Part II: Building Block for Analysis

1
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chap. 3 Power
• Chap. 4 International Systems
• Chap. 5 Foreign Policy Analysis
• Chap. 6 International Conflict
• Chap. 7 International Cooperation

2
Chap. 3 Power (Outline)

• Power Resources What is Important and What Is
  Not?
  
• Thinking about Power
• Case Study Restoring Democracy in Haiti
• Fallacies
• Power A Multidimensional Concept

3
Chap. 3 Power (Outline, cont.)

• The Political-Military State Historically
  Dominant
  
• Geography
• Population
• Military Power
• Natural Recourses
• Economic Wealth
• National Will

4
Chap. 3 Power

• Power. The authors define power as The
  ability to influence and determine the actions of
  others. It can be viewed as a resource one
  possess, a relationship, or a means to an end
  (p. 69).
• Alternatively, the use of tangible and
  intangible resources to influence global politics
  and/or political actors. Note, this definition
  may prove more useful as we consider the sources
  of power.

5
Chap. 3 Power

• Continued.
• Case Study Restoring Democracy in Haiti.
  Point The worlds most powerful nation flailed
  about attempting to influence Haitian power
  elite, arguably the weakest nation state in the
  Western hemisphere. Ultimately, a combination of
  diplomacy and threat of use of power influenced
  Haitian politics. This case used to illustrate
  certain fallacies of power.

6
Chap. 3 Power

• Continued.
• Fallacies
• Tendency to treat power as currency of politics.
  The reality is that money is fungible, whereas
  power is not. Power has an instrumental nature.
  Continuum of influence
• Persuasion Military Force
• ?------------------------------------------------
  ----?
  
• Influence

7
Chap. 3 Power

• Continued.
• Fallacies
• ii. The most powerful (or seemingly so) do not
  always influence global politics as desired. (US
  in Viet Nam USSR in Afghanistan, . . . .)
  

8
Chap. 3 Power

• Continued. The nature of Power.
• Power A Multidimensional Concept
• Power is a set of resourcestangible and
  intangible
  
• Power is a means toward an end
• Power is a set of political relationships,
  cooperative and conflictual
  
• Global actors (principally states) must
  differentiate between simply acquiring more power
  and acquiring different typesresources,
  indicatorsof power

9
Chap. 3 Power

• Power Resources What is important and what is
  not?
  
• Supplemental. Sources of Powerthree principal
  categories Natural, Socio-psychological,
  Synthetic.
  

10
Chap. 3 Power

• Power Resources What is important and what is
  not? Supplemental to IPiACW.
  
• Natural geography, population, natural
  resources complex relationship to whether one
  can exert influence. Note only natural
  resources is directly indicative of more power
  both geographynumber of borders w/ potential
  adversariesand populationmobilized vs.
  immobilizedcan indicate power or lack thereof.

11
Chap. 3 Power

• Power Resources What is important and what is
  not? Supplemental to IPiACW.
  
• Socio-psychological public will, regime type,
  public perceptions (of self and potential
  adversary), leadership, . . . The authors
  sub-sequently call this soft power.
• Synthetic military-industrial infrastructure
  global-export infrastructure competitiveness
  technology (pp. 85, 87 respectively).
  

12
Chap. 3 Power

• The Political-Military State Historically
  Dominant
  
• See Documenting History Global Demographic
  Trends, excerpts from Central Intelligence
  Agency, Long-Term Demographic Trends, July 2001.
  (p. 77.)

13
Chap. 3 Power

• The Trading State The Contemporary Challenger
• Competitiveness
• Technology
• Political Capacity
• Power as A Means to An End
• Hard Power vs. Soft Power
• A Continuum of Choices
• Ethics and the Exercise of Power

14
Chap. 3 Power

• Power as A Means to An End
• Ethics and the Exercise of Power (p. 91).
• Questions of goals and timeframe authors
  discuss Neo-Realist vs. Neo-Liberal view. The
  former posits the States survival preeminent
  thus short-term goals and national security
  dominate. While latter suggest individual and/or
  larger collectives thereof preeminent.
• Values that should (normative) be promoted.
• Nonuse of power. During Cold War nonuse
  infrequently seen as issue of ethics. In post CW
  world nonuse is becoming frequent debate topic.
  

