Models of Democracy and PostDemocracy

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Models of Democracy and Post-Democracy

• Alistair Cole

2
Politics and Society in Europe

• European politics are the politics of liberal
  democracy? In a formal sense, it is difficult to
  contest.
• The EU itself acts as a legal order that embeds
  democratic institutions in its member-states
• The new accession states of 2004 and 2007
  countries had each to meet strict criteria the
  Copenhagen criteria to be able to join in the
  European Union.
• European liberal democracies are constitutional
  political regimes i.e. that political processes
  are regularised by reference to respect for duly
  established rules and constitutional norms.

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Politics and Society

• The nations considered in this lecture are, by
  and large, the nations comprising the EU
• These countries are most similar in that they
  belong to broadly the same family of political
  regimes and have intense interaction with each
  other.
• Their fundamental similarity, in many respects,
  allow us to compare the importance of different
  institutional structures, or to weigh the causal
  force of specific cleavages.
• These countries operate under very similar
  constraints, notably their membership of the
  European Union, which weighs in an increasingly
  important manner on each of them.
• Comparative Politics middle level analysis. Not
  really meta- narratives of power or domination
• Middle level research objects institutions,
  elites, parties, leadership, electorates, policy
  sectors.
• Generic, cross cutting themes such as
  Europeanisation. Operationalising new forms of
  comparative analysis less based on country as
  unit of analysis, more on variables.

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Politics and Society

• In all European Union countries, the ability of
  national governments to control policy-making has
  diminished, as a result of the growing influence
  of the EU over economic and financial policy, and
  especially, as a result of globalisation of
  international economic and financial exchanges.
• The countries of continental Europe each have
  their own political cultures/state traditions,
  which mediate the impact of globalised exchanges
  and norms. The country unit of analysis retains
  pertinence. Debates about convergence and
  national policy styles remain vitally important.

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Regime Typologies The loss of clusters

• Traditional comparativists sought to distinguish
  between different types of regime that is
  clusters of regimes which share sufficient
  characteristics to enable them to be considered
  as belonging to a group of similar regimes.
• Comparative politics traditionally operated a
  tripartite division of the world into liberal
  democracies, Communist regimes, third world
  states (this last being the most unsatisfactory
  of the three). None of these categories is
  satisfactory.
• The traditional tryptic has been challenged by
  the evolution of history, not least the collapse
  of communism in 1989-1991.
• Unit of analysis less likely to be single
  country, more identifying explanatory variables
  across countries

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Liberal Democracy aka Gordon Smith, 1986

• political competition for the highest offices of
  state, as expressed by competing political
  parties,
• the free interplay of interests, and an
  acceptance of political and economic pluralism
• alternation in power ( or at least the
  theoretical possibility of it).
• recognition of a boundary between the state and
  civil society, implying freedom of the media.
  (liberal democracy)
• recognition of the rights of legal opposition.
• a recognition of constitutionalism i.e. that
  political processes are regularised by reference
  to respect for duly established rules and
  constitutional norms. This might take the form of
  a written constitution, or an unwritten form but
  of greater importance than this is the extent to
  which each branch of government theoretically
  operates within the strict parameters of legal
  rules, safeguard against arbitrary government.

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Limitations and criticism

• This classic definition of liberal democracy is
  rather a formalistic one it does not consider,
  by itself, whether democracies are capable of
  providing effective government, of delivering the
  goods.
• It is one based on a model of competitive
  elitism alternative elites stand by ready to
  conduct the affairs of government. It is one that
  requires a minimal democratic participation.
• Too much participation can be destabilising in
  one version of this (Lipset and Bendix)
  democratic stability requires limited
  participation.
• The claim sustained by the liberal democracies to
  allow for the free interplay of democratic forces
  has in most cases proved accurate this can be
  measured by the fact that most of the core 20
  liberal democracies have at some time managed an
  alternation in power.
• Moreover, it has been rare for any one government
  to remain in power for more than ten years

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Limitations and criticism 2

• that the liberties safeguarded by liberal
  democracy are excessively negative and
  formalistic, designed primarily to safeguard
  existing property relations
• that liberal democracy has proved intolerant of
  genuine attempts at revolutionary change any
  attempt fundamentally to challenge the norms of
  capitalism, e.g, has invited a reversion away
  from democracy towards dictatorship- such as in
  Chile with the overthrow of Allende's Marxist
  government in 1973.
• Reverse attempts to impose democracy through
  arms, as in Irak. Huntingdon crisis of
  civilizations and imposing democracy through the
  barrel of a gun. S. Huntingdon, The Third Wave
  Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,
  1991
• that the notion of pluralism - i.e. a dispersal
  of power throughout the political, social and
  economic systems - is a myth that the pluralist
  idea of fair interaction between competing
  interests is erroneous, with the odds heavily
  stacked in favour of those possessing capital
  and that the idea of democracy itself is a
  misnomer, since power is exercised by a small
  pro-capitalist elite.

