GENOCIDE PREVENTION: The Role of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Loading...

PPT – GENOCIDE PREVENTION: The Role of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur PowerPoint presentation | free to download - id: 3d3b49-MzA4Z



Loading


The Adobe Flash plugin is needed to view this content

Get the plugin now

View by Category
About This Presentation
Title:

GENOCIDE PREVENTION: The Role of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur

Description:

GENOCIDE PREVENTION: The Role of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur Studium Generale, Maastricht University, 21 September 2011 Fred Gr nfeld – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:61
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 61
Provided by: sgUnimaa
Learn more at: http://www.sg.unimaas.nl
Category:

less

Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: GENOCIDE PREVENTION: The Role of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur


1
GENOCIDE PREVENTION The Role of Bystanders in
Rwanda, Srebrenica and Darfur
  • Studium Generale, Maastricht University, 21
    September 2011
  • Fred Grünfeld

2
  • University of Maastricht, Faculty of Law,
    Department International Law, Maastricht Centre
    of Human Rights and University College
    Maastricht.
  • University of Utrecht, Faculty of Humanities,
    Centre for Conflict Studies, School of Human
    Rights Research.
  • Chair of Pioom, Interdisciplinary Projects for
    the Study of Root Causes of Human Rights
    Violations, on the Causes of Gross Human Rights
    Violations
  • Financially supported by the Horstman Foundation,
    Leader in the Dutch Resistance movement during
    the Second World War.

3
OUTLINE
  • 1. What is Genocide ?
  • 2. What/who is the Bystander ?
  • 3. Failure of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica
    and Darfur.
  • 4. Faces of Genocide - Survivors

4
(No Transcript)
5
Levels of GHRV
  • Scale 1 no political repression, rule of law
  • Scale 2 some political activists face
    imprisonment (few affected)
  • Scale 3 detention without trial takes place,
    arbitrary arrests, political imprisonment and
    murders
  • Scale 4 severe repression by murder, torture
    and disappearances for political opponents, but
    violence still mainly against political opinion
  • Scale 5 whole population faces the most severe
    repression, no limits on the means to pursue
    personal/ideological goals

6
Conflict Intensity
High-Intensity Conflict armed conflict causing
more than 1000 deaths per year Low-Intensity
Conflict armed conflict causing between 100-1000
deaths per year Violent Political Conflict
armed conflict causing less than 100 deaths per
year
7
Gross Human Rights Violations
  • Genocide
  • Crimes against Humanity
  • War Crimes (IHL)
  • Disappearances
  • Torture
  • Ethnic Cleansing
  • Widespread and systematic rape (now recognized as
    a weapon of war also punishable as Genocide
    following decisions at the ICTR)

8
Legal Distinctions
  • Genocide
  • any of the following acts committed with intent
    to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
    ethnical, racial or religious group, as such
  • Killing
  • Causing serious bodily or mental harm
  • Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
    of life calculated to bring about its physical
    destruction
  • Imposing measures intended to prevent births
  • Forcibly transferring children of the group to
    another group.

(Article 6 Rome Statute)
9
Destruction
  • Genocide is the deliberate destruction of a
    specific group
  • Destruction because of their birth, their
    existence, their being
  • Not because of their views, opinions or actions

10
Raphael Lemkin 1900-1959
  • GENOS means in Greek race or tribe
  • CIDE means in Latin killing
  • Churchill Crimes without a name
  • Crime of all Crimes, the most serious

11
Deliberate annihilation
  • Genocide is the deliberate, planned and
    systematic annihilation of a specific group of
    people
  • SPECIFIC GROUP
  • BY THE STATE
  • WITH INTENT
  • Politicide refers to political opponents
    (democide both but excluding war)

12
Five stages of Repression by Hilberg
  • Shutting off the supply of information for all
    outsiders
  • Restricting participation to those with knowledge
  • Prohibiting criticism by outsiders
  • Absence of public talk of process of repression
    and destruction
  • Killings but using euphimism (final solution, auf
    Transport nach Osten)

13
  • Article 2
  • Genocide means any of the following acts
    committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
    part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
    group, as such
  • ( a ) Killing members of the group
  • ( b ) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
    members of the group
  • ( c ) Deliberately inflicting on the group
    conditions of life calculated to bring about its
    physical destruction in whole or in part
  • ( d ) Imposing measures intended to prevent
    births within the group
  • ( e ) Forcibly transferring children of the group
    to another group.

