Micro-Foundations of Insurgent Violence: Implications for Iraq

1
Micro-Foundations of Insurgent Violence
Implications for Iraq

• Mark Smith, Janine Davidson, Peter Brooks
• Center for Adaptive Strategies Threats
• Hicks Associates, Inc.
• Prepared for Presentation to the
• Irregular Warfare Forum
• Pentagon, VA
• 5 October 2005

2
Agenda

• How Insurgency Works The micro-dynamics of
  insurgency
• Perspective of the civilian population (C.O.G.)
• Insurgent and Government tactics and objectives
• What To Do A Framework for Commanders
• How to analyze the AOR and tailor tactics
  accordingly
• Implications for Iraq
• Audience Unit level commanders

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Purpose

• The purpose of this briefing is to provide
  unit-level commanders (Company Brigade) with
• A deeper understanding of the micro-level
  motivations of insurgent and local civilian
  behavior
• A framework for applying this knowledge to
  develop a counterinsurgent strategy tailored for
  their AOR

4
Brief Based on Wide Array of Scholarship

• Bosnia
• Kosovo
• Vietnam
• Uganda
• Angola
• Mozambique
• Eritrea
• Palestine
• Greek Civil War
• El Salvador

• Cambodia
• Soviet Partisans in Ukraine during WWII
• Greek Partisans during WWII
• Nicaragua
• Guatemala
• French Revolution
• Cyprus
• Liberia
• Malaya

This brief describes the patterns of violence
observed in these other insurgencies, and then
applies these lessons to Iraq.
5
Insurgent Activity is Public

• Insurgent activity is extremely public at the
  local level.
• Caching weapons, recruiting fighters, punishing
  government collaborators, collecting taxes, etc
• Actions are visible to locals -- civilians are
  the audience.
• Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies are fought
  through the civilian population.
• Most of the violence is against civilians.
• Insurgents punish collaborators
• Historically, government forces often engage in
  reprisals, although this is not currently the
  case in Iraq

Civilians are the eyes and ears of COIN
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and THIS is What It Looks Like
A man, center, lying down, is punched before
being killed, while another man walks to execute
a second man, seen on his knees on the right, on
Baghdad's Haifa Street, Sunday Dec. 19 2004.
About 30 gunmen ambushed a car Sunday in central
Baghdad carrying employees of the Iraqi
organization running next month's elections,
killing three of the workers while two escaped
unhurt, an official from the election body said.
Adel al-Lami, a member of the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq, said the early
morning attack took place in downtown Haifa
Street, a thoroughfare running through central
Baghdad and the scene of repeated clashes between
security forces and insurgents. (AP Photo / Str)
7
Insurgents use Selective Violence

• Silence Was a Weapon If they want to survive,
  insurgents must keep the civilian population from
  aiding the government security forces.
• Reasons Insurgents Target
• American troops
• To drive them back into protected bases in order
  to allow insurgents to continue their public
  activities without fear of interruption.
• Indigenous security forces
• To allow insurgents to monopolize violence in the
  neighborhood.
• Collaborators with those forces
• To deter collaboration with security forces, in
  order to prevent identification of insurgents and
  their supporters.

As of March 2005, 24,865 Iraqi civilian deaths
were reported., 35.9 due to criminality, 12
due to insurgent targeting of govt.
collaborators, and only 7.7 due to terrorist
bombings. (IBC 2005)
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Because they Understand Nagls Ninety Percent

• LTC John Nagl points out that even if 90 of the
  civilians in Al Anbar support the Americans, they
  will not help if they are afraid of retaliation.

