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Part II: Building Block for Analysis

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East Timor relevant facts. ... 'formally renounces' Indonesia's claims over E. Timor. Soon thereafter, E. Timor became a UN 'protectorate' and sets presidential ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Part II: Building Block for Analysis


1
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chap. 3 Power
  • Chap. 4 International Systems
  • Chap. 5 Foreign Policy Analysis
  • Chap. 6 International Conflict
  • Chap. 7 International Cooperation

2
Chap. 3 Power (Outline)
  • Power Resources What is Important and What Is
    Not?
  • Thinking about Power
  • Case Study Restoring Democracy in Haiti
  • Fallacies
  • Power A Multidimensional Concept

3
Chap. 3 Power (Outline, cont.)
  • The Political-Military State Historically
    Dominant
  • Geography
  • Population
  • Military Power
  • Natural Recourses
  • Economic Wealth
  • National Will

4
Chap. 3 Power
  • Power. The authors define power as The
    ability to influence and determine the actions of
    others. It can be viewed as a resource one
    possess, a relationship, or a means to an end
    (p. 69).
  • Alternatively, the use of tangible and
    intangible resources to influence global politics
    and/or political actors. Note, this definition
    may prove more useful as we consider the sources
    of power.

5
Chap. 3 Power
  • Continued.
  • Case Study Restoring Democracy in Haiti.
    Point The worlds most powerful nation flailed
    about attempting to influence Haitian power
    elite, arguably the weakest nation state in the
    Western hemisphere. Ultimately, a combination of
    diplomacy and threat of use of power influenced
    Haitian politics. This case used to illustrate
    certain fallacies of power.

6
Chap. 3 Power
  • Continued.
  • Fallacies
  • Tendency to treat power as currency of politics.
    The reality is that money is fungible, whereas
    power is not. Power has an instrumental nature.
    Continuum of influence
  • Persuasion Military Force
  • ?------------------------------------------------
    ----?
  • Influence

7
Chap. 3 Power
  • Continued.
  • Fallacies
  • ii. The most powerful (or seemingly so) do not
    always influence global politics as desired. (US
    in Viet Nam USSR in Afghanistan, . . . .)

8
Chap. 3 Power
  • Continued. The nature of Power.
  • Power A Multidimensional Concept
  • Power is a set of resourcestangible and
    intangible
  • Power is a means toward an end
  • Power is a set of political relationships,
    cooperative and conflictual
  • Global actors (principally states) must
    differentiate between simply acquiring more power
    and acquiring different typesresources,
    indicatorsof power

9
Chap. 3 Power
  • Power Resources What is important and what is
    not?
  • Supplemental. Sources of Powerthree principal
    categories Natural, Socio-psychological,
    Synthetic.

10
Chap. 3 Power
  • Power Resources What is important and what is
    not? Supplemental to IPiACW.
  • Natural geography, population, natural
    resources complex relationship to whether one
    can exert influence. Note only natural
    resources is directly indicative of more power
    both geographynumber of borders w/ potential
    adversariesand populationmobilized vs.
    immobilizedcan indicate power or lack thereof.

11
Chap. 3 Power
  • Power Resources What is important and what is
    not? Supplemental to IPiACW.
  • Socio-psychological public will, regime type,
    public perceptions (of self and potential
    adversary), leadership, . . . The authors
    sub-sequently call this soft power.
  • Synthetic military-industrial infrastructure
    global-export infrastructure competitiveness
    technology (pp. 85, 87 respectively).

12
Chap. 3 Power
  • The Political-Military State Historically
    Dominant
  • See Documenting History Global Demographic
    Trends, excerpts from Central Intelligence
    Agency, Long-Term Demographic Trends, July 2001.
    (p. 77.)

