Framework for Sustained Peace, Development, and Poverty Eradication

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Planning and Management of Post-Conflict
Reconstruction Lessons from experienceWhat to
do first when everything is a priority?
Darfur Joint Assessment Mission Inception
Workshop Nairobi, June 30, 2006
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Key post-conflict characteristics

• Needs
• Large scale physical destruction
• Population displacement
• Deaths, vulnerable families, trauma
• Dislocated economy
• Risk of renewed conflict

• Capacity
• Old institutions often weakened, collapsed or
  inappropriate
• New institutions often designed for resistance,
  not government
• Large aid inflows and many new international
  actors
• Window of opportunity to transform

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Post conflict needs assessments

• Timor Leste, Iraq, Haiti and subnational, Sri
  Lanka and post Tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia
• Often WB/ UN partnership increasingly
  characterised by jointness with government and
  local consultations
• Motivated by prospect of donor support but
  broader, long term objectives can be addressed
• Development vision and strategic objectives
• Policy and program priorities
• Costing linked to domestic budget
• Results framework

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Developing a coordinated reconstruction
strategyDimensions and sequencing
1. Address urgent needs in particular needs of
the displaced, physical rehabilitation and
restoration of service delivery. ? Key is how
maximize job creation support stabilization
(e.g., strengthen links between, not only within,
communities). 2. Rebuild state and key
institutions (fiscal capacity, control over means
of coercion, macroeconomic management, judiciary,
administration, service delivery, etc.). Mix of
policy advice and technical assistance needed.
3. Jump-start the local economy through both
reforms investments). ? Key is how need
to adjust interventions to specific political
economy (focus on peace and stability), in
particular for prioritizing and phasing need to
question conventional wisdom.
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Timeline and Type of Assistance
Type of Aid
Security (AU, UN) and Humanitarian Assistance
(CAP/ workplan)
Development assistance eg Multi-Donor Trust Fund
bilateral programs
Development pledges
Track 1
Track 2
Two Years after peace
Time
Peace Agreement
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Factors in designing interventions

• Community-led initiatives local-level
  institution survive violent conflict better than
  national institutions speed and cost-effective
  delivery focus on local choice and
  accountability.
• Coordinated, outsourced service delivery often
  dominated by international NGOs initial
  outsourcing needs to transition to public sector
  management or the private sector.
• Combined with selected top-down service
  delivery to avoid marginalization of new
  administration toward building a track record of
  reform and good governance.
• Larger infrastructure unblock major bottlenecks
  while management/procurement capacity and
  structural policy issues are resolved.

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Lessons on institutional capacity building

• The budget focus on fiscal sustainability and
  prioritization between sectors providing for
  discipline and transparency in implementation
  opportunity to strengthen aid coordination and
  emphasize sustainability.
• Public expenditure management focus on core
  financial and administrative functions core
  macroeconomic management, budget and treasury
  functions, procurement.
• Management of technical assistance planned and
  coordinated TA avoiding conflicting donor
  systems attracting high quality staff skills
  transfer responsibilities in contracts.
• Justice and law and order legal framework and
  institutions training of judges physical
  rehabilitation police recruitment.

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General lessons learned (1)

• Post-conflict conditions provide an opportunity
  to rebuild and transform, but challenging
• In policy and program choices, there are
  trade-offs between
• Quick visible benefits to the people versus
  long-term capacity-building
• National ownership versus quick delivery
• Political sustainability and inclusion versus
  administrative efficiency
• Where expectations are high and capacity limited,
  setting priorities is essential

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Key lessons learned (2)

• Peace and stability as primary objectives
• Not a given in post-conflict contexts,
  pre-conditions for any other goal to be reached
  high risk of relapse
• Need to address both short-term and longer-term
  causes of instability.
• Need for a comprehensive approach
• political, military, administrative, economic,
  social and humanitarian given inter-relations
• Fast-evolving situation - need for regular review.

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CPA JAM Lessons for Darfur JAM
Darfur Joint Assessment Mission Inception
Workshop Nairobi, June 30, 2006
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Outline

• 1. Motivation, Objectives, Scope and Process
• 2. Emerging Shared Vision
• 3. Program and Policy Priorities
• 4. Financing Needs and Institutional
  Arrangements
• 5. Monitoring Arrangements
• 6. Conclusion

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2. Motivation Machakos Protocol, 2002

• Lays out vision to achieve sustained peace
• Addresses key causes of the conflict
• Presents a historic opportunity to overcome the
  devastation of war and neglect (5Rs)
• Provides relative peace in the war-affected areas
• DPA Articles (22, 23) The April 2004 Ndjamena,
  the May 2004 Addis Ababa, the November Abuja
  Agreements on Ceasefire
• DPA Article 17 (99) Recognizes cumulative
  effects of underdevelopment, prolonged
  deprivation and conflict and need for measures to
  address these effects.