Insurgents can Identify and punish collaborators
IM NOT SAFE
Silence
I Like the Government
Government can protect civilians from
retaliation IM SAFE
DenunciationTips Collaboration
Insurgents need only for good people to do nothing
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Civilian decisions rely primarily on security

• In the civilians mind A marginal benefit to
  government forces is not worth the sacrifice in
  personal security it brings with it.
• One persons aid to the government is not going
  to end the insurgency. It will make -- at best
  -- a small difference on behalf of the
  government.
• Result The vast majority of civilians will not
  put their security at risk to help the
  government.
• Creates a vicious cycle
• A governments legitimacy depends on its ability
  to provide security.
• Throughout history security has been the primary
  motivation and purpose for allegiance to a higher
  authority (E.g. feudal system, organized crime,
  etc.)

10
Even Mass Killings and Bombings by Insurgents are
often selective

• What may at first appear to be indiscriminate
  violence is often highly selective.
• Suicide car bombs often target police convoys,
  recruiting stations, government officials, and
  security forces.
• Truly indiscriminate violence signals the
  inability of the insurgency to get good
  intelligence on who is and is not a government
  collaborator, and so they often resort to
  targeting by ethnic group, the only information
  available to them.

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One week in Iraq (1 of 3) 7 July 2005 to 10
July 2005
Date Target Weapon Killed Location
7-Jul-2005 Ihab al-Sherif, Egypt's ambassador-to-be in Iraq gunfire 1 kidnapped in Baghdad
7-Jul-2005 Police Station, Local Govt. HQ mortars 3 Mosul
7-Jul-2005 Shiite cleric Hashium Attiya al-Fahdli gunfire 1 Baghdad
7-Jul-2005 Bodies found decapitated 5 b/w Ramadi and Rawah
7-Jul-2005 Ali Ghalib Ibrahim, head of Salahuddinn provincial council gunfire 1 Tikrit
8-Jul-2005 Jumhour Karim Khammas, Sunni Muslim Basra Univ. professor gunfire 1 Basra
8-Jul-2005 taxi passengers gunfire 4 Mosul
8-Jul-2005 Bodies of 4 men found executed 4 Mosul
8-Jul-2005 policeman gunfire 1 Al-Yarmouk
8-Jul-2005 Ali Shakir, chief of Iraqi karate federation gunfire 1 Kut, body found in river
9-Jul-2005 Translator working for U.S. and his family gunfire 4 Al Ta'mim, Baiji
10-Jul-2005 U.S. military convoy suicide car bomb 1 near Fallujah
Data from Iraq Body Count Database as of 28 July
2005
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One week in Iraq (2 of 3) 10 July 2005 to 11
July 2005
Date Target Weapon Killed Location
10-Jul-2005 truck drivers working for U.S. gunfire 3 Near Dujail
10-Jul-2005 security official gunfire 1 Kirkuk
10-Jul-2005 police colonel gunfire 1 Baghdad
10-Jul-2005 convoy of mayor suicide car bomb 3 Kirkuk
10-Jul-2005 army recruits suicide bomber 20 Muthanna airfield, Baghdad
10-Jul-2005 Sunni Arabs from northern Baghdad tortured, shot 12 Sadr City, Baghdad
10-Jul-2005 employees of Iraqna telecom co. gunfire 2 SW Baghdad
10-Jul-2005 convoy of police chief Brig. Gen. Salim Salih Meshaal suicide car bomb 5 near Mosul
10-Jul-2005 customs official 2 suicide car bombs 7 Walid crossing, Syrian border
11-Jul-2005 Shiite family gunfire 8 Baladiyat, Baghdad
Data from Iraq Body Count Database as of 28 July
2005
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One week in Iraq (3 of 3) 12 July 2005 to 14
July 2005
Date Target Weapon Killed Location
12-Jul-2005 Office of International Org. for Human Rights gunfire 4 Jamaa, western Baghdad
12-Jul-2005 industrial area car bomb 3 Kirkuk
12-Jul-2005 Lt. Col. Amer Mozar, head of Ministry of Interior CSI gunfire 1 Wahda, southern Baghdad
12-Jul-2005 worshippers at Al-Kebir Sunni mosque suicide bomber 2 Jalowla, 50 mi. SE of Baquba
13-Jul-2005 US Base mortars 1 al-Siniyah, Bayji
13-Jul-2005 Army checkpoint gunfire 1 Sahrayn, Tuz
13-Jul-2005 US Patrol roadside bomb 1 eastern Baghdad
13-Jul-2005 unknown tortured, gunfire 10 bodies found in eastern Baghdad
14-Jul-2005 checkpoint at entrance to Green Zone suicide car bomber 1 Green Zone entrance, Baghdad
14-Jul-2005 policeman in car gunfire 3 near Kirkuk
Data from Iraq Body Count Database as of 28 July
2005
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Civilian Micro-decisions
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

