Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti

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Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti

• A Country Social Analysis
• Presented by
• Dorte Verner
• World Bank
• May 2006

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Background

• Haiti is a resilient society whose rural
  communities in particular have developed coping
  mechanisms in response to a long history of
  underdevelopment and political instability
• The countrys religious, cultural, and artistic
  life is highly diverse and vibrant
• Like other fragile states, however, Haiti is also
  beset by widespread poverty and inequality,
  economic decline and unemployment, poor
  governance, and violence

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Objectives

• To support the Banks Country Assistance Strategy
  and Bank and other donors policy dialogue with
  Haiti
• To assess the main components of Haitis
  conflict-poverty trap from the perspective of the
  triangle of factors that have been identified
• The reports three main sections explore the
  nature of these components, and a closing section
  considers the linkages among them.

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Components of a conflict-poverty trap
Demographic and socioeconomic outcomes and risks
Institutional capacityprovide public goods
Political actors and strategies
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Demographic risk factors for violent conflict

• A very young population profile,
• High population turnover
• because of high in- and out-migrationnew
  migrants continue to be attracted to the metrop.
  area by higher levels of infrastructure,
  services, and jobs
• Poverty

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Rapid population growth and urbanization

• Rapid population growth
• now about 8 M (could reach about 12.3 M by 2030)
• 2.2 per year, 5 in urban areas
• Rapid urbanization
• 1.2 mill (1982) to 3.2 mill (2002)
• Two-thirds of growth occurred in PauP

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High population turnover absent economic growth

• High population turnover in PauP
• 75,000 migrants to greater PauP per year
• High rate of dissolved families
• The rapid rate of pop gr poor economic
  performance gt lowering per capita GDP
• has fallen by about 50 to 332 in the last two
  decades

8
High transfer dependency, Inequality and
Informality

• Very high access to nonlabor income
• Worlds top receiver of remittances30 of HH
  receive
• Esp. in urban areas
• Remittances contribute 32 of HH income
• Education promotes internal and external
  migration
• Little demand for workers
• 83 are self-employed/informal
• Skilled wage labor is key to escaping poverty
• Worlds highest income inequality (Gini 0.66)
• Both within and between rural and urban areas
• Remittances reproduce existing inequality

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Few and diminishing options for Haitis young

• 115,000 persons enter the PauP labor mk every
  year
• Unemployment is staggering among the young and
  educated (secondarygt50)
• Number of skilled jobs in the capital lt one
  years supply of new entrants
• Total number of wage jobs in the PauPlt 2 years
  supply of new entrants

Education
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Poverty is very deep and broad (2001)

• 49 of all Haitian households lived in extreme
  poverty (on the basis of a US1 a day extreme
  poverty line)
• Wide differences among localities and regions
• 20, 56, and 58 of households in metropolitan,
  urban, and rural areas, respectively, were
  extremely poor
• Most of the approx. 3.9 M who are extremely poor
  live in rural areas
• Poverty is especially extensive in the Northeast
  and Northwest regions

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Many social indicators low but improving

• Adult illiteracy
• From 78 to 40 (1970-2000)
• Infant mortality
• From 148 to 79 per 1000 (1970-2002)
• Child malnutrition
• From 34 to 23 (19902000)
• But varies strongly with HH income and region
  (rural vs. urban)

• Likely result of
• Remittances
• Illegal economy
• Price changes
• Reduction of food import tariffs in the 1990s
• Aid and non-state service provision

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Access education and infrastructural strongly
correlated with poverty in Haiti

• Infrastructure
• access infrastructural services is highly unequal
  (income, location)
• the rural poor in particular lack access to
  potable water, electricity, and roads
• Eduaction. Although overall educational
  attainment has increased in recent decades, there
  is substantial variation in attainment and school
  attendance across regions
• children and youth in the poorest regions lag
  behind their peers in richer regions.
• the children of poor households have less
  education than their nonpoor peers

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Crime and cohesion

• Despite troubles, many indicators point to strong
  social cohesion
• Rural peace and cooperation
• Migrant household bonds
• Social capital a factor in escaping poverty
• Homicide rates on regional average, but high
  incidence of domestic violence
• 35 of women victims of domestic violence
• 27 homicides per 100,000 citizens in 2001 (LCR
  22.9)
• Violent deaths concentrated in PauP
• Political violence worse in earlier periods

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High criminal threat areas
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A resilient society

• Economic indicators reflect pervasive development
  neglect demographic and socio-economic
  indicators point to high conflict risks
• But majority of population live in peace
• Crime rates are not higher than regional average
• Human security is improving basic social
  indicators are showing progress
• A society that has learnt to cope despite the
  state

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Components of a conflict-poverty trap
Demography, poverty, and inequality welfare
outcomes and social risks
Institutional capacity provide public goods
Political actors and strategies leadership and
entrepreneurs of violence
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Dimensions of Stateness
Coordinating private activity
Activist
Wealth redistribution
Functions
Intermediate
Addressing externalities
Social insurance
Pure public goods
Protecting the poor
Minimal
Public adm.Law and orderBasic health and
educationInfrastructure
Addressing market failure
Improving equity (ex post)
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Institutions matters

• Institutions matter for social and economic
  development, and are crucial for state building
• Institutions have the potential to mitigate the
  risk factors of violence and conflict that
  emanate from the socioeconomic and demographic
  context
• The Haitian state, however, has only a limited
  capacity to establish law and order, or to create
  conditions for economic growth and poverty
  reduction.
• Progress in breaking out of the conflict-poverty
  trap demands attention to the restoration of core
  state functions in these areas

