Meditations on First Philosophy

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Meditations on First Philosophy

• Philosophy 1
• Spring, 2002
• G. J. Mattey

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The Religious Crisis

• The Protestant Reformation destroyed the
  universal intellectual authority of the Roman
  Catholic Church
• Individual conscience was offered as a higher
  authority
• One philosophical issue was how to adjudicate
  this dispute
• Another was what role reason should play

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The Scientific Crisis

• Natural philosophers such as Galileo challenged
  the Aristotelian account of the natural world
• Mathematical explanations appeared preferable to
  teleological explanations
• Hobbess account of the natural world seemed to
  exclude any role for God

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The Skeptical Crisis

• The writings of the ancient skeptics had been
  recovered during the Renaissance
• Powerful skeptical arguments were mobilized by
  philosophers such as Montaigne
• These arguments threatened religious as well as
  scientific belief

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The Problem of the Criterion

• This problem was posed by ancient Pyrrhonian
  skeptics
• How can a dispute (e.g., authority vs.
  conscience) be settled?
• One may not appeal to what is in dispute
• So a new criterion is needed
• If the new criterion is in dispute, the problem
  arises once again

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René Descartes

• Born 1596
• French
• Studied under the Jesuits
• Invented analytic geometry
• Pursued many scientific investigations
• Father of modern philosophy
• Died 1650

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Descartess Contributions

• Produced a comprehensive mathematical system of
  the world, with laws of nature such as inertia
• Looked for new first principles of philosophy in
  pure reason
• Tried to refute skepticism decisively
• Attempted to prove that the mind an autonomous
  being, distinct from the body

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Preconceptions

• The Aristotelian account of knowledge began with
  notions acquired from sense-perception
• Descartes held that these preconceptions
  acquired in youth are the source of error
• He sought to overturn the preconceptions of his
  youth, thus purging his mind of error

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The Method of Doubt

• Descartes sought a method of removing all at once
  his erroneous opinions
• He would treat as false any opinion that was open
  to the slightest doubt
• Once all dubious opinions were removed, he would
  see what survived
• He would build on this foundation an edifice of
  knowledge free of preconceptions

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Doubts About Specific Objects

• My opinions about specific objects are based on
  sense-perception
• Opinions about obscure objects (e.g., small or
  distant ones) are dubious because I am often
  deceived by our sensory input
• Opinions about near and familiar objects (e.g.,
  I am seated next to the fireplace) are dubious
  because I have no criterion for distinguishing
  my waking states from my dreaming states

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Doubts About General Objects

• My mistaken opinions about specific objects
  depend on my opinions about general objects
  (e.g., shapes)
• People make errors regarding even the simplest
  things (e.g., that 235)
• I may have been made so that I can be deceived
  even about them
• A powerful God could have brought it about that
  the natural universe does not exist
• A lesser cause or chance could easily have
  brought it about that I am defective

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Sustaining Doubt

• The method of doubt requires that for now I
  treat my opinions about sensed specific and
  rationally known general objects as false
• A uniform way of keeping my doubts in mind is by
  assuming that there is a powerful evil genius who
  is exerting its will to deceive me
• Still, it is difficult to sustain this doubt due
  to laziness

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If I Am Thinking, I Exist

• Is there anything left that is not subject to
  doubt?
• Perhaps it is some specific object that is not
  perceived through the senses
• Such an object is myself, since I must exist in
  order to doubt at all (Augustine)
• In the period of time when I think (cogito) I am
  something, an evil genius cannot bring it about
  that I am nothing

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I Am a Thinking Thing

• What is the I which, necessarily, exists when it
  is thinking?
• It is a thinking thing (res cogitans)
• It need not have any bodily characteristics,
  since it has been assumed that there are no
  bodies and no knowledge of general things
• So what I am is not known by imagination, which
  simulates shapes

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What a Thinking Thing Does

• Most characteristics of a thinking thing are
  conditions that allowed me to reject my former
  opinions
• Doubting
• Understanding
• Affirming
• Denying
• Willing
• Refusing

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Imagining and Sensing

• The same thing that doubts, understands, etc.
  also
• Imagines many things, even when not willing to do
  so
• Notices many things that appear to arise from the
  senses
• It imagines things as if bodies exist
• It senses, i.e., seems to see, hear, feel, etc.
• I cannot doubt that these are powers in me
• They can all be classified as thinking

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Intellectual Perception

• Suppose that bodies exist how could they be
  known?
• The senses reveal nothing constant in them
• The imagination cannot comprehend their infinite
  possible variations
• They are perceived only through inspection by the
  intellect, which understands their constant
  features extension, flexibility, mutability
• The intellectual inspection that reveals the
  nature of bodies even more clearly reveals the
  nature of mind

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Clear and Distinct Perception

• I now know a number of things about myself
• To know these things, I must know what it is for
  me to know them
• The condition for knowledge is clarity and
  distinctness in the perception of what I affirm
• It seems a general rule that whatever I perceive
  very clearly and very distinctly is true

