Truman, David B., (1951) The Governmental Process: Political interests and Public Opinion. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14 The Web of Relationship in the Administrative Process

1
Truman, David B., (1951) The Governmental
Process Political interests and Public Opinion.
New York Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14 The Web of
Relationship in the Administrative Process

• Diffusion of leadership and a multitude of points
  of access (437)
• The legislature and executive share these
  characteristics as interdependent
• One reflects and reinforces the patterns in the
  other
• Accepting too literally the formal separation of
  legislative from the executive is a disadvantage
  to understanding the political process
• Refers to patterns of control that are
  dominantthe group of relationships that have
  the ability to influence change (438)

2
Truman, David B., (1951) The Governmental
Process Political interests and Public Opinion.
New York Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14 The Web of
Relationship in the Administrative Process

• The Character of the Legislative Mandate (439)
• The degree of controversy and the character of
  the oppositionsignificantly defined the nature
  of the mandate received by the administrator
• Demagogic leadership-direct relationship with
  members of an interest group (441)
• The interest group is loosely formed of other
  interests and the leaders serves as the
  galvanizing force to implement the policy change
• The Influence of the Office (executive branch)
• The dominant organized groups and many other
  factors impact the ability of the administrators
  in arriving at stable patterns of interaction
• The administrative official is constantly
  attempting to move from controversy to acceptance
  OR to maintain the routine

3
Truman, David B., (1951) The Governmental
Process Political interests and Public Opinion.
New York Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14 The Web of
Relationship in the Administrative Process

• Recruitment and the Administrators Group
  Membership (450)
• The notion of the administrator as a neutralized
  public servant without conflicting motivations is
  an illusion
• Identification with the Administrative Unit (453)
• The claims, goals and identity of the unit
  becomes those of the person
• Formal Devices for Group Adjustment (457)
• Advisory committees, administration by interest
  groups, propaganda by administrative agencies
• The Inflexibility of the Established Web (467)
• An administrative agency that survives the change
  of fortunes (vicissitudes) of the political
  process develops a set of relationships
  (internal, external-branch, legislative, interest
  groups) that are in a fairly stable equilibrium

4
Crozier, Michel (1964), The French Bureaucratic
System of Organization in The Bureaucratic
Phenomenon. Chicago University of Chicago
Press, page 213-236

• Model of a bureaucratic vicious circlefour basic
  elements (213).
• Impersonality of the rules-1
• Centralization of decisions-2
• Strata isolation-3
• Development of parallel power relationships-4
• French Society has many parallelsto the extent
  exclusively French then are their other models
  that are culturally specific
• At least there is need for a new and broader
  perspective
• In order to judge the relevance and usefulness
  limits of one model

5
Crozier, Michel (1964), The French Bureaucratic
System of Organization in The Bureaucratic
Phenomenon. Chicago University of Chicago
Press, page 213-236

• Cultural dimension-Explanation in terms of
  dysfunction to an explanation in terms of latent
  function (213)
• These terms include interactions (formal but more
  informal) and values PLUS
• Cultural differences and time period differences
• Latentneed to reduce tensions due to decline of
  friendly and informal interactions
• Also due different and opposing values of groups

6
Crozier, Michel (1964), The French Bureaucratic
System of Organization in The Bureaucratic
Phenomenon. Chicago University of Chicago
Press, page 213-236

• Describes approach as rational and empirical used
  to explore the cultural dimension question (213,
  214).
• Examine interpersonal and intergroup
  relationships
• Where cultural determinants appear to be the
  easiest to discover
• Discuss authority relationships and the general
  fear of face-to-face relationships
• Present a first general hypothesis of French
  features of model
• The problem of change understood in cultural
  terms
• The paradox The weakness of the omnipotent power
  at the top of bureaucratic pyramid
• Develop other comparable models for different
  dysfunctions and rigidities that develop in
  different cultural environments
• Russian system (228), American system (232),
• The American system emphasizes functional
  specialization and due process
• where Russia relies on hierarch, suspicion, and
  control (232)
• American dysfunctions are totally different in
  nature than Russian or French systems