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Six Models of European Democracy

• D. Held, Models of democracy,1987, 1996, 2005
• Held 1 Athenian Democracy
• Small communities, direct participation
  sovereignty (polis) over all public affairs
• Office short term, by election, lot rotation
• Women slaves excluded
• Low participation
• Domination by demagogues factions as/ more
  likely than deliberation instability

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Held 2 Competitive elitist democracy
(Majoritarian Model)

• Theoretical roots in Weber Schumpeter
• Influenced by the protective model of democracy
  dominant 1945-70s rather similar to the model
  outlined above
• Key feature competition between alternative
  elites
• Governments are strong within parliaments, but
  subordinate to elections, and hence parliaments,
  over time. This is particularly apposite to
  describe British democracy.
• Participation limited and intermittent. Too much
  particpipation destabilising (Lipset and Bendix)

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Held 3 Legal Democracy (Consensual model)

• Majoritarianism strongly constrained by the
  law/the rule of law
• Separation (sharing) of powers emphasised
• Minimum role for state in society
• Markets and free trade should be given fullest
  possible scope
• Epitomised by l.C20th neo-liberal trend

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Held 4 Participatory Democracy

• Inspired by developmental democracy in C20th by
  Macpherson Carole Pateman
• A knowledgeable, participating citizenry is
  essential
• Participation in regulating the state, local
  community/ies and the workplace
• Party elites directly accountable to members
• Need for consistency between power structures in
  public and private spheres. Democracy can not
  thrive of structures of civil society remain
  authoritarian.

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Beyond Held Social Democracy

• Dahrendorf 1945-1980 welfare states added a
  substantive (material) basis to the largely
  procedural basis of liberal democracy. Democracy
  consists in a set of rights and duties, including
  expectations of welfare rights. Democracy is a
  form of social citizenship.
• Bobbio Rolling back the welfare state implies
  rolling back/undermining democracy itself
• R. Dahrendorf, After Social Democracy, 1980
• N. Bobbio, Liberalism old and new in idem.
  The Future of Democracy, 1987

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C. Crouch, Postdemocracy, 2004

• Early C21st world-historical peak for democracy,
  in terms of its geographical range
• But there are many problems in established
  democracies. Everywhere there is increasing
  abstention, dissatisfaction with performance of
  democratic regimes, a challenge to the
  effectiveness of democratic regimes
• There is also, specifically, a problem with
  American democracy, which is bound to impact upon
  European countries. US leadership of democratic
  world established in the 1930s, on the basis of
  the Roosevelt Welfare state, when most of Europe
  turned Right. But since the 1980s, USA has
  changed fundamentally it no longer represents
  value-based, or normative leadership.
• For Crouch, post-Democracy is NOT non-democratic,
  nor anti-democratic, but it is satisfied with
  residual democratic and welfare rights.
  Individual market-based economic rights have the
  primacy over social or political rights
• In post-democracy, social movements are less
  vibrant, especially those of Labour,,, and the
  trade unions are marginal actors

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Post-Democracy (suite)

• unions are marginalised
• State as policeman ? more prominent role for the
  state in regulating everyday lives, a more
  instrusive state
• Wealth gap grows taxation less redistributive
  with moves to the global economy
• The poor return to pre-democratic condition of
  non-participation in the US, this is flagrant,
  but is also evidence in western European
  democracies, where electoral registration has
  declined. Poor do not register either because
  they do not have a home, or because they fear the
  State (for taxation purposes, e.g.).
• The nature of political communication is changed
  in an age of mediatisation and soundbites.
  Genuine discussion in the public space fades
  away.

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Lijpharts Majoritarian and Consensual
Democracies

• Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies. Patterns of
  Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
  twenty-one countries,
• Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy.
  Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
  Countries.

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Lijpharts Majoritarian and Consensual
Democracies

• Executive-parties cluster
• Concentration of executive power in a single
  party majority cabinet/broad coalitions
• Domination of Executive-Legislative relations by
  the Executive/ an active legislature influencing
  policy
• The prevalence of a two-party system/ a
  multi-party system
• A majoritarian electoral system(first past the
  post or two ballot)/ a proportional electoral
  system
• A pluralist interest group system, with
  free-for all bargaining/ a corporatist style
  pattern of interest mediation

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Federal-Unitary cluster

• Unitary and centralised government / devolved or
  federal government
• Unicameral concentration of legislative
  power/powerful second chamber representing
  societal interests
• Flexible constitutions/written constitutions
• Legislative sovereignty re the
  constitution/constitutional arbitration in a
  system of shared and separated powers
• Executive-dependent Central Banks/independent
  monetary authorities.

