Human Rights *Part 1 (July 21): The United Nations Human Rights Conventions *Part 2 (July 22):The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Human Rights *Part 1 (July 21): The United Nations Human Rights Conventions *Part 2 (July 22):The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

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Title: Human Rights *Part 1 (July 21): The United Nations Human Rights Conventions *Part 2 (July 22):The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms


1
Human RightsPart 1 (July 21) The United
Nations Human Rights ConventionsPart 2 (July
22)The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
  • Hathaway, Oona A. 2007. Why Do Countries Commit
    to Human Rights Treaties? Journal of Conflict
    Resolution 51 (4)588-621.
  • Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. The Origins of Human
    Rights Regimes Democratic Delegation in Postwar
    Europe. International Organization 54 (2)21752.

2
Plan for today tomorrow
  • Go over the exam
  • Various explanations of why governments enter
    into human rights treaties
  • Lock-in Story
  • Domestic enforcement
  • Signaling of resolve
  • Domestic pressure
  • International norm
  • Historical background
  • The United Nations Human Rights Conventions
  • The European Convention for the Protection of
    Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

3
(No Transcript)
4
D
D
C
B
A
A
C
B
5
Exam
  • Mid-term
  • All questions came from class lectures
  • Review session went over many questions
    explicitly
  • Answers were explicitly provided during the last
    class before the exam
  • Collectively, you have learned a lot
  • CONGRATULATIONS!!!
  • Final
  • Questions will be based on a close reading of
    required texts
  • Given our strong base, students are now
    encouraged to send in more challenging questions
    based on readings and lectures
  • Exams are about commitment problems its time
    to up the ante!

6
Confidence
  • Raise your hand!

7
Human Rights Treaties
  • Moravscik HR treaties are fundamentally
    different from agreements regarding trade,
    monetary policy, the environment, or security
  • HR treaties hold governments accountable for
    purely internal activities
  • However, Hafner-Burtons research shows the
    impact of human rights clauses in PREFERENTIAL
    TRADE AGREEMENTS (PTAs) http//www.princeton.edu/
    ehafner/pdfs/trading_hr.pdf
  • PTAs are more effective than softer human rights
    agreements in changing repressive behaviors when
    they supply hard standards that tie material
    benefits of integration to compliance with human
    rights principles
  • PTAs improve members human rights through
    coercion, by supplying the instruments and
    resources to change actors incentives to promote
    reforms that would not otherwise be implemented
  • So what are the soft human rights agreements
    about?...
  • Domestic politics!

8
Why would any government, democratic or
dictatorial, favor establishing an effective
independent international authority, the sole
purpose of which is to constrain its domestic
sovereignty?
9
Lock-in
  • European Convention for the Protection of Human
    Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)
    established a Commission on Human Rights
  • could investigate the case, seek to settle it, or
    forward it under certain circumstances to a court
    of human rights, whose decisions governments are
    legally bound to follow
  • Two optional clauses of the ECHR, Articles 25 and
    46, were subsequently adopted by all member
    states
  • they permit individual and state-to-state
    petitions and recognize the compulsory
    jurisdiction of the court
  • established "effective supranational
    adjudication" in Europe
  • Established democracies allied with dictatorships
    and transitional regimes in opposition to
    reciprocally binding human rights enforcement
  • Argues governments enter international agreements
    when the benefits of reducing future political
    uncertainty outweigh the sovereignty costs of
    membership
  • "self-binding" is of most use to newly
    established democracies

10
Measures come from positions on EHRC
11
(No Transcript)
12
Alternative way to test
  • Draws on theory/empirics regarding the survival
    of democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000. Democracy
    Development)
  • Uses contested elections per capita income
    instead of undemocratic/newly
    established/established democracy
  • STATA!