• Government can protect me and I like the
  government
• Denounce known insurgents
• Collaborate with govt.
• Provide Tips
• Join Security Forces

• Government will arrest or kill me if I help the
  insurgents, but I still like the insurgency
• Silence

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• Government cannot protect me, but I still like
  the government
• Silence

• Government cannot touch me and I like the
  insurgency
• Join insurgency
• Provide sanctuary
• Provide materiel

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
15
Secure Environment, Support for Govt
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT

• Government can protect me and I like the
  government
• Denounce known insurgents
• Collaborate with govt.
• Provide Tips
• Join Security Forces

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
16
Secure Environment, Oppose the Govt
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

• Government will arrest or kill me, but I still
  dont like the government
• Silence

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
17
Insecure Environment, Support for Govt
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• Government cannot protect me, but I still like
  the government
• Silence

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
18
Insecure Environment, Oppose the Govt
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• Government cannot touch me and I like the
  insurgency
• Join insurgency
• Provide sanctuary
• Provide materiel

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
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Control Precedes Collaboration

• Control precedes collaboration, not the other way
  around
• Once local security was achieved, if only
  partially, real flow of intelligence began. This
  is the second point to stress, for, without
  intelligence, the security forces are blind and
  cannot possibly pursue the selective tactics
  demanded by this type of warfare. (Asprey 571)
• Professor Stathis Kalyvas identifies the
  mechanisms
• Control deters coercion and intimidation.
• Recruitment generates cascades of support because
  families of fighters tend to support the side
  their family member is on.
• Control affects peoples belief in the ultimate
  outcome.
• Control makes it easier to monitor the
  population.

But control everywhere requires a huge military
commitment. Is this mission impossible?
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How to Do More With Less Amplifying COIN Force
Presence

• Counter-insurgents can use techniques that
  multiply their effect
• Manipulate civilian perceptions
• Change expectations about who will win.
• Psychological operations (eagle-tagging)
• Multiply presence by publicizing patrols and
  raids.
• Selectively target insurgents and their
  infrastructure
• Demonstrate an ability to discriminately target
  insurgents.
• Publicize selective captures of insurgents, as it
  demonstrates a high level of control and
  convinces people it is safe to collaborate.
• Build political-security-economic-social
  institutions simultaneously (oil-spot approach)
• Prior to moving to the next fight,
  counter-insurgents need to build civil
  administration and domestic capacity, which
  greatly reduces the military requirements of
  control.

21
Selective Targeting Requires Civilian Tips

• Tips and denunciations are how COIN operators
  know who the insurgents are..
• Anonymous denunciations protect collaborators,
  but make it impossible to judge the quality of
  the tip.
• Public denunciations are more dangerous, but more
  credible.

Local tips are the key to COIN identification of
insurgents and their infrastructure.
22
Solving the ConundrumTips are Essential but
Usually False

• Many denunciations are false
• Usually motivated by personal or clan feuds and
  vendettas.
• Must have a local system for vetting tips that
  examines motives
• Other civilians often know whether tips are
  credible.
• Map and understand existing tribal and clan
  networks
• Enlist cooperation of trusted locals to vet tips
• Secret village or tribal committees can evaluate
  accuracy of denunciations, as in Vietnam, Greece,
  and elsewhere
• Must have system to act on tips
• QRFs, Decentralized decision-making, command and
  control

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Which has Implications for Intelligence

• Intelligence about insurgency is very local and
  has a very short half-life
• Captured insurgents must be exploited locally
• Rather than arresting insurgents and sending them
  up to division headquarters
• The number of tips coming in is a good Measure of
  Effectiveness because it demonstrates civilian
  faith in govt.

