Title: Science and Secrecy: NSDD 189 Prologue to A New Dialogue
1Science and SecrecyNSDD 189 - Prologue to A
New Dialogue?
- American Association for the Advancement of
Science - RD Colloquium
- April 10, 2003
- John C. Crowley
- Vice President for Federal Relations
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2My Assignment
- To tell briefly the story of a particular slice
of recent science policy history as a possible
prologue to the future. I will briefly look at - - the late 1940s
- - the fears of the early 1980s and origins of
NSDD 189 - - the concerns of the post-911 era
- - conclusion.
3Little Is Truly New Here. The Tensions Between
Science and Security Are Deeply Rooted.
- The tensions between science and national
security during World War II are well documented
and widely known. - Following the war, in 1947, the Presidents
Scientific Research Board report on Science and
Public Policy included the following statement
4- Strict military security in the narrow sense is
not entirely consistent with the broader
requirements of national security. To be secure
as a Nation we must maintain a climate conducive
to the full flowering of free inquiry. However
important secrecy about military weapons may be,
the fundamental discoveries of researchers must
circulate freely to have full beneficial effect.
Security regulations, therefore should be applied
only when strictly necessary and then limited to
specific instruments, machines or processes.
They should not attempt to cover basic principles
of fundamental knowledge.
5AAAS Special Committee on Civil Liberties for
Scientists19 August 1949
- Executive Order No. 9835 -- The Loyalty Order -
no person shall be employed in a federal post if
he is believed to be disloyal to the government
of the United States. - The E.O. goal complete and unswerving loyalty
to the United States of all in its service. - AAAS Committee urged a focus on behavior not
beliefs.
6The AAAS Committee Quoted Judge Cardozo
- Experimentation there may be in many things of
deep concern, but not in setting boundaries to
thought, for thought freely communicated is the
indispensable condition of intelligent
experimentation, the one test of its validity.
7They Concluded by Quoting President Truman
- Continuous research by our best scientists is
the key to American leadership and true national
security. This work may be made impossible by
the creation of an atmosphere in which no man
feels safe against the public airing of unfounded
rumors, gossip and vilification.
8Then, We Endured The Fifties
- The House UnAmerican Activities Committee
- The McCarthy era
- Duck and Cover drills in schools.
9Thirty Years Later, After.
- The Korean War
- The Space Race
- Viet Nam
10The Fears of 1980s Openness Vulnerability to
Soviet Threat
- The U.S. - Soviet relationship deteriorated to
the levels of the Cold War of the 1950s. Fears- - - Loss of militarily significant technology and
superiority - - Loss of technological leadership and know-how
- - Loss of industrial competitiveness.
- Universities were seen as targets, points of
leakage and hemorrhage of technology, as the
Nations soft underbelly.
11National Academies Suspended Bi-Lateral Exchanges
- The only appropriate way for the scientific
community to deal with any kind of problem,
scientific or human, is through reason and
discussionIf we cannot learn how to rationalize
our differences, how to resolve then by argument
rather than by threats and by cutting off
relations, then we are really lost. Weisskopf
and Wilson, Science, 5-30-1980
12The Election of 1980 and the DOD-University
Forum, 1981
- April 3, 2001, HASC Hearing.
- Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary, RE.
- HASC Mandate- A new DSB Report University
Responsiveness to National Security Requirements. - Dr. DeLauer asked AAU for a report (done 11-81).
- DSB report released January, 1982.
- Each report recommended a mechanism for dialogue
be established. - President Paul Gray and Walter Milne of MIT first
made the proposal to AAU.
13DOD-University Forum
- Co-chairs
- Under Secretary DeLauer
- Dr. Donald Kennedy, President, Stanford
University - Members
- - 7 university CEOs
- - 6 senior DOD officials and 3 DBS Members
- Dr. DeLauer established three technical working
groups - Foreign languages and area studies
- Science and engineering education
- Technology Export Controls, David A. Wilson, U.
Ca. Co-chair - Met May, 1982 2-year FACA charter, 12-15-83
- Staff OSD, AAU (on behalf of AAU, ACE, NASULGC)
- Dr. DeLauer retired in1985 the Forum expired.
