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Building Great Organizations A Review of Important Literature


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Title: Building Great Organizations A Review of Important Literature

Building Great Organizations A Review of
Important Literature
By A V Vedpuriswar
  • Much has been written about organizational
    excellence. Here, we look at some of the most
    cited works and try to capture the essence.

Part IThe 4 principles of enduring success
By Christian Stadler Harvard Business Review,
July - 2007
Defining greatness
  • Research by Stadler reveals that in terms of
    total return for shareholders, top companies did
    62 times better than the general market.
  • An investment of 1 in 1953 would be worth
    4,077 today.
  • By contrast, the comparison companies beat the
    general market by a factor of eight, and 1
    would have reaped 713.

Stadlers four principles of enduring success
  • Exploit before you explore.
  • Diversify your business portfolio.
  • Remember your mistakes.
  • Be conservative about change.

Exploit Before You Explore
  • To measure exploration, Stadler used RD spending
    as a percentage of sales and patents issued as a
    percentage of sales. For exploitation, he used
    return on equity, return on sales, and return on
  • Though they did not neglect exploration, as a
    strategy the winners consistently preferred
    exploitation efforts to exploration initiatives.
  • Companies can compensate for insufficient
    exploration capabilities by being more efficient
    exploiters. But they are not able, over the long
    run, to make up for a lack of exploitation
    capabilities through better exploration.
  • In other words, great companies dont only
    innovate. They grow by efficiently exploiting the
    fullest potential of existing innovations.

Glaxo vs Wellcome
  • When Henry Wellcome started his business together
    in 1880, he wanted to make a name for himself as
    a medical pioneer. In pursuit of this aim, he
    sponsored much of the field research then under
    way in tropical medicine.
  • Glaxos story was very different. Founder Joseph
    Edward Nathan, started a new subsidiary in 1905
    to commercialize a patent he had purchased for
    manufacturing dried milk. Thanks to a
    well-organized marketing campaign waged by his
    son Alec, the company quickly became Britains
    leading supplier of dried infant milk.

  • Seventy-six years later, Glaxo repeated the trick
    with Zantac, the ulcer medication it introduced
    in 1981. At the time, the leaders were
    SmithKline, Pfizer, and Eli Lilly. Glaxo was a
    latecomer, launching Zantac five years after
    SmithKlines best-selling ulcer medication,
  • Zantac had no remarkable scientific or medical
    advantage over Tagamet. The only difference was
    that Zantac was packaged in such a way that fewer
    pills were required each day.
  • SmithKline continued to invest heavily in RD,
    but Glaxo fared much better in terms of sales and
    profitability so much so that it was eventually
    able to purchase its more innovative competitor
    in 2000.

Ericsson Vs Nokia
  • Ericssons strong army of researchers had made
    the company a pioneer with its GPRS wireless data
    communication and third-generation mobile
    technology standards. Unfortunately, these
    advances came at a high price large-scale
    duplication of research efforts, hefty RD
    expenditures, and big, risky bets on the future
    direction of mobile technology. When the telecom
    industry entered into recession in 2001, Ericsson
    was hit hard. It laid off approximately 60,000
    people and closed many research centers.
    Eventually it decided to combine its mobile
    business with Sonys.
  • Nokia, on the other hand, focused on
    exploitation. With margins under pressure in the
    mid-1990s, Nokia streamlined operations, cut
    inventories, and renegotiated component prices
    and delivery terms. When the telecom industry
    entered a recession, Nokia was far better
    prepared than Ericsson, and it remains a leading
    global competitor in mobile telephony.

Diversify Your Business Portfolio
  • Few people today would dispute that
    conglomeration is a poor strategy. But firms
    focusing on a single business or set of
    capabilities too do not seem much better when
    viewed from a long-term perspective.
  • Single-business companies perform very well in
    the short run, but over several decades, a
    different picture emerges.
  • Many of the single-business firms simply cease to
    exist. Once their primary offering reaches the
    end of its life span, the only possible next
    steps are decline, merger, or sale.
  • Which is why great companies are as suspicious of
    focusing too narrowly as they are careful about

Alliance vs AM Product diversification
  • The story of the German insurance giant Allianz,
    is a study in how to build a broad customer base.
    From its creation in 1890, the company had a
    strategy of diversifying its business portfolio.
  • On the other hand Aachener und Münchener (AM),
    founded in 1824, showed little ambition to become
    a broadly based insurance provider. While Allianz
    went from strength to strength, AM struggled.