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Good COIN looks like Good Policework.

• The key is the social interaction of police
  officers with the community.
• Permanent presence
• Ability to bring in tips
• Ability to extract information from suspects to
  lead them to new suspects
• The legitimacy that comes with a permanent
  presence in the community.

• Using tips to make arrests, then using the
  interviews to generate more tips, to make more
  arrests, leading to a raid on the ultimate
  target. following the chain of clues
• For example, you get a tip about a drug dealer,
  arrest the drug dealer, turn him to get his
  distributor, turn the distributor to give up the
  drug manufacturing house, which you raid with
  SWAT.

Indigenous forces will be better at these
techniques
25
Micro-Foundations to Macro Strategy

• Up to this point, we have talked about the nature
  of insurgent violence at the micro level.
• Now we apply this knowledge to the development of
  a COIN strategy.

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How do unit leaders know where they are?
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

• Security Indicators
• Low of Direct Attacks
• High of tips from civilians
• High degree of presence
• High number of recruits
• Attitude Indicators
• Improved Polls, focus groups
• Improved Quality of life measures

• Security Indicators
• High presence/access
• Low-Med Direct Attacks
• Low-Med of tips
• Low of Recruits
• Attitude Indicators
• Poor Polls and focus groups
• Poor Quality of Life Measures

Secure
Present-day Kurdistan Most of Baghdad
Sadr City, Prior to Chiarelli actions
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• Security Indicators
• Some Direct Attacks, frequent IED attacks
• High level of violence that looks like
  criminality
• Low/Sporadic Presence/Access
• Low-Med Tips, Mostly Anon
• Attitude Indicators
• People express support tacitly, but are reluctant
  to help openly

• Security Indicators
• Frequent Direct Attacks
• Low/Sporadic Presence/Access
• Low-No Tips
• Attitude Indicators
• Civs. celebrate insurgent attacks
• Little ability to measure attitude.

Nagls Al-Anbar Najaf during Sadr Uprising
Fallujah Prior to USMC Assault
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
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How do we win?
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

• Goal Build Legitimacy
• Tasks
• Increase Quality of Life
• Build legitimate institutions.
• Create upward trend in economic development
• Transfer to indigenous forces

• Goal Win Hearts and Minds
• Tasks
• Infrastructure development
• Reward civilians that help
• Work on econ development
• Good policework is key
• Transfer to indigenous forces

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• Goal Improve Security
• Tasks
• Combined selective targeting and police work,
  being careful not to alienate population while
  establishing security.
• Manipulate perceptions
• Build permanent police presence

• Goal Improve Security
• Tasks
• Security must be reestablished before anything
  else.
• Kinetic COIN
• Direct action against insurgents
• Heavy patrols and garrisons

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
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Eliminate Insurgent Sanctuaries, Gain Control
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• Goal Improve Security
• Tasks
• Security must be reestablished before anything
  else.
• Kinetic COIN
• Direct action against insurgents
• Heavy patrols and garrisons

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
29
Win Hearts and Minds and Construct Legitimate
Institutions
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

• Goal Win Hearts and Minds
• Tasks
• Infrastructure development
• Reward civilians that help
• Work on econ development
• Good policework
• Transfer to indigenous forces

Secure
Secure, Civilians Like Government
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
30
Restore Security without alienating population
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Secure, Civilians Like Government
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• Goal Improve Security
• Tasks
• Combined selective targeting and police work,
  being careful not to alienate population while
  establishing security.
• Manipulate perceptions
• Build permanent police presence

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
31
Build legitimate institutions and transfer power
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

• Goal Build Legitimacy
• Tasks
• Increase Quality of Life
• Build legitimate institutions.
• Create upward trend in economic development
• Transfer to indigenous forces

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
32
How to Mess it Up - Security
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Secure, Civilians Like Government
Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
If Govt. takes security for granted and does not
establish permanent policing.
If Govt. minimizes footprint to regain popular
support.
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• Then
• Insurgents will move in and fill power vacuum
  because of existing popular base.

