Nuclear NonProliferation - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 21
About This Presentation
Title:

Nuclear NonProliferation

Description:

Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya signed but were at one point or another found ... Pakistan sold clandestinely to Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:127
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 22
Provided by: applicati
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Nuclear NonProliferation


1
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
  • Moral Hazard and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    Treaty (NPT)

2
outline
  • History of the NPT.
  • The NPT game
  • taking the teeth out of NPT
  • NPT with enhanced monitoring
  • US bias in Iraq
  • conclusion

3
history
  • 1945 failure of the Baruch plan, which would
    have abolished nuclear weapons. Instead, U.S.
    adopts a policy of strict secrecy.
  • Dissemination
  • 1949 Soviet Union,
  • 1952 UK,
  • 1960 France,
  • 1964 China.

4
The NPT
  • Concluded in 1968,
  • the treaty
  • bans acquisition of nuclear weapons by
    non-nuclear 5
  • bans transfer of nuclear technology to
    non-parties to the treaty
  • all nuclear materials must be declared to the
    IAEA and accessible to IAEA inspectors.

5
Implementation
  • France and China only signed in the 1990s .
  • South Africa, India, Pakistan and Israel did not
    sign at first and acquired nuclear weapons.
  • Only South Africa signed eventually and agreed to
    denuclearize.
  • Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya signed but
    were at one point or another found in violation
    (Iraq 1991), fell short of their obligations
    (Iran, Libya), or withdrew (NK).

6
Monitoring
  • IAEA conducts on-site inspections
  • but the results of these inspections are random.
  • Assume 300 possible sites in Iraq
  • IAEA inspectors can visit 1 site a day
  • The inspectors are given 100 days.
  • If 1 of these sites is hot, the probability
    that the inspectors find it is 1/3.

7
Moral hazard
  • Since compliance is not fully verifiable, the
    disseminator may shirk and not be caught.
  • To prevent moral hazard, large countries promise
    incentives or threaten sanctions so as to make
    compliance an attractive option.
  • Such was the point of the NPT treaty.

8
Incentives and sanctions in the NPT
  • Incentives for joining
  • access to civilian nuclear technology
  • along with some U.S. financial assistance
  • the nuclear 5 guarantee the non-nuclear members
    against a nuclear attack.
  • The 5 agree to engage in arms control.
  • Sanctions against cheaters
  • UN Security Council imposes economic or military
    sanctions.

9
The NPT game
  • Two players, a sanctioner S (the nuclear-5) and a
    target T.
  • S wants T to disarm S wins 1 if T disarms, 0
    otherwise.
  • S offers the NPT treaty with terms
  • disarm and receive reward wC, at cost wC to S,
  • or proliferate and receive negative payoff wB, at
    cost ? to S (with ? ? 0).
  • T either signs or rejects the treaty
  • if T rejects, it gets reservation payoff 0.
  • if T signs, it then decides whether
  • to disarm at cost e (with e
  • or shirk.

10
NPT game (conted)
  • S does not observe Ts action.
  • Instead, S observes the result of an on-site
    inspection
  • Assume 3 possible sites, inspectors can only
    visit one site
  • if site is hot, inspectors declare T in
    breach,
  • if site is cold, inspectors declare T in
    compliance.
  • The inspection result is stochastically related
    to compliance
  • if T disarms, all 3 sites are cold the
    probability of being declared in breach is
    pe00
  • if T shirks, 1 site is hot the probability of
    being declared in breach is pe01/3.

11
NPT game (conted)
  • if declared in breach, T is sanctioned wB.
  • if declared in compliance, T is rewarded wC.
  • Payoffs
  • if T disarms
  • EuT(e0)1wC 0wB -e wC -e,
  • EuS(e0)1 -wC.
  • If T shirks
  • EuT(e0) 2/3wC (1/3)wB,
  • EuS(e0) 2/3(0 -wC)1/3(0 -?) -(2/3wC 1/3?).