Lafarge vs Ciments Francais Geographic
  • Geographic diversification is as important as
    product range, as the contrasting experiences of
    the two leading French cement producers show.
  • Lafarge began as a family-controlled cement
    producer in southern France. Lafarge felt that it
    could not rely on its home market alone and
    diversified internationally at an early date.
  • The first step abroad was a large contract to
    deliver 110,000 tonnes of lime for the
    construction of the Suez Canal in 1864.
  • After World War II, Lafarge used the cash
    generated by post war growth to speed its
    internationalization and diversify into related
    industries, such as aggregates and ready-mix
  • When the first oil crisis ended the building boom
    in France in 1973, Lafarge was doing business in
    15 countries. Growth opportunities in the
    developing world thus compensated for the
    slowdown in France.
  • Originally, in 1846, a producer of Portland
    cement in northern France, Ciments Francais
    operated almost exclusively in France for the
    next 100 years.

Ericsson vs Nokia Vendor diversification
  • Supply-side diversification also matters. On
    March 17, 2000, a fire in a Philips factory in
    Albuquerque, New Mexico, disrupted the global
    mobile-phone supply chain.
  • Nokia had alternative suppliers in the U.S. and
    Japan, which were able to deliver most of the
    components destroyed in Albuquerque.
  • Ericsson, on the other hand, had no backup
    suppliers. In an early cost-cutting exercise, the
    company had decided to concentrate on a single
    supplier and paid the price. While the
    Albuquerque incident had no lasting negative
    effect for Nokia, it marked the beginning of
    Ericssons steady decline in mobile telephony.

Remember your mistakes
  • What really separates the great companies from
    the good ones is that the great companies also
    remember their mistakes.
  • They take learning from mistakes very seriously,
    taking care not to make the same mistake again.

Shell vs BP
  • Take the case of Shell. Henri Deterding had led
    the merger in 1907 of his Royal Dutch Petroleum
    Company with Shell Transport and Trading to form
    the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. Deterdings strong
    personality and impressive record gave him a
    position of unchallenged power inside Shell.
    Unfortunately, it also put him in a position to
    consider financial and moral support for Adolf
    Hitler, whom Deterding saw as the man most likely
    to preserve Europe from the Communists. Luckily
    for Shell, he retired in 1936, before he could
    make any commitments that would have embarrassed
    the company later on.
  • The company did not forget its narrow escape
    Deterdings successors were never allowed to be
    so powerful. In 1964, the board rejected advice
    from McKinsey Company to install an
    American-style chief executive officer, whose
    official powers would have matched those
    Deterding once wielded. Instead, the board
    installed a Committee of Managing Directors as
    the top executive authority in the company. Its
    chairman was only marginally more responsible
    than its other members.

  • These arrangements stayed in place for decades,
    and only recently following a crisis triggered
    by the companys overstatement of its proven oil
    and gas reserves has Shell opted for a classic
    CEO leadership model. Still, even now, it has
    remained remarkably careful to avoid placing an
    authoritarian leader at the top.
  • BP, in contrast, appears not to have drawn any
    lessons when in 1951 Iran nationalized its
    assets, which accounted for fully 75 of the
    companys oil supply.
  • After receiving compensation two years later
    following a coup, BP failed to diversify its
    asset base significantly in the ensuring decades,
    ending up heavily dependent on a small number of
    sites in Alaska and the North Sea.
  • As oil prices plummeted toward the end of the
    1990s, those assets lost value, and BP found
    itself caught short again. BP is now as heavily
    dependent on sites in Russia and other former
    Soviet states as it was on its Iranian assets.

HSBC vs Standard Chartered
  • The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
    was set up in 1865 by the merchant community in
    Hong Kong to finance international trade. A close
    relationship with the banks main customers
    guaranteed a strong start, but there were also
  • Financing investments in fixed assets in China
    turned out to be riskier than anticipated, and
    access to London capital was more complicated for
    HSBC than it was for its UK-based competitors.
    HSBC was badly affected when a severe recession
    struck in 1873.
  • The bank decided to adopt a more balanced
    management approach.
  • In 1876, it established a second executive board
    in London, creating a balance of power between
    the trade finance business in the East and the
    capital allocation center in London.
  • The bank also continued to build up reserves and
    made sure that senior managers no longer had
    business interests outside the bank.