15
Chap. 3 Power

• Power Relationships
• Conflictual Cold War model
• Cooperative becoming an issue in post Cold War
• Conclusion
• Next Slide . . .

16
Chap. 3 Power

• Conclusion
• Power is clearly multidimensional concept but
  also problematicno common definition. Authors
  briefly highlight approaches from previous
  chapter to illustrate.
• Realist power largely a military concept
  states seek power because its rational to do so
  
• Neo Liberals (Idealists) decreasing efficacy of
  military-only power. Economic and other types of
  power as relevant if not more so. Power is not
  the possession of state-only actors.

17
Chap. 3 Power

• Conclusion
• Power is clearly multidimensional concept but
  also problematicno common definition. Authors
  briefly highlight approaches from previous
  chapter to illustrate.
• Dependency power principally an economic
  concept related to asymmetrical (exploitive)
  economic relationships
  
• Feminists power historically gender-oriented/dis
  torted. Classic Public/Private dichotomy
  illustrative.

18
Chap. 3 Power

• Conclusion
• Traditionalists power important concept but
  problematic to measure. Power elites intuitively
  measure it.
  
• Behavioralists power may be measured
  objectively. Its a matter of careful definition
  of concepts and finding appropriate indicators.

19
Supplemental Boltons Ordinal Matrix
Military preparedness
Military infra.
Industrial base
Geography
Leadership
Regime type
Public will
Population
Resources
20
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chap. 3 Power concluded
• Chap. 4 International Systems next

21
Chap. 4 International Systems

• Introduction. The notion of international
  systems is metaphorical, albeit a commonly used
  one in international politics. During the Cold
  War, for instance, analysts and policymakers
  frequently used the metaphor to explain state
  behaviorparticularly of the superpower but of
  their allies and other states as well. Why did
  the US invade the Dominican Republic in 1965?
  Why did the USSR invade Czechoslovakia, 1968?
  (Spheres of influence or prevent redistribution
  of power, stability. Similarly, why did the
  USSR attempt to sneak ICBMs onto Cuba?
  Calculated risk to redress a perceived
  disequilibrium!) During the CW, as we shall see,
  and as we have already briefly discussed, the
  systems was characterized as bipolar. (Tight
  bipolarity, loose bipolarity, incipient
  multi-polarity. However, prior to the Cold War
  an array of regional systems existed which too
  were the focus of attention for analysts.
  Regional balance of power between India and
  Pakistan historic balance of power in Europe in
  which U.K played a unique balancer role. 5th
  Century BCE wherein both Sparta and Athens vs.
  Persia then themselves city-states vs. empire
  balance of power system city state balance of
  power system. In lieu of the CW once again the
  topic has returned. Analysts want to know how
  best to characterize the current, post-CW balance
  of power. Why? Not just for the sake of it but
  because it is believed, variously, the bipolar
  balances are more stable and that multi-polar
  balances are more stable researches test
  hypotheses about them and a debate continues . .
  . .

22
Chap. 4 International Systems

• Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
  System
  
• Zones of Peace Prosperity vs. Zones of War
  Despair characterizes the current intl system as
  a series of relatively self-contained zones.
  