13
Chap. 3 Power
  • The Trading State The Contemporary Challenger
  • Competitiveness
  • Technology
  • Political Capacity
  • Power as A Means to An End
  • Hard Power vs. Soft Power
  • A Continuum of Choices
  • Ethics and the Exercise of Power

14
Chap. 3 Power
  • Power as A Means to An End
  • Ethics and the Exercise of Power (p. 91).
  • Questions of goals and timeframe authors
    discuss Neo-Realist vs. Neo-Liberal view. The
    former posits the States survival preeminent
    thus short-term goals and national security
    dominate. While latter suggest individual and/or
    larger collectives thereof preeminent.
  • Values that should (normative) be promoted.
  • Nonuse of power. During Cold War nonuse
    infrequently seen as issue of ethics. In post CW
    world nonuse is becoming frequent debate topic.

15
Chap. 3 Power
  • Power Relationships
  • Conflictual Cold War model
  • Cooperative becoming an issue in post Cold War
  • Conclusion
  • Next Slide . . .

16
Chap. 3 Power
  • Conclusion
  • Power is clearly multidimensional concept but
    also problematicno common definition. Authors
    briefly highlight approaches from previous
    chapter to illustrate.
  • Realist power largely a military concept
    states seek power because its rational to do so
  • Neo Liberals (Idealists) decreasing efficacy of
    military-only power. Economic and other types of
    power as relevant if not more so. Power is not
    the possession of state-only actors.

17
Chap. 3 Power
  • Conclusion
  • Power is clearly multidimensional concept but
    also problematicno common definition. Authors
    briefly highlight approaches from previous
    chapter to illustrate.
  • Dependency power principally an economic
    concept related to asymmetrical (exploitive)
    economic relationships
  • Feminists power historically gender-oriented/dis
    torted. Classic Public/Private dichotomy
    illustrative.

18
Chap. 3 Power
  • Conclusion
  • Traditionalists power important concept but
    problematic to measure. Power elites intuitively
    measure it.
  • Behavioralists power may be measured
    objectively. Its a matter of careful definition
    of concepts and finding appropriate indicators.

19
Supplemental Boltons Ordinal Matrix
Military preparedness
Military infra.
Industrial base
Geography
Leadership
Regime type
Public will
Population
Resources
20
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chap. 3 Power concluded
  • Chap. 4 International Systems next

21
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • Introduction. The notion of international
    systems is metaphorical, albeit a commonly used
    one in international politics. During the Cold
    War, for instance, analysts and policymakers
    frequently used the metaphor to explain state
    behaviorparticularly of the superpower but of
    their allies and other states as well. Why did
    the US invade the Dominican Republic in 1965?
    Why did the USSR invade Czechoslovakia, 1968?
    (Spheres of influence or prevent redistribution
    of power, stability. Similarly, why did the
    USSR attempt to sneak ICBMs onto Cuba?
    Calculated risk to redress a perceived
    disequilibrium!) During the CW, as we shall see,
    and as we have already briefly discussed, the
    systems was characterized as bipolar. (Tight
    bipolarity, loose bipolarity, incipient
    multi-polarity. However, prior to the Cold War
    an array of regional systems existed which too
    were the focus of attention for analysts.
    Regional balance of power between India and
    Pakistan historic balance of power in Europe in
    which U.K played a unique balancer role. 5th
    Century BCE wherein both Sparta and Athens vs.
    Persia then themselves city-states vs. empire
    balance of power system city state balance of
    power system. In lieu of the CW once again the
    topic has returned. Analysts want to know how
    best to characterize the current, post-CW balance
    of power. Why? Not just for the sake of it but
    because it is believed, variously, the bipolar
    balances are more stable and that multi-polar
    balances are more stable researches test
    hypotheses about them and a debate continues . .
    . .