  • Standard Chartered, in contrast, did not learn
    from its biggest mistake, which was creating a
    centralized London-based management system, which
    had a limited understanding of the China market.
  • It lost major business to HSBC on numerous
    occasions in the mid-1860s, for instance, it
    lost out because repayment periods for trade
    bills were shortened by London against the advice
    of local managers.
  • Nonetheless, the company stuck to the old system.
    In the following decades, the firm survived
    despite, not because of, its centralized
    management. Local branch managers simply ignored
    orders from London, which they saw as unfit.

Be Conservative About Change
  • Great companies go through radical change only at
    very selective moments in their history.
  • Jumping onto every new management wave is not for
  • These companies use their core values and
    principles as guidelines and approach change in a
    culturally sensitive manner that requires
    patience to work through.

  • Siemens took a very deliberate approach to its
    changes, initiating them only when it could see a
    clear strategic case for restructuring the
    business portfolio and then taking its time over
    implementation to make the transformation as
    painless as possible for the workforce.
  • Change came to Siemens for four reasons, any one
    of which would on its own have provided ample
  • First, management recognized that the
    long-standing separation between its high-current
    (power generation) and low current
    (telecommunications) technologies was no longer
  • Second, as the group faced pressure to merge
    these two subsidiaries, management was also aware
    that the companys long-standing consumer
    business was fitting less and less well with the
    high- and low-current activities, which were
    driving growth.
  • Third, on top of these strategic considerations
    was the fear of what would happen when
    then-chairman Ernst von Siemens retired.
  • Finally, the German government was preparing
    legislation that would force the corporation to
    reveal sensitive information about its operations
    unless it consolidated its subsidiaries.

  • Siemens was very deliberate in the way it
    responded to those pressures. It began laying the
    groundwork for the disposition of its consumer
    businesses in 1957, when it brought its radio,
    TV, and appliances businesses together to create
    a new subsidiary, Siemens Electrogeräte. Over the
    following years, it closed or sold off the radio
    and TV production businesses, leaving it with a
    rump appliance business, which it spun off into a
    joint venture with Robert Bosch, a leading
    appliance maker, in 1967, a full decade after it
    had begun the process. Initially, BSH Bosch und
    Siemens Hausgeräte was hardly more than a joint
    sales force, and only over the years did it start
    to integrate production.
  • The company was no less deliberate in its
    response to the pressure to integrate the low
    current and high current subsidiaries. Halske and
    Schuckert. The decision to merge them was
    announced in 1965, but it was not until 1969 that
    the two subsidiaries were formally replaced by
    six divisions components, data technology,
    energy technology, installation technology,
    medical technology, and telecommunications.
  • Culturally, the change took even longer.
    Management left many of the traditional
    arrangements and practices in place for as long
    as 20 years after the reorganization had been
    formally completed. Arguably, the convergence was
    not completed until the late 1980s, when another
    transformation process was initiated. In
    contrast, silver medalist AEG took a far hastier
    and less sensitive approach.

Part IIGood to GreatBy Jim Collins
Good to Great
  • Jim Collins makes some pertinent observations, in
    his book, based on extensive research
  • Larger-than-life, celebrity leaders who ride in
    from the outside are negatively correlated with
    taking a company from good to great.
  • The good-to-great companies do not focus
    principally on what to do to become great. They
    focus equally on what not to do and what to stop
  • Technology and technology-driven change have
    virtually nothing to do with the transformation
    from good to great. Technology can accelerate a
    transformation, but cannot cause a
  • Mergers and acquisitions play virtually no role
    in igniting a transformation from good to great.
    Two big mediocre entities joined together never
    make one great company.

  • The good-to-great companies pay scant attention
    to managing change, motivating people, or
    creating alignment. They create the right
    conditions so that the problems of commitment,
    alignment, motivation, and change do not have to
    be dealt with separately.
  • The good-to-great companies have no name, tag
    line, launch event, or program to signify their
    transformations. Indeed, some were unaware of the
    magnitude of the transformation at the time. Only
    later, in retrospect, did it become clear. They
    produced a truly revolutionary leap in results,
    but not by a revolutionary process.
  • The good-to-great companies are not, by and
    large, in inherently attractive industries. In
    fact, some are in terrible industries. Greatness
    is not a function of circumstances. Greatness, is
    largely a matter of conscious choice.
  • Compared to high-profile leaders with big
    personalities who make headlines and become
    celebrities, the good-to-great leaders are
    self-effacing, quiet, reserved, even shy. These
    leaders are a paradoxical blend of personal
    humility and professional will.