• Zones of Peace and Prosperity consist of
  democratic polities, prosperous economically
  (mostly capitalistic), industrialized, access to
  technology. Their social orders more or less
  accepting of universal norms regarding human
  rights and even environmental. While conflict
  may arise it is far less likely to be settled by
  peaceful rather than military means (at least
  intra-zone conflict.
• Zones of War and Despair are characterized by
  states with varying conceptions of governance,
  lack of shared norms, ad hoc political, economic
  and social systems. These zones tend to be
  resource pooror if they have resources they are
  not yet harnessed, meaning they may have the
  potential power to change their situation but
  have thus far failed to do so. The lack of
  common norms means a survival of the fittest
  approach to environmental, social, and economic
  issues. They have problems with corruption and
  in terms of economic and political development.

23
Chap. 4 International Systems

• II. Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
  System
  
• Return to the Future is the phrase our authors
  use to describe a pre-CW, Eurocentric,
  multi-polar balance of power. These are systems
  that are relatively affluent in which the units
  more or less share responsibility for harmony and
  for mitigating problems in the non-affluent areas
  of the world. This small number of affluent
  units also maintain the balance of power by
  shifting alliances at the topi.e., powerful
  states within the system place a priority on
  maintaining stability and peace over the own
  unique best interests (U.K. in 1800s).

24
Chap. 4 International Systems

• Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
  System
  
• C. Clash of Civilizations (S. Huntington) is a
  view of the world as divided along lines of
  civilizations, not necessarily nation-states.
  (See Map 4.1, next slide.)

25
Chap. 4 International Systems
26
Chap. 4 International Systems

• II. Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
  System
  
• C. Clash of Civilizations Thesis is relatively
  controversial. Although, in my view much of it
  is semantics. It is criticized for
  oversimplifying what constitutes a civilization
  clashes arent necessarily the norm between
  civilizations similarly, ignoring the extent to
  which states control civilizations rather than
  the reverse is common.

27
Chap. 4 International Systems

• II. Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
  System
  
• D. Global Village. This metaphor has existed for
  centuries and owes its existence to
  Neoliberalism. Indeed earlier incarnations
  included the belief that air travel would lead to
  a more peaceful world because persons would get
  to know others and their cultures rather than
  fear them. In any case modern communications
  and technology and modern travel are thought to
  be positive influences in intl politics. This
  is somewhat predicated of a diminution if
  nationalism, etc.

28
Chap. 4 International Systems

• The Concept of System
• International Systems Overview
• Ordering Principles
• The Character of Units
• States
• IGOs
• MNCs
• NGOs (Transnationalism or authors Transnational
  Activist Groups, TAGs)
  
• Terrorist other groups
• Individuals

29
Chap. 4 International Systems

• Distribution of Capabilities
• International Military Systems
• Bi- Multi-Polarity
• National Intelligence Estimate (pp. 120-21).
• Unipolarity
• International Economic Systems
• Imperialism
• Interdependence

30
Chap. 4 International Systems

• International and Global Security. There is not
  much in said section that I find worth
  discussing. Conclusion. International System is
  a widely used metaphor and a widely accepted as a
  level-focus of analysis. Unfortunately, scores
  of analysts disagree on how to define it
  precisely, as well as how much weight to give it
  in a particular analysis.
• Conclusion

31
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis (pp.
  133-156).
  
• See Bolton, pp. 1-14.

32
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
• Intro Foreign policy is a course of action
  designed to realize national goals through
  interactions with states and other actors outside
  ones borders (p. 133). Alternately, U.S.
  foreign policy is the goals/ objectives US
  decisionmakers seek to attain abroad, the values
  that underlie said goals, and the instruments
  used to achieve them. Discuss continuity vs.
  change.

33
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
• Case Study N. Korea and the Bomb? Yong Byon
  reactor, 1984 N. Korea signs NPT, 1984 N. Korea
  signs additional protocol (IAEA) in 1992 IAEA
  presents N. Korea w/ 1-month ultimatum to allow
  inspections N. Korea withdraws from IAEA and
  following year (1994) refuses inspectors access
  CIA announces N. Korea has enough plutonium to
  make couple of nukes, 1999, and subsequently
  identifies same as exporter of missile
  technology . . . Why?

