Session 11 UK EMV Implementation Case Study

1
Session 11 UK EMV Implementation Case Study

• Richard Sanders, Business Consultant
• ACI Worldwide

2
Agenda

• Chip and PIN - a project of exceptional scale
• Drivers
• Solution the UK project structure
• The challenges
• The Public Trial in Northampton key issues,
  learning and conclusions
• Customer Research and Communications
• Views on Success of and Learnings from the
  project

3
Drivers of the UK Chip and PIN Project
4
UK Industry Issues prior to project

• Escalating card fraud trends
• UK PIN infrastructure - LINK ATMs required to
  provide sufficient PIN change/unblock services
• EMV Migration from UKIS and magnetic stripe
• Scheme interchange rates liability shifts
  favoured EMV
• Commercial negotiations between retailers and
  acquirers
• Approach to roll out pilot, regional or big
  bang
• Fallback to magnetic stripe and customer bypass
  requests
• Readiness of US issuers/small APACS members
• Chip card transaction times to be improved
  (originally 6.1 seconds slower than magnetic
  stripe)
• Issuer/acquirer business case imbalances

5
Chip and PIN, a ground breaking initiative to
tackle card fraud in the UK

• UK card industry losing 1m a day to card fraud
  perceived need was to be first to adopt EMV as -
  
• Impacting customer confidence
• Funding other serious crime
• Banks/Retailers partnership required for Chip and
  PIN Rollout
• Regulatory encouragement - Domestic and EU -
  SEPA
• Chip and PIN - the technology of chip combined
  with PIN to protect against counterfeit and lost
  and stolen fraud.
• Chip and PIN - biggest change to payments in the
  UK since Sterling decimalisation a deterrent
  to, but not the panacea for, plastic card fraud
• Seen as a migration plan to multi-application etc

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Chip and PIN The Do Nothing Option
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UK Card Fraud The Facts Prior to Rollout
425
450
411
402
400
317
350
300
250
millions
189
200
135
130
122
150
97
97
83
100
50
0
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Source, APACS

• UK lost over 400 million through plastic card
  fraud in 2001, 2002 and 2003
• Card fraud had affected one in three people in
  the UK
• A fraudulent transaction was taking place every 8
  seconds
• Without Chip and PIN forecasts indicate that UK
  fraud losses would reach 800m pa by 2005.

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UK Issuer/Acquirer EMV Business Case

• Primary driver anti fraud
• Reduction in Counterfeit fraud (2000-2001 50),
• Lost/Stolen (2000-2001 12) fraud
• Avoid liability shift and future fraud avoidance
• Improve credibility of, and consumer confidence
  in plastic card payments (and drive migration
  from cash and cheques)
• Control of operational costs off-line
  auths,chargebacks
• Deliver greater certainty of payment
• Protect against international fraud migration
• Secondary drivers
• Infrastructure for new income streams - ID
  authentication, , loyalty and multi-application,
  prepaid, biometrics
• Improved customer service
• Review of need for hot card files
• Greater use of unmanned terminals
• Reduced cash usage

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Retailer Business Case Some argue there isnt
one BUT

• Retailers had a case if avoidance of liability
  shift fraud counted as a benefit - resisted
  change in this despite pressure from particularly
  Spain
• Retailers (in aggregate) had a case for Chip and
  PIN without fraud avoidance as there are
  non-fraud benefits -
• Virtual elimination of need to respond to RFIs
  and therefore reduced cost of chargeback handling
• No need to retain payment receipts for most
  domestic transactions
• Onus of identifying the cardholder shifted from
  POS staff to technology
• Opportunity for staff and operational savings
  through introduction of self pay technology
  (market benefits) and loyalty schemes etc
• Reduced telephone costs through revised
  authorisation strategies
• Large merchants delayed adopting Chip only (UKIS)
  due to a 7 year hardware replacement cycle
  waiting for EMV to provide internal system
  improvements trial data would assess business
  impact
• Need to support the Card Industry for business
  growth - customers expect retailers to protect
  them too

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Implications for Banks in Delaying EMV
Implementation

