,
Address Date of birth Sex, Height Dates of
issue/expiry more numbers
CBSA
AAMVA
CBP
22
The actor-network of Ontarios DL
MTO
ServOnt
Drivers DB
Ontario DL Facial Image DL Number Name,
Address Date of birth Sex, Height Dates of
issue/expiry more numbers
23
The actor-network of DL FRT
MTO
ServOnt
Facial
Images
Drivers DB
Ontario DL Facial Image DL Number Name,
Address Date of birth Sex, Height Dates of
issue/expiry more numbers


24
FRT - Facial Recognition Tech (aka Photo
Comparison Technology)
Image template
Ontario DL(ID) database 10M records
25
FRT - Facial Recognition Tech (aka Photo
Comparison Technology)
  • IPC statements on biometrics
  • Given the power and complexity of biometrics, my
    office has set out strict conditions under which
    the use of biometrics could be considered. No
    database of biometric information, … should be
    created without applying the minimum standards
    for the use of biometrics, as set out in the
    Ontario Works Act.
  • ….there must be no ability to compare biometric
    images from one database with biometric images
    from other databases or reproductions of the
    biometric not obtained from the individual
  • (Open letter, from Commissioner Cavoukian to
    Hon. D. Tsubouchi, April 5, 2001)

26
FRT - Facial Recognition Tech (aka Photo
Comparison Technology)
  • Ontario Works Act 1997 standards
  • the biometric must be stored in encrypted form
    both on the card and in any database
  • the encrypted biometric cannot be used as a
    unique identifier
  • the original biometric information must be
    destroyed upon encryption
  • the stored encrypted biometric can only be
    transmitted in encrypted form
  • no program information is to be retained or
    associated with the encrypted biometric
    information
  • there can be no ability at the technical level to
    reconstruct or recreate the biometric from its
    encrypted form
  • there must be no ability to compare biometric
    images from one database with biometric images
    from other databases or reproductions of the
    biometric not obtained from the individual
  • there can be no access to the biometric database
    by law enforcement without a court order or
    specific warrant.

27
FRT - Facial Recognition Tech (aka Photo
Comparison Technology)
  • Another noted Ontario biometrics expert
  • "Biometrics, if used as currently marketed by
    most biometric vendors where the biometric
    template is used as the token of identification
    or verification will further erode privacy and
    jeopardise our freedoms. The simple fact is that
    template-based biometrics are not privacy
    friendly. Any time you base verification or
    identification on comparison to a stored template
    you have a situation which, over time, will
    compromise privacy either by business or
    government, in response to the next national
    emergency
  • Tomko, George, "The Fundamental Problem with
    Template-based Biometrics", presentation at the
    12th Conference on Computers, Freedom and
    Privacy, San Francisco, 16 April, 2002.

28
FRT - Facial Recognition Tech (aka Photo
Comparison Technology)
  • Evidence for effectiveness?
  • Protection against false positives? Redress?
  • Will a template approach be used?
  • Compliant with Ontario Works Act standards?
  • Security of the database? (e.g. biometric
    encryption?)
  • Data sharing? Strictly limited and transparent?
  • Protection against function creep?
  • Privacy Impact Assessment?
  • Independent? Public involvement?

29
The actor-network of DL FRT
MTO
MGS
ServOnt
IPC
Biometric expert
Ontario Legislature
Photo Card Act 2008
Ontario Works Act 1997
Facial
Images Image Templates ?
Drivers DB
Ontario DL Facial Image DL Number Name,
Address Date of birth Sex, Height Dates of
issue/expiry more numbers


FRT software
FRT Vendors
30
The actor-network of DL FRT
MTO
MGS
ServOnt
IPC
Biometric expert
Ontario Legislature
Photo Card Act 2008
Ontario Works Act 1997
Facial
Images Image Templates ?
Drivers DB
Ontario DL Facial Image DL Number Name,
Address Date of birth Sex, Height Dates of
issue/expiry more numbers