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The Return of Doubt

• When I turn my attention to what I perceive very
  clearly and distinctly, I believe that I cannot
  be deceived about them
• But when I turn my attention to my preconceived
  notion of God, I believe that I might have been
  made so that I can be deceived about them
• To dispel this very tenuous and, so to speak,
  metaphysical doubt, it must be determined
  whether God exists and can be a deceiver

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Truth and Falsity

• Truth and falsity reside in judgments
• Judgment embraces in thought something beyond the
  subject judged
• The primary subjects of judgment are ideas
• Ideas in themselves are neither true nor false
  (nor are acts of will)
• Error arises most commonly when the idea is taken
  to be a likeness of something outside me

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Grounds for Judgment

• Why do I take it that my ideas are likenesses of
  things outside me?
• I seem to have been taught so by nature I
  spontaneously believe this
• Natural impulses can give rise to error
• But the light of nature always yields true
  judgments (e.g., from the fact that I doubt, it
  follows that I am)
• The ideas come to me against my will
• But they might be produced by something in me
• Even if the ideas come from things outside me,
  they might not be likeness of them (e.g., the
  small image of the sun)

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A Hierarchy of Ideas

• Ideas as modes of thought are equal one idea is
  no more an idea than another
• But they are not equal in the objects they
  represent
• An idea of a substance has more objective
  reality than that of an accident
• An idea of an infinite substance has more
  objective reality than that of a finite substance

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Cause and Effect

• We know by the light of nature that the efficient
  cause of a thing has at least as much reality as
  its effect
• This holds for objective reality as well as the
  formal reality of existing things
• The cause of the objective reality of an idea
  must have at least as much reality as it does it
  cannot get this reality from nothing

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The Cause of Ideas

• There must be a formal reality which is the cause
  of the objective reality of ideas
• This formal reality might be an idea itself
• But the causal chain cannot be infinite there
  must be a non-idea causing the first idea
• This is a sort of archetype that contains
  formally all the reality that is in the idea
  merely objectively

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Escape from the Circle of Ideas?

• Suppose there is an idea in me whose objective
  reality is so great that I cannot be the formal
  reality that is its cause
• Then I am not alone in the world the cause of
  that idea exists as well
• Are there any ideas of this sort?
• Different classes of ideas will have to be
  examined

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Ideas of Finite Beings

• I could be the cause of ideas of other men,
  animals or angels they are like me
• And I could be the cause of ideas of physical
  objects
• Their sensory qualities are very obscure, and
  even if accurate, they are no more real than I
• Their greatest objective reality is as
  substances, but I am a substance as well

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The Idea of God

• God is an infinite, independent, supremely
  intelligent and supremely powerful substance who
  created me and all else
• The idea of God is not materially false, like
  that of heat or cold, because of its clarity and
  distinctness
• I do not have the degree of reality needed to
  produce an idea of God
• There is much in me that is merely potential and
  not actual

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The Cause of Myself

• Since it is easy to be blinded by preconceptions,
  I will ask whether I could exist without God
• I did not get my being from myself, since I would
  have given myself all the perfections
• I have not always existed, since I need something
  to sustain my existence over each moment of time,
  and I cannot perpetuate my own existence
• I did not get my being from my parents, since
  they could not be the ultimate source of my idea
  of God

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The Existence of God

• The only way I can have an idea of God is by
  Gods causing me to have the idea
• Since I and my idea exist, God exists
• The idea of God in my mind is like a signature on
  a painting
• The idea I have of God precludes Gods being a
  deceiver, since deception implies an imperfection

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The Possibility of Error

• God did not give me a faculty of judgment that
  would lead me to error if I did not use it
  properly
• So error is the result of my improper use of my
  judgment
• This is possible because of my finitude, the fact
  that I partake to some extent of nothing

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The Cause of Error

• Why do I err, since it seems that it would be
  better for me not to?
• I cannot know what is best based on what appears
  to my mind
• Error is the result of my faculty of choosing
  over-reaching my faculty of knowing
• Will is infinite, but my understanding is limited
• I resemble God most through the infinitude of my
  will

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Willing

• Willing is to be able to do or not to do the same
  thing, e.g., to affirm or deny it
• A better account willing is the minds movement
  toward or away from what is proposed by the
  intellect, in a way that we sense we are
  determined by no external force

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Freedom of the Will

• Freedom is the inclination to choose the course
  that appears to be good and true
• This inclination may be based on clear
  understanding or an impulse implanted in me by
  God
• In my judgment that I truly exist, a great light
  gave way to a great inclination of my will
• Therefore, indifference is the lowest degree of
  freedom, since the intellect sees no reason to
  prefer one course to another

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Using and Abusing Free Will

• The indifference of the will extends to that
  about which we know nothing
• It even extends to what is probable
• My knowledge that it is not certain (e.g.,
  whether I have a body) pushes me away from
  judging it as true
• This diffidence is a proper use of judgment
• But making an assertion or denial in such a case
  is abuse of my free will
• If I am right, it is only through luck

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No Complaints Against God

• The ability to err might be thought to be grounds
  for complaint against God, but
• I should thank God for my limited intellect,
  since God owes me nothing
• My will must be unlimited (and hence subject to
  error) because it is unitary
• Error is privation, and hence not a thing
• Even though God could have made me error-free, it
  was for the best that I was made as I was
• I can still avoid error through self-restraint

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So Do External Things Exist?