• Reputational Risk
• Failure to Meet Payment Scheme timescales
• Fraud increases as a result of migration to
  non-chipped parties - will be apparent to
  marketplace and consumers
• Without smart cards will appear more vulnerable -
  Low technology is not a good message
• Compliance Risk
• Increased costs as a result of Payment Scheme
  liability shifts
• Legislation
• Strategic/Operational Risk
• Missed revenue opportunities in secure e-/mobile
  commerce
• Operational problems in charge-backs/authorisation
  s and reduced Customer Service compared to
  competitors
• Transaction risk as they will not be off-line and
  lower cost
• Valuable operational learning and opportunity to
  strengthen customer relationship for multi
  application cards will be lost
• Forced reissue of cards may be required rather
  than replacement within existing card expiry
  process

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The Solution
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Why the solution was EMV Chip and PIN

• The Chip
• A microchip embedded in the card to provide
  powerful processing intelligence to make
  decisions
• Effective fraud deterrent - expensive and complex
  to counterfeit.
• Platform using secure methods of identifying
  cardholders at POS
• EMV standards ensure global interoperability
• Liability shift to non-Chip and PIN party.
• Longer life expectancy than stripe cards
• What happens is on the card - sealed by
  cryptograms
• A platform for future developments
• The PIN
• PIN not Pen protection against lost and stolen
  fraud at POS
• Acceptable to most customers
• Only current viable option - international
  standards already exist
• Consistent with International vision
• The Stripe Card becomes a smart card

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A project of exceptional scale over a period of
3 or more years
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The UK Banking Industry Approach

• Radical change to card payments infrastructure
  meant a consensus project - Banks
  (Issuing/Acquiring) and Retailers working
  together
• Formation of an independent central Programme
  Management Organisation (PMO) - Primary
  objectives co-ordinate activities, track KPIs
  to ensure EMV maturity liability shift achieved
• Key work streams to co-ordinate
• Trial eventually took place May-July 2003 then
  Implementation
• Technical/Operational Issues
• Communications
• Vendors/Processors (later) (MVEG)

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Success of the implementation was built on
engaging successfully with multiple
stakeholders, who can have conflicting objectives.
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The Critical Path
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Key Performance Indicators
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Key Indicators agreed to track performance/success
of UK rollout

• Debit 95 Chip and PIN by end 2005
• Faster rollout than credit
• Credit 95 Chip and PIN by end 2005
• Not achieved US Issuers/Processor issues and
  some reissue problems with bureaux ability to
  supply silicon
• Terminals accounting for 65 of card transactions
  enabled for Chip and PIN
• Achieved 66.4 enabled January 2005
• 90 of Customers to be within 1 mile of ATM
  offering Reciprocal PIN Services
• Achieved January 2005 .
• Technical Fallback
• Pin to Signature (PIN Pad Failure) Achieved
• Chip to Signature plan in place

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Chip and PIN - Key Indicators

• KPI 50 POS Chip and PIN enabled by end 2004
• Actual 44.2 by end 2004 Target of 80 set for
  end 2005.
• KPI PIN Bypass
• Bypass to be removed 14 February 2006
• Issues
• Foreign cardholders especially US where there
  are no EMV plans
• Hard Core Resistors amongst cardholders
• Technical Fallback will still occur
• Disabled who cannot use PIN- Chip and Signature
  cards issued after detailed discussion of
  requirements with disabled customers
• Mid tier merchants who are slowest to move
• Vendors/Processors engaged late in the process
• KPI 90 of Cardholders to be aware PIN is coming
  80 to know their PIN
• Achieved January 2005 Research shows awareness
  97 . Knowledge of PIN 91 debit 73 credit

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The Challenges
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The Challenges

• Consumers behaviour will cardholders adapt or
  use another payment method, Can they be prevented
  from writing down PIN numbers, Are there specific
  groups impacted ?
• Retailers - to enforce the regime on fallback
• Communication APACS/Scheme led generic messages
  provided over a long time - from early trials
  through rollout to maturity - Website key -
  www.chipandpin.co.uk
• Technology - Type approval and certification by
  Payment Schemes and EMVCo, MI,Transaction timings
• Training - bank and retail staff
• New technology but not so different to ATM use
• Help-desk support and training material specially
  written
• Beware mystery shopping exercises by external
  parties
• Key messages for issuers, acquirers, merchants
  and vendors
• Be proactive, plan well ahead, lobby suppliers.
• We can only do this together

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The Trial in Northampton
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Why Northampton?

