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Wildlife and Fisheries: A Commons to Trust

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Wildlife and Fisheries: A Commons to Trust Ross Saxton The Lack of a Commons Management Agency (CMA) Anyone with the initial necessary capital can harvest. – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Wildlife and Fisheries: A Commons to Trust


1
Wildlife and Fisheries A Commons to Trust
  • Ross Saxton

2
The Lack of a Commons Management Agency (CMA)
  • Anyone with the initial necessary capital can
    harvest.
  • Example Distant water fleets (DWFs) fishing off
    the coast of Namibia has decreased their domestic
    economic rent (resource rent) by about 50 from
    1970-1990.
  • Slave-like conditions for workers (The Namibia
    Food and Allied Workers Union)

3
If a CMA existed
  • Namibias economic rent would be increased
    short-term and long-term.
  • -regulated catch amounts, especially for
    DWFs
  • -new incentives available for sustainable
    harvesting
  • -Namibian Permanent Fund?
  • Slave-like conditions would disappear less
    fierce competition for fish and more equality for
    all.

4
Those dang commercial fishersTaxing commercial
fishers does not work
  • Transfers all economic rent (resource rent) to
    the government, so harvesters will use political
    power to prevent the tax from being implemented.
  • Computing the optimal tax is extremely difficult
    due to the complexity of the demand for wildlife
    and biological processes.
  • Taxing harvesting effort can be difficult because
    fishers have an incentive to substitute types of
    effort that are taxed for types that are not
    taxed.

5
Tradable quotas
  • Governments and communities will sometimes freely
    distribute permits and licenses to pollute or
    gather a resource (e.g oil).
  • ?selling them for any fee will produce
    economic rent
  • Every state does sells licenses and permits to
    hunt or fish...sometimes auction off limited
    licenses for the most scarce wildlife.

6
Botswana
  • Hunting permit fees
  • The more scarce the species, the more the permit
    costs.
  • -Elephant, lion 5,000
  • -Leopard 2,500
  • -Cape Buffalo 1,200

7
Botswana
  • Additional fees collected from recreational
    hunters go to local communities
  • -Elephant 20,000
  • -Lion 30,000
  • -Leopard 4,000
  • -Buffalo 3,300
  • (per animal)

8
Direct Use Value
  • Historically, poorer people generally have had a
    higher direct use value for wildlife than the
    wealthy.
  • Recently, the direct use value of wildlife has
    decreased for the poor. Wildlife valued less.
  • ?Lower class living in more urban areas and the
    dependence on wildlife for food is diminishing.

9
-Economic Incentives and Wildlife Conservation.
Bulte, E. H., Kootan, G. Cornelis van, and
Swanson, T.-Simulation of ecological and
economic impacts of distant water fleets on
Namibian fisheries. Sumaila, U. R. and
Vasconcellos, M.http//www.safarihuntingafrica.c
om
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