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The End of the NeoConservative Moment by G. John Ikenberry Surivival 46, 1

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Title: The End of the NeoConservative Moment by G. John Ikenberry Surivival 46, 1


1
The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment by G.
John Ikenberry Surivival 46, 1
  • Presented by Randall Kent Cohn
  • September 15, 2004

2
Summary
3
Summary
  • American foreign policy has been largely
    controlled for approximately two years by a group
    of hard-liner idealogues who call themselves
    neo-conservatives

4
Summary
  • American foreign policy has been largely
    controlled for approximately two years by a group
    of hard-liner idealogues who call themselves
    neo-conservatives
  • The Neo-conservative agenda has focused on
    asserting US power through unilateral action,
    withdrawing from international institutions, and
    pursuing aggressive paths towards democratization
    of developing areas, particularly the Middle East

5
Summary
  • American foreign policy has been largely
    controlled for approximately two years by a group
    of hard-liner idealogues who call themselves
    neo-conservatives
  • The Neo-conservative agenda has focused on
    asserting US power through unilateral action,
    withdrawing from international institutions, and
    pursuing aggressive paths towards democratization
    of developing areas, particularly the Middle East
  • The neo-conservative policy is built on a
    foundation of faulty assumptions, short-sighted
    analysis and a misreading of history, and it has
    had largely disastrous results

6
Summary
  • American foreign policy has been largely
    controlled for approximately two years by a group
    of hard-liner idealogues who call themselves
    neo-conservatives
  • The Neo-conservative agenda has focused on
    asserting US power through unilateral action,
    withdrawing from international institutions, and
    pursuing aggressive paths towards democratization
    of developing areas, particularly the Middle East
  • The neo-conservative policy is built on a
    foundation of faulty assumptions, short-sighted
    analysis and a misreading of history, and it has
    had largely disastrous results
  • The primary objectives of a new US foreign policy
    should be to seek to repair the damage the US has
    sustained in world opinion, reinvigorate the
    multinational institutions it fought to create
    over the last 60 years, and restore the delicate
    moral authority which is its most important asset.

7
Theoretical Sources
  • Primary G. John Ikenberry, The End of the
    Neo- Conservative Moment Survival 46, 1.
  • Supporting George Kupchan, The End of the
    American Era US Foreign Policy and the
    Geopolitics of the 21st Century
  • From an address to the Carnegie Council on
    Ethics and International Affairs Feb 27, 2003.
  • Opposing Robert Kagan, Power and
    Weakness Policy Review no. 113.

8
Theory Questions
Q1.
Should the US be bound by international law and
be accountable to transnational regimes and
institutions ?
Q2.
Does the US need to focus on courting European
support in order to gain legitimacy in its role
as global hegemon ?
Q3.


Does the US need international intelligence and
operational support in the global war on
terrorism in particular?
9
Q1.
Should the US be bound by international law and
be accountable to transnational regimes and
institutions ?
10
Q1.
Should the US be bound by international law and
be accountable to transnational regimes and
institutions ?
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • The tested American strategy of alliance and
    partnership and multilateral rule-making will be
    crucial in an era of new threats and shifting
    power relations. At the heart of this old order
    is a strategic bargain that has served America
    well for decades the US ties itself to other
    democratic states and agrees to develop its
    policies in concert with them, in the process
    giving up some modest procedural and political
    freedom of action. In return, the US acquires
    dependable allies who share the burden and
    operate within rules and institutions that serve
    American interests over the long term.

11
Q1.
Should the US be bound by international law and
be accountable to transnational regimes and
institutions ?
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • The tested American strategy of alliance and
    partnership and multilateral rule-making will be
    crucial in an era of new threats and shifting
    power relations. At the heart of this old order
    is a strategic bargain that has served America
    well for decades the US ties itself to other
    democratic states and agrees to develop its
    policies in concert with them, in the process
    giving up some modest procedural and political
    freedom of action. In return, the US acquires
    dependable allies who share the burden and
    operate within rules and institutions that serve
    American interests over the long term.
  • Kupchan Yes.
  • …we ought to not just back away from
    international institutions but recommit to and
    revitalize them, because these institutions are
    the lifeblood of a world that doesn't operate by
    the savage rules of the balance of power. I fear
    that we are scuttling these institutions because
    we think we can get away with it as we have so
    much power but we are likely to need those
    institutions a few years down the road -- NATO,
    the UN, the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC -- only to
    find them in shambles. We will then have no one
    but ourselves to blame because it was the U.S.
    that walked away.

