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Industrial Process Safety Lessons from major accidents and their application in traditional workplace safety and health

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Industrial Process Safety Lessons from major accidents and their application in traditional workplace safety and health Graham D. Creedy, P. Eng, FCIC, FEIC – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Industrial Process Safety Lessons from major accidents and their application in traditional workplace safety and health


1
Industrial Process Safety Lessons from major
accidents and their application in traditional
workplace safety and health
Graham D. Creedy, P. Eng, FCIC, FEIC Formerly
Senior Manager, Responsible Care Canadian
Chemical Producers Association (now Chemistry
Industry Association of Canada) gcreedy_at_canadianch
emistry.ca System Safety Society Spring
Event May 26, 2011
2
Overview
  • How I got into this
  • The evolution of the philosophy of industrial
    safety and prevention of major accidents
  • Some key insights and concepts
  • How these apply to management of workplace safety
    in various sectors and at different levels of the
    organization

3
Some history
  • 1984 Bhopal accident is wake-up call to chemical
    industry
  • Industry responsibility to understand and control
    hazards and risks
  • Responsible Care launched in Canada
  • Principles, codes, commitment, tools, support,
    progress tracking, verification
  • Major Industrial Accidents Council of Canada
    1987-1999

4
Safety Performance by Industry Sector Injuries
illnesses per 200,000 hours worked (2002)
Source US Bureau of Labor Statistics
(www.bls.gov/iif)
5
Relative risks of fatal accidents in the work
place of selected occupations
Sanders, R.E, J. Hazardous Materials 115 (2004)
p143, citing Toscano (1997)
6
Chemistry Industry Association of Canada Member
Performance
CIAC website www.canadianchemistry.ca Staff
contact Stephanie Butler 613-237-6215 x 245
7
A proactive approach focuses on these
categories, but be careful you may miss the
really serious ones!
8
Terminology
  • Process hazard
  • A physical situation with potential to cause harm
    to people, property or the environment
  • Risk (acute)
  • probability x consequences of an undesired event
    occurring

9
They thought they were safe
  • Good companies can be lulled into a false sense
    of security by their performance in personal
    safety and health
  • They may not realise how vulnerable they are to a
    major accident until it happens
  • Subsequent investigations typically show that
    there were multiple causes, and many of these
    were known long before the event

BP Deepwater Horizon
10
Why and how defences fail
  • People often assume systems work as intended,
    despite warning signs
  • Examples of good performance are cited as
    representing the whole, while poor ones are
    overlooked or soon forgotten
  • Analysis of failure modes and effects should
    include human and organizational aspects as well
    as equipment, physical and IT systems

11
  • Process safety management
  • Recognition of seriousness of consequences and
    mechanisms of causation lead to focus on the
    process rather than the individual worker
  • Many of the key decisions influencing safety may
    be beyond the control of the worker or even the
    site they may be made by people at another
    site, country or organization
  • Causes differ from those for personnel safety
  • Need to look at the whole materials, equipment
    and systems and consider individuals and
    procedures as part of the system
  • Management system approach for control

Flixborough, Bhopal, Pasadena
12
Scope (elements of process safety management)
  • Accountability
  • Process Knowledge and Documentation
  • Capital Project Review and Design Procedures
  • Process Risk Management
  • Management of Change
  • Process and Equipment Integrity
  • Human Factors
  • Training and Performance
  • Incident Investigation
  • Company Standards, Codes and Regulations
  • Audits and Corrective Actions
  • Enhancement of Process Safety Knowledge

CCPS Guidelines for Technical Management of
Chemical Process Safety
13
Functions of a management system
Direction
Measurement
Structure
Results
CCPS Guidelines for Technical Management of
Chemical Process Safety
14
Features and characteristics of a management
system for process safety
CCPS Guidelines for Technical Management of
Chemical Process Safety
15
Examples of PSM management systems concerns at
different organizational levels
CCPS Guidelines for Technical Management of
Chemical Process Safety
16
A page from the Site Self-Assessment Tool
17
Use of self-assessment tool for collective
progress reporting and action As of August 29,
2008 compared with past five years (some site
changes) Target for meeting Essential level
June 30, 2003
18
Process-Related Incident Measure (PRIM) 2007
Findings All Elements
19
Assessing an organizations safety effectiveness
  • What is the safety policy and culture (written,
    unwritten)?
  • How are the following handled?
  • Establishing what has to be done
  • Benchmarking
  • Communicating
  • Assigning accountabilities
  • Ensuring that it gets done
  • Monitoring and corrective action
  • Evidence (documentation) and audit process
  • Resourcing not only for ideal but for
    anticipated conditions
  • Balancing with other priorities
  • How are exceptions handled?