13
Domestic enforcement story
  • The domestic enforcement of the treaty and the
    treatys collateral consequences
  • Democratic states with strict human rights
    legislation are de facto compliant, so they
    ratify
  • Democratic states without strict human rights
    legislation, but where international treaties may
    impact domestic law do not ratify (especially if
    they have poor human rights records)
  • Dictatorial states international treaties are
    not consequential domestically, so governments
    only sign if they are looking for international
    political cover the worst human rights
    violators are the most likely to sign!
  • Empirical puzzle dictatorships with the worst
    human rights records are the most likely to sign
    (particularly the Convention Against Torture
    CAT)

14
Leader-resolve story
  • Addresses the puzzle that dictatorships with the
    worst human rights records are the most likely to
    sign
  • Argues that signing commits the leader to
    prison if he relinquishes power
  • Commitment is credible because of international
    enforcement
  • Signals to the domestic audience that the leader
    is a high-resolve type
  • May ironically lower torture as the domestic
    audience realizes it is futile to resist
  • Absent resistance, dictatorships need not
    practice as much torture
  • Low-resolve types do not sign because they fear
    going to prison if they fall from power, which
    they deem likely
  • Why dont low-resolve types practice as much
    torture to begin with?
  • Could the practice of torture itself act as a
    signal of resolve?

15
Domestic institutions under dictatorship story or
  • CAT SelectionWhy Dictatorships enter into the
    UN Convention Against Torture

16
The Puzzle (Hathaway 2003)
17
My solution begins with the logic of torture
  • Torture is more likely when power is shared than
    when power is absolute (Kalyvas 2000, Arendt
    1970).
  • A measure of power sharing?
  • Some dictatorships allow for
  • INDEPENDENT POLITICAL PARTIES (Gandhi 2003).
  • Under no-party one-party states, limitations
    are obvious.
  • No ambiguity.
  • With multiple political parties, some degree of
    dissent is endorsed by the state.
  • Ambiguity. Some people go too far.
  • I predict torture to be ironically higher in more
    liberal dictatorships with multiple political
    parties.

18
Will no/one-party states enter into the CAT?
  • They are not anti-torture.
  • One reason we observe low levels of torture is
    because of the FEAR of torture.
  • They face no pressure from organized alternative
    political parties to adopt the CAT.
  • I predict no/one-party states are less likely to
    sign/ratify the CAT.

19
Will multi-party dictatorships enter into the CAT?
  • Institutions like multi-parties encapsulate
    parts of society into the regime (ODonnell 1979,
    Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).
  • Regime faces pressure from organized political
    parties.
  • Policy concessions (Gandhi 2004).
  • Spend more on education, less on the military
  • Entering the CAT is a form of policy concession.
  • I predict more liberal dictatorships will be more
    likely to sign/ratify the CAT.

20
Dictatorships with parties have higher levels of
torture
21
To put this plainlyholding other things equal
  • For every 100 observations of dictatorships with
    no political parties and low levels of torture
    during a year, one can expect 7 of them to
    practice high levels of torture the following
    year (plus or minus 4).
  • For every 100 observations of dictatorships with
    political parties and low levels of torture
    during a year, one can expect 14 of them to
    practice high levels of torture the following
    year (plus or minus 6).
  • I conclude that torture is, somewhat
    counter-intuitively, more prevalent in
    dictatorships with multiple political parties.

22
Dictatorships with parties are more likely to
sign/ratify the CAT
23
Ratifying the CAT
24
The story explains
  • Why governments with more torture enter into the
    CAT
  • We observe more torture because power is divided
    (political parties).
  • Governments enter the CAT as a concession to the
    interest groups represented in the political
    parties.
  • Why governments without torture do not enter the
    CAT
  • There is less torture because there is more fear
    of torture.
  • The last thing these regimesthat rely on
    fearwant to do is make a gesture that they
    oppose torture.
  • These regimes are not anti-torture, and face no
    pressure to enter into the CAT.

