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BIOSECURITY

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A biological weapon (BW) is a system capable of disseminating pathogens ... Dalles, Oregon, a religious cult, Rajneesh, disseminated salmonella bacteria in ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: BIOSECURITY


1
BIOSECURITY BIOSAFETY A NON-PROLIFERATION
INSTRUMENT
  • Marc Finaud,
  • Geneva Centre for Security Policy,
  • Moscow, 9 September, 2005

2
DEFINITIONS
  • BIOSAFETY Set of standards and procedures
    defining all aspects of protection of workers
    and the environment against accidental
    dissemination of biological agents, including
    technology to ensure confinement of pathogens
    (filters, sealed equipment, etc.).
  • BIOSECURITY Procedures aimed at avoiding
    deliberate dissemination of pathogens (by theft,
    diversion or other hostile acts).

3
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
  • A biological weapon (BW) is a system capable of
    disseminating pathogens (biological or toxic
    agents), natural, or genetically modified to
    enhance their characteristics.
  • Developments in biotechnology could be used for
    the production or the improvement of BW and
    provide access to new biological agents better
    suited to military uses, making vaccines and
    treatments more complex.

4
INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS
  • 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use in war of
    asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and
    bacteriological methods of warfare. Not
    prohibited use in internal conflicts, threat of
    use, production, RD 133 ratifications with many
    reservations (retaliation).
  • 1972 Biological Toxin Weapons Convention No
    verification. 152 ratifications. Expert Group
    negotiating Confidence Transparency Measures,
    incl. a Code of Conduct for Scientists.
  • Australia Group control of dissemination and
    transfer of equipment, items and technology in
    both biological and chemical fields of interest
    for proliferating countries or terrorist
    organisations (Lists covering main dual-use areas
    with a catch-all clause to control exports of
    unlisted items).

5
NATIONAL PREVENTION MEASURES
  • UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (28/04/04)
    all States () shall adopt and enforce
  • () effective laws which prohibit any non-State
    actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop,
    transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or
    biological weapons and their means of delivery
    ()
  • () measures to establish domestic controls to
    prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
    or biological weapons and their means of
    delivery, including by establishing appropriate
    controls over related materials ()
  • (a) () measures to account for and secure such
    items in production, use, storage or transport
  • (b) () physical protection measures
  • (c) () border controls and law enforcement
    efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat ()
    the illicit trafficking and brokering in such
    items ()
  • (d) () national export and trans-shipment
    controls over such items, including () criminal
    or civil penalties for violations of such export
    control laws and regulations.

6
THE TERRORIST RISK
  • So far, terrorist attempts to acquire biological
    agents have fallen short of successful
    weaponization. Only 2 significant biological
    attacks
  • Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo failed to
    weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax, and used
    chemical agent sarin for attacks in a Tokyo
    subway in 1994 and 1995.
  • In 1984 in Dalles, Oregon, a religious cult,
    Rajneesh, disseminated salmonella bacteria in 10
    restaurants, infecting 750 people, but with no
    fatalities.
  • In October 2001, letters containing anthrax sent
    to members of US Congress and the media, killed 5
    and infected 18 others. Mass disruption and
    billions of dollars in decontamination and
    prevention expenses.

7
THE TERRORIST RISK
  • Required quantities for lethal effect
  • Weapon Grams
  • Aerial explosives 320 million
  • Fragmentation cluster bombs 32 million
  • Hydrocyanic acid 32 million
  • Mustard gas 3.2 million
  • Sarin nerve gas 800,000
  • Radiological weapon 5,000
  • Type A botulinal toxin 80
  • Anthrax spores 8
  • Attack on a water supply
  • Potassium cyanide 18,000
  • Nerve agent VX 100
  • Typhoid culture 1

8
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)
  • G8 Global Partnership 2002gt2012 20bn to help
    Russia FSU to destroy or secure WMD
    WMD-related materials. Priority to Nuclear
    Chemical Weapons/Materials. International Science
    Technology Center (ISTC).
  • US Bilateral CTR Programs

9
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)
  • THE EU THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
  • 2003-2006 (in M)

10
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)
  • Russian BW Complex
  • early 1990s 65,000 personnel 50 facilities,
    huge quantities of agents
  • 2000 15,000 personnel 50 labs insecure (2002
    GAO Report).

11
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)
  • International Cooperation Programs
  • USA (FY2005)
  • Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
    (DoD) 55M
  • Improved safety/security of dangerous pathogen
    collections (2004 11.2M 2005 24.6M).

12
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR)
  • France 5M (2003-2004) Biosecurity Program to
    develop new prophylactic and therapeutic means
    for fighting bioterrorism
  • 1. Securing pathogens by applying international
    norms to labs
  • 2. Training Russian scientists on international
    norms in the framework of scientific
    collaboration
  • 3. Joint research in New Generation Therapies in
    conformity with pharmaceutical norms.
  • Framework ISTC

13
SCIENTIST REDIRECTION PROGRAMS
  • Moscow ISTC
  • 1994-2004 600M 60,000 scientists employed.
  • 2004 56M for 193 projects, grants to 27,104
    scientists 9,012 full-time/yr
  • Biotechnology 31.6 of new projects 38.7 of
    funding.

14
.
Source ISTC Annual Report 2004
15
IDENTIFIED AREAS OF COOPERATION
  • Consolidating eliminating dangerous pathogens
    collections
  • Upgrading biosafety biosecurity of microbial
    collections and research facilities
  • Strengthening epidemiological surveillance
  • Integrating coordinating disease surveillance
    systems, incl. Anti-Plague Institutes
  • Computerizing paper archives on past disease
    outbreaks
  • Training of scientists on proliferation risks
  • Improving access to facilities
  • Establishing single point of contact of
    government.

16
SOURCES
  • John Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking
    Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment
    for International Peace, 2002
  • Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control, A Guide to
    Negotiations and Agreements, Peace Research
    Institute, Oslo, 2001
  • http//http//www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwiss
    uebrief.asp
  • http//www.bioterrorism.slu.edu/bt/products/ahec_c
    hem/ppt/17
  • http//www.defense.gouv.fr/portal_repository/15912
    0745__0001/fichier/getData?_ispopup1
  • http//www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00138.pdf
  • http//cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm56
  • http//www.ransac.org/Issues/U.S.-Russian20Nonpro
    liferation20Programs/Chemical20and20Biological
    20Weapons/Biological20Weapons/624200331413PM.html
  • http//cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm
  • http//www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/annual-report.
    htm
  • http//cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/pottertalk.h
    tm
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