22
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
    System
  • Zones of Peace Prosperity vs. Zones of War
    Despair characterizes the current intl system as
    a series of relatively self-contained zones.
  • Zones of Peace and Prosperity consist of
    democratic polities, prosperous economically
    (mostly capitalistic), industrialized, access to
    technology. Their social orders more or less
    accepting of universal norms regarding human
    rights and even environmental. While conflict
    may arise it is far less likely to be settled by
    peaceful rather than military means (at least
    intra-zone conflict.
  • Zones of War and Despair are characterized by
    states with varying conceptions of governance,
    lack of shared norms, ad hoc political, economic
    and social systems. These zones tend to be
    resource pooror if they have resources they are
    not yet harnessed, meaning they may have the
    potential power to change their situation but
    have thus far failed to do so. The lack of
    common norms means a survival of the fittest
    approach to environmental, social, and economic
    issues. They have problems with corruption and
    in terms of economic and political development.

23
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • II. Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
    System
  • Return to the Future is the phrase our authors
    use to describe a pre-CW, Eurocentric,
    multi-polar balance of power. These are systems
    that are relatively affluent in which the units
    more or less share responsibility for harmony and
    for mitigating problems in the non-affluent areas
    of the world. This small number of affluent
    units also maintain the balance of power by
    shifting alliances at the topi.e., powerful
    states within the system place a priority on
    maintaining stability and peace over the own
    unique best interests (U.K. in 1800s).

24
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
    System
  • C. Clash of Civilizations (S. Huntington) is a
    view of the world as divided along lines of
    civilizations, not necessarily nation-states.
    (See Map 4.1, next slide.)

25
Chap. 4 International Systems
26
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • II. Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
    System
  • C. Clash of Civilizations Thesis is relatively
    controversial. Although, in my view much of it
    is semantics. It is criticized for
    oversimplifying what constitutes a civilization
    clashes arent necessarily the norm between
    civilizations similarly, ignoring the extent to
    which states control civilizations rather than
    the reverse is common.

27
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • II. Competing Visions of the Contemporary Intl
    System
  • D. Global Village. This metaphor has existed for
    centuries and owes its existence to
    Neoliberalism. Indeed earlier incarnations
    included the belief that air travel would lead to
    a more peaceful world because persons would get
    to know others and their cultures rather than
    fear them. In any case modern communications
    and technology and modern travel are thought to
    be positive influences in intl politics. This
    is somewhat predicated of a diminution if
    nationalism, etc.

28
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • The Concept of System
  • International Systems Overview
  • Ordering Principles
  • The Character of Units
  • States
  • IGOs
  • MNCs
  • NGOs (Transnationalism or authors Transnational
    Activist Groups, TAGs)
  • Terrorist other groups
  • Individuals

29
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • Distribution of Capabilities
  • International Military Systems
  • Bi- Multi-Polarity
  • National Intelligence Estimate (pp. 120-21).
  • Unipolarity
  • International Economic Systems
  • Imperialism
  • Interdependence

30
Chap. 4 International Systems
  • International and Global Security. There is not
    much in said section that I find worth
    discussing. Conclusion. International System is
    a widely used metaphor and a widely accepted as a
    level-focus of analysis. Unfortunately, scores
    of analysts disagree on how to define it
    precisely, as well as how much weight to give it
    in a particular analysis.
  • Conclusion

31
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis (pp.
    133-156).
  • See Bolton, pp. 1-14.

32
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
  • Intro Foreign policy is a course of action
    designed to realize national goals through
    interactions with states and other actors outside
    ones borders (p. 133). Alternately, U.S.
    foreign policy is the goals/ objectives US
    decisionmakers seek to attain abroad, the values
    that underlie said goals, and the instruments
    used to achieve them. Discuss continuity vs.
    change.

33
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
  • Case Study N. Korea and the Bomb? Yong Byon
    reactor, 1984 N. Korea signs NPT, 1984 N. Korea
    signs additional protocol (IAEA) in 1992 IAEA
    presents N. Korea w/ 1-month ultimatum to allow
    inspections N. Korea withdraws from IAEA and
    following year (1994) refuses inspectors access
    CIA announces N. Korea has enough plutonium to
    make couple of nukes, 1999, and subsequently
    identifies same as exporter of missile
    technology . . . Why?