  • Good-to-great leaders first get the right people
    on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the
    right people in the right seats. Then they figure
    out where to drive it.
  • Every good-to-great company embraces unwavering
    faith that it will succeed, regardless of the
    difficulties. At the same time, such companies
    have the discipline to confront the hard reality,
    however unpleasant it might be.
  • Going from good to great implies a better
    understanding of competence. Just because
    something is a companys core business, or
    because it has been doing it for years does not
    necessarily mean it can be the best in the world
    at it. And if it cannot be the best in the world
    in its core business, then its core business
    cannot form the basis of a great company.
  • All companies have a culture, some companies have
    discipline, but few companies have a culture of
    discipline. When there is discipline, hierarchy,
    bureaucracy and excessive controls are not
    needed. A culture of discipline combined with
    entrepreneurship, leads to great performance.

  • Let us examine some of these points in a little
    more detail.

Level 5 Leadership
  • Compared to high-profile leaders with big
    personalities who make headlines and become
    celebrities, the good-to-great leaders seem to
    have come from Mars. Self-effacing, quiet,
    reserved, even shy these leaders are a
    paradoxical blend of personal humility and
    professional will. They are more like Lincoln and
    Socrates than Patton or Caesar.

First who Then What.
  • Good-to-great leaders first got the right people
    on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the
    right people in the right seats and then they
    figured out where to drive it.

Confront the Brutal Facts (Yet Never Lose Faith)
  • Good-to-great companies embrace the Stockdale
  • They maintain unwavering faith that they can and
    will prevail in the end, regardless of the
  • AND
  • at the same time have the discipline to confront
    the most brutal facts of their current reality,
    whatever they might be.

The Hedgehog Concept (Simplicity within the Three
  • To go from good to great requires transcending
    the curse of competence. Just because something
    is a core business just because the company has
    been doing it for years or perhaps even decades
    does not necessarily mean the company can be
    the best in the world at it.
  • And if the company cannot be the best in the
    world at its core business it absolutely cannot
    from the basis of a great company.
  • It must be replaced with a simple concept
    that reflects deep understanding of three
    intersecting circles.

A Culture of Discipline
  • All companies have a culture, some companies
    have discipline, but few companies have a culture
    of discipline.
  • When a company has disciplined people, it does
    not need hierarchy.
  • When there is disciplined thought, bureaucracy
    is not needed. Disciplined action obviates the
    need for excessive controls.
  • A culture of discipline combined with
    entrepreneurship leads to great performance.

Technology Accelerators
  • Good-to-great companies think differently about
    the role of technology.
  • They never use technology as the primary means
    of igniting a transformation.
  • Yet, paradoxically, they are pioneers in the
    application of carefully selected technologies.

The Flywheel and the Doom Loop
  • Those who launch revolutions, dramatic change
    programs, and wrenching restructuring are
    unlikely to succeed.
  • No matter how dramatic the end result, the
    good-to-great transformations never happened in
    one fell swoop.
  • There was no single defining action, no grand
    program, no one killer innovation, no solitary
    lucky break, no miracle moment.
  • Rather, the process resembled relentlessly
    pushing a giant heavy flywheel in one direction,
    turn upon turn, building momentum until a point
    of breakthrough, and beyond.

Part IIIBuilt to lastBy Collins and Porras
Built to last
By Collins and Porras
  • According to Collins, the Good-to-Great ideas lay
    the groundwork for the ultimate success of the
    Built to Last ideas.
  • Good-to-Great provides the core ideas for getting
    a flywheel turning from build up through
    breakthrough, while Built to Last outlines the
    core ideas for keeping a flywheel accelerating
    long into the future and elevating a company to
    iconic stature.
  • Each of the Good-to-Great findings enables all
    four of the key ideas from Built-to-Last. Those
    four key ideas are
  • Clock Building, Not Time Telling. Building an
    organization that can endure and adapt through
    multiple generation of leaders and multiple
    product life cycles as opposed to being built
    around a single great leader or a single great

  • Genius of AND. Embracing both extremes on a
    number of dimensions at the same time. Instead of
    choosing A or B, the built to last companies
    figure out how to have A and B purpose and
    profit, continuity and change, freedom and
    responsibility, etc.
  • Core Ideology. Instilling core values and core
    purpose as principles to guide decisions and to
    inspire people throughout the organization over a
    long period of time.
  • Preserve the Core/Stimulate Progress. Preserving
    the core ideology as an anchor point while
    stimulating change, improvement, innovation, and
    renewal in everything else. Change practices and
    strategies while holding core values and purpose
    fixed. Set and achieve Bhags consistent with the
    core ideology.

