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Lesson Seven: Insurgency Beyond Vietnam

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Title: Lesson Seven: Insurgency Beyond Vietnam


1
Lesson Seven Insurgency - Beyond Vietnam
Columbia University 26 October 2006
2
Please Note The views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not purport to reflect
the position of the United States Military
Academy, the Department of the Army, or the U.S.
Department of Defense.
3
Terrorism History Nuggets
  • First VBIED (or Car Bomb) terrorist attack?
  • New York City, September 1920
  • Terrorist Italian anarchist Mario Buda
  • Vehicle Horse-drawn wagon
  • Target Corner of Wall and Broad streets
    (directly across from JP Morgan Company)
  • Attack The wagonpacked with dynamite and iron
    slugsexploded at precisely noon in a fireball of
    shrapnel, killing 40 and wounding more than 200.

4
Terrorism History Nuggets
  • Second VBIED (or Car Bomb) terrorist attack?
  • Haifa, Palestine (now Israel) January, 1947
  • Terrorists Stern Gang (a pro-fascist splinter
    group led by Avraham Stern that broke away from
    the right-wing Zionist paramilitary Irgun)
  • Vehicle Truck
  • Target British police station in Haifa
  • Attack A truckload of explosives was driven into
    the station, killing 4 and injuring 140.
  • (The Stern Gang would soon use truck and car
    bombs to kill Palestinians as well, as part of
    their extremist agenda)

5
Terrorism Key Terms
  • Vision
  • Power
  • Strategy
  • Tactic
  • Duty
  • Shame
  • Freedom fighter
  • Self-sacrifice
  • Will to kill
  • Skill to kill
  • Ideology
  • Indoctrination
  • Radicalization
  • Rationalization
  • Emotions
  • Moral Disengagement
  • Communicative Acts
  • Facilitators/Causes
  • Learning Organization
  • Counter vs. Anti
  • Hard/Soft Power

AB95-5.PPT //
6
Certain aspects are fundamental
  • Political act
  • Desire for political change
  • Terrorism is typically non-state in character
  • (Note the separate but related topic of state
    terrorism typically antithetical to the desire
    for political change.)
  • States can terrorize, but they are not
    terrorists.
  • Terrorists do not abide by norms
  • They target innocents
  • They seek psychological trauma

7
Contemporary Insurgencies
  • Afghanistan
  • Bangladesh
  • Chad
  • Colombia
  • Iraq
  • Nepal
  • Nigeria
  • the Philippines
  • Sri Lanka
  • Thailand
  • Turkey
  • Uzbekistan

Common strategic objective Force the government
to overextend itself in dealing with the threat,
thereby allowing the insurgency to gain support
and commit further attacks against the government.
What else do these have in common?
8
Underlying Conditions Local
  • Could include political, economic and social
    conditions, before terrorism
  • Unemployment or other unmet aspirations
  • Socio-demographic pressures
  • Authoritarian/repressive regimes
  • Ethnic fissures (Tamils, Chechens)
  • Chaos capacity
  • Weak/failing states

Expectations
Opportunities
9
Underlying Conditions Global
  • Grievances that transcend geographic boundaries
  • Could include global animosities
  • e.g., Sunni vs. Shia
  • Could include foreign occupation
  • Afghanistan, Iraq
  • Israel Palestinian Territories

Demands/Grievances
Power to enact change
10
Conditions Facilitators
  • Global weapons proliferation (especially in
    weak/failing states)
  • Technology
  • Communication and transportation shrinks time and
    space enable networked forms of terrorism
    (including fundraising aspects)
  • Weapons invention of dynamite helped launch
    capabilities
  • Global criminal networks
  • Profit motive
  • Money laundering
  • Trafficking in drugs, humans, explosives, other
    bad stuff
  • Ideologies fuel both local and global perceptions
    of injustices and need for action/retribution

11
Facilitating Ideologies of Violence
  • Nationalist (e.g., Anti-colonial groups,
    territorial objectives)
  • Ethno-nationalist/Separatists (liberation,
    territorial objectives)
  • Left-wing (e.g., radical Communists
    revolutionaries)
  • Right Wing (often target race and ethnicity)
  • Anarchist
  • Environmentalist
  • Religious (e.g., militias, jihadists, etc.-
    attack on Islam)
  • Others (e.g., apocalyptic, charismatic cults,
    philosophies of Man is evil - Hobbes, et al.)
  • Overall These all reflect the importance of
    perceptions, emotions, strategic influence,
    information warfare The Vision Thing