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JAM Objectives

• Assessment and costing of the reconstruction and
  development requirements for consolidation and
  sustenance of peace in the post-conflict Sudan
• Framework for sustained peace, development and
  poverty eradication with clear benchmarks for
  assessing progress
• DPA Article 17 (100) Recognizes poverty
  eradication strategy as basis for development
  policy framework with the aim of meeting the
  MDGs.
• DPA Article 17 (103) Conduct of a comprehensive
  assessment of needs in Darfur as a matter of top
  priority.
• DPA Article 19 (155) JAM to be conducted by WB,
  UN and AfDB to identify and quantify the needs of
  post-conflict recovery, development and poverty
  eradication programme for Darfur states.

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JAM Scope and Emphasis

• Diagnostic Quantitative, qualitative, field
  work, conflict, environment and gender analysis
  and consultations
• Poor and most disadvantaged parts of the country,
• Policies and programs focus on poverty
  eradication, acceleration to reach the MDGs and
  on redressing disparities
• Thematic Areas Reconstruction and development
  needs within national priorities, efforts and
  budget commitments with focus on critical first
  two years (2005-7) in eight (8) thematic areas
• DPA Article 17 (102, 108, 109) Recognizes the
  urgent and serious needs of the war-affected
  areas/persons, women, basic functioning
  government and civil administration.
• DPA Article 33 Page 94 Darfur JAM Purpose,
  Scope, preparation, costing and cost-sharing to
  be agreed upon by the JAM Oversight Committee.

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JAM Process and Structure

• Conducted by the World Bank and the United
  Nations
• Partnership with technical teams from GOS and
  SPLM with focus on capacity building
• Substantial input from civil society and
  international development partners
• Running for nearly one year, in parallel to the
  peace process, and to support the peace process
  through joint technical dialogue and policy
  training
• Ownership Process Ensure local ownership and
  buy-in from domestic and international
  stakeholders through broad-based consultations
• Structure (Core Coordination Group, Core Teams,
  Higher/National Committees, Council of Ministers/
  Leadership Council)
• DPA Article 33 Page 94 JAM Oversight Committee
  consisting of one representative of each state
  (3), representatives (3) of GNU, one
  representative each of WB, UN and AfDB.

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December 2003 CCG established in Nairobi
CPA JAM Timeline
February 2004 Preparatory phase initiated
May 2004 Signing of 3 Naivasha Protocols
August 2004 Joint Poverty Eradication Strategy
developed by parties
September 2004 Official launch of JAM at joint
retreat in Nairobi
Sectoral Field Assessment Missions
September 2004 IPF meeting in Oslo
Dec 04/Jan 2005 Joint sectoral sessions/workshops
January 2005 Signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement
Drafting of cluster reports and synthesis report
Jan/Feb 2005 Core team to draft synthesis report
GoS, SPLM, UN, WB in Addis Ababa
March 2005 Final report circulated to donors
Darfur JAM Timeline DPA Article 19 (155) Darfur
JAM to be conducted within three months after the
signing of the DPA
Consultations and sharing of final report
April 2005 Donors conference in Oslo
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2. Emerging Shared Vision Poverty Agenda

• Implementing the CPA and promoting a culture of
  peace
• Building decentralised governance, characterised
  by transparency and accountability
• Ensuring macro-stability and enabling environment
  for private sector and rural development
• Comprehensive capacity building programmes at all
  levels
• Empowering local communities and civil society
  groups
• Managing resources in an environmentally sound
  way
• Promoting access to basic services
• Building a sound and simple system to monitor and
  evaluate progress towards the MDGs
• DPA Article 19 Macroeconomic policy framework
  for combating povety and sense of
  marginalization, promoting decent quality of
  life, living conditions and dignity of all
  citizens, development of private and agriculture
  sector, restoration of peace, sustained pro-poor
  economic growth, macro-economic stability,
  attainment of MDGs and equitable development.