Then Insurgents will undermine govt. authority
with violence against civilians and
infrastructure.
Not Secure, Civilians Like Govt.
Not Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
33
How to Mess it up Hearts and Minds
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY
Secure
Secure, Civilians Like Government
Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
If Civilians dont see continual improvement and
there is no transfer to indigenous authorities
Level of Security (Govt. Control)
Not Secure, Civilians Like Govt.
Not Secure, Civilians Dislike Govt.
If In attempts to restore security, Govt. is too
heavy-handed
If Tanks roll in to restore security and then
leave without establishing a presence.
Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
34
COIN Forces Need the Capability to

• Selectively target insurgents and their
  supporters.
• Gather, vet, and act on tips.
• Act on them locally.
• Teach officers role of tips and their
  motivations.
• Evaluate the quality of tips before and after
  acting on them
• Go back and check on number and effectiveness of
  past tips.
• Maintain networked records to get the big picture
  of the insurgency.
• Maintain records even if informant is
  confidential.
• Interoperability
• Protecting security of database
• Exploit captured insurgents locally.
• Interrogate locally.
• Promise benefits in exchange for information.
• Turn a series of local arrests and interrogations
  into a raid.
• Acquire, maintain, and demonstrate control.
• Rapidly mass troops on a contested area.
• Establish and maintain presence.
• Patrols Both mounted and dismounted.
• Permanent police stations or garrisons in
  community.

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Questions? (and Suggested Readings)

• Mueller, John. 2000. The banality of ethnic
  war. International Security 25, 142-70.
• Gates, Scott. 2002. Recruitment and Allegiance
  The Microfoundations of Rebellion. The Journal of
  Conflict Resolution 46, 1111-130.
• Johnson, Chalmers A. 1962. Civilian loyalties and
  guerrilla conflict. World Politics 14,4 646
  661.
• Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. The Organization of
  Rebellion in Africa. Unpublished Paper.
• Herrington, Stuart. Stalking the Vietcong Inside
  Operation Phoenix.
• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2001. New and Old Civil
  Wars A Valid Distinction? World Politics, 541,
  99-118.
• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2003. Warfare in Civil Wars.
  Unpublished Paper.
• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2004. The Urban Bias in
  Research on Civil Wars. Security Studies 133,
  1-31.
• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2004. The Paradox of
  Terrorism in Civil War. Journal of Ethnics 81,
  97-138.
• Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1999. Wanton and Senseless?
  The Logic of Massacres in Algeria. Rationality
  and Society 113, 243-285.