25
Cases of no parties and (dictatorship) low torture
  • Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara (1983 to 1987)
  • Burundi under the dictatorships of Jean-Baptiste
    Bagaza (198187) and Pierre Buyoya (19871993)
  • Central African Republic under Andre Kolingba
    (19811993)
  • The dictatorship of Paul Biya in Cameroon also
    experienced low levels of torture from 1985
    through 1991, during which period multiple
    parties were not allowed. When the Biya
    dictatorship finally did legalize political
    parties in 1992, rates of torture reached their
    highest levels.
  • Gabon under Omar Bongo, where torture averaged
    2.2 according to the Hathaway scale during the
    closed party period from 1985 to 1989, but
    averaged 3.1 during the open party period from
    1990 to 1996. The pattern, while not as stark, is
    also found in Mauritania under Moaouya Ould Sidi
    Ahmed Taya, where torture averaged 2.8 when
    parties were not allowed from 1985 to 1990, and
    torture averaged 3.3 when parties were legal.
  • Ibrahim Babangidas dictatorship in Nigeria.
    Torture levels averaged 2.3 when parties were
    officially closed (19851988), but the average
    level went up to 4.0 when parties were legalized
    (19891992). The dictatorship of Juvenal
    Habyarimana in Rwanda had low rates of torture
    averaging 1.5 from 1985 to 1990 when parties were
    closed, but the torture rate averaged 3.7 when
    parties were legal from 19911993.
  • Cote dIvoire, the closed single party
    dictatorship of Felix Houphouet-Boigny had but a
    few isolated incidences of torture from 1985 to
    1989. In 1990, when Cote dIvoire legalized
    multiple parties, torture became more common,
    reaching frequent levels in 1992, according to
    the CIRI measure of torture. CIRI also reports
    that torture in Cote dIvoire reached frequent
    levels again in 1995 under Henri Konan Bedie.
    Interestingly, this is the same year the
    government signed and ratified the CAT.

26
Cases of parties and high torture
  • Egypt, where multiple parties were legalized
    under Anwar el-Sadat in 1976. Torture averaged
    3.8 from 1985 to 1996, with common rates of
    torture from 1988 to 1994 and prevalent torture
    in 1995.
  • Torture rates also reached prevalent levels in
    the open dictatorship of Mexico under Carlos
    Salinas (in 1991 and 1992) multiple parties
    were legal throughout.
  • Other examples of high torture rates under
    multi-party dictatorships include Paraguay (1986)
    and Georgia (19923).

27
Cases where dictatorships failed to signed the
CAT without political parties but did accede
after legalizing political parties
  • Benin, which legalized political parties in 1990,
    and then signed and ratified the CAT in 1992
  • Burundi, which legalized political parties in
    1992 and then signed and ratified the CAT in
    1993
  • Chad, which legalized political parties in 1992
    and then signed and ratified the CAT in 1995
  • Ethiopia, which legalized political parties in
    1991 and then signed and ratified the CAT in
    1994
  • Malawi, which opened political parties in 1993
    and signed and ratified the CAT in 1996
  • Nepal, which opened political parties in 1990,
    signing and ratifying in 1991
  • Chile, which opened political parties the same
    year as it signed the CAT (1987), ratifying the
    following year (see Hawkins - raises the
    interesting possibility of international
    legitimacy as a further payoff from entering into
    the CAT)

28
Normative stories
  • Governments become more likely to join an
    international agreement as the total number of
    joiners increases
  • Norms, in turn, are defined as as a standard of
    appropriate behavior for actors with a given
    identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891 our
    emphasis)
  • Goodliffe Hawkins (2006) show that countries
    are more likely to sign/ratify as others in the
    world do so
  • They find stronger results for countries of the
    same region regional identity finding!
  • Political regime identity?
  • Do democracies follow democracy-norms?
  • Institutionalized dictatorships (multi-party
    dictatorships) follow their own norms?
  • Pure dictatorships have their norms?
  • We find little evidence of political regime
    identity at a global level, but strong evidence
    for democracies and mp dictatorships at the
    regional level