12
Religion and Political Violence
  • What makes religious ideologies unique?
  • Long-term view of history and future
  • Sense of crisis, threat of secularization,
    globalization
  • Believe they are involved in an epic struggle of
    good vs evil
  • Believe in their own revealed truth from God
    piety and persistence in the faith will give you
    the strength to overcome anything
  • Acting along desires of a diety audience is
    thus not necessarily human.
  • Doing the bidding of a higher power demands
    sacrifice rewards in this life and the next
  • Feel unconstrained by law higher calling

13
Religion and Political Violence
  • Religious ideologies are the most powerful
    radicalization agents, because they
  • Explain the state of the world, particularly why
    believers are continuously persecuted, oppressed
    or discriminated
  • Explain how and why violence may be condoned and
    necessary
  • Are often theologically supremacist - meaning
    that all believers assume superiority over
    non-believers, who are not privy to the truth of
    the religion
  • Are exclusivist - believers are a chosen people,
    or their territory is a holy land
  • Are absolutist - it is not possible to be a
    half-hearted believer, and you are either totally
    within the system, or totally without it (and
    only the true believers are guaranteed salvation
    and victory, whereas the enemies and the
    unbelievers - as well as those who have taken no
    stance whatsoever - are condemned to some sort of
    eternal punishment or damnation, as well as
    death)

14
Religion and Terrorism
  • Overall, religious ideologies help foster
    polarizing values in terms of right and wrong,
    good and evil, light and dark - values which can
    be co-opted by terrorist organizations to convert
    a "seeker" into a lethal killer.

15
Religion and Global Insurgency
  • Unlike politically-focused ideologies (left-wing,
    right-wing, nationalist, etc.), religion
    transcends geopolitical boundaries, and can
    sustain a global insurgency
  • Global insurgency overthrow the established
    system of governments, replace it with something
    else
  • Global Islamic Insurgency replace Westphalian
    system with a Caliphate
  • Adherents believe their religion is under attack
    and requires all Muslims to defend Islam
  • Globally Networked

16
New York Washington, DCSept. 11, 2001
17
Karachi, PakistanMay 8, 2002 June 14, 2002
Attack on U.S. Consulate
Bus attack
14 Dead, including11 French engineers
12 Dead50 Injured
18
Bali, IndonesiaOctober 12, 2002
202 Dead350 Injured
Citizens from 21 countries, mostly Western
tourists, were killed in the blasts
19
Casablanca, MoroccoMay 17, 2003
44 Dead107 Injured
20
Jakarta, IndonesiaAugust 5, 2003
12 Dead60 Injured
J.W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta
21
Riyadh, Saudi ArabiaNovember 8, 2003 April
21, 2004
Attack on Security Services Headquarters
3 simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on
Al-Muhaya apartment complex
4 Dead148 Injured
17 Dead122 Injured
22
Istanbul, TurkeyNovember 20, 2003
27 Dead400 Injured
Primary Targets British consulate and the HSBC
bank headquarters
23
Madrid, SpainMarch 11, 2004
191 Dead1,035 Injured
24
Jakarta, IndonesiaSeptember 9, 2004
9 Dead173 Injured
Australian Embassy was primary target
25
London, UKJuly 7, 2005
54 Dead716 Injured
26
Countering a Global Insurgency
  • Military
  • Intelligence
  • Diplomacy
  • Legal
  • Information
  • Financial
  • Economic

Using All Instruments of National Power The
MIDLIFE (formerly DIME) Approach to CT
27
GWOT (Good Guys)
VNSAs (Bad Guys)
M I D L I F E
28
Countering GI - Issues of Concern / Contested
Terrains
29
Global Application of CT Strategy
Middle East
Europe
Security Operations
Economic, Political Development
Ongoing Missions
Proliferation Security Initiative
Partnership Development
Security Cooperation
  • Deny Safe Havens
  • Build Capacity
  • Amplify Moderates
  • Improve Governance
  • Secure WMD
  • Attack Terrorists
  • Develop Partnerships
  • Economic
  • Development
  • Educate Train
  • Short-term and Long-term actions required

Africa
South East Asia
Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative
Security Cooperation Programs
Horn of Africa JTF
Humanitarian Operations
CT Fellowships
30
Countering Insurgencies
  • Economic and political dimensions
  • Create economic political opportunities to meet
    aspirations
  • Consider foreign policy dimensions (state
    sponsorship, bias)
  • Chaos capacity
  • Law enforcement, border security containment
  • Weapons proliferation criminal networks
    (35-40b)
  • Pressure states and private companies to prevent
  • The battleground of ideologies is particularly
    important
  • Exploit ideological vulnerabilities