• Ben-Zeev, Efrat. 2002. The Palestinian Village
  of Ijzim During the 1948 War Forming an
  Anthropological History Through Villagers
  Accounts and Army
• Documents. History and Anthropology 13, 113-30.
• Deininger Claus. 2003. Causes and Consequences of
  Civil Strife. Microlevel Evidence from Uganda.
  Unpublished Paper.
• Loizos, Peter. 1988. Intercommunal Killing in
  Cyprus. Man, 23639-653.
• Lucas, Colin. 1983. Themes in Southern Violence
  After 9 Thermidor. In Gwynne Lewis and Colin
  Lucas (eds), Beyond the Terror Essays in French
  Regional and Social History, 1794-1815.
  Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 152-194.
• Paul, Benjamin D. and William J. Demarest. 1988.
  The Operation of a Death Squad in San Pedro la
  Laguna. In Robert M. Carmack (ed.), Harvest of
  Violence The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan
  Crisis. Norman University of Oklahoma Press,
  119-154.
• Schroeder, Michael J. 1996. Horse Thieves to
  Rebels to Dogs Political Gang Violence and the
  State in the Western Segovias, Nicaragua, in the
  Time of Sandino, 1926-1934. Journal of Latin
  American Studies 28, 2383-434.
• Bax, Mart. 2000. Warlords, Priests and the
  Politics of Ethnic Cleansing A Case Study from
  Rural Bosnia Hercegovina. Ethnic and Racial
  Studies 23, 116-36.
• Aschenbrenner, Stanley. 1987. The Civil War from
  the Perspective of a Messenian Village. In Lars
  Baerentzen, J.O. Iatrides, and O.L. Smith (eds.),
  Studies on the History of the Greek Civil War,
  1945-9. Copenhagen Museum Tusculanum Press,
  105-125.
• Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows The Guerrilla
  in History. William Morrow Company. 1994.

36
BACKUP
37
What Capabilities do you need for each of these
tasks?
I WANT TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT
I WANT TO SUPPORT INSURGENCY

• DoD in a Supporting Role
• Indigenous forces
• Police / Law Enforcement
• USAID, State, Rest of Inter-Agency
• Civil Affairs

• DoD in a Supporting Role
• USAID
• State
• Rest of Inter-Agency
• Indigenous forces
• Civil Affairs

Secure
Level of Security (Govt. Control)

• DoD is primary actor
• Indigenous Security Forces
• DoD Military Forces
• Civil Affairs
• Police / Law Enforcement

• DoD is primary actor
• DoD Military Forces
• Indigenous Security Forces

Insecure
Attitude toward Government (Hearts Minds)
Support
Oppose
38
Foreign Involvement in Insurgency

• Historically Most insurgencies have had
  significant external support, especially
  insurgencies during the Cold War.
• The COMINTERN brought together insurgent
  movements and coordinated them around the globe.
  
• Islamist insurgencies have attracted strong
  diaspora support, as did many Communist
  insurgencies.
• Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan during Soviet
  invasion.
• In Afghanistan, the Arab fighters were
  ineffectual despite getting most of the money
  from Pakistani ISI. Local commanders were able
  to do much more damage to the Soviet occupation
• Afghan commanders such as Ahmed Shah Massoud (the
  Lion of Panjshir) often derided the quality and
  effectiveness of the Arab fighters.

39
What About Foreign Jihadis in Iraq?

• Most suicide bombers are foreigners, although
  this is beginning to change.
• These non-Iraqi Arabs require local assistance
  and knowledge to be effective at all.
• A Saudi in Baghdad is like an American in London
  their clothes, their accent, their dialect, and
  their lack of local knowledge give them away to
  local Iraqis.
• Local insurgent commanders will use suicidal
  foreigners like any other weapon. They are
  especially useful against hard targets, and for
  situations where it is better to blame the
  carnage on a foreigner.
• Zarqawi has had time to build a network inside
  Iraq since before the war, so he is less visible.
  His alliance to Bin Laden came at the price of
  putting off his quest to foment a civil war in
  favor of attacking Americans and their allies.

40
and Perceptions Become Reality

• For the Government
• If civilians see government patrols out in force,
  they perceive the government as being able to
  protect them, and they feel safe to denounce
  insurgents and provide tips. This allows the
  government forces to make progress against the
  insurgents, turning the perception of control
  into reality.
• Every effort must be taken to multiply presence
  through psychological and information operations,
  and the constant publicizing of patrols, raids,
  captures, and other successes.
• For the Insurgents
• Insurgent activity that creates the perception of
  a strong presence can undermine civilians faith
  in the governments ability to protect them. This
  reduces cooperation with the government,
  resulting in greater freedom of action for the
  insurgents and eventually greater control.