12
Q2.
Does the US need to focus on courting European
support in order to gain legitimacy in its role
as global hegemon ?
13
Q2.
Does the US need to focus on courting European
support in order to gain legitimacy in its role
as global hegemon ?
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • American unilateralism got the US into this
    predicament American taxpayers are getting stuck
    with the bill while the EU -- slighted in the
    Bush administrations rush to war -- has offered
    only 250 million for Iraqi reconstruction in
    2004. Today, all roads lead to the UN and away
    from the neo-conservative vision of a unilateral
    America remaking the Middle East. The Challenge
    over the medium run will not be to resist UN and
    allied involvement, but rather, how to induce
    them to get involved in the perilous Iraqi
    occupation.

14
Q2.
Does the US need to focus on courting European
support in order to gain legitimacy in its role
as global hegemon ?
Ikenberry Yes. American unilateralism got the
US into this predicament American taxpayers are
getting stuck with the bill wile the EU --
slighted in the Bush administrations rush to war
-- has offered only 250 million for Iraqi
reconstruction in 2004. Today, all roads lead to
the UN and away from the neo-conservative vision
of a unilateral America remaking the Middle East.
The Challenge over the medium run will not be to
resist UN and allied involvement, but rather, how
to induce them to get involved in the perilous
Iraqi occupation.
Kupchan Yes. …rather than practicing and
striving for preeminence, we should practice
strategic restraint. A country that is as
powerful as this country, if it is unrestrained,
scares the hell out of the rest of the world. I
fear that we Americans are today compromising our
most precious commodity, our international
legitimacy -- the sense that we are a benign
power who plays by the rules.
15

Q3.

Does the US need international intelligence and
operational support in the global war on
terrorism in particular?
16

Q3.
Does the US need international intelligence and
operational support in the global war on
terrorism in particular?
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • In an age when terrorism is the overriding
    security threat, offering or withholding American
    security cooperation does not mean as much as it
    did during the Cold War…Current threats are less
    geographically fixed and the United States feels
    more at risk than its major Asian or European
    allies. Yet the US needs those allies for
    assistance in intelligence, law enforcement and a
    thousand small cooperative gestures every week in
    the war on terrorism. Contrary to new
    fundamentalist thinking, the US does not hold all
    the cards. Indeed, in many ways other countries
    -- notably those in the EU -- may have a stronger
    hand when it comes to terrorism.

17

Q3.
Does the US need international intelligence and
operational support in the global war on
terrorism in particular?
Ikenberry Yes. In an age when terrorism is the
overriding security threat, offering or
withholding American security cooperation does
not mean as much as it did during the Cold
War…Current threats are less geographically fixed
and the United States feels more at risk than its
major Asian or European allies. Yet the US needs
those allies for assistance in intelligence, law
enforcement and a thousand small cooperative
gestures every week in the war on terrorism.
Contrary to new fundamentalist thinking, the US
does not hold all the cards. Indeed, in many ways
other countries -- notably those in the EU -- may
have a stronger hand when it comes to terrorism.
  • Kupchan Yes.
  • …we need Europe. We need Europe partly because
    some of the most effective tools against terror
    are the quiet ones intelligence sharing,
    freezing of assets, law enforcement. I have no
    evidence to say that this Europe-U.S. split will
    make cooperation in taking anti-terrorism
    measures harder to come by, but I bet it will be
    the case.

18
Data Questions
Q4.
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q5.
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q6.

Were factors besides the Strategic Defense
Initiative promoted by Reagan-era hardliners
(including the buildup of NATO, the World Peace
Movement and authentic ideological reform within
the USSR) significantly responsible for the
ultimate outcome of the Cold War?
19
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q4.
20
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q4.
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • …Fear is a dangerous and self-defeating
    strategy of global leadership. There is no
    persuasive evidence that the demonstration
    effect of the Iraq War is working with NK or
    Iran or other troublesome states. The more likely
    outcome is that these regimes will continue to
    seek and keep nuclear weapons so as to establish
    some deterrence against an American invasion.

21
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q4.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Supporting Data North Korea
The nuclear reactor at Yongbyon
Source Institute for Science and International
Security July 1, 2003
22
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q4.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Supporting Data North Korea
Source Institute for Science and International
Security July 1, 2003
23
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q4.
Source Institute for Science and International
Security July 1, 2003
24
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q5.
25
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q5.
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • American power advantages -- massive, useable
    and enduring -- are the linchpin of the new
    fundamentalist go-it-alone strategy of
    maintaining global order through American
    domination…But this strategy is premised on a
    radically inflated view of American power. The
    United States is preeminent, not omnipotent…in
    economic and political realms the world is not
    really unipolar at all.