31
Implications for Information Operations
  • How to combat an idea-based global network?
  • Map the influences within the network Identify
    their most influential members who is trusted
    most? Whose ideas carry the most weight?
  • Avoid strategic miscommunications that reinforce
    their beliefs
  • Deprive them of the ability to discredit the U.S.
    and the West
  • Combat the enemy in the strategic battlespace of
    ideas and perceptions

32
Implications for Information Operations
  • This is a War of Ideas We need to convince them
    (potential supporters and recruits) that we
    (liberal democracies) offer a better way than
    separatist Islamic Jihad (but without attempting
    to convert them to our way of life)
  • Foster/strengthen a universal belief that the
    globalized community of responsibly governed
    states offers a more viable future of dignity,
    respect, security, prosperity for everyone
  • Note this does not say promote democracy
  • Develop an effective counter-ideological
    message- Manage perceptions/be more proactive in
    the information battlespace- Undermine the
    perceived legitimacy among supporters
  • Work to bolster the image of American morals and
    values being compatible with those of the Arab
    and Islamic world, where we are too often
    portrayed as greedy, selfish hedonists

33
Counterterrorism Strategy
  • Human intelligence networks are critical
    (although non-efficient use of manpower)
  • Must have continual presence cannot go into a
    village looking for the terrorists
  • Evaluate trends and potentials, capabilities and
    intentions, and provide an operational net
    assessment
  • Must not over-react terrorist strategy may be to
    provoke over-reaction, leading to further
    alienation and possible supporters among populace
  • Tactical level thwart an attack, pursue and
    bring to justice attack perpetrators
  • Strategic level build resilient communities

34
Winning Long Wars
  • We face a hostile ideology-global in scope,
    atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and
    insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it
    poses promises to be of indefinite duration.
  • Farewell Radio and Television Address to the
    American People
  • by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January
    17, 1961.
  • In the long run, winning the war on terror means
    winning the war on ideas, for it is ideas that
    can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing
    to kill innocent victims. National Security
    Strategy (March 2006), p. 9

35
Defeating an Ideology Takes Time
  • Communism
  • Communist ideology gained prominence in 1919
  • US opposition began in 1946
  • 43 years of Cold and Hot War to defeat the
    ideology
  • Communism ultimately collapsed from within
  • Violent Islamic-Based Extremism
  • Threads of history thousands of years long
  • Potentially more legitimacy with a religious
    based ideology, especially when conditions
    support
  • group based vs. state based more difficult to
    apply cold war strategies

Key Lesson Marginalizing an ideology requires
patience and promoting reform from within
36
  • Questions?

37
Global Human Networks
38
Key Human Network Features
  • Cliques, cells, bridges all components of
    networks in which contingent relationship, based
    on trust, are formed
  • Sophisticated organizational forms Living,
    breathing organisms with no state/geographical
    boundaries
  • Can include hierarchical organizations within the
    overall network
  • Becoming preferred method of communication,
    coordination, cooperation collaboration
  • Political Activists
  • Organized Crime
  • Terrorists
  • Academic Researchers

39
Shared Beliefs in the Salafist Network
  • Core tenets of the Sunni insurgents ideology and
    key ideologues
  • Taymiya, Wahhab inspired Salafist (pure Islam)
    movements among Sunnis
  • Banna Every aspect of Western thought is a
    threat to Islam
  • Mawdudi Gods sovereignty is absolute thus, no
    laws created by man are valid
  • Qutb Muslims who do not conform to jihadi
    interpretations are infidels (ok to kill)
    separation of church and state is anathema to
    true Islam
  • Azzam Jihad is a necessity wherever Muslim lands
    are invaded or occupied, including Afghanistan
  • Azzam and Zawahiri manhaj (blur the paradigm of
    defensive jihad with the idea of jihad against
    the West)
  • Zawihiri In order to bring down the apostate
    regimes in the Middle East (the near enemy), we
    must focus on the superpower patrons the U.S.
    and the West (the far enemy).