• Trial Wish List
• Geographically isolated
• Local shoppers shop locally
• Limited number of visitors
• Range of major and specialist retailers of all
  sizes
• Socio-economic profile to match UK
• Test communications via media
• Ease of access for project members to visit
• Major Bank branches/ATMs

• Northampton fitted
• It was a success when used previously
• Good feedback
• Retailer familiarity
• Chip awareness
• Central location
• Concentrated location
• Volumes of bank staff

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Objectives of the Trial - to test how well Chip
and PIN works

• Monitor consumer and merchant reaction
• Effectiveness of cardholder communications to
  formulate comprehensive strategy to communicate
  the change to customers and retailers for rollout
• Evaluate end-to-end operational processes and
  procedures
• Monitor technology performance/reliability
• Performance of ATM PIN Management Services
• Ability to measure fraud related to Chip and PIN
• Build confidence in the technology in a live
  environment following pre trial phases IPT, CTT
  and OTT to ensure satisfactory technical testing

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Chip and PIN Trial

• Starting in May 2003 a - 3 month Trial was held
  in Northampton By end of trial
• Over 200,000 Chip and PIN cards issued by 11 FI
  s
• 200,000 transactions, 25,000 per week
• 1400 POS terminals accepting Chip and PIN
  including shops restaurants pubspetrol
  stations
• Around 170 ATMs PIN Management Services upgraded
• Many UK household names to drive volume- Asda,
  Co-op Retail, The Link, McDonalds, Next, Shell
  Morrisons, Marks Spencer, Safeway, UK,Scottish
  Newcastle Retail, Spar,Tesco, Wilkinsons
• UK Chip and PIN Trial is the biggest in the world
  so far

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Chip and PIN Trial Conclusion

• End of Trial Report - Chip and PIN - a success !
• Communications successful
• Chip and PIN received very positively by
  customers
• and retail staff.
• High knowledge and awareness levels achieved
• Training effective communication critical
• Consumer reaction positive but sensitive to
  existing PIN
• knowledge and usage
• Technology works but need to continue testing
• Privacy/accessibility/disability issues
  identified
• PIN Services (ChangeandUnlock) are essential
• Transactions faster than those they replace
• UK Home Office Minister extremely happy
• BUT Overall NOT fully proven based on
• original KPIs

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Chip and PIN Trial - Not Proven ?

• Rejection of the scheme amongst customers minimal
• Card rationalisation/decreased usage/attrition
  did not occur
• Trials main problem - lack of Chip and PIN
  enabled outlets
• 11 large retailers not 16 with 9 entering the
  trial late
• Bank owned terminal switch on slower than
  expected
• Lengthy EMVCo approval and Scheme certification
  process
• More customers than expected bypassed PIN
• Research suggests forgotten PIN or never advised
  of PIN
• Partly driven by lack of retailer POS
  availability time lag to use
• Fewer customers than expected used their cards
• Lack of opportunity to use their new card,
  working against the awareness / motivation of
  cardholders
• Overlap period between cards meant continued to
  use stripe card
• A number of incidents highlighted card and
  terminal incompatibility e.g. legacy cards in new
  terminals

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Key Learning from Trial
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Key Learning from Trial
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Customer Research
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Cardholder reaction to EMV Chip PIN

• Messaging
• Cards part of everyday life
• Lots of fraud about
• Its a real hassle when it happens to you
• Banks Retailers working together to develop a
  solution
• Findings From PMO Market Research
• Majority of cardholders positive about Chip and
  PIN and awareness grew as project progressed
• No migration to other payment methods
• Fraud is prime motivator for cardholders to adopt
  Chip and PIN, but banks must not over emphasize
  and cause alarm.
• Five waves of research to track changing customer
  reactions/effect of communications from pre-trial
  through rollout

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UK Research Customer Segments prior to EMV Project
Not comfortable using PINs - concerned about
using new scheme
PIN Fearful
Sceptics
Concerned about fraud - but do not think new
system will work
Happy Coasters
Relaxed about fraud - happy to adopt scheme
Convenience Seekers
Early adopters - convenience is driving concern
Information Hungry
Very concerned about fraud and personal
safety Want to know exactly how it will work
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Segment size based on Research Data
Represents 7.8m people
Represents 11.1m people
Represents 5.7m people
Represents 10.7m people
Represents 5.3m people
Q
Base All respondents (n1264)
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Summary of likely adoption
Most enthusiastic
Information Hungry
Welcome it as solution to fraud
Welcome it because its new, modern and may make
life easier
Convenience Seekers
No barriers to adoption, but no real motivation
Happy Coasters
Concerned about PINs
PIN Fearful
Reject concept outright
Sceptics
Least enthusiastic
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A communications package was needed to inform
generally and have specifics for identified
groups