12
How to elicit non-proliferation?
  • Assume S is better off with T disarming, or
    (wC
  • S sets the agenda
  • S chooses wC and wB so that T chooses to disarm
  • (that is, T goes down the sign,disarm equilibrium
    path).

13
NPT Tree with Ts payoffs
shirk
reject
S
T
T
disarm
sign
14
How to constrain T down the sign,disarm path?
  • Make disarm at least equal to shirk
  • wC -e ? (2/3wC )(1/3)wB
  • (incentive constraint)
  • Make sign at least equal to reject
  • wC -e ? 0
  • (participation constraint)
  • Solving for both equations simultaneously
    yields
  • wC e (because S chooses smallest wC)
  • wB? -2e (wB is off the e-path and thus left
    semi-indeterminate).
  • The SP Nash equilibrium is
  • ((e, ? -2e)sign,disarm).
  • Ts payoff is 0,
  • Ss payoff is 1-e.

15
reflections
  • The treaty is efficient
  • S pays for cost e and no more wC e
  • T gets its reservation value 0
  • And yet, many countries
  • either rejected the treaty in 1968
  • or signed it but failed to comply afterward.
  • WHY?

16
The cartel broke down.
  • France did not sign for 20 years
  • Germany sold to Brazil.
  • Pakistan sold clandestinely to Libya, Iran, Iraq,
    and North Korea.
  • Export controls were not updated
  • and inspections were not beefed up
  • As a result, the threatened sanction was not
    credible, and thus the promised reward
    insufficient.

17
The no-teeth NPT game
  • Absence of sanction means wB 0.
  • By the incentive constraint
  • wC -e (2/3)wC (1/3)wB
  • wB 0 ?
  • wC 3e and thus wC 3e .
  • Ts payoff EuT(e0) 2e, which is a rent.
  • Ss payoff EuS(e0)1-3e, requiring e to offer the contract in the first place.
  • S no longer offers the treaty to targets with a
    high e.

18
Enhancing monitoring
  • Recall the latest inspection episode in Iraq.
  • Chirac tried to derail U.S. military intervention
    by proposing the doubling of inspectors
  • still assume 3 possible sites, with inspectors
    now able to visit 2 sites in the case of
    shirking,
  • pe0 ? P(one of the two visited sites is hote
    0) 2/3,
  • 1-pe0 ? P(both visited sites are colde 0)
    1/3,
  • pe0 ? P(one of the two visited sites is hote
    0) 0,
  • 1-pe0 ? P(both visited sites are colde 0)
    1.
  • solution is wC e and wB - (1/2)e, greater than
    -2e.
  • Threatened sanction need not be as steep as it is
    with fewer inspectors.

19
The Tragedy of partial monitoring
  • Given that the Bush administration held the prior
    belief that Iraq had WMD with near certainty,
    ...
  • could the inspection regime have led the
    administration to change their mind?
  • The American public believed it could,
  • the French were hoping it could,
  • the Iraqis were doubtful.
  • Facts proved the Iraqis right.

20
U.S. Bias
  • Assume the U.S. prior belief that Iraq shirked is
    q 9/10.
  • Assume enhanced monitoring (2 sites visited)
  • pe0 2/3, 1-pe0 1/3,
  • pe0 0, 1-pe0 1.
  • Assume inspectors find nothing U.S. posterior
    belief q P(shirk2 cold)

e0
e0
2 cold 1
2 cold 1/3
1/10
9/10
1 hot 2/3
  • Even if Saddam had disarmed, the U.S. would have
    still believed that the odds he hadnt were 3 to
    1.
  • Only a quasi-perfect monitoring regime (1-pe0 ?
    0) could have made a difference.

21
The clouded future of the NPT
  • 1999 U.S. Senate refused to ratify the
    Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
  • 2002 U.S. withdrew from the 1972 Antiballistic
    Missile Treaty.
  • 2002 new U.S. nuclear preemption doctrine
  • US named seven nations that it would consider
    striking first with nuclear weapons
  • 2003 North Korea withdrew from NPT and built
    several nuclear weapons.
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com