40
Shared Beliefs in the Salafist Network
  • Resonance of the Al Qaeda message (principle of
    jihad) is one form of network protocol, like a
    secret handshake which confirms a lot of tacit
    knowledge between two people
  • Religious dimension Sunni insurgents ideology
    exploits certain Islamic teachings in order to
    push the global umma into bringing down the world
    order of responsibly governed states
  • Political dimension As a whole, the Muslim world
    has many developmental challenges due to
    political corrupion these can only be overcome
    by bringing down the world order of responsibly
    governed states and replacing it with Islamic
    rule in the form of a caliphate
  • Social dimension Social reinforcement of the
    core tenets of the ideology eventually raises it
    to a level of sacred obligation

41
Network Vulnerabilities
  • Harmony/Disharmony report
  • Analysis of captured AQ documents in OEF and OIF
  • Reveals concern over disagreements within
    movement
  • Suggests ways to interdict/degrade lines of
    communications between network nodes
  • Offers insights into ways some members of the
    movement have subverted the authority of senior
    commanders (preference divergence)

42
Agency Theory
  • Three main areas of preference divergence within
    the organization/movement
  • Tactical control
  • Transaction integrity
  • Ideological authority
  • Protocols Humans need trust in order to work
    together toward any goal
  • Preference divergence impacts the level of
    trust/expectations of shared effort toward common
    goal

43
Network Viruses
  • Viruses malicious code that infects computers,
    network routers, etc. and propagates, spreads
    itself to others on the network, often by
    corrupting the normal protocols used for
    information and financial transactions
  • Are there viruses we can use to negatively impact
    the network integrity of the global salafist
    insurgency?
  • Independence Day plant a virus into the mother
    ship . . .
  • Functional Agency (FA) Viruses to exacerbate
    preference divergence within an organization

44
FA Virus 1 Tactical Control
  • Political and ideological leadersthe
    principalsmust delegate certain duties to
    middlemen or low-level operatives, their agents.
  • But because of the need to maintain operational
    secrecy, terrorist group leaders cannot perfectly
    monitor what their agents are doing.
  • Thus, preference divergence creates operational
    challenges which can be exploited to degrade a
    terrorist groups capabilities.

45
FA Virus 1 Tactical Control
  • Preference divergence over controlled use of
    violence terrorists cannot afford too alienate
    the center of gravity, or risk losing all support
  • Preference divergence over whos in charge
  • Preference divergence over who needs what kinds
    of situational awareness
  • Preference divergence over what should be done to
    maintain security

46
FA Virus 1 Tactical Control
  • Abu Bakr Naji
  • one of AQs leading strategists
  • published a number of texts discussing problems
    that confront the global network
  • e.g., organizational difficulties in resolving
    chains of command, ferreting out spies within the
    organization, and reigning in overzealous
    recruits.
  • also worries about low-ranking members of the
    movement will initiate their own large-scale
    attacks against high-value targets.
  • for more, see Stealing al Qaedas Playbook
  • What does newly established Shura Council in Iraq
    signify re desire among some leaders for greater
    tactical control over activities?

47
FA Virus 1 Tactical Control
  • What could UBL do to destroy his own credibility,
    popular ratings? If you were UBL, what would you
    fear or worry about most?
  • Perception of strategic drift
  • Highlight disconnect between rhetoric and actions
  • Publicize CT successes and tactical failures
    discredit perception of competence
  • Publicize the differences between AQ leaders and
    affiliate groups and the internal dissension
    within the AQ leadership
  • Make information management more difficult
    degrade the C2 network channels with noise, static

48
FA Virus 1 Tactical Control
  • Create uncertainty over which affiliate group is
    responsible for particularly brutal attacks
    against innocent Muslim
  • provide claims of responsibility on behalf of
    dozens of groups each time
  • try to force real culprits to prove their
    ownership of an attack
  • in doing so, they may reveal more than they want
    to (OpSec challenge), and may also alienate the
    local population/support base by demanding
    recognition for murdering Muslims
  • Force leaders to consider punitive actions
    against agents/operatives
  • Flood the network nodes with requests for
    info/requests for clarification of intent,
    strategy, etc. Goal overwhelm the
    decision-makers from within

49
FA Virus 1 Tactical Control
  • Cellular structures complicate C2
  • Secure long-distance communication is time
    consuming and expensive
  • How can we increase their concern about network
    infiltration, forcing them to spend more time on
    screening new members, allowing less time for
    planning/conducting attacks?
  • Overall focus degrade level of trust regarding
    leadership, leaders competence, personal
    agendas, etc. as well as forcing them to focus
    more on operational security and tactical control