34
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
  • Foreign Policy What Is It?
  • Sense of Purpose and Place
  • Sense of Threat
  • The authors discuss threat type as a function of
    regime-type typology moderate regimes
    pragmatic regimes, militant regimes radical
    regimes. (Ideal Types). Alternatively, one may
    conceptualize sense of purpose ethos, mythology,
    general goals sense of threat opportunity
    ?-----------------? high threat. Hence,
    alternative definition more useful. Also, as
    will be seen authors cobble on instruments under
    Statecraft below.

35
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
  • Foreign Policy Goals The National Interest
  • The National Interest as a Guide to Action
  • The Lippman Gap The gap between the power a
    state needs to realize goals and the actual power
    it possess. Note thus far only states are
    actors! Next section clumsily disaggregates
    state into decisionmakers. Again alternative
    definition more efficacious.

36
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
  • Foreign Policy Decisions How Are They Made?
  • Rational actor model
  • Bureaucratic model
  • Small-group decisionmaking model
  • Societal model
  • Elites
  • CNN. Media, special-interest groups SIGs
  • Policy Maker and Analytic Perspective

37
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis
  • Foreign Policy Decisions How Are They Made?
  • Rational actor model
  • Bureaucratic model
  • Small-group decisionmaking model
  • Societal
  • Policy Maker and Analytic Perspective

38
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis Foreign
  • Policy Decisions How Are They Made?
  • Rational Actor Model
  • Bureaucratic Politics Model
  • Small-Group Decisionmaking Model
  • Societal Model
  • Statecraft The Instruments of Foreign Policy

39
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis Foreign
  • Statecraft The Instruments of Foreign Policy
  • Instruments of foreign policy
  • Diplomacy
  • Military power
  • War-fighting capability (recall Lippman gap)
  • Deterrence define
  • Compellence define
  • Economic power free trade mercantilism
    embargo etc.
  • Covert actions clandestine
  • Public diplomacy (propaganda)

40
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter V Foreign Policy Analysis Foreign
  • Conclusion
  • Interesting section on James Rosenaus Pre
    Theories framework. Discuss see Table 5.1, p.
    153. Note we discussed this earlier in section
    I, (Chapter I). Re-Discuss?
  • Bolton, pp. 1-14.

41
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chap. 3 Power
  • Chap. 4 International Systems
  • Chap. 5 Foreign Policy Analysis
  • Chap. 6 International Conflict
  • Chap. 7 International Cooperation

42
Part II Building Block for Analysis
Feedback
Process
YUSFP
X-external-systemic inputs, X-societal inputs,
X-Governmental inputs, X-Role inputs,
X-individual inputs.

43
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VI International Conflict
  • Counting Wars The authors make the point that
    counting warsor quantifying them in any way
    making them amenable to scientific studyis
    problematic. Why? Analysts, scholars,
    policymakers do not agree on what constitutes a
    war. They mention Levy, COW (Singer/Small)
    etc. Further, they ask a series of questions
    about the defining characteristics of wars in
    order to illustrate the problems
  • Must there be an official declaration?
  • Is there a requisite length of time?
  • Is there a requisite level of violence?
    (deaths?)
  • When is a war over?
  • Is there a life cycle? ignore

44
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VI International Conflict
  • Classifying Wars
  • International Wars great power wars vs.
    hegemonic wars, the latter of which is smaller
    subset in which the stakes are the establishment
    of a new hegemonic order.
  • Crises defined systemically (Williams, Betts)
    I prefer decisionmaking definition
  • Civil War we all know intuitively but rarely is
    a civil war free from outside influence
    (Americas wars of independence colonial wars of
    liberation most unconventional or guerilla wars)
    Mao Zedong
  • Terrorism narco-, super-, cyber- ,etc.
  • Why States Go to War
  • Case Study India Pakistan discuss case study
    (pp. 170-172).