34
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
• Foreign Policy What Is It?
• Sense of Purpose and Place
• Sense of Threat
• The authors discuss threat type as a function of
  regime-type typology moderate regimes
  pragmatic regimes, militant regimes radical
  regimes. (Ideal Types). Alternatively, one may
  conceptualize sense of purpose ethos, mythology,
  general goals sense of threat opportunity
  ?-----------------? high threat. Hence,
  alternative definition more useful. Also, as
  will be seen authors cobble on instruments under
  Statecraft below.

35
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
• Foreign Policy Goals The National Interest
• The National Interest as a Guide to Action
• The Lippman Gap The gap between the power a
  state needs to realize goals and the actual power
  it possess. Note thus far only states are
  actors! Next section clumsily disaggregates
  state into decisionmakers. Again alternative
  definition more efficacious.

36
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
• Foreign Policy Decisions How Are They Made?
• Rational actor model
• Bureaucratic model
• Small-group decisionmaking model
• Societal model
• Elites
• CNN. Media, special-interest groups SIGs
• Policy Maker and Analytic Perspective

37
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
• Foreign Policy Decisions How Are They Made?
• Rational actor model
• Bureaucratic model
• Small-group decisionmaking model
• Societal
• Policy Maker and Analytic Perspective

38
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis Foreign
• Policy Decisions How Are They Made?
• Rational Actor Model
• Bureaucratic Politics Model
• Small-Group Decisionmaking Model
• Societal Model
• Statecraft The Instruments of Foreign Policy

39
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis Foreign
• Statecraft The Instruments of Foreign Policy
• Instruments of foreign policy
• Diplomacy
• Military power
• War-fighting capability (recall Lippman gap)
• Deterrence define
• Compellence define
• Economic power free trade mercantilism
  embargo etc.
  
• Covert actions clandestine
• Public diplomacy (propaganda)

40
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis Foreign
• Conclusion
• Interesting section on James Rosenaus Pre
  Theories framework. Discuss see Table 5.1, p.
  153. Note we discussed this earlier in section
  I, (Chapter I). Re-Discuss?
• Bolton, pp. 1-14.

41
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chap. 3 Power
• Chap. 4 International Systems
• Chap. 5 Foreign Policy Analysis
• Chap. 6 International Conflict
• Chap. 7 International Cooperation

42
Part II Building Block for Analysis
Feedback
Process
YUSFP
X-external-systemic inputs, X-societal inputs,
X-Governmental inputs, X-Role inputs,
X-individual inputs.

43
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VI International Conflict
• Counting Wars The authors make the point that
  counting warsor quantifying them in any way
  making them amenable to scientific studyis
  problematic. Why? Analysts, scholars,
  policymakers do not agree on what constitutes a
  war. They mention Levy, COW (Singer/Small)
  etc. Further, they ask a series of questions
  about the defining characteristics of wars in
  order to illustrate the problems
• Must there be an official declaration?
• Is there a requisite length of time?
• Is there a requisite level of violence?
  (deaths?)
  
• When is a war over?
• Is there a life cycle? ignore

44
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VI International Conflict
• Classifying Wars
• International Wars great power wars vs.
  hegemonic wars, the latter of which is smaller
  subset in which the stakes are the establishment
  of a new hegemonic order.
• Crises defined systemically (Williams, Betts)
  I prefer decisionmaking definition
  
• Civil War we all know intuitively but rarely is
  a civil war free from outside influence
  (Americas wars of independence colonial wars of
  liberation most unconventional or guerilla wars)
  Mao Zedong
• Terrorism narco-, super-, cyber- ,etc.
• Why States Go to War
• Case Study India Pakistan discuss case study
  (pp. 170-172).

45
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VI International Conflict
• Intl System Level Causes of War
• Security Dilemma one states defensive
  actions perforce seen by another as offensive
  action.
  