50
FA Virus 2 Transaction Integrity
  • Expectations of money to support operations will
    be made available in a timely fashion
  • Expectations that individual recipients will do
    the correct things with those funds
  • Problem Limited or no accountability
  • Because of operational security needs, a
    clandestine organization cannot offer much
    transparency regarding its finances
  • This allows considerable latitude for abuse,
    corruption
  • Use their need for secrecy against them

51
FA Virus 2 Transaction Integrity
  • Networked organizations need to support financial
    transactions, movement of assets, weapons, people
  • Key element in financial networks is trust
  • Promote suspicion, rumors, mistrust in financial
    networks
  • Encourage internal looting (or perception of
    looting)
  • Overall goal degrade the integrity within
    financial networks make asset management more
    difficult

52
FA Virus 2 Transaction Integrity
  • Get money to disappear with no reason
  • Have conspicuous consumption items (big screen
    TV) appear in place of the missing money
  • Raise suspicion of misappropriation, fund
    diversion should be particularly effective in
    certain cultures where conspiracy theories are
    already popular
  • Some members of the movement (especially
    Pakistanis) have complained on web forums that
    Egyptians and Saudis are given preferential
    treatment in the network opportunities for
    exploiting fissures by publicizing supposed
    benefits given to them

53
FA Virus 2 Transaction Integrity
  • How else to enhance suspicion of financial
    mismanagement, corruption in network?
  • Slow the transfer of funds, assets from one node
    to another cause unexplained transaction delays
  • If Internet is a primary means for getting funds
    into the network, need to publicize financial
    agency problems, encourage suspicion that money
    donated will not necessarily be used as intended
    (e.g., to pay drug couriers, murderers of
    schoolchildren, etc.)
  • Publish articles on lavish lifestyles of AQ
    leaders focusing on KSM and his playboy antics
    al Fadl stealing money in Kenya the Montreal
    cell and its money mismanagement, etc. Paint a
    portrait of these guys as anything but humble,
    pious, devout Muslims or competent financial
    decision makers.

54
Other Functional Agency Virus Ideas
Financial Efficiency
Technological Capacity
Tactical Control
Operational Security
Operational Security
Organizational Tightness
Constrain the networks security environment
55
FA Virus 3 Ideological Authority
  • Preference divergence over who has greater
    ideological authority
  • Zawahiri illustrates challenges of networked
    organization
  • Trying to retain his ideological grip on the
    movement struggle with Zarqawi over tactics,
    influence
  • Public arguments with others over strategy,
    control, authority (e.g., Zawahiris criticism of
    Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas)
  • Is democratic process de-legitimizing existing
    orgs (in the eyes of radicals)?
  • Hamas and Sudan responded to recent UBL tape with
    thank but no thanks Hamas also criticized
    recent attacks in Egypt

56
FA Virus 3 Ideological Authority
  • Identify and exploit rivalries within the network
  • Disagreements already exist in the network
  • How to exacerbate them, make them more
    acrimonious?
  • Open marketplace to encourage competition force
    them to defend their ideas
  • What are the ideological disagreements in the
    global jihadist movement?
  • Is Muslim Brotherhood competing against AQ for
    the support of the center of gravity (bulk of
    Muslim world)?
  • Encourage network competition/competing network
    formation
  • Get competitive fatwas out there

57
FA Virus 3 Ideological Authority
  • Exploit disconnects between nationalist loyalties
    and calls for a non-state global caliphate
  • Who would be on the soccer team for the World Cup
    finals?
  • Sacred values are important focus on attacks,
    other activities that occur without any religious
    justification
  • In the history of insurgencies, once a group has
    had the power to do so, it destroys/terrorizes
    any political opposition rarely provides the
    just society it promised
  • Insurgent groups will not/cannot be just rulers
    because they have only known success through
    unjust, violent means

58
FA Virus 3 Ideological Authority
  • Raise questions strategic coherency
  • Puncture the myths
  • Highlight the hypocrisies
  • Highlight personal agendas expose jihadists as
    seeking a power grab, but pursuing a religious
    goal
  • Emphasize internal criticisms of armchair
    jihadists with no operational experience (e.g.,
    Maqdisi)

59
(No Transcript)
60
Other Items on the To Do list
  • Build new networks, based on alternative
    protocols of trusted relations (e.g., civic
    groups, sports clubs, etc.), particularly for
    dissatisfied youth
  • Develop MOE for assessing gradual network
    deterioration (e.g., frustration of members over
    C2, financial agency disruptions)
  • Dont do anything that could strengthen the
    protocols of trust with the enemys networks
  • For example, if we dont deliver on our
    post-conflict reconstruction promises, we lose
    our honor, respect, social credibility among
    critical target populations

