On the Alleged Transparency of Conscious Experience

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On the Alleged Transparency of Conscious
Experience

• Pete Mandik
• Assistant Professor of Philosophy
• Coordinator, Cognitive Science Laboratory
• William Paterson University, New Jersey USA

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Primary Goal

• Present a novel argument against the so-called
  transparency of conscious experience

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Secondary Goal

• Derive, from the failure of transparency,
  conclusions regarding the nature of conscious
  experience and its phenomenal character

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The Transparency Thesis

• If you have a conscious experience, all that you
  are conscious of are the objects and features of
  the objects that the experience is an experience
  of.

• Elaborations of Transparency
• Introspective access to experience simply looks
  through experience to the external world
• We are never introspectively aware of features of
  experiences themselves

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The Transparency Thesis

• If you have a conscious experience, all that you
  are conscious of are the objects and features of
  the objects that the experience is an experience
  of.

Entailments 1. If true, then first-order
representationalism is true and higher-order
representationalism is false 2. If false, then
first-order representationalism is false
(however, higher-order representationalism may be
either true or false)
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Spelling out entailment 1

• If consciousness experience is transparent, then
  first-order representationalism is true and
  higher-order representationalism is false
• First-order representationalism phenomenal
  character is one and the same as the content of
  (certain) first-order representations and a state
  may be conscious independently of being
  represented by any other state (i.e.,
  independently of being the target of higher-order
  representations).
• Higher-order representationalism phenomenal
  character is one and the same as the content of
  (certain) higher-order representations and a
  state is conscious only if it is represented by
  some other state

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Spelling out entailment 1

• If consciousness experience is transparent, then
  first-order representationalism is true and
  higher-order representationalism is false
• First-order representationalism phenomenal
  character is one and the same as the content of
  (certain) first-order representations and a state
  may be conscious independently of being
  represented by any other state (i.e.,
  independently of being the target of higher-order
  representations).
• The Transparency Thesis If you have a conscious
  experience, all that you are conscious of are
  features of the objects the experience is an
  experience of.

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Spelling out entailment 1

• If consciousness experience is transparent, then
  first-order representationalism is true and
  higher-order representationalism is false
• Higher-order representationalism phenomenal
  character is one and the same as the content of
  (certain) higher-order representations and a
  state is conscious only if it is represented by
  some other state
• The Transitivity Thesis If you have a conscious
  experience, you must be conscious of the
  experience
• The Transparency Thesis If you have a conscious
  experience, all that you are conscious of are
  features of the objects the experience is an
  experience of.

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Spelling out entailment 1

• If consciousness experience is transparent, then
  first-order representationalism is true and
  higher-order representationalism is false
• Higher-order representationalism phenomenal
  character is one and the same as the content of
  (certain) higher-order representations and a
  state is conscious only if it is represented by
  some other state
• The Transitivity Thesis If you have a conscious
  experience, you must be conscious of the
  experience
• ? Higher-order contents must include vehicular
  properties of their lower order targets
• If they didnt, then they would have the same
  contents as their targets and thus not be
  higher-order.
• HO content I am in a state with the content the
  grass is green
• FO content the grass is green

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Spelling out entailment 2

• If conscious experience is not transparent, then
  first-order representationalism is false
  (however, higher-order representationalism may be
  either true or false)
• If we can be conscious of features of the
  experiences themselves then phenomenal character
  is something other than the content of
  first-order representations
• ? Phenomenal character sometimes includes either
  vehicular properties of experiences or the
  contents of higher-order representations (note
  the non-equivalence of these disjuncts)
• (Higher-order representationalism is true only if
  phenomenal character always includes the contents
  of higher-order representations)

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Argument Against Transparency 1

• Attitude discrimination without content
  divergence

• My memory that I am at a movie on a Tuesday
• My intention that I am at a movie on a Tuesday
• My perception that I am at a movie on a Tuesday

If (first-order) content is all I have
introspective access to, then memory, intention,
and perception would be indistinguishable.
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Argument Against Transparency 1

• Objection Perhaps this only shows that memory
  and intention arent transparent, but perception
  still is
• Reply 1 If memory and intention arent
  transparent, this casts doubt on the transparency
  of perception

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Argument Against Transparency 1

• Objection Perhaps this only shows that memory
  and intention arent transparent, but perception
  still is

Reply 2 A natural reading of the opacity of
memory and intention is the mismatch between the
time of occurrence of the mental state and its
truth conditions, similarly what one has access
to in introspecting perception is the time of
occurrence of both percept and target ?time of
occurrence is vehicular
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Argument Against Transparency 2