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To understand the Haitian states capacity to be
a driver of development, its financial
constraints must be noted (2005)

• GDP is low and declining since 1980
• Gov. revenues were only 9 of GDP (avg. of 18 in
  low-income cou)
• Only 1.8 of revenues derive from taxes on
  income, profits, or capital
• Gov. expenditures have fluctuated sharply9-16
  of GDPlargely as a result of volatility in
  external assistance.
• Therefore a weak domestic revenue base, unstable
  external flows, and poor expenditure targeting
  have left spending on edu., health, and infrast.
  below the avg of low-inc cou

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The absent state

• 1987 constitution established complex and
  comprehensive national governance structure
• But the Collectivities Territoriales never
  implemented in practice
• Local participation in policy planning and
  institutional channels between local levels and
  central gov. remains low
• Public infra. (electricity, telephones, piped
  water, roads, regulatory frameworks) hardly
  provided outside of PauP gtNSS

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Basic service provided by non-state actors

• Non state sector (NSS) has expanded rapidly to
  respond to unmet needs
• Some 80 of education provided by NSS providers
• Make the difference between access and nonaccess
  for large parts of the population, esp in rural
  areas
• The NSS sector is diverse diverse in character
  Serious problems of efficiency, accountability,
  equity, and access for the poor
• Can the state successfully facilitate and
  coordinate service provision to enhance quality
  and cover gaps in provision to the poor?

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Weakness and corruption of police and judiciary

• Massive efforts to build police and judiciary
  institutions in the 1990s
• Achievements wiped out in late 1990s because of
  political interference
• Police is involved in corruption, smuggling
  etc.(HNP chief October 05)
• ILAC 2005 assessment Rule of law has fallen to
  lowest point since 1994
• Politicization is the fundamental problem

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A failed state

• The Haitian state does not provide core public
  goods (security, rule of law, infrastructure) and
  cannot claim the monopoly of the legitimate use
  of physical force within its given territory
• Economic growth, poverty reduction, increased
  equity, and conflict prevention are equally
  dependent on restoration of core state functions

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Components of a conflict-poverty trap
Demography, poverty, and inequality welfare
outcomes and social risks
Institutional capacity provide public goods
Political actors and strategies leadership and
entrepreneurs of violence
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Soup of democracy, fork of divisionPolitical
Actors and Strategies

• Twenty years have passed since the 1986 ouster of
  Jean-Claude Baby Doc Duvalier created a window
  of opportunity to establish a more stable and
  democratic form of governance
• But polarized politics has complicated efforts to
  address the countrys complex and deeply rooted
  development challenges

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Haitian Politics

• The 1987 constitution provides for a clear
  separation of executive, judicial and legislative
  powers, as well as decentralized governance
  structures
• In practice politics in Haiti lacks a predictable
  system of rules
• Political stability will remain illusive without
  the establishment of an equilibrium among the
  competing forces within society
• Haitian politics swings between two key dangers
• capture by privileged elites who harness
  government to protect their dominant position in
  society and
• populism that neglects the cou.s long-term
  institutional and eco. development while paying
  lip service to the poor

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Strong national leadership is crucial to
achieving a turnaround in Haiti

• Entrepreneurs of violence have taken advantage of
  political instability and weak state institutions
  to manipulate popular grievances for political
  and criminal ends
• Breaking free of Haitis poverty-conflict trap
  will require capable national political
  leadership that is committed to the consolidation
  of democratic institutions and processes
• In a context of very difficult socioeco.
  conditions, high social risks, defunct state
  institutions, extremely limited budget resources,
  and political polarization, Haitis leaders face
  enormous challenges
• The 2006 electoral process, however, has created
  new opportunities for reform, reconciliation and
  partnerships

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Summary The Trap
Demography, poverty, and inequality
Social risks, high demand
Opportunities for illegality,growth disabling
Supply of grievances and recruits
Tactical mobilization
Political interference and corruption
Institutional capacity
Political actors and strategies
Institutional weakness, missing checks and
balances
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Conclusion Breaking the Conflict-Poverty Trap

• Haitis social resilience and social capital and
  improvements in social indicators are keystones
  to draw upon in breaking the conflict-poverty
  trap
• The state has struggled to provide basic services
  to the population and has been dominated by a
  small elite that has made limited investments in
  infrastructure and basic services
• Development, poverty reduction and conflict
  prevention will not be possible without a focus
  on strengthening the states capacity to provide
  basic public goods, including security and the
  rule of law
• Its financial and managerial resources must be
  used with an exceptionally strong sense of
  priority

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Conclusion (2) Breaking the Conflict-Poverty
Trap

• The most important factor for breaking out of
  Haitis poverty-conflict trap cannot be provided
  by donors but only by Haitians themselves good
  leadership
• Because of the centrality of corruption in
  undermining good leadership, transparency in
  public finances should be a foundation for the
  Bank and other donors assistance to the new
  Haitian government
• Among the triangle of risk factors in the
  poverty-conflict trap, institutional capacity
  building is a key entry point for breaking the
  cycle improving demographic and socioeconomic
  outcomes and supporting political dialogue remain
  longer-term objectives
• National planning and international assistance
  should build on the existing International
  Cooperation Framework by prioritizing resources
  and monitoring progress, such that both donors
  and government can be held accountable for results