The Ethical Status of Artificial Agents With and Without Consciousness EIntentionality 91106

1
The Ethical Status of Artificial Agents With
and Without ConsciousnessE-Intentionality
9/11/06

• Steve Torrance
• Middlesex University, UK
• and
• University of Sussex, UK
• stevet_at_sussex.ac.uk

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• This is an expanded version of a talk given at a
  conference of the ETHICBOTS project in Naples,
  Oct 17-18, 2006.
• See S. Torrance The Ethical Status of
  Artificial Agents With and Without
  Consciousness (extended abstract), in G.
  Tamburrin and E. Datteri (eds) Ethics of Human
  Interaction with Robotic, Bionic and AI Systems
  Concepts and Policies, Napoli Istituto Italiano
  per gli Studi Filosofici, 2006.
• See also S. Torrance, Ethics and Consciousness
  in Artificial Agents, submitted to Artificial
  Intelligence and Society

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What this talk covers

• Artificial Agency (AA)
• Artificial Consciousness (AC)
• Artificial Ethics (AE)
• Artificial Intelligence
• our interaction with them
• and our ethical relation to them.

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Artificial X

• One kind of definition-schema
• ? Creating machines which perform in ways which
  require X when humans perform in those ways
• (or which justify the attribution of X?)
• Outward performance, versus
• psychological reality within?

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Artificial Consciousness

• Artificial Consciousness (AC)
• ? creating machines which perform in ways which
  require consciousness when humans perform in
  those ways (?)
• Where is the psychological reality of
  consciousness in this?
• ? functional versus phenomenal
  consciousness?

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Shallow and deep AC research

• Shallow AC developing functional replications
  of consciousness in artificial agents
• Without any claim to inherent psychological
  reality
• Deep AC developing psychologically real
  (phenomenal) consciousness

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Continuum or divide?

• Continuum or divide?
• Is deep AC realizable using current
  computationally-based technologies (or does it
  require biological replications)?
• Thin versus thick phenomenality
• (See S.Torrance Two Concepts of Machine
  Phenomenality, (to be submitted, JCS)

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Real versus simulated AC -an ethically
significant boundary?

• Psychologically real versus just simulated
  artificial consciousness
• This appears to mark an ethically significant
  boundary
• (perhaps unlike the comparable boundary in AI?)
• Not to deny that debates like the Chinese Room
  have aroused strong passions over many years
• Working in the area of AC
• (unlike working in AI?)
• puts special ethical responsibilities on
  shoulders of researchers

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Techno-ethics

• This takes us into the area of techno-ethics
• Reflection on the ethical responsibilities of
  those who are involved in technological R D
• (including the technologies of artificial agents
  (AI, robotics, MC, etc.))
• Broadly, techno-ethics can be define as
• Reflection on how
• we, as developers and users of technologies,
• ought to use such technologies to best meet
• our existing ethical ends,
• within existing ethical frameworks
• Much of the ethics of artificial agent research
  comes under the general techno-ethics umbrella

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From techno-ethics to artificial ethics

• Whats special about the artificial agent
  research is that the artificial agents so
  produced may count (in various senses) as ethical
  agents in their own right
• This may involve a revision of our existing
  ethical conceptions in various ways
• Particularly when we are engaged in research in
  (progressively deeper) artificial consciousness
• Bearing this in mind, we need to distinguish
  between techno-ethics and artificial ethics
• (The latter may overlap with the former)

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Towards artificial ethics (AE)

• A key puzzle in AE
• Perhaps ethical reality (or real ethical status)
  goes together with psychological reality??

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Shallow and deep AE

• Shallow AE
• Developing ways in which the artificial agents we
  produce can conform to, simulate, the ethical
  constraints we believe desirable
• (Perhaps a sub-field of techno-ethics?)
• Deep AE
• Creating beings with inherent ethical status?
• Rights?
• Responsibilities?
• The boundaries between shallow and deep AE may be
  perceived as fuzzy
• And may be intrinsically fuzzy

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Proliferation

• A reason for taking this issue seriously
• AA, AC, etc. as potential mass-technologies
• Tendency for successful technologies to
  proliferate across the globe
• What if AC becomes a widely adopted technology?
• This should raise questions both of a
  techno-ethical kind and of a kind specific to AE

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Techno-ethical considerations
BENZ 3-WHEELER 1.7 LITRES (GERMANY, 1885)

• The responsibilities of current researchers in
  robotics, etc. can be compared to that of the
  founding fathers of automobile design or powered
  flight
• A certain sort of innocence in relation to the
  implications of proliferation that might have
  been anticipated