• Deliver greater customer confidence and peace of
  mind and..
• Remove the worry, hassle, and inconvenience of
  card fraud
• Although fraud is a prime motivator to adopt,
  Programme needs to ensure that our consumer
  education and communication is effective to drive
  
• Action for 5 identified customer segments

Reassure that they can cope, educate
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Communications Plans
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UK Advertising Campaign To Cardholders 2004
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
NOV
DEC
ANNOUNCE
Chip and PIN is coming!
Cut Card Fraud Remember your PIN
INFORM
MANAGE EXPECTATIONS
How Chip and PIN actually works
INFORM/ANNOUNCE
REASSURE
Ways to remember your PIN
ANNOUNCE
Chip and PIN is here!
CALL TO ACTION
INFORM/ PROMPT
Use Chip and PIN wherever you can! Its ok to
guard against shoulder surfing
REASSURE/ PROMPT
Get out there and start using it!
Strapline Safety in numbers
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Views on Success and Learnings from the Project
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The changing make up of fraud after EMV in the UK
Counterfeit and Lost and Stolen have been reduced
Fraud Breakdown 2000
2
3
6
35
20
BUT
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• Growth in e-commerce fraud
• Growth in CNP fraud
• Growth in identity theft
• None of which EMV addresses directly

SourceAPACS
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UK Fraud 1994 - 2006
Source APACS
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UK Fraud changes Jan-Dec 2006 APACS figures
compared to same period in 2005
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Explaining Fraud Trends in 2006

• Chip and PIN has made it more difficult for
  fraudsters to commit card fraud - Domestic UK
  Fraud has fallen by 13 to 309.8m from 356.6m
  in 2005
• Reduced rollout of cards by Issuers following
  record levels to beat the liability shift has
  meant fewer cards to intercept
• Terminal base virtually fully EMV compliant
• Fallback/bypass at customer request - an area for
  fraudster to exploit withdrawn 14 February 2006
• However
• criminals are still targeting UK cards and
  copying the magnetic stripe data to create
  counterfeit magnetic stripe cards to be used in
  countries that havent upgraded to Chip and PIN.
  This has caused an increase in fraud abroad
  losses for UK Issuers over the last 12 months of
  43 (118.2m compared to 82.8m in 2005) and is
  the reason total counterfeit has risen slightly
• card-not-present fraud losses now account for
  just under 50 of all card fraud losses.
• losses as a percentage of plastic card turnover
  equated to 0.095 in 2006 significantly less
  than the 0.141 figure in 2004.

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The Changing Make Up of UK Fraud
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Even with EMV Card fraud is still big business

• Fraudsters are still targeting cards and the
  internet
• High return for low investment while stripe
  remains on the card
• Not technically challenging stripe / SDA
• Organised crime can fund
• Information/attack methods easily dispersed via
  internet
• Fraud moves easily across borders
• There are a number of fraud options
• Consumers now more aware of transaction security
  but still Customer apathy

Known card fraud

• Unreported fraud
• By customerBy bank
• Fraud reported as bad debt
• Identity theft/CNP
• Chargeback fraud
• Fraud migrated to other channels

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Was is it a Success ? The Bankers View

• Yes - lost and stolen and counterfeit fraud
  reduced - BUT
• Business case payoff has not been seen as fraud
  rose initially
• Rollout took longer than expected
• Technical Issues like SDA failures persisted
• Bypass and technical fallback too high and not
  tackled early enough in the programme
• Credit much slower than debit
• Misinformation at POS and in the Press as
  liability shift and removal of PIN bypass
  approached
• Time lag between receipt of card and usage longer
  than expected
• Counterfeit and Lost and Stolen Fraud reduced but
  now need to tackle Card Not Present and Account
  takeover by Installing CAP.
• Cross border fraud issues especially with ATMs
  and MI
• Contactless EMV is the next Challenge and learn
  from the Face to Face Implementation

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Was it a Success ? The Retailers View

• Wanted a date for withdrawal of Bypass as it
  causes problems at POS - confirmed for 14
  February 2006
• Large retailers created business cases driven by
  liability shift but some mid tier still
  outstanding and some major chains not fully ready
• Contactless cards will require further
  development of terminal base and utilise a subset
  of EMV who pays 7 year replacement cycle
• Growth of Internet channel usage does not use
  Chip and PIN technology now need to develop
  Verified by Visa/Secure Code/CAP and maybe proxy
  numbers. AVS also needs to be developed further
• Authorisation levels still high.