14
definitions of genocide
  • "a form of one-sided mass killing in which a
    state or other authority intends to destroy a
    group, as that group and membership in it are
    defined by the perpetrator." Frank Chalk and Kurt
    Jonassohn
  • "the mass killing of substantial numbers of
    human beings ... under conditions of the
    essential defenselessness and helplessness of the
    victims." Israel Charny
  • "sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to
    physically destroy a collectivity directly or
    indirectly, through interdiction of the
    biological and social reproduction of group
    members, sustained regardless of the surrender or
    lack of threat offered by the victim." Helen Fein
  • "the promotion and execution of policies by a
    state or its agents which result in the deaths of
    a substantial portion of a group ...when the
    victimized groups are defined primarily in terms
    of their communal characteristics, i.e.,
    ethnicity, religion or nationality." Barbara
    Harff and Ted Gurr
  • Genocide is not extreme war or conflict it is
    extreme exclusion. Exclusion may start with
    name-calling, but may end with a group of people
    being excluded from a society to the point where
    they are destroyed. James M. Smith

15
GENOCIDE CONVENTION
  • Article 3
  • The following acts shall be punishable
  • ( a ) Genocide
  • ( b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide
  • ( c ) Direct and public incitement to commit
    genocide
  • ( d ) Attempt to commit genocide
  • ( e ) Complicity in genocide.

16
Seven stages by Lecomte
  • 1. definition of the target group
  • 2. registration of the victims
  • 3. designation of the victims
  • 4. confiscation of goods
  • 5. exclusion from working activities
  • 6. systematic isolation
  • 7. mass extermination
  • All stages in the Holocaust and in Rwanda

17
Holocaust Studies and Genocide Studies
  • Un-precendented and Total
  • Exterminalist anti-semitism
  • As paradigme
  • Repeated but also in part
  • War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
  • Victim oriented or perspective of perpetrator and
    bystander included of societal transformation
    (Weimar, 30s)

18
Eight Stages of Genocide by Stanton
  • Classification us and them
  • Symbolization yellow star of David
  • Dehumanization hate radio
  • Organization special army units
  • Polarization silencing the moderate
  • Preparation separation of the victims
  • Extermination mass killing, genocide
  • Denial cover up evidence

19
Denial of Genocide
  • Armenian Genocide
  • Nowadays Politics
  • More than 90 years ago

20
Genocides in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur
  • Why did the international bystanders fail to act
    to prevent or to stop the genocides in Rwanda,
    Srebrenica and Darfur?
  • In what way would the international bystander
    have been able to act with the available
    instruments?
  • Why were all the warnings not translated into
    action or, more precisely, what are the reasons
    for non-action or the ineffectiveness of the
    action that was undertaken?

21
The Atrocity Triangle
C Bystanders
  • A Perpetrators

B Victims
22
Each case
  • 1. WARNINGS
  • 2. INSTRUMENTS
  • 3. DECISION-MAKING

23
(No Transcript)
24
(No Transcript)
25
(No Transcript)
26
(No Transcript)
27
(No Transcript)
28
(No Transcript)
29
(No Transcript)
30
DARFUR
31
DEATH TOLL
  • Rwanda 1994 800,000 in 100 days 8,000 a day
  • Srebrenica 1995 8,000 in 5 days 1,600 a day
  • Darfur 2003-2010 300,000 in 2555 days 117 a day

32
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
1 Before
Prevent
2 During
React
3 After
Rebuild
33
EARLY WARNING

34
NEVER AGAIN
  • EARLY WARNING DOES NOT LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO
    EARLY ACTION OR ANY ACTION
  • AT THE MOMENT WHEN DECISIONS ARE MADE, PREVIOUS
    NEVER AGAINS ARE FORGOTTEN

35
WARNINGS INSTRUMENTS
  • BOTH IN RWANDA AND IN SREBRENICA AND IN DARFUR
  • WARMINGS WERE AVAILABLE
  • INSTRUMENTS WERE AVAILABLE
  • THIRD PARTIES (BYSTANDERS) COULD HAVE PREVENTED
    IN BOTH CASES THE GENOCIDE

36
The Atrocity Triangle
C Bystanders
  • A Perpetrators

B Victims
37
The bystanderthe third party that will not act
or that will not attempt to act in solidarity
with the victims of gross human rights
violations.
  • AFTERWARD FOUR ROLES
  • PERPETRATORS AND VICTIMS
  • COLLABORATORS AND RESCUERS IN THE END

38
DVD
  • The Faces of Genocide 20 minutes

39
MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON Warning IN RWANDA 1.
  • HATE PROPAGANDA PRIOR TO GENOCIDE PUNISHED AS
    INCENTIVE TO GENOCIDE
  • WEAKER MANDATE UNAMIR THAN NEEDED BECAUSE OF
    FEASABILITY
  • OUTSPOKEN RELIABLE EARLY WARNINGS NOT FORWARDED
    TO SC
  • ANY DECISION-MAKING BY SC WAS PRECLUDED
  • the withholding of this information from the
    members of the security council by the un
    bureaucracy precluded any security council
    decision in this field.

40
AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN RWANDA 2.
  • THE OPTION TO LINK THE EVACUATION FORCE WITH
    UNAMIR WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN ANY WESTERN CAPITAL
    OR AT THE UN.
  • RIZA UN TOP OFFICIAL - WAS NOT PREPARED ON
    APRIL 14 TO PROPOSE AN ENFORCEMENT POWER TO SC
    (DUTCH ARCHIVES).
  • SC VOTED UNANIMOUSLY FOR FORCE REDUCTION TO 270
    PERSONS ON April 21.