CAR WRECK (USA, 2005)
http//www.car-accidents.com/
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Considerations that seem to transcend the merely
techno-ethical

• There may be deep controversies concerning the
  ethical status of life-like artificial agents
  (shallow / deep AC agents)
• There could be enormous shifts in our ethical
  landscape
• Our conception of the ethical community, of who
  we are, may become hotly contested

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Instrumentality

• Instrumental versus intrinsic stance
• Normally we take our technologies as our tools or
  instruments
• Instrumental/intrinsic division in relation to
  psychological reality of consciousness?
• As we progress towards deep AC there could be a
  blurring of the boundaries between the two
• (already seen in a small way with emerging
  caring attitudes of humans towards
  people-friendly robots)
• This is one illustration of the move from
  conventional techno-ethics and artificial ethics

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Artificial Ethics (AE)

• AE could be defined as
• The activity of creating systems which perform in
  ways which imply (or confer) the possession of
  ethical status when humans perform in those ways.
  (?)
• The emphasis on performance could be questioned
• ? What is the relation between AE and AC?
• What is ethical (moral) status?

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Two key elements of Xs moral status (in the eyes
of Y)

• Xs being the recipient or target of moral
  concern by Y (moral consumption) Y ? X
• Xs being the source of moral concern towards Y
  (moral production) X ? Y

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Two key elements of Xs moral status

• Xs being the recipient or target of moral
  concern by Y (moral consumption)
• Xs being the source of moral concern towards Y
  (moral production)

(a)
moral agent (natural/artificial)
(b)
moral community (totality of moral agents)
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Two key elements of moral status

• Being the recipient or target of moral concern
  (moral consumption)
• Being the source of moral concern (moral
  production)

(a)
moral agent (natural/artificial)
(b)
moral community (totality of moral agents)
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Ethical status in the absence of consciousness

• Trying to refine our conception on the relation
  between AC and AE
• What difference does consciousness make to
  artificial agency?
• In order to shed light on this question we need
  to investigate
• the putative ethical status of artificial agents
  (AAs) when (psychologically real) consciousness
  is acknowledged to be ABSENT.

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Our ethical interaction with non-conscious
artificial agents

• ?? Could non-conscious artificial agents
• have genuine moral status
• As moral consumers?
• ? (having moral claims on us)
• (b) As moral producers?
• ? (having moral responsibilities towards us (and
  themselves))

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A Strong View of AE

• Psychologically real consciousness is necessary
  for AAs to be considered BOTH
• as genuine moral consumers
• AND
• (b) as genuine moral producers
• AND there are strong constraints on what counts
  as psychologically real consciousness.
• ? So, on the strong view, non-conscious AAs
  will have no real ethical status

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• One way to weaken the strong view
• by accepting weaker criteria for what counts as
  psychologically real consciousness
• e.g. by saying Of course you need consciousness
  for ethical status, but soon robots, etc. will be
  conscious in a psychologically real sense.

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A weaker view

• Psychologically real consciousness is NOT
  necessary for an AA to be considered
• as a genuine moral producer
• (i.e. as having genuine moral responsibilities)
• But it may be necessary for an AA to be
  considered
• (b) as a genuine moral consumer
• (i.e. as having genuine moral claims on the moral
  community)

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A version of the weaker view

• A version of the weaker view is to be found in
• Floridi, L. and Sanders, J. 2004. On the Morality
  of Artificial Agents, Minds and Machines, 14(3)
  349-379.
• Floridi Sanders Some (quite weak kinds of)
  artificial agents may be considered as having a
  genuine kind of moral accountability
• even if not moral responsibility in
• a full-blooded sense
• (i.e. this kind of moral status may attach to
  such agents quite independently of their status
  as conscious agents)

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Examining the strong view

• See Steve Torrance, Ethics and Consciousness in
  Artificial Agents,
• Submitted, Artificial Intelligence and Society
• Being a fully morally responsible agent requires
• empathetic intelligence or rationality
• moral emotions or sensibilities
• ? These seem to require presence of
  psychologically real consciousness

BUT.
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Shallow artificial ethics a paradox

• Paradox
• Even if not conscious, we will expect artificial
  agents to behave responsibly
• ?To perform outwardly to ethical standards of
  conduct
• This creates an urgent and very challenging
  programme of research for now
• ? developing appropriate shallow ethical
  simulations

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Locus of responsibility

• Where would the locus of responsibility of such
  systems lie?
• For example, when they break down, give wrong
  advice, etc?
• On current consensus With designers, operators
  rather than with AA itself.
• If only with human designers/users, then such
  moral AAs dont seem to have genuine moral
  status even as moral producers?
• BUT

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Moral implications of increasing cognitive
superiority of AAs

• Well communicate with artificial agents (AAs) in
  richer and subtler ways
• We may look to AAs for moral advice and support
• We may defer to their normative decisions
• E.g when multiplicity of factors require superior
  cognitive powers to humans
• ? Automated moral pilot systems?