14The Government, Secrecy, and University
Research, D. Kennedy, 4-23-1982
- Promising signs of change.
- Apply visa controls.
- Classify the technology.
- Enable universities to decide in advance.
- New burdensome regulations will cost the nation
more than it can be worth.
15Contemporary Incidents
- April, 1982, E.O. 12356, broadened authority to
classify information included - - Basic scientific research information not
clearly related to national security may not be
classified. - - The meaning of this was widely debated.
- August, 1982, Raid at San Diego The first 2
papers were withdrawn from 26th annual Society
for Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers
(SPIE) conference in all, more than 100 papers
were withdrawn at government request.
16Wm. D. Carey Handcuffing Science, 9-24-1982
- When a proper concern for the national security
is burdened by clumsy execution, something is
subtracted from the fundamental respect that is
owed the necessary goal of safeguarding defense
secrets. Once confidence in the judgment and the
management of the security process is shaken, its
integrity is served badly. The defense
authorities have very good reason to know that
the scientific community has proved its respect
for the national security through three hot wars
and a long cold one. That respect must be
reciprocated.
17Corson Panel of NAS/NRC, Spring 1982
- Mandate
- - Examine evidence of technology leakage and
methods of controlling it - - Seek policy measures by which competing
national goals of defense and intellectual
freedom could be accommodated satisfactorily. - A Distinguished Panel.
- The Panel Reviewed Classified Information.
18Corson Panel Scientific Communication and
National Security, 9-30-1982
- Security by Secrecy will weaken U.S.
technological capabilities. - There is no practical way to restrict
international scientific communication without
also disrupting domestic scientific
communication. - Build high walls around narrow areas in pursuit
of security by accomplishment. - Identify and devise controls only for Gray
Areas.
1918 Months After Corson Report, May 1984
- After four attempts to formulate a new policy,
hope has faded. M. Wallerstein, Science, May 4,
1984 - Interagency review (National Security Decision
Directive 14-82, NSDD 1-830), remained incomplete
and the process itself classified - DOD internal reviews continued
- Incidents of forced withdrawal of papers
continued.
20DOD Forum Working Group
- From 1982 to 1984 the Working Group tried to
define and then implement a category
unclassified but sensitive i.e.., Corson Panel
gray areas. - April 17, 1984 effort abandoned in favor of only
two categories classified and unclassified. - May 24, 1984 DOD announced a draft national
policy agreed to by DOD and OSTP. - Dialogue produced changes agreed to on 9-14-84.
- October 1, 1984 DeLauer memorandum to the
Services and DARPA - the basis for NSDD 189. - Forum hoped for a new era of closer cooperation.
21Scientific Communications and National Security
R. DeLauer
- Must distinguish science from technology
technology from know-how. - Nature yields her secrets to anyone.
- Ideas cannot be stopped at national borders.
- Benefits of open publication far outweigh the
risks. - Ultimately the relationships among academia,
government and industry will depend on the trust
and understanding among the people who work
together and depend on one another. Science,
10-5-84
22Tested Throughout ThePrinciples of Universities
- When the rubber hits the road, some will take
the money with new restrictions attached. - AAUP has thought it inappropriate to condemn
faculties and universities for making such
arrangements per se, but it has regularly
expressed concern that inconsistency with respect
to academic freedom is a genuine danger that all
academic institutions should weigh carefully in
the research and the restrictions they accept.
Report October 1982 Science, 1-21-1983
23Groucho Expressed The Possibilities His Way
- These are my principles. If you dont like
them, I have others! -
- Once you give up your integrity, everything else
is a piece of cake.
24NSDD 189 September 21, 1985
- It is the policy of this Administration that, to
the maximum extent possible, the products of
fundamental research remain unrestricted. that
where the national security requires control, the
mechanism for control of information generated
during federally-funded fundamental research in
science, technology, and engineering at colleges,
universities and laboratories is classification.
25NSDD 189, cont
- Each federal government agency is responsible
for a)determining whether classification is
appropriate prior to the award of a research
grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if
so, controlling the research results through
standard classification procedures b)
periodically reviewing all research grants,
contracts, or cooperative agreements for
potential classification.