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Was it a Success ? Cardholder View

• Cardholder reaction tracked in a series of
  research waves mostly positive
• Hard core still bypassing PIN and there were no
  issues after February 14th despite the press
  proCmoting otherwise
• Disabled still have issues
• Does not work on the Internet or MO/TO
• Contactless provides new options and a
  potential re-run of EMV implementation but not
  all retail sectors will be involved
• Two Factor Authentication some banks trialled
  bespoke solutions but APACS have now agreed
  specifications
• In Essence its still about fraud to customers

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UK - The Key Learnings from Chip and PIN

• Migration timelines extended despite strong
  central co-ordination
• Scheme and Acquirer Certification issues impacted
  merchant plans
• Engaging Mid-tier merchants remained a
  challenge
• Vendors/Processors should have been engaged
  earlier
• Time lags-
• between bank-owned terminal deployment and
  activation
• between issuance and first usage of cards
  (particularly credit) due to reissue timeframes
  US monolines slower
• Reciprocal PIN management delivery key
• Consideration of disability discrimination
  requirements key
• Effective communication underpins success and
  limits need for force reissue of cards to
  customers
• Resist calls for changes to liability shift it
  is a main driver
• Major changes to be avoided at Peak business
  periods
• Adequate measurement of performance against all
  Programme maturity KPIs

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UK - The Key Learnings from Chip and PIN

• The Business Case involves Merchants, Hardware
  and Software Vendors and Banks Issuer and
  Acquirer arms working together ( Government ?)
• Disallowing PIN bypass more difficult than
  originally envisaged and withdrawal should be
  planned before rollout starts to avoid an
  unstructured end to the programme
• The customer will accept EMV provided he is
  informed COMMUNICATE more than once using all
  available channels
• ATM networks need to offer reciprocal PIN
  Management services to all Issuers for all
  Schemes to drive adoption
• Migration of Fraud will happen as EMV restricts
  Counterfeit and Lost And Stolen Face to Face
  Fraud prepare for it.
• Chip and PIN enable branch counter terminals if
  you are a Bank
• Manage the end of the Programme
• Look at this as the first stage of a revolution
  as to how cards will develop opportunities will
  arise from a common platform.

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Two Major Issues Disability and Fallback/Bypass
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Disability Top Line Findings

• Overall, positive attitudes to Chip and PIN for
  most 86 of people happy to use and fears
  allayed by usage
• More secure than signing (less likelihood of
  fraud)
• As convenient, and in many cases, more convenient
  than signing
• Specific strengths emerged for Elderly Deaf/hard
  of hearing Blind/ visually impaired BUT
• Learning and remembering PIN causes apprehension
• A problem for people with learning/manual
  dexterity difficulties
• Knowing that PIN be easily changed alleviates
  concern
• PIN exemption could be an important option for
  severe cases, but requires careful management and
  communication by banks
• Security and Vulnerability shoulder surfing
  especially wheelchair bound customers
• PIN Pad design
• Banks retain liability if they issue a Chip and
  Signature card meant additional development for
  those migrating from stripe cards

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Disabled Groups Special Cases

• Extensive consultation with disability groups
  took place banks previous indicator was a
  braille statement flag
• During rollout no suitable, certified portable
  Chip and PIN terminals available meant disabled
  Drivers Association pressure group allowed
  disabled drivers to continue to sign
• After Strategic Risk reviews some banks issued
  Chip and Signature Cards under special
  application procedures to certain groups, others
  relied on by-pass procedures
• RNIB Mystery Shopper exercises for the blind
  and partially sighted exposed poor disability
  training/knowledge in Bank call centres and
  limited access to Chip and Signature cards
• Removal of PIN bypass in February 2006 ensured
  Issuers and Retailers complied with the
  Disability Discrimination Act
• Specific communications for the disabled were
  required along with extensive bank (customer
  facing/call centre) and retailer staff training.
  Some pin pad changes made.