• Structure of Intl System redux
• Power Transitions power vacuum into which states
  fill void
  
• War Cycles rise and demise of hegemonic
  powersRomans, Portuguese, UK, US
  
• State-Level Causes of War
• Types of Government democracies vs. autocracies
• Nationalism separatism, irredentism, discuss
  theorys diminution since 9/11
  
• Internal Violence spillover
• Economic Systems dependency theory, world
  systems theory, Marxism
  
• Relative Deprivations
• Individual-Level Causes of War
• Calculated Benefits ratl choice
• Human Nature atavism, humans marking territory .
  . . (Konrad Lorenz)
  
• Personality great-person thesis discuss/ read
  key passage from Stoessinger)
  
• Misperceptions human and technical

46
Terrorism Modern Mutations
47
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VI International Conflict
• Ending Wars Fights, Games, and Debates see
  figure 6.3, next slide game theory
  

48
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VI International Conflict

49
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VI International Conflict
• Conclusions authors slip out by saying no
  general theory multi-causal need for bridges
  between islands of theory.
  

50
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• Introduction. The authors note that in contrast
  to conflict, international cooperation has
  received relatively little academic or
  policymaking attention. They attribute the lack
  of attention to the dominance of Realism-Neo
  Realism in academic and policymaking circles. I
  would suggest, only slightly different emphasis,
  the fact that the Cold War dominated the past
  fifty years of both scholarship and
  policymaking. In any event, Neoliberalism, and
  its various focuses on paths toward cooperation
  between members of the international system, has
  clearly suffered. Those attempts, furthermore,
  have been piecemeal and ad hoc, what one scholar
  has called islands of theory. The authors begin
  with the case of E. Timor as a case example.

51
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• II. East Timorrelevant facts. Indonesia invaded
  E. Timor in 1975, claiming sovereignty over the
  former Portuguese colony and its mostly Catholic
  indigenous population. President Suharto, who
  came to power in a coup detat in the 1960s, was
  then the dictator of Indonesia with a powerful
  military. During the 1960s-1980s the US
  supported the anti-Communist Suhartoincluding
  military aid of various sortsand complained very
  little about his military subjugation of E.
  Timor. Ever since the invasion of 1975, there
  had been low-grade civil war with indigenous
  peoples of Timor fighting Indonesian subjugation.
  Internal turmoil in Indonesia (about corruption,
  lack of democracy, etc.) resulted in Suharto
  stepping down in 1998, and the enfeebled
  President Habibie as a caretaker regime. In
  1999 Habibie announced that a referendum would be
  held in E. Timor on independence.

52
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• East Timorrelevant facts. There was resultant
  widespread violence and turmoil in Indonesia
  throughout 1999. Partially an issue of
  nationalism partly the powerful military
  unwilling to give up E. Timor partially, people
  who had lived under a dictatorship for years
  feeling newly empowered. The US pressures
  Indonesia to go through with the referendum
  among other things, the US threatened to cut
  military ties and block IMF loans. The issue
  came before the UNs Security Council where China
  blocked potential UN sanctions. Fall 1999,
  Habibie formally renounces Indonesias claims
  over E. Timor. Soon thereafter, E. Timor became
  a UN protectorate and sets presidential
  elections for 2001. On May 20, 2002 E. Timor
  became an independent state.

53
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• Why Cooperate?
• The authors engage in some discussion of formal
  negotiations vs. tacit cooperation vs. imposed
  cooperation, etc. You are to read but I shall
  not discuss. The main point is this states
  choose to cooperate when it is in their best
  interest to do so.
• G. Persuasion --------- War Power Continuum -------------------
  ------------ Increasing Costs Note as well
  discuss later, International Law and IOs can be
  seen as entities used by states to mitigate the
  more anarchic characteristics of the
  international system.