41
CONTINUING MAIN CONCLUSIONS 3.
  • DOMINATING TRUST IN PRESIDENT AND PEACE PROCESS
  • SHIFT IN PERCECEPTION NEEDED
  • FROM PROMOTING PEACE TO EMERGING GENOCIDE

42
(No Transcript)
43
MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON WARNING IN SREBRENICA 1.
  • In May 2005 SC Members and UN Officials knew
    about intended Serbian Attack but they did not
    share this information with the Dutch.
  • A preventative military enforcement attack was
    excluded by the UN and the major powers
  • No SC debate on maintaining safe area Srebrenica

44
AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN SREBRENICA 2.
  • NORDIC peacekeepers successful with tanks to
    deter Serbian aggressor in safe area at Tuzla.
  • DUTCH peacekeepers not only missed military
    enforcement power but they did not try in any way
    to deter or resist Serbian aggression.
  • NATO AIR support was available but not used at
    the moment of the attack on Srebrenica.

45
LESSONS LEARNED
  • RECOGNITION OF ANNAN OF MISTAKES IN PERCEPTION IN
    2004 (CHANGING MINDS)
  • CHAPTER VII MEASURES (USE OF FORCE AUTHORIZED)
    WHEN national authorities are manifestly failing
    to protect their populations from genocide
    sept.05
  • INVOLVEMENT OF SC WITH GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS
    VIOLATIONS HAS INCREASED TREMENDOUSLY

46
R2P
  • Sovereignty (STATE SOVEREIGNTY NOT AS A BARRIER
    BUT AS A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ITS PEOPLE)
  • 1.PROTECT OWN POPULATION
  • 2.HELP GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT OWN POPULATION
  • 3.COLLECTIVE ACTION, EXTREEM NEED AND LACK OF
    WILL (RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT, HUMANITARIAN
    INTERVENTION, CHAPTER VII DECISIONS)

47
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE26 February 2007
  • CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
    ON THE
  • PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF
    GENOCIDE
  • (BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

48
Obligations to prevent
  • it is clear that the obligation to prevent is one
    of conduct and not one of result. The obligation
    of States parties is rather to employ all means
    reasonably available to them, so as to prevent
    genocide so far as possible.
  • A State does not incur responsibility simply
    because the desired result is not achieved
    responsibility is however incurred if the State
    manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent
    genocide which were within its power, and which
    might have contributed to preventing the
    genocide.(430)

49
Prevention awareness of danger
  • a State may be found to have violated its
    obligation to prevent even though it had no
    certainty, at the time when it should have acted,
    but failed to do so, that genocide was about to
    be committed or was under way
  • it is enough that the State was aware, or should
    normally have been aware, of the serious danger
    that acts of genocide would be committed.(432)

50
Duty to act
  • a States obligation to prevent, and the
    corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant
    that the State learns of, or should normally have
    learned of, the existence of a serious risk that
    genocide will be committed.(431) (see art. 8 for
    UN)

51
(No Transcript)
52
(No Transcript)
53
DARFUR, CONFLICT CHARACTERISTICS
  • PRIORITY FOR NORT-SOUTH CONFLICT SUDAN
  • GENOCIDE OR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
  • STRONG PUBLIC OPINION

54
(No Transcript)
55
WARNINGS FROM THE START 1.
  • UN RAPPORTEUR, KAPILAS ROLE
  • UN HEAD HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
  • NGOs
  • USA INQUIRY, LABELING GENOCIDE, SEPTEMBER 2004

56
INSTRUMENTS DARFUR 2.
  • DIPLOMACY CEASE FIRE
  • ARMS EMBARGO
  • AFRICAN PEACE KEEPERS, EU FORCE in CHAD, UN PEACE
    KEEPERS
  • NO NO-FLY ZONE, NO SEIZURE OF WEAPONS
  • ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
  • PROSECUTION, BASHIR TRAVELS

57
MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON DARFUR 3
  • CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION IN SC BUT NO
    ACTION AT THE START PREVENTION FAILED - AND
    WEAK DECISIONS LATER
  • INCREASING CONFUSING SITUATION, good versus bad,
    international conflict Chad and CAR
  • STRONG INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF SUDAN, China 80
    oil, Russia weapons, US intelligence
  • SMART LEADERS, giving impression of cooperation
    but in fact doing the opposite, strong power
    position.

58
DARFUR
59
ALL CASES
  • We did not Know. No, because Information was
    clear, reliable and available. Enough Early and
    later Warnings.
  • We were not able to act. No, because Instruments
    in soldiers and equipment were available to
    prevent or stop.
  • Failures. Perhaps decision-making, political
    power, indifference?

60
CONCLUDING QUOTE
  • The bystanders at the state level and at the
    international level did not act in solidarity
    with the victims. They did not attempt to rescue.
  • Evaluating afterwards, we may conclude that
    these bystanders turned into collaborators who
    facilitated the genocidaires by not acting
    against continuing atrocities.
  • Nowadays Ivory Coast, Lybia, Egypt, Syria ?
About PowerShow.com