7
Heidenheimer et al (1989), Political Corruption
A Handbook. Transaction New Brunswick. Chapter
6, 73-86

• Corruption as a historical phenomenon
• Corruption as a dysfunction
• Historically, corruption has not been regarded as
  a problem
• Seen only as a series of accidental acts of
  dishonesty on part of civil servants
• Two extreme ideal types where corruption doesnt
  exist
• Monarchy (absolute one-person rule)
• Popular sovereignty (popular will reflected in
  national policy democracy?)
• Intermediary bodies, gradations between the two
  ideal types, nurture corruption

8
Heidenheimer et al (1989), Political Corruption
A Handbook. Transaction New Brunswick. Chapter
6, 73-86

• Monarchy (absolute one-person rule)
• Inca state impossible for civil servants to
  divert more revenues than already allocated to
  them by the monarch
• The more developed the monarchy, the greater its
  corruption-checking tendency
• Popular sovereignty
• Civil servants are only executive instruments of
  the peoples will people will not allow their
  own exploitation
• Corruption stems from people being subjected to
  the control of officials

9
Heidenheimer et al (1989), Political Corruption
A Handbook. Transaction New Brunswick. Chapter
6, 73-86

• Intermediary groups
• Created by the monarch public officials
• Autonomous, traditional landlords, oligarchs and
  urban patricians
• Van Klaveren debunks the myth that these
  urbanites were champions of democracy
• They have rights of their own
• Monarch may adjust to let them claim what they
  regard as their due portion of the national
  income
• Struggle around distribution of national income
  within this conflict triangle

10
Heidenheimer et al (1989), Political Corruption
A Handbook. Transaction New Brunswick. Chapter
6, 73-86

• Corruption embedded within these intermediary
  groups perhaps because of cultural reasons
• Underlying organizational structure
• Oligarchs - collegial civil servants -
  hierarchical
• Entitlement mentality of the middle groups
• Entitled to a certain lifestyle and corresponding
  income
• Shocklike effect of external conditions
• Spread of French fashion and oriental luxury
  goods
• Perceived need to build a fortune for posterity
• High salaries of civil servants did not deter
  corruption

11
Solomon (1992), Other Voices, Other Vistas.
Mentor New York. The Wog by Khushwant Singh,
292-310

• Story about a Westernized Oriental Gentleman or a
  WOG (brown sahib)
• Perhaps provides a counter backdrop to the
  English / French models
• Contrast
• Impersonal, detached and rule-based bureaucratic
  culture imposed by the colonial masters
• Natives followed a more open, personalized and
  physically interactive tradition

12
Solomon (1992), Other Voices, Other Vistas.
Mentor New York. The Wog by Khushwant Singh,
292-310

• Consequences
• Creation of a local elite that has contempt for
  its own native, traditional model
• Buffer between the ruler and the masses
• Creates a conflict on the psycho-social level by
  blurring the line between the public and the
  private life of the civil servant
• Works while the colonials still have power but
  disintegrates in post-colonial transition
• Theme building on an existing model vs. imposing
  a new model

13
A Synthesis Historical Models, Contemporary
Models, Socio-Economic Change

• Politics Administration clearly connected
• Dominant political influence staffing beau racy
  with staff similar ideology, concepts, values
• Government related to society with preference to
  supporters
• Authority based models of bureaucracy
• Legal rational system
• Position has authority impersonal relationships
• Traditional system
• Person has authority kinship relationships
• Charismatic system
• Leader and follower relationships
• Usually we see hybrid structures

14
A Synthesis Historical Models, Contemporary
Models, Socio-Economic Change

• BureaucraticFrench Model
• Impersonality of the rules, strata isolation
• Isolation of the individual
• Struggles for privileges
• Latentneed to reduce tensions due to decline of
  friendly and informal interactions
• And different/opposing values of groups
• Avoidance of face-to-face relationships
• Avoiding authority relationship encounters
• Difficulty facing conflict
• Do not take a political system or a regime at its
  face value
• Methods of influence formal/informal different
  points in history different cultural settings

