Securing Americas Future Strategy for National Security2007 and Beyond

1
CHINA THE US IN SPACE MOVING BEYOND SCORPIONS
IN A BOTTLE
Joan Johnson-Freese Naval War College Johnsonj_at_nwc
.navy.mil 10 June 2004

2
PENTAGONS FY04 REPORT MILITARY POWER OF THE PRC

• Its all about Taiwan in the near-mid term
• resist, counter, delay, or raise the costs of
  effective US military intervention
• US-China
• GWOT has presented opportunities for cooperation,
  but Beijing still uncertain of US long-term
  intentions
• PRC budget figures
• In all areas, Beijing is seeking (diversified)
  increased interaction with countries

3
SHENZHOU 5

• October 15, 2003
• Lt. Col (now Colonel) Yang LiWei
• 38 years old
• Fighter pilot
• 21 hours, 14 orbits

4
(No Transcript)
5
DILEMMA OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY
6
TECHNOLOGY GAP/MILITARY

• U.S. Space Dominance
• Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq
• 1998 Turning Point Blue Team
• 1999 Cox Commission
• 2001 U.S. Space Commission Report
• Inevitability that space will become a
  battlegroundso the U.S. would be remiss not to
  prepare
• 2001 First US Space War Game
• Chinese view that they would be remiss not to
  prepare for the inevitability of U.S. development
  of space weapons
• For countries that can never win a war with the
  US by using the method of tanks and planes,
  attacking a US space system may be an
  irresistible and most tempting choice. 2001,
  Xinhua Hong Kong Service

ACTION-REACTION
7
CHINAS SIZE AND COMPLEXITY PROVIDE EVIDENCE FOR
WHATEVER THESIS YOU SEEK TO PROVE
8
MAY 2003
9
CAPE CANAVERAL, Florida (Reuters) -- The Chinese,
who launched their first astronaut into space
last year, are "shocked" the United States has
not welcomed them into the tight-knit community
of space-faring nations, a leading U.S. expert
said on Tuesday. Joan Johnson-Freese, who chairs
the National Security Decision Making Department
at the U.S. Naval War College, said one space
official she met on a recent trip to China was in
tears as he pleaded for U.S. recognition and
cooperation.
10
LACK OF CHINESE TRANSPARENCY

• Silence makes speculation a primary source of
  information in the U.S. and silence is often
  equated with hiding something or nefarious
  intent.
• Domestic politics Hu Jintao Jiang Zemin
• Cultural appearance of deliberate concealment
• Internal Debate v Information Management

DOD Best estimates. .Aversion to transparency
FEEDS THE ACTION-REACTION POSTURE THAT HAS
PREVAILED
11
OFFICIAL CHINESE SPACE STRATEGY

• November 2000 White Paper by State Council
• The Chinese government attaches great importance
  to the significant role of space activities in
  implementing the strategy of revitalizing the
  country with science and education and that of
  sustainable development, as well as in economic
  construction, national security, science
  technology development and social progress. The
  development of space activities is encouraged and
  supported by the government as an integral part
  of of the states comprehensive development
  strategy.

12
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER (CNP)

• Three essential conditions for China to survive
  develop
• National unity
• Stability
• Sovereignty
• Continued growth is imperative for stability
• Agriculture
• Industry
• Science Technology
• SPACE SCIENCE TECH INDUSTRIALIZATION

13
APOLLO ANALOGY

• Goals of the Apollo Program
• Beat the Russians/Cold War Battle for Intl
  Prestige Post-Spuntik domestic credibility
• Technology Gap
• Economics
• Jobs (political and economic benefits)
• Military

14
IMPLEMENTATION

• Economics limited will focus on high-pay-off
  areas
• Can match or by-pass others (e.g. robotics,
  manned space)
• High return on economic development
• Satellites
• Domestic linkage with West
• Communications important to attract foreign
  investment
• Environmental/Disaster monitoring management
• Military satellites

15
SATELLITES

• Mao 1/China 1 April 24, 1970, The East is Red
• Over 50 satellites with gt 90 success rate
• Multiple launch capability since 1981
• Military
• Communications January 2000
• Fanshui Shi Weixing (FSW) recoverable
  photo-reconnaissance
• Remote Sensing Ziyuan (ZY), resource
• CBERS-1 or ZY- China-Brazil
• ZY-2 (2002/3) High-resolution electro-optical
  imaging satellites (resolution about 3 meters)
• Jianbing-3 Pathfinder
• Radar remote sensing satellite development

16
SATELLITES

• Weather Fengyun (FY)/ Wind and Cloud gt6 for
  Olympics
• Communications Dongfanghong (DFH)/ East is
  Red
• Moving to C, Ku, KA, And L band transponders
• Oceanography Haiyang (HY) Ocean
• Microgravity Shijian (SJ) Practice
• Science/Astronomy
• Double Star 2003 with ESA effects of the Sun
  on the Earths environment (5 ESA sensors)
• Navigation Beidou Twin Star
• 4 total/2 launched in 2000/3rd in 2003
• EU Galileo program