61
Other Items on the To Do list
  • Diminish likelihood of state sponsorship/facilitat
    ion
  • Diminish likelihood of new group affiliation,
    allegiance to AQ/OBL/global Islamic
    insurgency/movement
  • Explore possible opportunities to address
    generational preference divergence
  • Find other ways to create suspicion in the
    network discredit conduits and centers of
    learning
  • dont download the training manuals they have
    been tampered with, and could get you killed!
  • The training provided by so-and-so is
    inaccurate, ineffective they are incompetent

62
Conclusion
  • Understanding a terrorist organizations internal
    challenges and vulnerabilities is key to
    developing effective strategies to combat the
    threats they pose and degrade these groups
    ability to kill
  • Networked organizations require trusted
    relationships in order to support information and
    financial transactions
  • Degrading the network protocols of trust may be
    more important than other missions
  • Refrain from actions that encourage preference
    alignment among disparate groups within the
    global network
  • Spread agency theory-based viruses that exploit
    network vulnerabilities and produce a constant
    state of disruption and uncertainty degrade its
    ability to function effectively

63
  • You have to be lucky everyday We only have to
    be lucky once - IRA Bomber

Questions?
64
  • To win the War on Terror, we will
  • Advance effective democracies as the long-term
    antidote to the ideology of terrorism
  • Prevent attacks by terrorist networks
  • Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states
    and terrorist allies who seek to use them
  • Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of
    rogue states
  • Deny terrorists control of any nation they would
    use as a base and launching pad for terror and
  • Lay the foundations and build the institutions
    and structures we need to carry the fight forward
    against terror and help ensure our ultimate
    success.

65
Elements of the National CT Strategy
  • 4 Ds
  • Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach
  • Deny terrorists the sponsorship, support, and
    sanctuary they need to survive
  • Diminish the underlying conditions that promote
    the despair and destructive visions of political
    change that lead people to embrace terrorism
  • Defend against terrorist attacks on the U.S., our
    citizens and our interests around the world

66
Defeat terrorist organizations of a global reach
  • Objectives
  • Identify the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information)
  • Locate the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Intelligence, Diplomacy, Information)
  • Destroy the terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Military, Financial, Legal)
  • Requires considerable interagency coordination
    and multinational cooperation
  • Particular importance given to organizations with
    combination of high motivation and significant
    capabilities

67
Deny terrorists sponsorship, support, sanctuary
  • Objectives
  • End state sponsorship (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Diplomacy, Intelligence, Economic, Financial,
    Information, Legal, and in the most extreme
    cases, Military)
  • Establish maintain international
    accountability (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomatic,
    Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Strengthen international will to combat
    terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomacy,
    Military, Intelligence, Economic, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Interdict disrupt material support for
    terrorists (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomacy,
    Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens
    (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomacy, Military,
    Intelligence, Economic, Intelligence, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Requires considerable interagency coordination
    and multinational cooperation
  • In particular, we must work with willing and able
    states, enable weak states, persuade reluctant
    states, and compel unwilling states

68
Diminish the underlying conditions
  • Objectives
  • Strengthen international capacity to combat
    terrorism (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomacy,
    Intelligence, Military, Economic, Financial,
    Information, Legal)
  • Win the war of ideas (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Legal)
  • Requires considerable interagency coordination
    and multinational cooperation
  • Special attention is already being given to
    developing SOF capabilities in places like the
    Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel
    Region (e.g., TSCTI)
  • We need to focus on strengthening law
    enforcement/rule of law intelligence gathering
    sharing public diplomacy
  • Local communities must de-legitimize terrorism

69
Defend against terrorist attacks
  • Objectives
  • Implement National Strategy for Homeland
    Security (DIMEFIL dimensions Intelligence,
    Economic, Financial, Information, Legal)
  • Attain domain awareness (DIMEFIL dimensions
    Diplomatic, Intelligence, Information, Economic,
    Financial, Legal)
  • Enhance measures to protect critical
    infrastructure (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomatic,
    Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Integrate measures to protect U.S. citizens
    abroad (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomatic,
    Intelligence, Information, Economic, Financial,
    Legal)
  • Ensure an integrated response capability
    (DIMEFIL dimensions Diplomatic, Intelligence,
    Information, Economic, Financial, Legal)
  • Based on the mindset that the best defense is a
    good offense
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