Safety Organisation and Management Assessment Process of the Nuclear Installations. Application to the CEA Facilities. Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Institute (France) Dr. D. Conte - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Safety Organisation and Management Assessment Process of the Nuclear Installations. Application to the CEA Facilities. Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Institute (France) Dr. D. Conte

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WGOE/FCS Workshop Fuel Cycle Safety 2002 - Tokyo. 1. 1st and 2nd October 2002 ... FCS Workshop Fuel Cycle Safety 2002 - Tokyo. 3. 1st and 2nd October 2002. The ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Safety Organisation and Management Assessment Process of the Nuclear Installations. Application to the CEA Facilities. Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Institute (France) Dr. D. Conte


1
Safety Organisation and Management Assessment
Process of the Nuclear Installations. Application
to the CEA Facilities. Radiation Protection and
Nuclear Safety Institute (France) Dr. D. Conte
WGOE/FCS Workshop Fuel Safety 2002 1st and 2nd
October 2002
2
Safety Organisation and Management Assessment
  • 1- The context in which the assessment was
    carried out
  • 2- Characteristics of the organisation under
    assessment
  • 3- Principles adopted for assessing
  • 4- How organisation works case studies
  • 5 Assessment results
  • 6 - Conclusion

3
The context
  • Ministerial order of August 10th, 1984 setting
    out
  •  a framework for the measures to be implemented
    by all nuclear facility operators in order to
    obtain and maintain a level of quality in their
    facility and operating conditions that guarantee
    safety 
  • In 1991 the CEA was requested to reinforce safety
    in its facilities and to implement a safety
    organisation to comply with these requirements
  • In 1993, the implemented Safety Organisation of
    the CEA was examined and found acceptable

4
The Context
  • In 1999 the IRSN (Safety Authoritys TSO) was
    required to examine this organisation with
    regards to the operating feedback of the recent
    years
  • It was necessary to set out a formal safety and
    radiation protection organisation assessment
  • The assessment was carried out on different
    levels
  • Formal organisation
  • Resources implemented
  • How the organisation worked (cases studies)

5
The Ministerial Order of August 10th,1984
  • Five objectives
  • Defining a safety baseline (and keeping it
    updated) that
  • Present the risks (and give the demonstration of
    the control of the risks)
  • Safety related elements Required characteristics
    of these
  • Obtaining and maintaining a level of safety
    compliant with this baseline
  • By training the personal and providing them
    suitable tools
  • Checking that safety is obtained and maintained
  • By performing tests, inspections and
    investigations
  • Analysing and correcting any deviation from the
    baseline
  • Demonstrating that safety is obtained and
    maintained
  • Traceability of the actions

6
Framework of the assessment
  • The operator is free to define any structure that
    led to obtaining the objectives of the
    ministerial order
  • The operator is to demonstrate that the
    organisational measures he has taken are
    sufficient
  • The expert assessment was carried out on the
    basis of documents submitted by the operator
  • A description of the main organisational measures
    taken to ensure safety management in nuclear
    facilities
  • An audit containing quantitative data assessing
    the compliance of the nuclear facilities with the
    quality requirements

7
Characteristics of the organisation under
assessment
  • Operator responsible for 43 basic nuclear
    facilities installed on 5 sites
  • Experimental reactors
  • Industrial and commercial facilities
  • Research laboratories
  • Waste treatment facilities
  • Facilities being dismantled
  • The organisation settled by the operator includes
  • Operational departments (line of action)
  • Functional department (support units and
    supervision line)

8
Principles adopted for assessing the safety
organisation
  • The facilities
  • (contain the products and the process that
    generate hazards)
  • are the starting point of the assessment
  • which was extended to support and supervision
    units
  • (they depend onresources, logistics and
    methodology on external entities)
  • Two organisation assessment levels
  • Assessment of the formal organisation of the
    facilities
  • Analysis of how the safety organisation works

9
Assessment of the formal organisation
  • An organisation is made of rules, structures and
    means
  • We checked that each objective of the M.O. on
    quality was taken into account in written rules
  • Organisation procedures
  • Instruction procedures,operating modes
  • Organisation flow charts
  • Other documents (guides, manuals..)
  • All the rules are not written (arbitrations)
  • Interviews (main heads,inspection units)

10
How the organisation works
  • There are always discrepancies between the
    actual operation of an organisation and the
    theoretical operation deduced from its structure
    and resources
  • It is not possible to totally anticipate the
    behaviour of a complex system
  • Structures, means and rules are resources and
    constraints
  • It is necessary to examine how the rules are
    interpreted
  • There are other influence on the group actions
    (safety culture, site culture, spatial layout of
    the workstations..)