Part IVIn Search of ExcellenceBy Peters and
The 8 attributes of excellent companies
  • Peters Waterman identified eight attributes
    that characterised excellent, innovative
  • A bias for action. These companies like to get
    on with it. Even though these companies may be
    analytical in their approach to decision making,
    they are not paralyzed by endless analysis. In
    many of these companies the standard operating
    procedure is Do it, fix it, try it.
  • Close to the customer. These companies learn from
    the people they serve. They provide unparalleled
    quality, service, and reliability things that
    work and last.
  • Autonomy and entrepreneurship. These companies
    foster many leaders and many innovators
    throughout the organization. They dont try to
    hold everyone on so short a rein that they cant
    be creative. They encourage practical risk
    taking, and support good hires.

  • Productivity through people. The excellent
    companies treat the rank and file as the root
    source of quality and productivity gain. They do
    not regard capital investment as the fundamental
    source of efficiency improvement.
  • Hands-on value driven. CEOs walk the plant floors
    and regularly visit retail outlets and assess
    them on the factors the company holds dear.
  • Stick to the knitting. While there were a few
    exceptions, the odds for excellent performance
    seem strong to favour those companies that stayed
    reasonably close to businesses they know.
  • Simple form, lean staff. The underlying
    structure, forms and systems in the excellent
    companies are elegantly simple. Top-level staffs
    are lean.
  • Simultaneous loose-tight properties. The
    excellent companies are both centralized and
    decentralized. Even as they push autonomy down
    to the shop floor or product development team,
    they are fanatic centralists around the few core
    values they hold dear.

Part VUnderstanding the new paradigm
The Individualised corporation Ghoshal
Bartlett Transformation of management roles
Management competencies for new roles
Part VIGetting into action mode
The importance of purposeful action Creating a
bias for action Ghoshal Bruch
  • Most managers know roughly if not exactly what is
    to be done but few get around to action mode.
  • People who exhibit purposeful action possess two
    critical traits energy and focus.
  • Energy implies a high level of personal
    involvement and effort, engaged, and self-driven
  • Focus requires discipline to resist distraction,
    overcome problems and persist in the face of
    unanticipated setbacks.

Four kinds of managerial behaviour
  • The Frenzied They are highly energetic but very
    unfocused and appear to others as frenzied,
    desperate, and hasty.
  • The Procrastinators They postpone the work that
    really matters to the organization because they
    lack both energy and focus. They often feel
    insecure and fear failure.
  • The Detached They are disengaged or detached
    from their work altogether. They are focused but
    lack energy and often seem aloof, tense, and
  • The Purposeful They get the job done. They are
    highly focused and energetic and come across as
    reflective and calm, amidst chaos.

Motivation and Willpower
  • Motivation might suffice in helping managers
    sustain organizational routines. But the more
    important tasks are usually complex and require
    creativity and innovation. When dealing with
    ambitious goals, high uncertainty and extreme
    opposition, managers have to rely on a different
    force, the power of their will.
  • Willpower goes beyond motivation. It enables
    managers to execute disciplined action, even when
    they are disinclined to do something, uninspired
    by the work, or tempted by other opportunities.
    Willpower gives managers an insatiable need to
    produce results.
  • Willpower enables managers to overcome barriers,
    deal with setbacks, and persevere to the end.
    Wilful managers resolve to achieve their
    intention, no matter what.

The Three Traps of Nonaction
  • The trap of overwhelming demands
  • The trap of unbearable constraints.
  • The trap of unexplored choices.

The trap of overwhelming demands.
  • Purposeful action-takers manage their demands by
  • developing an explicit personal agenda
  • practicing slow management
  • structuring contact time
  • shaping demands and managing expectations.