29
Ratification vs. Signing
  • Ratification Gives official sanction or approval
    to an international treaty. Requires a formal
    adoption process (e.g., approval by the
    legislature or the agreement of multiple
    sub-national entities)
  • veto players? Some political systems may have
    few (authoritarian regimes) others multiple (US
    president 2/3 majority of the Senate)
  • Signing May be largely symbolic if not followed
    by ratification

30
About how many international treaties have been
signed at the dawn of the 21st century?
  • 50,000

31
Human Rights
  • Principally a legacy of World War II
  • The content of what human rights means was
    largely developed by the United Nations Universal
    Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
    http//www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
  • and 2 international covenants (both 1966)
  • International Covenant on Civil and Political
    Rights http//www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.ht
    m
  • International Covenant on Economic, Social and
    Cultural Rights http//www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
    a_cescr.htm
  • http//www.youtube.com/watch?vvpAfe-ruM4U

32
The core universal human rights treaties
  • 1987 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
    Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) the only
    one with UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
  • 1976 International Covenant on Civil and
    Political Rights (ICCPR)
  • 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
    of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

33
CAT
  • Domestic law requirements
  • Article 2 calls for signatories to take
    effective legislative, administrative, judicial
    or other measures to prevent acts of torture in
    any territory under its jurisdiction.
  • Article 4 specifically requires signatories to
    make torture illegal according to their domestic
    laws.
  • Article 10 mandates that persons who may be
    involved in the custody, interrogation or
    treatment of any individual subjected to any form
    of arrest, detention or imprisonment be educated
    about the prohibition against torture and about
    what actions constitute illegal acts of torture.
  • Article 14 calls for rights to be provided to
    victims of torture, including some form of
    compensation and rehabilitation.

34
CAT
  • International monitoring
  • The CAT established an international monitoring
    board called the Committee Against Torture
    consisting of 10 experts of high moral standing
    and recognized competence in the field of human
    rights, who are elected by the countries
    participating in the CAT (Article 17)
  • Article 21 allows a state party to declare that
    it accepts the competence of the Committee to
    receive and consider communications by another
    state party indicating that it is not fulfilling
    its obligations under the convention.
  • Article 22 allows a state party to extend the
    same right to individuals who claim to be the
    victims of a violation of the treaty by the state
    party.

35
CAT
  • Universal Jurisdiction
  • The principle that a states jurisdiction is
    based on the nature of the crime rather than
    factors such as where the crime occurred or the
    nationality of the alleged perpetrator or victim.
  • In effect, CAT hands over prosecuting authority
    to other countries for state-sanctioned crimes!
  • This principle allows Nigeria, for example, to
    prosecute a crime committed in Germany by an
    American against an Indonesian.
  • Spain vs. Pinochet
  • Spain vs. 6 former officials of the Bush
    administration (John Yoo, Jay Bybee, David
    Addington, Alberto Gonzales, William Haynes and
    Douglas Feith) http//www.huffingtonpost.com/marjo
    rie-cohn/spain-investigates-what-a_b_183801.html
  • http//www.youtube.com/watch?vEwDihun2FN0

36
1976 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)
  • Broad
  • Liberty security of the person
  • Equality of all persons before courts and
    tribunals
  • The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
    religion equality before the law
  • The right of peaceful assembly and freedom of
    association.
  • State parties to the convention are required to
    submit reports
  • This requirement has low enforcement (put you on
    a naughty list!)

37
1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
  • condemns any distinction, exclusion or
    restriction made on the basis of sex which has
    the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying
    the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women,
    irrespective of their marital status, on a basis
    of equality of men and women, of human rights and
    fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
    social, cultural, civil or any other field.
  • State parties to the convention must file reports
    or face being put on a naughty list

38
European Convention on Human Rights
  • http//www.youtube.com/watch?vfM94MvyvBs8feature
    related

39
Exam questions
  • Answer Established democracies (Moravscik)
  • Question
  • Answer Dictatorships (Moravscik)
  • Question
  • Answer Lock-In
  • Question
  • Answer Democracies (Hathaway)
  • Question
  • Answer Dictatorships (Hathaway)
  • Question
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