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PKI: Ten Years Later

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We have reached an anniversary in PKI. Has our understanding of this technology grown in any way? ... Makes PK technology available to applications and ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: PKI: Ten Years Later


1
PKI Ten Years Later
  • Carlisle Adams
  • School of Information Technology and Engineering
  • University of Ottawa
  • Mike Just
  • Treasury Board of Canada, Secretariat

2
Outline
  • Motivation
  • Public key technology and PKI
  • PKI examples
  • PKI criticisms
  • PKI evolution and a current definition
  • The road ahead

3
Motivation
  • We have reached an anniversary in PKI
  • Has our understanding of this technology grown in
    any way? If so, how?

4
PK Technology and PKI
  • Public key technology
  • Each entity in a collection has a pair of keys
  • Alice has pubA, privA
  • Enc, d-sig. possible (mathematical operations)
  • Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
  • Makes PK technology available to applications and
    environments that wish to use it
  • Enc, d-sig. possible (security operations)
  • Key pair bound to an entity identifier in a way
    that makes it useful to a variety of apps

5
PKI (contd)
  • Identifier
  • Uniquely specifies entity within some context or
    environment (no ambiguity), but need not reveal
    actual identity
  • Anonym (single-use identifier no mapping to
    entity)
  • Pseudonym (multiple-use identifier no mapping to
    entity)
  • Veronym (multiple-use identifier clear mapping
    to entity)
  • Context/environment need not be global in scope
    (depends on apps that will use keys)

6
PKI (contd)
  • Binding of key pair and identifier
  • Validity of bindings
  • Authority (making breaking)
  • Issuance process (syntax dissemination)
  • Termination process (alerting)
  • Use of bindings
  • Anchor management process (augment diminish)
  • Private key management process (fit for
    purpose)
  • Binding validation process (trusting someone
    elses key)

7
Outline
  • Motivation
  • Public key technology and PKI
  • PKI examples
  • PKI criticisms
  • PKI evolution and a current definition
  • The road ahead

8
PKI Examples
  • Over the past ten years, there have been several
    different approaches to modeling and implementing
    a PKI
  • These approaches can be compared based on the 6
    components of the binding concept
  • We look at the following
  • X.509, PGP, X9.59, SPKI

9
Sample Comparisons(see paper for others)
10
Sample Comparisons(see paper for others)
11
PKI Criticisms
  • Many criticisms have been leveled at this
    technology
  • Probably the best-known collection is the 10
    Risks paper by Ellison Schneier
  • But criticisms cannot always be taken at face
    value need to consider whether the flaw being
    criticized is actually related to PKI or not

12
PKI Criticisms (contd)
  • Examples
  • Authentication versus authorization
  • Security of computing platforms
  • Linkage between identifier and real entity (John
    Robinson problem)

13
PKI Criticisms (contd)
  • Understatement alert PKI has had its share of
    critics over the years
  • A number of criticisms have been unjustified, and
    a number have been misdirected (aimed at PKI when
    the actual problem is elsewhere)
  • The remainder have been very beneficial, driving
    evolution and leading to a deeper understanding
    of this technology

14
Outline
  • Motivation
  • Public key technology and PKI
  • PKI examples
  • PKI criticisms
  • PKI evolution and a current definition
  • The road ahead

15
Evolution
  • Ten years ago, the 1993 version of the ISO/IEC
    CCITT/ITU-T IS X.509 began to be disseminated,
    recognized, and implemented in small-scale
    environments
  • Late 1993 / early 1994 was effectively the birth
    of PKI (although the acronym was yet to be
    coined)
  • Infrastructural considerations were paramount
    (how to make PK technology available to a wide
    variety of applications)

16
Evolution (contd)
  • Initial definition (1994)
  • Authority always and only a CA
  • Issuance X.509 syntax DN X.500 Directory
  • Termination CRL X.500 Directory
  • Anchor root of CA hierarchy
  • Private key CA gen. OOB reg. local storage
  • Validation large, special-purpose s/w toolkit

17
Evolution (contd)
  • After ten years of extensive discussion,
    research, and implementation by numerous
    interested parties world-wide
  • Each of the 6 components has broadened quite
    considerably with deeper understanding
  • BUT, the same 6 components comprise the core of
    the definition (i.e., the essential
    characteristics of the definition remain
    unchanged)

18
Evolution (contd)
  • Current definition (2004)
  • Authority multiple choices (incl. end entity)
  • Issuance multiple choices (syntax dissem.)
  • Termination multiple choices (incl. online)
  • Anchor multiple choices (augment diminish)
  • Private key multiple choices (gen., reg.,
    storage)
  • Validation mult. choices (thin client native
    apps)

19
Outline
  • Motivation
  • Public key technology and PKI
  • PKI examples
  • PKI criticisms
  • PKI evolution and a current definition
  • The road ahead

20
Future of PKI
  • Moving from theory to practice
  • Over ten years, innovative thinking, fruitful
    technical discussion, constructive criticism, and
    implementation efforts have driven the
    recognition of the need for options
  • Research into secure architectures and secure
    protocols have made options possible
  • BUT options have yet to be embraced in a
    significant way in real products

21
Future of PKI (contd)
  • Example identifier bound to public key
  • Sometimes there are valid reasons for the
    identifier to be a veronym sometimes a
    pseudonym sometimes an anonym
  • Standards (in their language and syntax) do not
    preclude different identifier types
  • However, history and tradition have made rigid
    interpretations PKI deployments are almost
    exclusively one type or another
  • WHY NOT HAVE CAs THAT CAN BIND KEYS TO ANY OF THE
    THREE TYPES, AS REQUIRED?
  • This would make PKIs more suited to real-world
    needs

22
Conclusion
  • The goal of this work has been to demonstrate
    that the PKI community has significantly
    broadened its understanding of this technology
    over the past ten years
  • The challenge now is to translate that
    understanding to real PKI deployments that solve
    authentication challenges in real, heterogeneous
    environments
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