The trap of unbearable constraints.
  • To unshackle themselves from this trap,
    purposeful action-takers adopt strategies like
  • Mapping relevant constraints
  • Accepting trade-offs
  • Selectively breaking rules
  • Tolerating conflicts and ambiguity

The trap of unexplored choices
  • The third trap of non action is unexplored
  • Many managers concentrate on immediate needs and
  • They do not perceive or exploit their freedom to
    make choices about what they would do and how
    they would do it.

Unleashing Organizational Energy for Collective
  • The real challenge for most organizations is to
    tap their energy and channelise it into
    purposeful action.

Comfort Zone
  • Corporations that have succeeded for long
    periods in a relatively stable environment often
    settle into the comfort zone.
  • Characterized by weak but positive emotions
    such as calm and contentedness, they lack the
    internal vitality, alertness, and emotional
    tension necessary for initiating bold, new
    strategic initiatives.
  • Inertia stems from the belief that they have
    found the ultimate success formula.

Resignation zone
  • Companies in the resignation zone have the same
    low-energy intensity as those in the comfort
  • But these people find themselves in the grip of
    weak emotions, such as frustration and
  • Typically, they suffer from low levels of
    emotional commitment, alertness, and effort.
  • Persistent mediocrity makes people lose their
    confidence in dealing with problems or
  • Believing that nothing they can do would make any
    difference, they passively resign themselves to
    their fate.
  • Companies in the resignation zone believe that
    they are simply not good enough to succeed.

Corrosion Zone
  • Companies in the corrosion zone show a high
    degree of energy, intense levels of activity and
    emotional involvement.
  • They draw that intensity from strong emotions,
    such as anger, fear, or hate.
  • The interplay of high energy and destructive
    responses is one of the most debilitating energy
    states in which a company can find itself.
  • With much of the companys energy dedicated to
    internal conflicts, rumors, micropolitics, or
    other destructive activities, the effort needed
    to cope with fear, suspicion, and rivalry drains
    peoples vitality and stamina, leaving little
    left for productive work.

Productive Zone
  • Unlike companies in the corrosive, resignation
    and comfort zones, those in the productive zone
    display high emotional tension, alertness, and
  • Employees work with a sense of urgency, driven by
    enthusiasm, positive excitement, joy, and pride
    in their work rather than anger, fear, or
    internal rivalry.
  • Typically, these companies strive for challenges
    that surpass the routine, the obvious, and the
  • While low-energy companies look for
    standardization and institutionalization,
    avoiding surprises and risks whenever possible,
    companies in the productive zone thrive on
    surprises, the excitement of the unknown, and
    novel opportunities.
  • A sense of urgency and alertness, allows them to
    process information and mobilize resources
  • Inevitably, these organizations also have leaders
    who direct their people toward shared purposes,
    channeling the companys potential by aligning
    its collective perception, emotions, and
    activities to pursue business-critical

Slaying the dragon and Winning the princess
  • Companies that achieve truly radical change have
    leaders who adopt one of three approaches for
    focusing the energy of their organizations and
    moving them into the productive zone.
  • Some adopt the slaying-the-dragon strategy,
    driving their people out of the comfort zone by
    focusing their emotion, attention, and action on
    a crisis or a threat to overcome.
  • Others pursue a winning-the princess strategy,
    moving their organizations into the productive
    zone by building peoples enthusiasm for
    realizing a specific, motivating dream.
  • A few others use a combination of these strategies

Strategies for summoning willpower
  • There are six strategies that leaders can use to
    help managers summon their will power
  • Strategy 1 Help managers visualize their
  • Strategy 2 Prepare managers for obstacles
  • Strategy 3 Encourage managers to confront their
  • Strategy 4 Develop a climate of choice
  • Strategy 5 Build a self-regulating system
  • Strategy 6 Create a desire for the sea

Building employee loyalty
  • Broad loyalty to an organization is increasingly
    difficult to achieve and sustain.
  • Besides, such general commitment, even if
    achieved, does not necessarily lead to purposeful
    action on specific tasks.
  • A diffused sense of organizational loyalty often
    creates a taken-for-granted kind of relationship
    between managers and the company that actually
    dulls the edge of execution.
  • The best way leaders can build effective
    organizational commitment, is through a bottom-up
    style that emphasizes personal ownership and
    commitment to specific initiatives and goals.