FRT software
FRT Vendors
31
Introducing the RFID for the Enhanced DL
Current DL
Proposed DL
Proposed EDL
FRT
MRZ
ltltCANCLEMENTltltANDREWltHOWARDltltlt JK123456lt5CAN470101
0M0809100ltlt
For WHTI deadline (June 2009)
32
Introducing the RFID for the Enhanced DL
Current DL
Proposed EDL
RFID
For WHTI deadline (June 2009)
33
RFID - Radio Frequency ID chip
10m
RFID reader
US databases
Unique identifier
Border agent
CBSA database
EDL/ID cardholder
34
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff
  • On the EDL
  • When youre coming up to the booth at the
    land port of entry, if you have to hand your card
    over and the inspector has to key in your name,
    thats five seconds, 10 seconds, plus the
    possibility of an error. What the chip does is it
    allows, as you approach, the system to read it
    and then pop up your information on the screen.
  • Its kind of a REAL ID with an additional
    feature … a chip.
  • Arizona, Dec 6, 2007  seehttp//www.dhs.gov/xnews
    /releases/pr_1197041144284.shtm
  • To an international privacy conference
  • While some debate has taken place in Canada over
    the idea of a national ID card, Chertoff said
    Americans would never stand for it.
  • "Their heads would explode," he said.
    CP, Montreal, Sep 26, 2007
  • http//www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2007/09/26
    /qc-homeland0926.html

35
Canadas Privacy Commissioners
  • Expressed their concern that any requirement
    imposed by the United States government for
    vicinity radio frequency identification
    technology (RFID)
  • 1. permits surreptitious location tracking of
    individuals carrying an EDL and
  • 2. does not encrypt or otherwise protect the
    unique identifying number assigned to the holder
    of the EDL and would not protect any other
    personal information stored on the RFID
  • They called on the Government of Canada, and
    participating provinces and territories, to take
    steps to ensure the security of personal
    information stored on EDL RFID tags and to
    prevent the possibility of surreptitious location
    tracking."
  • Victoria, February 5, 2008
  • http//www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2008/res_0802
    05_e.asp  

36
RFID - Radio Frequency ID chip
  • Why choose a notoriously insecure vicinity RFID
    (i.e.UHF EPC Gen 2), rather than a proximity
    RFID? (10m vs 10cm range)?
  • What protection against covert sniffing,
    interception, or other identification attacks?
  • Can the protective sleeve possibly be
    effective?
  • Why isnt the unique RFID number treated as
    personal information? e.g. Why no encryption?
  • What protections for Canadians data in US?
  • Has DHS bullied Canada into an inferior approach?

37
Other rationales for including RFID?
  • Integration with REAL ID, as de facto NA ID card?
  • Population surveillance capability with Human ID
    at a distance (HumanID) - Total Information
    Awareness
  • http//w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/hid.php
  • What protection against this function creep?

38
The actor-network of EDL/RFID
MTO
MGS
ServOnt
Priv Comm
Ontario Legislature
Photo Card Act 2008
Passenger Protect
convenient cheap fast
bulky costly slow
Drivers DB
Police
CBSA DB
EDL RFID
Passport
CBSA
AAMVA
MOU
CBP
RFID reader
Protective Sleeve
SPP
CBP DB
Secure Flight..
IRPTA
ICEPIC..
WHTI
REAL ID
DHS
US Congress
RFID vendors
US public
39
The actor-network of EDL/RFID
MTO
MGS
ServOnt
Priv Comm
ACT
CoC
Canadian public
BTA
Ontario Legislature
Photo Card Act 2008
Passenger Protect
bulky costly slow secure versatile
ICLMG
privacy protective secure
convenient cheap fast
surveillance enabling
Drivers DB
Police
CBSA DB
EDL RFID
Contact-less Smart Card
North American National ID card
Passport
CBSA
AAMVA
MOU
CBP
RFID reader
Protective Sleeve
SPP
CBP DB
Secure Flight..
IRPTA
ICEPIC..
WHTI
REAL ID
DHS
US Congress
RFID vendors
Smartcard Alliance
ACLU
US public
EPIC
40
Main EDL/RFID Actors (Human)
  • Human Actors
  • Canadian
  • Ontario Min. Of Transportation (MTO)
  • Service Ontario
  • Police officers
  • Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA)
  • Vendors
  • Bars
  • Post offices
  • Couriers
  • Merchants
  • other orgs that ask for the DL
  • Ontario Legislature
  • Min of Gov Services (CIPO)
  • Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC)
  • Biometric expert
  • FRT vendor(s)
  • Human Actors - cont
  • Privacy Commissioners (PC)
  • Advanced Card Association of Canada ACT (industry
    lobby org)
  • International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group
    (ICLMG) Council of Canadians (CoC)
  • Consumer Council of Canada (CCC)
  • GS1 Canada (Industry stds. body)
  • Can/US
  • American Association of Motor Vehicle
    Administrators (AAMVA)
  • Binational Tourism Alliance (BTA)
  • US
  • US Customs and Border Protn (CBP)
  • Smart Card Alliance (ind. lobby)
  • American Liberties Union (ACLU)
  • Digimarc (vendor of US EDLs)
  • L-I Identity Solutions (identity product
    conglomerate)