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Patterns of Growth and Poverty

• Important economic gains achieved in 1990s
  following macro stabilization, but pattern of
  growth is unbalanced
• ?Wide poverty variation both between--and
  within--North, South, urban-rural and three areas
  (Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei)

North
South
(Darker color indicates higher level of poverty)
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Human Development IndexState-level and
Cross-Country Comparison

• Disparities in outcomes large, both across states
  and compared to neighbors and countries with
  similar income levels, with Southern Sudan among
  the worst in the world
• Worse-off states are comparable to Ethiopia,
  which has a much lower per capita income

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3. Program And Policy Priorities

• Two Broad Phases
• Immediate recovery and consolidation of peace in
  the first 2 ½ years (mid-2005-2007) in Phase I
• Scaling-up for MDGs in Phase II (through 2011)
• Embedded in the CPA, and building on the
  principles laid out for the Poverty Eradication
  Strategy (PRSP).
• D JAM Track I (Early Recovery Quick Peace
  Dividends) and Track II (Long Term Development
  Scaling-up) with focus on sector-wide specific
  programmes rather than small-stand alone projects
  and use of budget as a coordinating tool.

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National Government and Northern States
Strategic Objectives Commitments

• Enable consolidation of the CPA at all levels
  through capacity building and increased political
  commitment for a change and transformation
• Improve governance through promoting human
  rights, decentralization, improved management
  capacity, and anti-corruption measures
• Broad-based growth of income-earning
  opportunities through stable macroeconomic
  framework and policy reform and
• Expanding access to basic services.

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Phase I JAM costs for National Government
(including Three Areas) by Cluster (million US)
Notes For 2005, July-December only.
Excluding DDR (estimates not yet available). For
details see Volume II. Costs, in particular for
infrastructure, will be revised based on further
technical analysis and studies.
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Government of Southern SudanStrategic
Objectives Commitments

• Developing physical infrastructure for roads,
  river and air
• Prioritizing agriculture, and promoting private
  sector development
• Restoring peace and harmony through access to
  basic services, including health, education and
  water
• Regenerating social capital (including safe
  return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees)
  and
• Developing institutional infrastructure for
  better governance, focusing on public service and
  service delivery capacity.
• D JAM Makes it simple and realistic to address
  urgent needs, build key institutions and
  jump-start the local economy with focus on
  community-driven programmes, peace and stability

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Phase I JAM costs for Southern Sudan by Cluster
(Million US)
Notes For 2005, July-December only.
Excluding DDR (estimates not yet available). For
details see Volume II. Costs, in particular for
infrastructure, will be revised based on further
technical analysis and studies.
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4a. Financing Needs Phase I (US billions)

• ? High and rising Pro-Poor Ratio, Declining
  External Share ()

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4b. Aid Management Arrangements and the
Multi-Donor Trust Funds

• Donors asked to work mostly through two MDTFs to
  minimize fragmentation and transaction costs
• National MDTF National Government, war-affected
  and least developed states in the North including
  Three Areas
• Southern Sudan MDTF ten states of Southern
  Sudan.
• Management structure (oversight
  committee/standing committee, technical
  secretariat with World Bank as administrator,
  Appraisal Committee (GoSS), MDTF Unit in MOFNE)
• Process for projects/programmes approval and
  implementation (Initial Project Proposal (IPP),
  Full Project Proposal (FPP), Project
  Implementation Appraisal, Project Implementation)
• Regular consortium meetings to assess results,
  discuss future directions, and renew pledges
• DPA Article 33 Page 93 Provides for
  establishment of Darfur Window within existing
  National MDTF under the same Oversight Committee
  as for DRDF with addition of representatives of
  donors

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5. Monitoring Framework

• Immediate start to monitoring of JAM
  implementation to cultivate a results-based focus
  and culture of public donor accountability.
• Results matrices have been developed
• At the cluster level
• Overall summary monitoring framework
• Monitoring framework is instrument for dialogue
  at several levels Line agency, cabinet, NG and
  GOSS - donor and donor-donor
• ? reported to Sudan Consortium
• Designed to be comprehensive including security
  and political -- framework and with integral
  link to emerging Poverty Eradication Strategy

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Sample of Summary Monitoring Framework
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6. Conclusions

• Basis for policy and programs planning and
  results focus
• Improved coordination among donors and government
  institutions, yet institutional and/or political
  motives prevail.
• JAM programmes linked to budget and
  country-driven priorities.
• Pledges vs. disbursement, humanitarian vs.
  recovery/development
• National ownership vs. quick delivery
• Participation and inclusion vs. administrative
  efficiency
• Liberation struggle vs. reconstruction challenges
• Decentralization and devolution of powers vs.
  centralization
• Quick visible benefits vs. long term capacity
  building
• Community-led initiatives vs. top-down planning
• D JAM Makes its simple, realistic and doable