11
Static analysis of the working of the
organisation
  • We examined the documents drawn within the
    framework of the safety organisation
  • Activity reports (incidents, inspections,audits..)
  • Reports on specific actions ( spreading the
    safety culture that concerned 2000 agents)
  • Static analysis identifies deficiencies in the
    contributions of certain units but does not
    identify the roots
  • We need a description of the processes by which
    the contributions were developed
  • Cases studies provide a means of collecting
    theses types of data

12
Analysis of the dynamic working of the
organisation
  • We approached the working of the organisation by
    examining the periods during which the major
    events or the  historical  events of the
    facility had occurred
  • Preliminary safety studies and analyses
    drafting of a safety document
  • Operating incident management analysis of how
    an incident is dealt with
  • Normal operation analysis of a specific
    operating phase
  • It is a widely adopted approach (retrospective
    case studies of severe accidents)

13
How the assessment was carried out in the nuclear
facilities
  • We studies the 3 cases above defined in each of
    the 5 types of utilities (15 cases)
  • A contercheck study (1 case study) was conducted
    in another facility of each type (5 cases)
  • There was a kick-off meeting to define the
    conditions of the study with the site manager,
    the supervision unit and the facility
  • The case history was then constructed with the
    protagonists of actions and the written 
     traces  of the activities
  • A feedback meeting was organised with the
    facility and the supervision units

14
The difficulties
  • Retrospective case studies
  • The  traces  cannot be modified and
     restrain  the protagonists statements
  • We used very accurate questioning technique to
    avoid after the event jugement and
    interpretations
  • Individual and group point of view
  • Diverging interests in a group (freedom of
    expression may be restricted)
  • The conclusions are used for impose requirements
    to the operator (those interviewed tend to adopt
    a  uniform point of view the  official
    version )

15
Data analysis
  • The assessment aimed at producing an
     explanation  of the cases study
  • to understand which and how characteristics of
    the organisation affect the development of events
  • The assessment was guided by explicit principles
    using a methodology that distinguish esbetween
    data and data interpretation
  • Case study data were made available to the
    operator
  • This encouraged discussion about safety
    organisation and allowed it to take a technical
    dimension

16
The results
  • On the basis of the IRSN assessment, the Safety
    Authority took formal note of the safety culture
    and training efforts accomplished at the CEA
    since 1993 and of the reinforcement of safety
    provisions
  • Development of skills in facilities operating
    teams and CEA divisions
  • Development of relevant resources at the site
    management

17
The results
  • Many things were learned from this assessment
  • Definition of unit missions
  • Ionizing radiation protection units were
    responsible of giving support to the nuclear
    facilities and checking compliance with
    radiological protection regulations
  • Definition of the rules governing cooperation
    between units
  • A protocol should be drawn up between the project
    manager and the future users to guarantee their
    implication in the project
  • Competence management
  • The prestige of the post of the facility manager
    should be increasedand he should have the means
    for keepin control of the safety aspects when
    certain activities are subcontracted
  • Organisation follow up
  • The safety organisation should be followed upin
    order to judge whether the mesures taken are
    suitable (by human factors studies, cases
    studies, indicators)

18
Conclusion
  • Assessment of the CEA radiation protection and
    safety organisation marked an important step on
    the road of formalizing the IRSNs safety
    organisation assessment procedure
  • The quality of the results obtained largely
    depends on the quality of the interviews with the
    different safety organisation protagonists during
    the cases studies which presuppose
  • A participative open-mindedness on the part of
    the  assessing  party
  • A desire of transparency and a freedom of speech
    of the  assessed party
  • This methodology of assessment let the Safety
    Authority have a good approach of the functioning
    of a complex organisation
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