20
Consider targets in groups
  • Those who
  • Dont care
  • Dont know (and perhaps dont know that they
    dont know)
  • Did know, but may have forgotten or could have
    gaps in application (and perhaps dont realize
    it)

21
  • Excellent guidance exists but how is it being
    used?

22
The New Product Introduction Curve
  • Can be applied to adoption of new ideas
  • Categories differ by ability and more
    importantly, motivation

23
Accountability
  • Management commitment at all levels
  • Status of process safety compared to other
    organizational objectives such as output, quality
    and cost
  • Objectives must be supported by appropriate
    resources
  • Be accessible for guidance, communicate and lead

24
Management of Change
  • Change of process technology
  • Change of facility
  • Organizational changes
  • Variance procedures
  • Permanent changes
  • Temporary changes

25
Process and Equipment Integrity
  • Design to handle all anticipated conditions, not
    just ideal or typical ones
  • Make sure what you get is what you designed
    (construction, installation)
  • Test to make sure the design is indeed valid
  • Make sure it stays that way
  • Preventative maintenance
  • Ongoing maintenance
  • Review
  • Be especially careful of automatic safeguards

26
  • Consider operator as fallible human performing
    tasks in background
  • Design for error tolerance, not just prevention
  • detection
  • correction

Buncefield, UK
27
  • Realization of significance of sociocultural
    factors in human thought processes and hence in
    behaviours

28
Human behaviour aspects
Familiarity to engineers More
  • People, and most organizations, dont intend to
    get hurt (have accidents)
  • To understand why they do leads us eventually
    into understanding human behaviour, both at the
    individual and organizational level, and
    involves
  • Physical interface
  • Ergonomics
  • Psychological interface
  • Perception, decision-making, control actions
  • Human thought processes
  • Basis for reaching decisions
  • Ideal versus actual behaviour
  • Social psychology
  • Relationships with others
  • Organizational behaviour

Less
29
Human behaviour modes
  • Instead of looking at the ways in which people
    can fail, look at how they function normally
  • Skill-based
  • Rapid responses to internal states with only
    occasional attention to external info to check
    that events are going according to plan
  • Often starts out as rule-based
  • Rule-based
  • IF, THEN
  • Rules need not make sense they only need to
    work, and one has to know the conditions under
    which a particular rule applies
  • Knowledge-based
  • Used when no rules apply but some appropriate
    action must be found
  • Slowest, but most flexible

30
Reasons Cheese Model James Reason,
presentation to Eurocontrol 2004
31
Active and latent failures
  • Active
  • Immediately adverse effect
  • Similar to unsafe act
  • Latent
  • Effect may not be noticeable for some time, if at
    all
  • Similar to resident pathogen. Unforeseen
    trigger conditions could activate the pathogens
    and defences could be undermined or unexpectedly
    outflanked

32
A Classic Example of a Latent Failure
  • Hazard of material known, but lack of awareness
    of potential system failure mode leads to
    defective procedure design through management
    decision

Epichlorhydrin fire, Avonmouth, UK
33
And another
Danvers, MA, Nov 2006 Solvent explosion at
printing ink factory
  • Hazards known, but defences compromised by
    apparently benign change
  • Latent error in procedure design creates
    vulnerability to likely execution error

US Chemical Safety Board
34
And another
  • Hazard of material not obvious (despite history)
  • Latent error allowed dust to accumulate, creating
    conditions for subsequent events

Scottsbluff, NE 1996
Port Wentworth, GA 2007
35
Lessons from other fields
  • Aerospace and nuclear show how significant human
    and organizational aspects can be even where the
    obvious signs of failure are technical in nature
  • Finance shows
  • Relevance of such factors without technical
    distractions
  • How fast a system can deteriorate once controls
    are relaxed
  • How wrong risk assessments can influence bad
    policy decisions