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Lijpharts 1999

• study increased also addressed the issue of
  substantive outcomes. He considered which, of
  majoritarian or consensual democracies, performed
  better in relation to A) Economic performance
  and B) Democratic quality. Lijpharts main
  conclusion was that consensus/negotiation
  democracy pole is far superior to the
  majoritarian, winner-takes all one. AL found
  that there was little difference between
  Consensual and Majoritarian democracies in
  relation to economic performance. But that
  consensual, non-majoritarian democracies ensured
  a much higher democratic quality.

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Summary

• European democracies, for Lijphart, could be
  divided according to these two poles. In
  practice, individual democracies would lie
  somewhere between the two extremes. Britain, for
  example, as the archetype of the Westminster
  model, was clearly the representative of the
  first camp more divided countries, such as the
  Netherlands, of the second camp.
• This model has long been very influential, as a
  basic way of differentiating between European
  democracies. There are variants on this.
• Lijpharts concept of consociationalism was also
  very influential for many years. According to the
  consociational model, divided societies such as
  the Netherlands or Belgium could nonetheless
  support effective and consensual political
  systems, as a result of elite-level compromises
  between the main pillars represented in a
  society.
• In a society divided by issues of religious
  identity, for example, elite level accommodation
  ensured broad support for the system.
• The consensus model ensures a positive logic of
  negotiation and compromise whereas the Winner
  takes all system is inherently conflictual and
  negative sum.
• The Lijphart model was a critique of the
  pretensions of the Westminster model of
  democracy and celebrated the fact that
  negotiation, compromise and coalition produced
  not only fairer, but also better politics.

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A CRITIQUE OF LIJPHART

• One such critique was that of Paul Penning. The
  first criticism that this model betrayed the
  empirical reality, as much in Majoritarian
  systems, as in Consensual ones.
• TheMajoritarian model did not necessarily
  produce a winner takes all mentality, because
  regular alternations in power meant that
  governments exercised power with caution.
• Likewise, the negotiated consensual and
  consociational mechanisms of divided societies
  did not always succeed in producing a fairer, or
  more effective politics.
• The role of institutional incentives could be
  overstressed in these accounts. In the
  consociational model, as in Belgium, this has
  clearly broken down, with territorial elites
  repillarising Belgian society.
• P. Pennings, Parliamentary control of the
  executive in 47 countries, paper prepared for
  the ECPR, April 2000 _at_ http//www.essex.ac.uk
  /ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/copenhagen
  /ws10/pennings.PDF

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Penning 2

• for Penning, Lijpharts distinction between
  Consensus democracy and majoritarian democracy
  offers a poor statistical explanation of
  variations in parliamentary control.
• Lijpharts assumption that Westminster systems
  are characterized by strong governments and weak
  parliaments, whereas Consensual countries are
  characterized by strong parliaments weak
  governments. But for Penning this is not
  confirmed by the data analysis.
• Statistical and case study analysis has shown
  that the parliamentary control of the government
  in Consensual democracies is seriously weakened
  by the majority's duty to support the coalition
  government.

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Penning 3

• Penning argued that the Lijphart model
  exaggerated differences and explained these
  overly in relation to institutional, rather than
  societal arguments.
• The dichotomous view of there being two types of
  democracy is highly misleading. Contrary to
  Lijpharts assumptions, strong executives do not
  automatically imply weak legislatures this is
  far too mechanical and assumption, one that
  relies too much on structure and not enough on
  agency explanations.

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Role of electoral system and coalitions

• There have also been criticisms about the role of
  the electoral system. PR systems can create
  stalemate and instability, just as easily as they
  can create compromise and flexibility. On the
  other hand, majoritarian electoral systems and
  moderate multi-party systems, in particular, tend
  to generate slightly higher levels of
  institutional confidence than alternative
  arrangements' (p.234). Institutional confidence
  is maintained because Majoritarian democracy can
  contribute to rapidly forming and maintaining
  stable governments

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Novak, 1997

• Novak (1997) suggests that in certain
  circumstances, action-efficiency is essential
  will lead to outcome-effectiveness. Political and
  economic reforms in C-E Europe, esp. in
  homogenous countries, leading to comparative
  advantage for them
• Furthermore, major changes of power occur more
  frequently in Majoritarian democracies These
  can be more conducive to political innovation and
  allow for genuine democratic choice.
• Majoritarian democracy sees the advantage lying
  in ability to take decisions and provide firm
  government.
• M Novak (1997), Is There One Best Model of
  Democracy? Efficiency and Representativeness
  Theoretical Revolution or Democratic
  Dilemma?, Czech Sociological Review, 5,2
  131-157

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End of consociationalism?

• The original basis of Ls consensual model of
  democracy, consociational theory, which stressed
  elite cooperation in divided societies preventing
  civil disorder ( even war) has been largely
  disproved.