45
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VI International Conflict
  • Intl System Level Causes of War
  • Security Dilemma one states defensive
    actions perforce seen by another as offensive
    action.
  • Structure of Intl System redux
  • Power Transitions power vacuum into which states
    fill void
  • War Cycles rise and demise of hegemonic
    powersRomans, Portuguese, UK, US
  • State-Level Causes of War
  • Types of Government democracies vs. autocracies
  • Nationalism separatism, irredentism, discuss
    theorys diminution since 9/11
  • Internal Violence spillover
  • Economic Systems dependency theory, world
    systems theory, Marxism
  • Relative Deprivations
  • Individual-Level Causes of War
  • Calculated Benefits ratl choice
  • Human Nature atavism, humans marking territory .
    . . (Konrad Lorenz)
  • Personality great-person thesis discuss/ read
    key passage from Stoessinger)
  • Misperceptions human and technical

46
Terrorism Modern Mutations
47
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VI International Conflict
  • Ending Wars Fights, Games, and Debates see
    figure 6.3, next slide game theory

48
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VI International Conflict

49
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VI International Conflict
  • Conclusions authors slip out by saying no
    general theory multi-causal need for bridges
    between islands of theory.

50
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • Introduction. The authors note that in contrast
    to conflict, international cooperation has
    received relatively little academic or
    policymaking attention. They attribute the lack
    of attention to the dominance of Realism-Neo
    Realism in academic and policymaking circles. I
    would suggest, only slightly different emphasis,
    the fact that the Cold War dominated the past
    fifty years of both scholarship and
    policymaking. In any event, Neoliberalism, and
    its various focuses on paths toward cooperation
    between members of the international system, has
    clearly suffered. Those attempts, furthermore,
    have been piecemeal and ad hoc, what one scholar
    has called islands of theory. The authors begin
    with the case of E. Timor as a case example.

51
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • II. East Timorrelevant facts. Indonesia invaded
    E. Timor in 1975, claiming sovereignty over the
    former Portuguese colony and its mostly Catholic
    indigenous population. President Suharto, who
    came to power in a coup detat in the 1960s, was
    then the dictator of Indonesia with a powerful
    military. During the 1960s-1980s the US
    supported the anti-Communist Suhartoincluding
    military aid of various sortsand complained very
    little about his military subjugation of E.
    Timor. Ever since the invasion of 1975, there
    had been low-grade civil war with indigenous
    peoples of Timor fighting Indonesian subjugation.
    Internal turmoil in Indonesia (about corruption,
    lack of democracy, etc.) resulted in Suharto
    stepping down in 1998, and the enfeebled
    President Habibie as a caretaker regime. In
    1999 Habibie announced that a referendum would be
    held in E. Timor on independence.

52
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • East Timorrelevant facts. There was resultant
    widespread violence and turmoil in Indonesia
    throughout 1999. Partially an issue of
    nationalism partly the powerful military
    unwilling to give up E. Timor partially, people
    who had lived under a dictatorship for years
    feeling newly empowered. The US pressures
    Indonesia to go through with the referendum
    among other things, the US threatened to cut
    military ties and block IMF loans. The issue
    came before the UNs Security Council where China
    blocked potential UN sanctions. Fall 1999,
    Habibie formally renounces Indonesias claims
    over E. Timor. Soon thereafter, E. Timor became
    a UN protectorate and sets presidential
    elections for 2001. On May 20, 2002 E. Timor
    became an independent state.

53
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • Why Cooperate?
  • The authors engage in some discussion of formal
    negotiations vs. tacit cooperation vs. imposed
    cooperation, etc. You are to read but I shall
    not discuss. The main point is this states
    choose to cooperate when it is in their best
    interest to do so.
  • G. Persuasion --------- War Power Continuum -------------------
    ------------ Increasing Costs Note as well
    discuss later, International Law and IOs can be
    seen as entities used by states to mitigate the
    more anarchic characteristics of the
    international system.

