Swaziland NAI Country Status Report presented at the N.A.I. Workshop Pretoria South Africa 79 March

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Swaziland NAI Country Status Reportpresented at
the N.A.I. Workshop Pretoria South Africa 7-9
March 2006

• Dr. P.M. Dlamini (Epidemiologist-Department of
  Livestock and Veterinary Services)
  
• Dr. R.S. Nxumalo (Senior Veterinary
  Officer-Department of Livestock and Veterinary
  Services
  
• Dr. C. Mabuza (Director of Medical
  Services-Ministry of Health and Social Welfare)

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1. RISK OF INTRODUCTION OF AI

• MIGRATORY BIRDS
• A.1. Palaeartic migratory birds
• Most common intercontinental migratory species
  are
  
• -European Swallow (Hirundo rustica)
• -Common sandpiper (Actitis hypoleucus)
• -Steppe Buzzard (Buteo buteo)
• -Redback Shrike (Lanius collurio)
• -Willow Warbler (Acrocephalus schoenobaenus)
• Start arriving Oct/Nov and leave by April
• Do not breed in Swaziland
• Do not involve high risk carriers of AI

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RISK OF INTRODUCTION OF AI (cont.)

• A.2. Intra regional migratory birds
• Considered to be in low densities in Swaziland
• Most common is Great spotted Cuckoo (Clamator
  glandarius) and a few other cuckoo species
  
• Do breed in Swaziland
• A.3. Waterfowls in Swaziland
• Movement not considered migratory but more
  nomadic
  
• Movement considered to be within Southern African
  region (little information avail?)
  
• No regular pattern of movement

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RISK OF INTRODUCTION OF AI (cont.)

• B. LIVESTOCK FARMING SYSTEMS
• B.1 Backyard poultry
• 70 domestic poultry are backyard indigenous
  breeds
  
• Mostly chickensvery few ducks, turkeys and
  guinea fowl
  
• Predominant in communal homes, but also suburban
• Mostly outside more esp. in winter (post harvest
  period)
  
• B.2. Commercial poultry
• May comprise 20 of poultry being layers
  broilers
  
• All housed but in different biosecurity levels
  (V.few high, mostly moderate esp. smallholder
  commercial units)
  

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RISK OF INTRODUCTION OF AI (cont.)

• C. Trade in poultry
• C.1. Formal trade
• large commercial units mostly and smallholder
  commercial units
  
• Through 1 large export abattoir (contract
  growers) and about four small abattoirs for
  smallholder commercial units
  
• C.2. Informal trade
• In markets, road side and on farms
• Significant for the occassional commercial rearer
  and a lot of small holder commercial farmers
  
• Market broilers mostly, but also indigenous
  backyard poultry

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2. CAPACITY

• A. Human Resource

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2. CAPACITY (cont.)

• B. Diagnostics
• Only 1 vet diagnostics lab. (CVL), 1 Central
  Public Health Lab. and 6 hospital labs
  

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2. CAPACITY (cont.)

• C. Infrastructure
• Lab. infrastructure limits live virus tests
• Lab relatively equipped for serological tests
• Lab. consumable accessibility severely affected
  by
  
• resource limitations
• Communication facilities exist in general, but
  insufficient
  
• for effective internal networking
• Public awareness resources limited, currently
  mobilising
  
• policy makers to support AI activities

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3. PREPAREDNESS

• Preventive position
• Establishment of a cross sectoral AI committee
• Public awareness - spread info. in media about
  disease incl. preventive action, biosafety and
  public safety
  
• Any cases of abnormal high mortality are
  investigated for AI as differential, particularly
  with NCD endemicity
  
• Active lobbying of policy makers, and other
  authorities incl. local UN Agencies
  
• Preparedness plan developed with planned
  programs
  
• However, various programs (incl. targeted
  surveillance) not yet effected - hindered by
  resource shortfalls.
  

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PREPAREDNESS (cont.)

• B. Controlling of outbreak
• Avian Influenza
• In-terms of the contigency plan a stamping out
  policy will be adopted in an outbreak
  
• Strict biosecurity measures will be enforced
• Vaccination to be considered for modified
  stamping out
  
• Human Influenza
• Mobilise regional epidemic teams as per
  preparedness plan
  
• 1 hospital per region to be designated regional
  referral
  
• Samples expeditiously sent to South Africa via
  central lab