17
CHINESE SPACE PLANS

• Official Evolutionary (Ambitious, Fast-Track,
  Aggressive, Cautious)
• Second Manned Launch Likely October 2004
• 2 Taikonauts
• Small Space Station
• Unmanned Lunar Exploration (Change)
• Unconfirmed
• Manned Lunar Program (US presscancelled)
• Lunar Base
• Mars ProbeMars Program

18
SPACE STATION
Approx. 20 tons 4 to 5 m in diameter
19
PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

• General Cao Gangchuan Was head of the General
  Armaments Department of the PLA, member of the
  Central Military Commission (CMC) Director of
  the Manned Spacecraft Program Now the Chinese
  Defense Minister
• General Li Jinai Chief Commander of Chinas
  Space Program

Political hence economic commitment/Tightly
controlled
20
ORGANIZATION

• Civilian military programs often intertwined
  (Mystery Within a Maze)
• China Aerospace Technology Corporation (CASC)
  Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA)
  same group
• CASC Employs over 150,000 people 130
  subordinate organizations
• Recognition that commercial/civil aspects must be
  separated, for political image reasons

21
REORGANIZATION

• Aerospace From pure, central-economy run program
  to internationally competitive enterprise
• Balance
• Jobs (young)
• Efficiency
• Competition/Cooperation
• Politics
• Military Control/Civilian Control as
  International Requisite

22
PROJECT 921 MANNED PROGRAM

• Second (third) attempt
• Money determines timetable
• as much as technology
• Four precursor unmanned
• launches fully tested technology
• prior to Shenzhou V
• October 2004 likely next launch
• 2 taikonauts, will leave command
• module
• 14 Taikonauts (2 trainers)
• (Yuhangyuans in Chinese)
• Women to be recruited in 2005

23
TAIKONAUT/Yuhangyuan
24
YANG LIWEI
25
LEARNING FROM OTHERSOR NOT REINVENTING THE WHEEL
X
X
Xichang Launch Site 28 degrees N latitude
KSC 28.5 degrees N latitude
26
SOYUZ/SHENZHOU

• Soyuz A

Shenzhou
27
(No Transcript)
28
SATELLITES
DONG FANG HUNG (DFH) - 1
TELSTAR 1
29
CHINAS VIEW

• Russias experience in space technology
  development was and is of momentous significance
  to China. Xinhua News Agency, 2002
• A post-launch article points out that China is
  considered with Brazil and India, into the
  marginal countries in science which ranks at
  the fourth layer among the core countries in
  science, powerful countries in science and
  under-developed in science.(Peoples Daily
  Online, 23 October 2003) Obviously that is not
  where they want to be, and they are relying
  heavily on space to push them up the science
  learning curve, as it has done for other
  countries.

30
CHINESE LAUNCHERS

• Long March (Dong Feng 3 5) 1-4
• Long March 5
• For their more ambitious plans, China needs a new
  launch vehicle
• RESTRICTING FACTOR
• Debut expected 2008
• 3 stage
• 20 ton lift
• Ariane-V/Proton M equivalent

LM/CZ 2F
31
LAUNCH SITES

• Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center
• Gobi Desert in Gansu Province, NW China,
  launches all recoverable satellites
• Xichang Satellite Launch Center
• Sichuan Province. GEO satellites (only center
  which can accommodate cryogenic upper stage)
• Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.
• Shanxi Province. Polar orbits.
• Hainan Island?

32
REGIONAL COOPERATION

• 1992, China, Pakistan Thailand Asia-Pacific
  Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology
  Applications (AP-MCSTA)
• Actively promote multilateral regional
  cooperation establish a regional space
  cooperation initiative.
• January 2003 Asia-Pacific Multilateral
  Cooperation in Space (APSCO)

• MOU for Cooperation on Small Multi-Mission
  Satellites (SMMS) Other Project in 1998/99
• Bangladesh, China, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, ROK
  Thailand
• With UN ECOSOC for Asia Pacific, UN/OOSA, 2
  short term training course on space technology
  remote sensing applications.

33
COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS

• Remote Sensing
• CBERS-1 or ZY- China-Brazil
• ZY-2 (2002/3) High-resolution electro-optical
  imaging satellites (resolution about 3 meters)
• Jianbing-3 Pathfinder
• Science/Astronomy
• Double Star 2003 with ESA effects of the Sun
  on the Earths environment (5 ESA sensors)
• Navigation satellites
• EU Galileo
• DOD Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, the UK, France,
  Germany and Italy

34
COOPERATION AMBITIONS

• Joining the international family of space-faring
  nations
• ISS
• Shenzhou uses a Russian APAS-89 design docking
  mechanism currently used on Shuttle ISS
• Suggested that positioning of Chinese tracking
  station(s) suggests no near term interest in ISS
• Many countries will be willing and anxious to
  work with China will that include the United
  States?