54
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • Why Cooperate?
  • A. Absolute vs. relative gains benefits vs.
    costs (supra). Absolute gains (largest possible
    gain for a state irrespective of gains for
    others relative gains (gains relative to others
    involved.) Number of states. The larger the
    number of states involved, typically increases
    bargaining-consensus thus possibly increasing
    costs in terms of gains. Further, typically
    increases free-rider problem On the other
    hand, certain states are more likely to view
    agreements as legitimate to the extent they
    have participated thus larger number could
    advantage cooperation.
  • Presence of hegemonic state. Authors point out
    that to Realists, hegemonic state is seen and a
    necessary (though not sufficient) condition.
    Neoliberals, by contrast, look toward
    strengthening of international institutions,
    norms, regimes. They dont discuss hegemonic
    stability theory which posits that a hegemonic
    power tends to incur, usually willingly,
    inordinate costs for peacelack of
    instabilityresulting in the very free riding
    they note. Also, while the case study implies
    hegemonic influenceUS and Chinasthere are
    relatively few hegemonic powers around.

55
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • Why Cooperate?
  • Increases in scientific and technical knowledge.
    Arguable. However, some Neoliberals tend to
    think said knowledge increases the chance of
    cooperation. Well discuss under integration
    theory.
  • Feminist theory. This section includes with a
    discuss of Feminist theory, eschewing the view of
    cooperation in purely strategic terms rather, a
    stress on empathetic cooperation, etc.

56
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • International Law. The authors begin with the
    shop-worn critiques of international law as a
    means of cooperation. Namely, Neorealists remind
    us that there is nothing above the nation
    stateno supranational entity that can arbitrate
    disputes. Thus, international law is found
    wanting by its critics when compared to say
    domestic law. That being said, the authors argue
    that in the post-CW era, international law is
    seen by many as increasingly efficacious. For
    reasons of costs alone, states increasingly
    frequently find it in their self interest to
    voluntarily forfeit a limited portion of their
    sovereignty to be bound be international law as
    it is a cost-effective way to ensure their self
    interests. The authors pose five
    issues/questions around which they see the
    potential for international consensus, hence,
    increasing the efficacy of international law.

57
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • Origins-Sources. Generally, what we think of as
    international law comes from the European
    Enlightenment and Liberal traditions.
    International conventions-treatise (e.g., various
    Geneva conventions) Customary law. Perhaps
    early laws of the sea General normative
    principles I would add subsidiary sources such
    as legal rulings, scholarship in jurisprudence.
    Etc.

58
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • Is intl law global in nature? Is International
    Law Global in Nature?
  • Feminist Challenge. This perspective disputes
    the sources of international law as gender
    biased. Citing examples, the authors discuss
    traditional religiousreproductive
    rightsconstraints and similar cultural
    restraints.
  • The Challenge of Developing Nations. The authors
    rightly note that the origins of international
    law were during the European Enlightenment and
    Liberal periods. During said periods, Europeans
    and others thought nothing of using international
    law to exploit their colonial holdings. As such,
    international law cannot necessarily be seen as
    global in nature. They cite colonialism
    specifically and unequal treatment under
    colonialism. Chinas Century of Humiliation,
    which we will discuss in the final section of the
    text, was exacted under the guise of
    international law. They make a good point.
    Consider, they say, a future global convention
    held to establish universal norms for future
    wars.

59
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • . . . Global in nature?
  • Just War Theory. The traditional Western-centric
    concept of war established by Catholic
    theologians, subsequently others, to justify what
    then was the states (churchs) actions.
  • defensive
  • other possibilities have been exhausted
  • proportionality or commensurate action
  • non combatants

60
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • . . . Global in nature?
  • Jihad. Obviously, a clearly distinct and
    contrasting view of what constitutes a just war.

