Countering Secessionist Terrorism: CrossBorder Operations and Looking Ahead

1
Countering Secessionist Terrorism Cross-Border
Operations and Looking Ahead

• Assoc.Prof.Dr. Sadi Çayci
• Colonel, Military Judge (Ret.)
• ASAM International Law Advisor

2
Secession International Law

• Legal basis Peoples right to self determination
  consensus - civil divorce.
  
• Controversial Unilateral declaration of
  independence - recognition of newly established
  states.
  
• De facto (pending settlement).
• De jure (final).

3
Terrorism / Armed Conflict?

• Controversy - reason Confusion / intentional act
  in separating political and military terminology
  from those of the legal terms of art.
  
• Strategic situations
• Terrorism (qualification of certain acts) armed
  conflict (qualification of a certain strategic
  situation).
  
• Resistance / liberation conflict insurgency /
  civil war.
  
• Status of the parties Belligerent party to
  armed conflict - neutral.
  
• Status of individuals
• Terrorist freedom fighter.
• Guerilla combatant fighter.

4
Liberation Conflict

• People,
• Exercising right to self determination,
• Waging armed struggle against
• Colonial domination,
• Alien occupation,
• Racist regime.
• Strategic situation International armed conflict.

5
Prosecution of Crimes

• International crimes
• Crimes against humanity,
• Genocide,
• War crimes,
• Terrorism.
• Universal jurisdiction.

6
PKK Terrorism Background

• Root causes
• Kurdism.
• Kurdish irredentism Great Kurdistan.
• Modular liberation strategy
• Original springboard Turkish South East.
• Occasion new priority N. Iraq (Iraqi
  Kurdistan).
  
• Follow up Parts of Syria Iran.
• Third parties Exploitation manipulation
  indirect aggression.

7
Indirect Aggression Low Intensity Conflict -
Escalation

• Phase I Subversive activities foment
  discontent terrorism.
  
• Phase II Insurgency.
• Phase III Civil war.

8
PKK Terrorism Qualification of the Strategic
Situation Under the LOAC

• Not a liberation conflict not an international
  armed conflict.
  
• Not a non-international armed conflict of high
  intensity.
  
• But Protracted, non-international armed
  conflict
  
• Of low intensity,
• Waged by employing terror and guerilla tactics.

9
Status of the PKK Under the LOAC

• Not a belligerent.
• But A party to a non-international armed
  conflict. Meaning
  
• Enemy.
• Legitimate military objective.
• Subject to combat operations.
• In country.
• Cross-border.

10
Members of the PKK

• Not combatant, not POW if surrendered / captured
  otherwise.
  
• No privilege, no immunity from the criminal
  jurisdiction.
  
• Detention
• Internment (security measure), and / or,
• Arrest (prosecution measure).
• N.B. Refugee law aspect prosecution not
  persecution.

11
Countering Terrorism

• Political / ideological / religious cause.
• Quality of the State and society (hearts and
  minds) relations.
  
• Sponsoring States, other entities and
  individuals.
  
• Tolerating States, other entities and
  individuals.
  
• Terror organisation.
• Leadership.
• Armed militants.
• Support elements (propaganda, recruitment,
  intelligence, logistics, finance, legal aid...).
  
• Sister - criminal organisations.

12
Strategic Framework

• Rather simple Fight against the military
  capability of the terror organization.
  
• More complex
• Fight against the cause of the terror
  organization.
  
• Popular support.
• Fight against the elements that are aiding and
  abetting the terror organization.
  
• Military means only complementary to a general
  compact national strategy which should cover all
  political, diplomatic, legal and social
  dimensions.

13
Countering PKK Terrorism

• To eliminate a terror threat, by taking and
  applying all necessary, legitimate and
  proportionate measures in a resolved manner is
  the very reason of existence of any state.
• International co-operation, especially among
  friends and allies essential.
  
• Neutral attitude towards the PKK and security
  forces by putting them on equal footing by third
  party governments, institutions and other
  entities not acceptable.

14
Countering Terrorism Measures

• Preventive
• Democracy, human rights, minority rights, rule of
  law.
  
• Intelligence, counter-intelligence and protective
  security.
  
• Preventive law enforcement.
• Civil law.
• Corrective
• Supressive law enforcement.
• Clandestine, covert and special operations.
• Prosecution of crimes.
• Emergency rule.
• Use of armed force.

15
Operation Sun(Günes Harekati)

• (21-29 February 2008)

16
Use of Armed Force Considerations

• Jus ad bellum law on war (Public International
  Law).
  
• Jus in bello law in war (LOAC Law of Armed
  Conflict).
  
• Human Rights Law.
• Political, diplomatic, military, economic,
  financial, social etc. considerations.

17
Countering Terrorism and the Armed Forces

• Support to the Law Enforcement
• Province Administration Act.
• State of Emergency Act.
• Internal Security Operations
• Martial Law Act.
• Security Organization Act (No. 3201).
• Cross-Border Operations
• Legal basis Self defence.
• Territorial state / authority unable / unwilling
  / permissive.
  
• TGNA authorization.
• Council of Ministers directive.
• TGS implementation.

18
Operation Basic Categories

• Law enforcement Prosecute criminals.
• Combat Eliminate military threat.
• Special Complementary.

19
Targeting

• PKK
• Leading staff.
• Armed militants.
• Other persons taking direct and active part in
  hostilities.
  
• PKK military infrastructure.
• Problematic Dual use cases.

20
Operation Sun Criticism Against the TGS
Statements

• Using of certain terminology may provide the
  terror organization with an unwarranted
  prestige.
  
• Examples
• Commander, chief of staff, regional
  commander.
  
• Command post, combat and logistics base,
  anti-aircraft position with crew.
  
• Test Facts on the ground legal grounds for
  authority to resort to the use of armed force in
  combat operations context, to eliminate military
  objectives.
• Army not shadow boxing!

21
Reminder LOAC

• Ad hoc legal norms, regulating de facto.
• ICJ Leges specialis (special norms).
• Application does not effect the legal statuses of
  the parties to an armed conflict.

22
Looking Ahead

• Decree by the TGNA (17 October 2007 / 903).
• Findings
• Serious terrorist attacks. Clear threat.
• Political and diplomatic initiatives not
  successful.
  
• Cross-border operation and intervention by the
  Turkish Armed Forces deemed necessary.
  
• Area of operations Northern Iraq and contiguous
  areas.
  
• Authorization valid for one year.

23
Looking Ahead

• So long as the threat continues, military
  operations will likely to continue.
  
• Consultation, co-operation and solidarity with
  friends and allies, territorial state, and
  neighbouring countries not a sign of weakness to
  the contrary, sign of wisdom, insight and common
  sense.
• Like religion, the army must not be made
  subject of domestic political controversies.
  
• Transformation from a security concept too much
  depending on military strenght, to a civilian and
  political attitude is a promising, positive
  development.
• Real success lies in the ability to transform
  military success to political gains.
  
• In this respect, capability and credibility in
  politics, diplomacy and public relations are
  determining elements.