53
What is a Fallback transaction ?

• A Fallback transaction is where the main or
  preferred technology cannot be used, and a weaker
  technology has to be used to complete the
  transaction. There are 2 types of fallback
• Technical Fallback Where the best card
  technology supported by both card and terminal
  cannot be used, the transaction is completed,
  according to Scheme and product rules, using the
  magnetic stripe for Chip cards ( paper or PAN Key
  Entry for magnetic stripe). Scenarios where the
  PIN is locked (and a transaction is completed
  using chip and signature), or where the PINpad is
  not working but a chip and signature transaction
  can be completed are also forms of technical
  fallback and are covered by EMV processes (rather
  than scheme rules)
• Signature Fallback Where a chip and PIN card has
  met a chip and PIN terminal, the card chip has
  been read but the PIN has not been verified
  because the cashier has taken a proactive step to
  bypass PIN entry. PIN bypass often arises because
  the cardholder does not know their PIN at the
  time of purchase or the cashier has deliberately
  chosen not to ask the customer for it

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What is not a Fallback Transaction

• Definition of Technical Fallback does not include
• Chip cards meeting magnetic stripe only capable
  terminals
• Magnetic stripe only cards meeting Chip capable
  terminals
• Magnetic stripe transactions initiated following
  a declined chip transaction for the same card in
  the same terminal
• Definition of Signature Fallback does not include
• Chip and PIN cards meeting non-Chip and PIN
  terminals
• Non Chip and PIN cards meeting Chip and PIN
  terminals
• Cards (typically foreign issued cards ) which do
  not support off-line PIN verification
• UK cards used overseas in terminals not
  supporting off-line PIN
• Cards issued without a PIN for disability reasons
• PIN locked or PIN pad not working transactions

55
So why did UK Banks allow Fallback ?

• Issuers agreed position Non competitive for
  Issuers
• To safeguard/maintain customer service standards
  during the period of transition to Chip and PIN
  maturity
• Retailer requirement to progress Chip and PIN
  Programme (Paradoxically many later agreed with
  Banks original position
• that it should have been disallowed)
• Priority to build confidence in new processes and
  technology
• Customer market research suggested it would be
  beneficial during the transition period
• EMV rollout in other countries (Japan) had
  utilised fallback and bypass (but high rates 50
  retained because they did not address early in
  the programme)
• French model (non EMV) did not allow fallback -
  customers received a request for another card

56
Risks associated with allowing Fallback

• Bank Risk (Issuer Liability) vs. Customer Service
  Trade-off
• Risk preferred no fallback but needed by
  marketing and customer services during
  transition to maturity.
• Card Schemes - Issuer liable for approved
  fallback transactions.
• Concerns surrounding high levels of PIN bypass
  first raised in Trial when rates observed were
  30-35 credit and 15 debit
• Retail staff offer it due to lack of training
  etc.
• Failure to maximise return on investment
• Fraud reduction transaction efficiency benefits
  cannot be fully realised while EMV is by-passed
  as it prevents a change in cardholder behaviour.
  - while bypass was available some cardholders
  will continue to use it.
• Fraud Loophole
• By-passing the 2 main security features of a
  card gives fraudsters an opportunity for
  continued counterfeit and lost/stolen fraud . No
  direct link has been proven between fraud and
  fallback as these transactions are subject to
  100 online authorisation

57
UK Industry Activity on Fallback/Bypass

• Do nothing is not an option. Japan still have
  issues. Ultimate goal - a No PIN, No
  Transaction but still problems with foreign
  issued cards e.g. the US with no plans to migrate
  to EMV and the disabled
• Collaboration between banks, retailers and
  Payment Schemes to agree fallback removal
  strategy and track rates to meet pre-defined
  KPIs. Combined approach, as merchant or issuer
  only approaches had significant drawbacks
• Heightened expectation on issuers to be actively
  monitoring rates and communicating with
  cardholders who bypass PIN
• No soft (i.e. no specific date attached) PR
  announcement of the removal of PIN Bypass -
  cardholder communication occured via central PR
  and issuer direct communication
• PMO Workgroup set up to manage and communicate
  withdrawal

58
PIN Bypass Withdrawal Issues

• Sectors where goods have been consumed prior to
  purchase e.g. Petrol and Hospitality
• Requirements of disabled customers after PIN Day
  particularly groups like disabled motorists
• One agreed measure for PIN Bypass rates,
• Scheme data to identify merchants with high
  fallback rates
• Key retailers providing independent data
• Technical fallback rates blended with signature
  fallback a distortion
• Misreporting of terminal capability and incorrect
  terminal configurations
• The continued acceptance of international cards
  must be in accordance with card scheme rules.
• Mid tier retailers and Vendor support
• I love PIN campaign aimed at hard core resistors
  hence Valentines day withdrawal four months
  notice

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