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Non-conscious AAs as moral producers

• None of these properties seem to require
  consciousness
• So the strong view seems to be in doubt?
• Perhaps non-conscious AAs can be genuine moral
  producers
• On the question of When can we trust a moral
  judgment given by a machine?
• ?See Blay Whitby, Computing Machinery and
  Morality
• submitted, AI and Society

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So

• So non-conscious artificial agents perhaps could
  be genuine moral producers
• At least in limited sorts of ways

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• Ive challenged this in my paper Ethics and
  Consciousness in Artificial Agents
• I said that having the capacity for genuine
  morally responsible judgment and action require a
  kind of empathic rationality
• And its difficult to see how such empathic
  rationality could exist in a being which didnt
  have psychologically real consciousness
• but Im far from sure

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• In any case, it will be a hard and complex job to
  ensure that they simulate moral production in an
  ethically acceptable way.

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Non-conscious AAs as moral consumers

• What about non-conscious AAs as moral consumers?
• (i.e. as candidates for our moral concern)?
• Could it ever be rational for us to consider
  ourselves as having genuine moral obligations
  towards non-conscious AAs?

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Consciousness and moral consumption

• At first sight being a true moral consumer
  seems to require being able to consciously
  experience pain, distress, need, satisfaction,
  joy, sorrow, etc.
• i.e. psychologically real consciousness
• Otherwise why waste resources?
• ? The coach crash scenario

BUT
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The case of property ownership

• AAs may come to have interests which we may be
  legally (and morally?) obliged to respect
• Andrew Martin robot in Bicentennial Man
• Acquires (through courts) legal entitlement to
  own property in his own person

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Bicentennial Man

• Household android is acquired by Martin family
  christened Andrew
• His decorative products
• exquisitely crafted from driftwood
• become highly prized collectors' items

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Bicentennial Man (2)

• Andrews owner wins for him the legal right to
  have bank account and legally own the wealth
  accumulated from sales of his artworks, (though
  still deemed a machine)
• Conflict between Andrew and his owner who
  refuses to give him his freedom leads to his
  moving to his own home

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• Andrew, arguably, has moral, not just legal
  rights to his property
• It would be morally wrong for us not to respect
  them (e.g. to steal from him)
• His rights to maintain his property
• (and our obligation not infringe those rights)
• does not depend on our attributing
  consciousness to him

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A case of robot moral (not just legal) rights?

• Andrew, arguably, has moral, not just legal
  rights to his property
• Would it not be morally wrong for us not to
  respect his legal rights?
• (morally wrong, e.g., to steal from him?)

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Does it matter if he is non-conscious?

• Arguably, Andrews moral rights to maintain his
  property
• (and our moral obligation to not infringe those
  rights)
• do not depend on our attributing
  consciousness to him

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• On the legal status of artificial agents, see
• David Calverley, Imagining a Non-Biological
  Machine as a Legal Person,
• Submitted, Artificial Intelligence and Society
• For further related discussion of Asimovs
  Bicentennial Man, see
• Susan Leigh Anderson, Asimovs Three Laws of
  Robotics and Machine Metaethics
• ibid.

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Conclusions

• We need to distinguish between shallow and deep
  AC and AE
• We need to distinguish techno-ethics from
  artificial ethics (especially strong AE)
• There seems to be a link between an artificial
  agents status as a conscious being and its
  status as an ethical being
• A strong view of AC says that genuine ethical
  status in artificial agents (both as ethical
  consumers and ethical producers) requires
  psychologically real consciousness in such agents.

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Conclusions,continued

• 5. Questions can be raised about the strong view
• - (automated ethical advisors property
  ownership)
• 6. There are many important ways in which a kind
  of (shallow) ethics has to be developed for
  present day and future non-conscious agents.
• 7. But in an ultimate, deep sense, perhaps AC
  and AE go together closely
• (NB In my paper Ethics and Consciousness in
  Artificial Agents
• I defend the strong view much more robustly, as
  the organic view.)