• Introspecting brain states as such (Churchlandish
  Introspection)
• 1. Perception is the automatic conceptual
  exploitation of the natural information carried
  by sensations about things other than themselves
• 2. Sensations also carry natural information
  about themselves
• 3. The introspection of sensory experience is the
  automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural
  information sensations carry about themselves
• 4. Learning can increase both a persons number
  of concepts and the ability to apply them
  automatically
• 5. This is no less true of neuroscientific
  concepts
• . Brain states may be introspected as such
• . We can be conscious of (neurophysiological)
  vehicular properties of conscious experiences

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1. Perception is the automatic conceptual
exploitation of the natural information carried
by sensations about things other than themselves

• The natural information carried by our sensations
  determines what we can perceive
• Conceptual exploitation of natural information
  determines what we do perceive
• (compare a person who doesnt see a fly because
  of poor eyesight to a person with excellent
  eyesight who hasnt noticed the fly)
• The automatic conceptual exploitation of natural
  information determines what we do perceive
  without (conscious) inference
• The non-automatic conceptual exploitation of
  natural information determines what we
  consciously infer without perceiving it
• (compare special-effects experts and novices
  observing realistic special effects)

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2. Sensations also carry natural information
about themselves

• A sufficient condition for natural information
• If (X if and only if Y) then X carries natural
  info that Y.
• This is neutral with respect to whether or not XY

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3. The introspection of sensory experience is the
automatic conceptual exploitation of the natural
information sensations carry about themselves
Exteroceptive Thermometer
Introspective Thermometer (no weirder than
clocks!)
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4. Learning can increase both a persons number
of concepts and the ability to apply them
automatically
The western sky reddening as the Sun sets
The wavelength distribution of incoming solar
radiation shifting towards the longer wavelengths
(about 0.7 X 10-6m) as the shorter wavelengths
are increasingly scattered away from the
lengthening atmospheric path they must take as
terrestrial rotation turns us slowly away from
their source (no weirder than wine-tasting!)

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5. This is no less true of neuroscientific
concepts

• Suppose that I know that the visual perception of
  motion always involves the neural activity in
  area V5/MT, then with a little practice

Just as I can automatically apply the concept of
motion to the things I see
I can automatically apply the concept of
activity in area V5/MT to the experience of motion
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5. This is no less true of neuroscientific
concepts

• . Brain states may be introspected as such
• . We can be conscious of (neurophysiological)
  vehicular properties of conscious experiences

Thus, contra the transparency thesis,
introspecting our experiences only as
representing features of the external world is
optional
One may instead augment ones conceptual
repertoire with neuroscience and introspect
vehicular properties of experiences
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Objections/Replies

• Objection 1 Presupposes identity theory (as
  opposed to functionalism or anomalous monism)
• Reply The multiple realizability of mousetraps
  doesnt rule out the perception of a mousetrap
  realization, so the multiple realizability of
  experiences wouldnt rule out the introspection
  of one of their neural realizations

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Objections/Replies

• Objection 2 Presupposes physicalism (as
  opposed to Cartesian soul mechanics or a
  completed Chalmersian kinematics of qualia)
• Reply The essential features of the argument can
  be restated by replacing a neuroscientific theory
  with a dualistic theory (if there were such a
  thing) and vehicular properties of experience
  will still be introspectible.

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Spelling out entailment 2

• If conscious experience is not transparent, then
  first-order representationalism is false
  (however, higher-order representationalism may be
  either true or false)
• If we can be conscious of features of the
  experiences themselves then phenomenal character
  is something other than the content of
  first-order representations
• ? Phenomenal character sometimes includes either
  vehicular properties of experiences or the
  contents of higher-order representations
• (Higher-order representationalism is true only if
  phenomenal character always includes the contents
  of higher-order representations)

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Does phenomenal character ever include vehicular
properties of experiences?

• If so, then representationalism is false, since
  something other than representational content is
  included in phenomenal character.
• If so, this isnt shown by the argument for
  Churchlandish introspection (quite the contrary)
• Consider an analogy to the direct and accurate
  perception of external objects
• Even when an object is directly and accurately
  perceived, neither an unrepresented aspect of the
  object nor the object itself enters into the
  perception
• Thus, even when an experience is directly and
  accurately introspected, neither an unrepresented
  aspect of the experience nor the experience
  itself enters into the introspection
• (this would be true on even the strongest
  versions of externalism about content, since they
  are all about content)

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Phenomenal character never includes vehicular
properties of experiences.

• Representationalism Phenomenal character is
  always some first-order or higher-order
  representational content and a conscious state is
  always some first-order or higher-order
  representation
• ? Neutral with respect to higher-order
  representationalism
• (Higher-order representationalism ? HO-reps are
  always involved in conscious states and
  phenomenal character)

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CONCLUSIONS/SUMMARY

• Churchlandish introspection ? Failure of
  transparency
• Failure of transparency ? Failure of first-order
  representationalism
• Churchlandish introspection
• Representationalism still stands
• Representationalism is neutral with respect to
  higher-order representationalism

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• THE END