54
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• Why Cooperate?
• A. Absolute vs. relative gains benefits vs.
  costs (supra). Absolute gains (largest possible
  gain for a state irrespective of gains for
  others relative gains (gains relative to others
  involved.) Number of states. The larger the
  number of states involved, typically increases
  bargaining-consensus thus possibly increasing
  costs in terms of gains. Further, typically
  increases free-rider problem On the other
  hand, certain states are more likely to view
  agreements as legitimate to the extent they
  have participated thus larger number could
  advantage cooperation.
• Presence of hegemonic state. Authors point out
  that to Realists, hegemonic state is seen and a
  necessary (though not sufficient) condition.
  Neoliberals, by contrast, look toward
  strengthening of international institutions,
  norms, regimes. They dont discuss hegemonic
  stability theory which posits that a hegemonic
  power tends to incur, usually willingly,
  inordinate costs for peacelack of
  instabilityresulting in the very free riding
  they note. Also, while the case study implies
  hegemonic influenceUS and Chinasthere are
  relatively few hegemonic powers around.

55
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• Why Cooperate?
• Increases in scientific and technical knowledge.
  Arguable. However, some Neoliberals tend to
  think said knowledge increases the chance of
  cooperation. Well discuss under integration
  theory.
• Feminist theory. This section includes with a
  discuss of Feminist theory, eschewing the view of
  cooperation in purely strategic terms rather, a
  stress on empathetic cooperation, etc.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• International Law. The authors begin with the
  shop-worn critiques of international law as a
  means of cooperation. Namely, Neorealists remind
  us that there is nothing above the nation
  stateno supranational entity that can arbitrate
  disputes. Thus, international law is found
  wanting by its critics when compared to say
  domestic law. That being said, the authors argue
  that in the post-CW era, international law is
  seen by many as increasingly efficacious. For
  reasons of costs alone, states increasingly
  frequently find it in their self interest to
  voluntarily forfeit a limited portion of their
  sovereignty to be bound be international law as
  it is a cost-effective way to ensure their self
  interests. The authors pose five
  issues/questions around which they see the
  potential for international consensus, hence,
  increasing the efficacy of international law.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• Origins-Sources. Generally, what we think of as
  international law comes from the European
  Enlightenment and Liberal traditions.
  International conventions-treatise (e.g., various
  Geneva conventions) Customary law. Perhaps
  early laws of the sea General normative
  principles I would add subsidiary sources such
  as legal rulings, scholarship in jurisprudence.
  Etc.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• Is intl law global in nature? Is International
  Law Global in Nature?
  
• Feminist Challenge. This perspective disputes
  the sources of international law as gender
  biased. Citing examples, the authors discuss
  traditional religiousreproductive
  rightsconstraints and similar cultural
  restraints.
• The Challenge of Developing Nations. The authors
  rightly note that the origins of international
  law were during the European Enlightenment and
  Liberal periods. During said periods, Europeans
  and others thought nothing of using international
  law to exploit their colonial holdings. As such,
  international law cannot necessarily be seen as
  global in nature. They cite colonialism
  specifically and unequal treatment under
  colonialism. Chinas Century of Humiliation,
  which we will discuss in the final section of the
  text, was exacted under the guise of
  international law. They make a good point.
  Consider, they say, a future global convention
  held to establish universal norms for future
  wars.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• . . . Global in nature?
• Just War Theory. The traditional Western-centric
  concept of war established by Catholic
  theologians, subsequently others, to justify what
  then was the states (churchs) actions.
• defensive
• other possibilities have been exhausted
• proportionality or commensurate action
• non combatants

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• . . . Global in nature?
• Jihad. Obviously, a clearly distinct and
  contrasting view of what constitutes a just war.
  