41
Main DL/RFID Actors (Non-Human)
  • Non-Human Actors
  • Documents
  • Highway Traffic Act R.S.O. 1990
  • Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
    Act R.S.O. 1990
  • Ontario Works Act 1997
  • Photo Card Act 2008 (Bill 85)
  • US Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevn Act
    (IRTPA) 2004
  • Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)
  • REAL-ID Act (US, 2005)
  • Smart Border Agreement and Action Plan (USCA)
  • Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP)
  • Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) USCAN,
    CANOnt
  • Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)
  • Threat Assessment (TA)
  • Non-Human Actors cont.
  • Devices
  • Drivers Licence (DL)
  • Image capture and card production
  • Wallets
  • FRT software
  • Enhanced Drivers Licence (EDL)
  • RFID (EPC Gen 2 RFID Tags)
  • Tag number
  • Protective sleeve
  • Contactless Smart Card (CSC)
  • REAL ID card
  • NEXUS card
  • PASS card
  • Passport
  • Biometric passport
  • National ID card

42
Main EDL/RFID Actors (Non-Human)
  • Non-Human Actors cont.
  • Databases
  • Drivers DB
  • Drivers facial image DB
  • Drivers facial image template DB ??
  • Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC)
  • Immigration and Customs Enforcement Pattern
    Analysis and Information Collection System
    (ICEPIC) includes
  • Treasury Enforcement Communications System,
  • Student and Exchange Visitor Information System,
  • National Security Entry Exit Registration System,
  • U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
    Technology program
  • Non-Human Actors cont.
  • Databases (cont.)
  • Secure Flight?
  • Passenger Protect?
  • Distances
  • 10m (range of RFID)
  • 10cm (range of CSC)
  • Borders
  • US/Canada
  • Dates
  • Sept 11, 2001 (9/11)
  • Jan 23, 2007 (WHTI implemented for US/Can air
    travel)
  • June 2009 (WHTI implemented for US/Can land/sea
    travel)

43
Passport as an alternative to EDL
  • Extend life of Canadian passport to 10 years
  • as in the US, UK, etc. i.e. lt9/year ?
  • Lower price of passport?
  • Auditor Gen says they are over-priced
  • Ontario subsidize cost for border area residents?
  • Passport as a citizenship right?
  • Speed up and ease issuing?
  • Temporary passport offices in border cities
  • Passport Fairs as in US
  • Speed up border crossing with passport?
  • Use the Machine Readable Zone (needed anyway)?

44
RFID - Radio Frequency ID chip
10m
RFID reader
US databases
Unique identifier
Border agent
CBSA database
EDL/ID cardholder
45
RFID-less EDL ( passport)
?
any distance
MRZ reader
Unique identifier/ passport
US databases
Border agent
Note Can also work
with passports
EDL/ID/passport cardholder
ltltCANCLEMENTltltANDREWltHOWARDlt JK123456lt5CAN4701010M
0809100lt
46
EDL/RFID vs Passport??
  • Considering
  • Cost
  • Convenience of acquisition and use
  • Privacy
  • Security
  • Usefulness
  • Governance
  • National sovereignty
  • will the EDL/RFID serve Ontarians better than the
    passport?

Most unlikely!
47
Summary - Questions cautions
Examine closely
Stop! Think again
Still preferable
RFID
FRT
Passport
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
48
Next steps
  • Legislative review of Bill 85
  • in Standing Committee on General Government
  • Public participation
  • Social impact assessments
  • Systems design
  • Concept and prototype design
  • Field testing
  • On-going accountability and oversight

49
Check out the FAQ, webcast and on-line discussion
forum at IDforum.ca
IPRP
Information Policy Research Program
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