36
Relevance of organizational factors
  • The relevance of organizational factors has
    also been graphically and tragically revealed in
    the inquiry reports of recent UK transportation
    and offshore oil disasters.
  • Prior to ..., senior managers in all the
    organizations propounded the pre-eminence of
    safety. They believed in the efficacy of the
    regulatory system, in the adequacy of their
    existing programs, and in their confidence of the
    skills and motivation of their staff.
  • The inquiry reports reveal that their belief in
    safety was a mirage, their systems inadequate,
    and operator errors and violations commonplace.
  • The inquiry reports stated that ultimate
    responsibility lay with complacent directors and
    managers who had failed to ensure that their good
    intentions were translated into a practical and
    monitored reality. Moreover, the weaknesses so
    starkly revealed were not matters of substantial
    concern to the regulatory authorities before the
    accidents.

HSC, 1993
37
Factors that can influence likelihood of failure
  • Organizational culture
  • the way we do things around here when no-one
    is looking
  • increasingly being recognized as one of the most
    important factors in major accidents
  • perceived balance between output, cost and safety
    is heavily dependent on this culture, and
    influences whether personnel work in a certain
    way because they believe the company and their
    co-workers feel it is the right way to do things,
    or whether they are simply going through the
    motions.

38
In general, safety gets better as society learns
more
Standard of Safety
Time
39
But the rate of improvement is not steady
Standard of Safety
x 10
Time
40
In fact, the curve can be one of periodic rapid
gains followed by gradual but increasing declines
Note how the rate of decay can be expected to
increase due to normalization of deviance
Standard of Safety
x 100
Time
41
Organizational Culture Model James W. Bayer,
Senior VP Mfg, Lyondell Chemical Company
Strong
Tribal
Operational Excellence
People
Chaotic
Bureaucratic
Weak
Strong
Systems
42
Preservation or loss of corporate memory
  • Demographic effects
  • Less staff
  • Experienced cohort leaving or left
  • Skills transfer senior gt (middle) gt junior
  • Replacements understand the way something is
    done, but not why it is done that way, the
    potential consequences of doing it differently
    and how to detect and recover from undesired
    actions
  • We are starting to see lowered standards of
    design and supervision that fifteen years ago
    would have been unthinkable in the chemical
    industry (Challenger, 2004)

43
  • What does an organizations investigation of its
    failures reveal about its
  • Culture
  • Management system?

44
  • Knowledge
  • Never realized problem could occur (benchmarking
    error)
  • was it treated as a unique deficiency?
  • was there a broader review of the benchmarking
    process to find if there are other areas where
    knowledge could be deficient?
  • Policy
  • Thought situation would be acceptable but didnt
    realize full implications until it happened
  • Does it appear to be acceptable now?
  • Was review of policy and accountability limited
    or broad in scope?
  • System design
  • Even if everything had been done as intended,
    problem would still have occurred
  • How comprehensive was analysis of system
    deficiencies and practicality of solutions?
  • How effective is action plan and follow through?
  • Was review of system design limited or broad in
    scope?
  • System execution (management system error)
  • Problem occurred because someone or something did
    not perform as intended
  • Did analysis consider why execution not as
    intended?
  • Was corrective action appropriate and balanced?
  • Was review of system execution limited or broad
    in scope?

45
Dealing with a Safety (or Engineering) Problem
  • Finding out who youre dealing with
  • Where is the organization on the curve?
    (generally, and re the specific issue or problem)
  • Where are the people youre dealing with on the
    curve? (generally, and re the issue or problem)
  • Finding out what to do
  • Benchmark dont try to reinvent the wheel
    unless youre sure there isnt one already (or
    youve time and its fun to do so)
  • Find out what others are doing about it
  • Read the instructions
  • Identify/define the issue
  • If its likely to be regulated, check with
    government agencies, trade associations, web,
    internet
  • If not regulated but likely good industry
    practice, check suppliers, other users of same
    material or item, other users of similar items,
    other industry contacts but test the info!!!
    (cross-check, ask if it makes sense)
  • Check standard reference works, (Lees, CCPS, etc)
  • Doing it
  • Try to think of all situations that are likely to
    occur (process, eqpt, people)
  • KISS, keep it user-friendly, show basis for
    decisions if practical to do so
  • Follow up afterwards to see how its working

46
Questions?
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