15
A Synthesis Historical Models, Contemporary
Models, Socio-Economic Change

• Corruption
• Historically not seen as a systemic problem
• Facilitated by intermediary groups between the
  governor and the governed
• Socio-cultural dimension
• Lifestyle entitlement mentality of the middle
  groups
• Not viewed as a dysfunction per se but as
  isolated incidental phenomenon

16
A Synthesis Historical Models, Contemporary
Models, Socio-Economic Change

• United States
• Diffusion of leadership and a multitude of points
  of access (Truman)
• Converting the controversial into routinemoving
  from controversy to acceptance
• Government reflects the claims of interest
  groups-organized and unorganized
• Administrators decision makingnot consciously
  thinking of guarding the constitutional
  understandings of people
• The notion of the administrator as neutralized
  public servant--an illusion

17
A Synthesis Historical Models, Contemporary
Models, Socio-Economic Change

• Japan more to it than meets the eye
• Traditional reasons cite cultural, structural,
  institutional and incidental bases for the
  Japanese miracle
• Orientation of state regulatory vs.
  developmental
• Plan rational, developmental Japan emphasis on
  substantive issues (ends rather than means)
• Market rational, regulatory USA emphasis on
  market-environment issues (means rather than
  ends)
• Trade-offs not two ideal types but a continuum

18
A Synthesis Historical Models, Contemporary
Models, Socio-Economic Change

• Contemporary Models
• New Public Management and reformers
• Neutral unbiased models
• Seemingly in conflict with competitive
  preferences
• Must involve a pragmatism to reconcile
• Focus on process alterationssuch as
  privatization
• Principles driven from experience rather than
  theory
• Methodological pluralism

19
A Synthesis Historical Models, Contemporary
Models, Socio-Economic Change

• Socio-Economic Change
• Structural changes are slow and the effects far
  reaching
• Bureaucratic staff embedded with values and ideas
  regardless to changes in formal relationships
• Growing economies and societies accompanied by
  growing bureaucratic capacity
• Request for more and different types of services
• New and bigger departments
• More staff

20
A Synthesis Historical Models, Contemporary
Models, Socio-Economic Change

• Bigger budgets
• Bureaucracies a force to be reckoned with by
  political officials giving oversight
• And those looking to the bureaucracy to implement
  policy
• Public backlash to govt and bureaucracy
• Thinning of infrastructure, reduced capacity
• Competitiveness of market-type mechanisms
• Performance, results focus
• Challenges of transition
• Too slow for contemporary society
• Too fast for necessary careful consideration of
  long-term impacts

21
Literary Map
Historical Perspective of PA
Authority-based Models of bureaucracy (Jreisat,
Peters, Picard, Heady)
Socio-Cultural Political Context (Crozier,
Picard, Singh)
Dysfunctions (Crozier)
Reform move away from legal-rational model /
emphasis on ends rather than means (Barzelay,
Truman)
Role of state regulatory vs. developmental /
MITI (Johnson)
Corruption (Warren, Klitgaard, Van Klaveren,
Scott)
22
References

• Solomon, Barbara (1992). Other Voices, Other
  Vistas. Mentor New York
• Crozier, Michel (1964). The Bureaucratic
  Phenomenon. University of Chicago Chicago
• Truman, David B. (1951). The Governmental
  Process Political Interests and Public Opinion.
  Alfred A. Knopf New York
• Heidenheimer, et. Al. (1989). Political
  Corruption A Handbook. Transaction New
  Brunswick
• Johnson, Chalmers (1983). MITI and the Japanese
  Miracle. The Free Press New York
• Jreisat, Jamil E. (2002). Comparative Public
  Administration and Policy. Westview Boulder
• Picard, Louis A (2005). The State of the State
  Institutional Transformation, Capacity and
  Political Change in South Africa. Johannesburg
  Wits University Press
• Heady, Ferrel (2001). Public Administration A
  Comparative Perspective, 6th Edition. New York
  Marcel Dekker
• Peters, B. Guy (1989). The Politics of
  Bureaucracy. New York London.
• Baker, Randall, ed. (1994) Comparative Public
  Management Putting U.S. Public Policy and
  Implementation in Context. Westport Praeger