• Some remaining issues about the nature of God and
  myself will be postponed
• The main question is whether the doubts about the
  existence of external objects can be overcome?
• The first step is to examine the ideas of
  external things for clarity and distinctness
• This will reveal what they must be

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Extension and Duration

• I have clear ideas of two continuous quantities,
  extension and duration
• Shapes and positions are understood through
  extension, and motion through extension and
  duration
• They apply to true and immutable natures, whether
  or not external objects exist

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Knowledge of Natures

• Natures are not fabricated by me, as can be seen
  through geometrical demonstrations
• I cannot refrain from assenting to judgments
  about them while perceiving them clearly
• Even when my attention was on the senses, I still
  regarded mathematical demonstration as certain

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Another Proof of Gods Existence

• What I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong
  to a thing really does
• I clearly and distinctly perceive that Gods
  nature is that of a supremely perfect being
• It belongs to the nature of a supremely perfect
  being to exist always
• So, God always exists

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A Sophism?

• We do not suppose that because a mountain is
  inseparable from a valley, a mountain exists
  they may both fail to exist
• So it seems possible to think of all Gods
  properties without Gods existing
• But to reason this way is fallacious it is
  existence itself that cannot be separated from
  Gods nature as a perfect being

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Knowing Gods Nature

• Gods nature, like that of a geometrical object,
  is not fabricated by me
• God is the only being I can think of whose
  essence includes its existence
• When I see that God now exists, I also perceived
  clearly that God has existed eternally
• There are other features in God that I perceive
  and cannot remove or change

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The Most Certain Knowledge

• The main way in which we can tell that we know
  Gods nature is through the clarity and
  distinctness of the perception of it
• This is revealed even if it was obscured
  initially by prejudice.
• Once it is known, nothing is more certain, or
  known more easily than that God exists

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Removing a Slight Doubt

• The remaining tenuous doubt was about things
  which are no longer clearly perceived
• God is not a deceiver, so if I remember that I
  had clearly perceived them, I can count on my
  memory
• Errors in memory occur when the original
  perception was not clear
• This holds even if I am always dreaming

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Imagination

• It seems that it follows from my use of the
  imagination that material objects exist
• Use of the imagination requires more exertion
  than that of the pure intellect
• I could exist as a pure understanding even
  without imagination
• So a probable conjecture is that imagination
  depends on something elsea body

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Sense

• Some things are better known through sense than
  through the intellect
• These include colors, sounds, tastes, pains
• Can an argument for the existence of material
  things be based on the contributions of the mode
  of thinking called sense?
• I must rehearse what caused doubt initially

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Naïve Beliefs About Sense

• Bodiesmy own and othersseem to be the objects
  of sense
• Associated with my body are ideas of pain and
  pleasure
• Many other ideas are also associated with bodies
• They come to me against my will, and so do not
  seem to come from me
• My body seems particularly related to me

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Doubts About Bodies

• There are numerous perceptual illusions, even
  with respect to pain
• I have no reason to believe that ideas in my
  dreams come from bodies, but I can dream anything
  I think I receive from bodies
• I might be constituted by nature to be deceived
  about what is true
• What is against my will could originate in me

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Separating Mind from Body

• God can make me without a body
• So my essence consists entirely of my being a
  thinking thing
• I am really distinct from my body
• Imagination and sense depend on my mind as modes
• But I can exist without them

49
Bodies Exist

• My passive faculty of sensing requires an active
  faculty producing what is sensed
• This faculty requires no act of understanding and
  it operates against my will
• So, the active faculty is not in me
• So, the active faculty is in another substance
  God, a super-human spirit, or body
• If it were not in body, God would be a deceiver
• God is no deceiver
• So, bodies exist

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The Teachings of Nature

• Nature is the handiwork of God
• It teaches me about the relation of my mind and
  my body
• I and my body form a single intermingled thing
• It also teaches me which other bodies should be
  pursued or shunned
• Anything else belongs exclusively to mind or to
  body
• Nature does not teach me that there is a likeness
  between ideas and bodies

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A Final Problem

• God, through nature, teaches me what to avoid as
  harmful or pursue as useful
• I am sometimes mistaken in this, yet God is no
  deceiver
• Attention to what is clear and distinct does not
  solve the problem, because in matters of utility,
  everything is obscure and confused

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Natural Errors

• The mind is a simple thing, while the body is a
  composite with many parts
• The interface of mind and body is in a common
  sense in the brain
• What is communicated to the mind is the last
  motion reaching the common sense
• But the motion from a remote part of the body
  could be corrupted on the way

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Coherence

• The final doubts have been dispelled
• A new argument against the dream hypothesis is
  given
• One can notice a considerable difference between
  waking and dreaming
• Waking life is connected without interruption,
  while dreaming life is not