35
MANNED TO MILITARY

• Tracking
• TTC 8 domestic tracking sites, one in
  Kiribati, 1 in Namibia, 4 Yuanwang class
  tracking ships
• S-band expansion/improvements (tracking GEO sats)
• On-orbit maneuvering
• Mission management
• Launch-on-demand
• Miniaturization (less weight)
• Computational analysis

36
MANNED TO MILITARY

• China is especially interested in acquiring
  modern intelligence, surveillance and
  reconnaissance (ISR) systems (Pentagon study)
• Dual-use technology
• Shenzhou orbital modules carrying ELINT and
  SIGINT equipment

37
DODS LIST OF 2003 MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS
CHINAS 2003 LAUNCHES

• Beidou (CZ-3A)
• navigation
• Shenzhou V (CZ-2F)
• manned
• CBERS-2 (CZ-4B)
• Imagery
• COM Smallsat
• FSW-18 (CZ-2D)
• imagery
• Zhongxing-20 (CZ-3A)
• FH-1 military comsat
• Doublestar 1 (CZ-2C)
• Scientific sat (w/ESA)

• First manned mission
• New type military GEO COMSAT
• New type film-based imagery satellite
• Prototype LEO COMSAT
• Efforts to .tracking defeating space systems
  of potential opponents

38
WEAPONIZATION

• Militarization
• Weapons
• With Russia, calls for treaty banning weapons
  from space
• ASAT Technology (Fielding?)
• Clearly developing military space technology
• Generally, same feelings as U.S. in terms of
  would be remiss not to prepare for what it sees
  as inevitable U.S. development of space weapons
• National Missile Defense better suited as ASAT?
• US interest in systems like Rods From God
• Physics
• What for? Against Whom?

39
THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

• Beijings increasing ability to use dual-use
  assets as force-enhancers
• Navigation, Communications, ISR, etc
• Beijings acquisition of technology with
  potential dual use as ASATs
• Smallsats
• The Perception that China is beating the U.S.
  in a space race
• Military
• Manned

40
SATELLITE CATEGORIES
SMALL SATS
41
SMALLSATS BENEFITS ISSUES

• Cheaper
• Cubesats 10 cm each side, 1 kg (Cal Poly)
  10,000
• Faster to build
• Lower launch costs

• Can smallsats avoid detection? (space mines)
• What limitations on capabilities does size
  dictate?

42
SMALLSATS

• Tsinghua-1 (Tsinghua University and Surrey Space
  Centre, UK
• June 28, 2000 launch
• 50-kg (Microsat)
• Under Know-How Transfer and Training Program
  between China U.K.
• SNAP- 1 Nanosatellite on same launch

Tsinghua-1 image taken by SNAP-1, 30 feet
apart http//www.surrey.ac.uk/news/releases/10-010
0sstl.html
43
SMALLSATS

• April 18, 2004 China launched 2 new research
  satellites
• Indigenously Developed
• Small sat (204 kilogram) Experimental Satellite 1
  (stereo mapping)
• Nano-satellite 1 (25 kilograms)
• Fourth country to be able to do so U.S., Britain
  Russia

USAF XSS-10 experiment 1/03 XSS 11 10/04
maneuverability ASAT on demand
44
FUTURE SPACE RACE?
45
IS CHINA HURTING THE US, OR IS THE US HURTING THE
US?

• Stature/Health of US aerospace industry
• Export control laws
• Perception that China is more committed to
  manned space than the US
• China is committed, much like the US was during
  Apollo
• US commitment still unclear
• China refuses to cede to unbreachable US
  technology gap
• Other nations moving away from dependence (EU,
  Japan)

46
CHINA AS NUMBER 2 (AND TRYING HARDER)

• Offers other countries options to working with
  the U.S.
• Combined with capabilities with other countries
• Partnerships versus participants
• Spring 2004, US beginning to consider foreign
  participation in new US space vision
• Japanese KIBO module
• U.S. commitment to follow through

47
RACING WITH THE US?

• Technology achievements versus scientific leaps.
• Seeking parity with US? NO
• Not letting gap get wider
• U.S.-China action-reaction YES
• Both countries see space as so vital to their
  futures, that actions by one seen as zero-sum to
  the other

48
CHINAS SPACE PROGRAM

• Chinas determination to regain what it considers
  as its deserved place in global, and by default,
  regional politics
• Win-Win investment as long as there are no
  catastrophic failures
• Minimize the Technology Gap with US

49
U.S. CHINA SPACE RELATIONS

• The benefits of space-related activity, civil
  and/or military, makes interaction between the
  U.S.-China on space issues inevitable. The only
  question is whether it will be preponderantly
  cooperative or competitive.
• For the United States, it is important to
  remember that in order to leadmust have
  followers.