  
• When and why is International Law Obeyed? Weve
  already discussed in terms of self interest
  and/or cost effectiveness. Another reason is
  reciprocity (comity). Essentially, states will
  agree to something (form consensus with other
  states) with which they do not necessarily agree
  in order to exact similar behavior from others at
  some future time where the matter of greater
  interest to them.
• The Relevance of International Law and War. The
  face of war is changing in the post-CW era and
  has been ever since technology was introduced
  its simply changing more rapidly now. Modernity
  also is correlated with increased rules and norms
  (intl laws). To illustrate they consider the
  Persian Gulf War (1991). The reasons is that it
  is generally considered a war that was fought
  humanely. Yet it illustrates issues associated
  with the changing face of war. US military
  doctrine of massive application of force,
  surprise and maneuverability.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• International Organizations.
• Historical Development. International
  Organizations (IOs) similar to international law
  in origins and purposes. They arise from the
  European Enlightenment and Liberal periods. They
  are intended to augment the anarchic tendencies
  of the international system. The authors
  discuss the historical development of IOs. They
  do not distinguish between IGOs and NGOs. For
  our purposes theres an important distinction.
  Namely, IGOs membership is comprised of nation
  statesinternational-governmental organizations.
  NGOs membership comprised of non-state actors,
  grass roots organizations, political action
  groupsnon-governmental organizations. There are
  far more of the latter and they tend to be
  narrowly focused doctors without borders,
  Catholic Relief, Green Peace, etc.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• International Organizations. Continued.
• The authors somewhat dubiously associate
  Neoliberals with both international laws and IOs.
  More accurately, the Neoliberal tradition
  arises out of the same milieu, namely, European
  Enlightenment and Liberalism. Neorealist
  certainly acknowledge international law and IOs
  but simply put less faith in their efficacy in
  terms of peace and stability. Citing I. Claudes
  work, they date IOs development beginning with
  the Concert of Europe 19th Century occasion on
  which the great powers came together to agree on
  common operating procedures (security regime or
  international laws) to establish the future
  political landscape of Europe. Could as
  easily be dated it with the Treaty of Westphalia,
  a similar arrangement at the conclusion of the
  Thirty Years War (c. 1658). Following the
  Concert of Europe came the Hague Conferences
  (1899 and 1907) to promote peaceful dispute
  resolution. The third effort at building
  institutional constraints against instability
  (read war) resulted in public international
  unions (International Telegraphic Union, 1865 and
  Universal Postal Union, 1874.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• International Organizations. Continued.
• Note well revisit under integration theory.
  The most significant effort was the League of
  Nations following WW I. It was establishedor
  nearly soto prevent the sort of systematic
  failure that led to the war. The goal was to
  legitimize the extant distribution of
  powerspheres of influence that others would not
  violate or disturb. It was also doomed to
  failure, say our authors, because it couldnt get
  broad membership (legitimacy, sufficient
  consensus). The US never joined the Russians
  joined late Japan refused to join partly as
  result of an article establishing equality of
  races failed to pass. Second, say our authors,
  the collective-security mechanism doomed it.
  Though included in its charterthe
  Covenantstates scarcely responded to challenges
  Italys invasion of Ethiopia Japans invasion
  of Manchuria.

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• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• International Organizations. Continued.
• The Evolving United Nations. Unlike the League,
  the UN did get broad membership. If I recall
  correctly, the original UN consisted of
  fifty-plus states. The US and Russia (the
  Soviets) both joined. And why not? They were
  among the victorsincluding the U.K., France, and
  Chinaat the conclusion of WW II and thereby had
  disproportionate influence in establishing how it
  would work. More on this when we discuss the
  Security Council. Operationally, the UN was
  established with six permanent entities from
  which others have grown over time.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis
66
Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Chapter VII International Cooperation
• International Organizations. Continued.
• The Evolving United Nations. Continued.
• General Assembly
• Security Council
• Economic Social Council (ECOSOC)
• Secretariat
• Intl Court of Justice (ICJ) or World Court
• Trusteeship Council

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Part II Building Block for Analysis

• Integration Theory
• Introduction
• Federalism
• Functionalism
• Neo-functionalism
• Collective Security