26NSDD 189 cont
- No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or
reporting of federally-funded fundamental
research that has not received national security
classification, except as provided in applicable
U.S. Statutes. - Ronald Reagan, September 21, 1985
27Why The Loophole?
- The final clause represents
- political compromise necessary to obtain it
- the seeds of continuing controversy.
28Todays Fears The Hart-Rudman Commission,
March 2001
- Second only to a weapon of mass destruction
detonating in an American city, we can think of
nothing more dangerous than a failure to manage
properly science, technology, and education for
the common good over the next quarter century.
29Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2,
10-29-01
- 3. Abuse of International Student Status
- The program shall identify sensitive courses of
study, and shall include measures whereby DOS,
DOJ, and U.S. academic institutions, working
together, can identify problematic applicants for
student visas and deny their applicationsthe
Sec.State, AG, Sec.Ed shall consult with the
academic community and other interested parties.
30Dr. Rice Letter to Dr. Harold Brown, CSIS, 11-1-01
- In the context of broad-based review of our
technology transfer controls that will begin this
year, this Administration will review and update
as appropriate the export control policies that
affect basic research in the United States. In
the interim, the policy on the transfer of
scientific, technical and engineering information
set forth in NSDD-189 shall remain in effect, and
we will ensure that this policy is followed. - Dr. John Marburger has reaffirmed this at NAS
and in congressional testimony.
31Three New Statutes
- USA Patriot Act, P.L. 107-56, 10-26-01
- The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act of 2002, P.L. 107-173, 5-14-02 - The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, P.L.
107-188, 6-12-2002 - Problems appear to be greater in
implementation than in statute.
32The Growing Effects of Post-911 Fears
- Access by foreign students and scholars to U.S.
institutions, organizations and conferences
denied. - Last October, almost 100 scientists were
prevented from attending the World Space Congress
in Houston due to visa delays. - Objectionable clauses are inserted into
contracts. - First-time security concerns in the life
sciences e.g.., select agents, inventory
controls, approved persons, laboratory security. - sensitive but unclassified again is bubbling up.
33Effects, cont
- Students and researchers denied return visas.
- Classes, laboratories disrupted.
- Enforcement mechanisms are slowly but steadily
being broadened bottom up without consultation. - Technology Alert List is a creeping blanket
across science, engineering e.g., civil
engineering, urban planning, landscape
architecture. - SEVIS implementation is plagued with problems.
- Well-intentioned individuals in the system are
making self-protective conservative decisions.
34Context 2003
- The Nations security, our global leadership,
the growth of our economy (50) and our health
depend on the excellence of our ST. - Rapidly advancing research and education still
depend on openness within our institutions and
across borders. - Science and technology are global.
- Looking ahead, the U.S. must remain the first
destination of choice for the worlds best minds
they now have unprecedented options.
35Recent Initiatives
- More meetings on this than one can possibly
attend. - House Committee on Science just requested a GAO
study of visa backlog. - CSIS-National Academies 2-year collaboration
- how to manage risks of malevolent use of
sensitive unclassified information - how to address international peer-to-peer
contacts and visits while ensuring a thriving and
secure scientific environment - - fostering dialogue analysis - science and
security - - co-chairs Harold Brown, David Baltimore.
36In Conclusion, This Is Not The 1960s
- The Nations research universities
- - strongly support appropriate homeland security
efforts - - they are prepared to cooperate as partners
with government.
37New Policy Mechanisms Are Needed
- It is time for government to bring universities
and industry to the policy table. - New, clear government-wide policy direction is
needed from the top. - Informed, workable policy will require new
mechanisms of consultation and deep commitments
to collaborative problem solving by universities,
researchers and government. - On April 14, Secretary Ridge will address the
AAU. - A new chapter of this story may begin.
38Thank You (in order of appearance)
- Paul Gray
- Walter Milne
- Richard DeLauer
- Donald Kennedy
- Robert Rosenzweig
- Leo Young
- Jeanne Carney
- David A. Wilson
- Mitchell Wallerstein
- John McTague
- Rosemary Chalk