  • When and why is International Law Obeyed? Weve
    already discussed in terms of self interest
    and/or cost effectiveness. Another reason is
    reciprocity (comity). Essentially, states will
    agree to something (form consensus with other
    states) with which they do not necessarily agree
    in order to exact similar behavior from others at
    some future time where the matter of greater
    interest to them.
  • The Relevance of International Law and War. The
    face of war is changing in the post-CW era and
    has been ever since technology was introduced
    its simply changing more rapidly now. Modernity
    also is correlated with increased rules and norms
    (intl laws). To illustrate they consider the
    Persian Gulf War (1991). The reasons is that it
    is generally considered a war that was fought
    humanely. Yet it illustrates issues associated
    with the changing face of war. US military
    doctrine of massive application of force,
    surprise and maneuverability.

61
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • International Organizations.
  • Historical Development. International
    Organizations (IOs) similar to international law
    in origins and purposes. They arise from the
    European Enlightenment and Liberal periods. They
    are intended to augment the anarchic tendencies
    of the international system. The authors
    discuss the historical development of IOs. They
    do not distinguish between IGOs and NGOs. For
    our purposes theres an important distinction.
    Namely, IGOs membership is comprised of nation
    statesinternational-governmental organizations.
    NGOs membership comprised of non-state actors,
    grass roots organizations, political action
    groupsnon-governmental organizations. There are
    far more of the latter and they tend to be
    narrowly focused doctors without borders,
    Catholic Relief, Green Peace, etc.

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Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • International Organizations. Continued.
  • The authors somewhat dubiously associate
    Neoliberals with both international laws and IOs.
    More accurately, the Neoliberal tradition
    arises out of the same milieu, namely, European
    Enlightenment and Liberalism. Neorealist
    certainly acknowledge international law and IOs
    but simply put less faith in their efficacy in
    terms of peace and stability. Citing I. Claudes
    work, they date IOs development beginning with
    the Concert of Europe 19th Century occasion on
    which the great powers came together to agree on
    common operating procedures (security regime or
    international laws) to establish the future
    political landscape of Europe. Could as
    easily be dated it with the Treaty of Westphalia,
    a similar arrangement at the conclusion of the
    Thirty Years War (c. 1658). Following the
    Concert of Europe came the Hague Conferences
    (1899 and 1907) to promote peaceful dispute
    resolution. The third effort at building
    institutional constraints against instability
    (read war) resulted in public international
    unions (International Telegraphic Union, 1865 and
    Universal Postal Union, 1874.

63
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • International Organizations. Continued.
  • Note well revisit under integration theory.
    The most significant effort was the League of
    Nations following WW I. It was establishedor
    nearly soto prevent the sort of systematic
    failure that led to the war. The goal was to
    legitimize the extant distribution of
    powerspheres of influence that others would not
    violate or disturb. It was also doomed to
    failure, say our authors, because it couldnt get
    broad membership (legitimacy, sufficient
    consensus). The US never joined the Russians
    joined late Japan refused to join partly as
    result of an article establishing equality of
    races failed to pass. Second, say our authors,
    the collective-security mechanism doomed it.
    Though included in its charterthe
    Covenantstates scarcely responded to challenges
    Italys invasion of Ethiopia Japans invasion
    of Manchuria.

64
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • International Organizations. Continued.
  • The Evolving United Nations. Unlike the League,
    the UN did get broad membership. If I recall
    correctly, the original UN consisted of
    fifty-plus states. The US and Russia (the
    Soviets) both joined. And why not? They were
    among the victorsincluding the U.K., France, and
    Chinaat the conclusion of WW II and thereby had
    disproportionate influence in establishing how it
    would work. More on this when we discuss the
    Security Council. Operationally, the UN was
    established with six permanent entities from
    which others have grown over time.

65
Part II Building Block for Analysis
66
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Chapter VII International Cooperation
  • International Organizations. Continued.
  • The Evolving United Nations. Continued.
  • General Assembly
  • Security Council
  • Economic Social Council (ECOSOC)
  • Secretariat
  • Intl Court of Justice (ICJ) or World Court
  • Trusteeship Council

67
Part II Building Block for Analysis
  • Integration Theory
  • Introduction
  • Federalism
  • Functionalism
  • Neo-functionalism
  • Collective Security
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