26
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q5.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Supporting Data Decreasing GDP gap
In billions of US
Source World Bank 2004
27
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q5.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Supporting Data Decreasing GDP gap
GDP Growth in change
Source World Bank 2004
28

Q6.
Were factors besides the Strategic Defense
Initiative promoted by Reagan-era hardliners
(including the buildup of NATO, the World Peace
Movement and authentic ideological reform within
the USSR) significantly responsible for the
ultimate outcome of the Cold War?
29

Q6.
Were factors besides the Strategic Defense
Initiative promoted by Reagan-era hardliners
(including the buildup of NATO, the World Peace
Movement and authentic ideological reform within
the USSR) significantly responsible for the
ultimate outcome of the Cold War?
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • It was not engagement, détente, paper
    agreements and mutual interest that brought the
    Soviet Union down, but the Reagan admins
    hard-line policies…boosting military spending and
    putting ideological pressure on the evil
    empire.
  • This historical narrative provides the ultimate
    defense for hard-line fundamentalist policies.
    The problem is that it is flawed history. The
    real lesson of the end of the Cold War is that
    the West won because it was united. The United
    States led the way in building a multilateral
    economic and security order that generated
    historically unprecedented prosperity and
    alliance protection…The Reagan era experience
    shows that a single, consistent and unambiguous
    hard-line policy that of the USSR was
    structurally impossible to sustain within the
    Western order -- and this is why the Cold War
    ended as successfully as it did

30
Were factors besides the Strategic Defense
Initiative promoted by Reagan-era hardliners
(including the buildup of NATO, the World Peace
Movement and authentic ideological reform within
the USSR) significantly responsible for the
ultimate outcome of the Cold War?
Q6.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Supporting Data USSR didnt Compete source
Way out there in the Blue Reagan, Star Wars, and
the End of the Cold War by Frances Fitzgerald
(2000) As CIA analysts discovered in 1983,
Soviet military spending had
leveled off in 1975 to a growth rate of 1.3
/annum, with spending for weapons
procurements virtually flat. It remained that way
for a decade…Soviet military spending rose
in 1985 as a result of decisions taken
earlier, and grew at a rate of 4.3 /annum
through 1987. Spending for procurement of
offensive strategic weapons, however,
increased by only 1.4 /annum in that
period…While the US military budget was
growing at an average of 8 /annum, the Soviets
did not attempt to keep up, and their
military spending did not rise even as might
have been expected given the war they were
fighting in Afghanistan.
31
Theory Questions
Q1.
Should the US be bound by international law and
be accountable to transnational regimes and
institutions ?
Q2.
Does the US need to focus on courting European
support in order to gain legitimacy in its role
as global hegemon ?
Q3.


Does the US need international intelligence and
operational support in the global war on
terrorism in particular?
32
Q12.
Should the US be bound by international law and
be accountable to transnational regimes and
institutions ?
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • The tested American strategy of alliance and
    partnership and multilateral rule-making will be
    crucial in an era of new threats and shifting
    power relations. At the heart of this old order
    is a strategic bargain that has served America
    well for decades the US ties itself to other
    democratic states and agrees to develop its
    policies in concert with them, in the process
    giving up some modest procedural and political
    freedom of action. In return, the US acquires
    dependable allies who share the burden and
    operate within rules and institutions that serve
    American interests over the long term.

Kupchan Yes. …we ought not just back away from
international institutions but recommit to and
revitalize them, because these institutions are
the lifeblood of a world that doesnt operate by
the savage rules of the balance of power. I fear
that we are scuttling these institutions because
we think we can get away with it as we have so
much power but we are likely to need those
institutions a few years down the road -- NATO,
the UN, the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC -- only to
find them in shambles. We will then have no one
but ourselves to blame because it was the US that
walked away.
33
Q12.
Should the US be bound by international law and
be accountable to transnational regimes and
institutions ?
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • The tested American strategy of alliance and
    partnership and multilateral rule-making will be
    crucial in an era of new threats and shifting
    power relations. At the heart of this old order
    is a strategic bargain that has served America
    well for decades the US ties itself to other
    democratic states and agrees to develop its
    policies in concert with them, in the process
    giving up some modest procedural and political
    freedom of action. In return, the US acquires
    dependable allies who share the burden and
    operate within rules and institutions that serve
    American interests over the long term.

Kupchan Yes. …we ought not just back away from
international institutions but recommit to and
revitalize them, because these institutions are
the lifeblood of a world that doesnt operate by
the savage rules of the balance of power. I fear
that we are scuttling these institutions because
we think we can get away with it as we have so
much power but we are likely to need those
institutions a few years down the road -- NATO,
the UN, the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC -- only to
find them in shambles. We will then have no one
but ourselves to blame because it was the US that
walked away.
Kagan No. Americans are idealists, but they
have no experience of promoting ideals
successfully without power. Certainly they have
no experience of successful supranational
governance little to make them place their faith
in international law and international
institutions, much as they might wish
to…Americans…still believe in the perfectibility
of man, and they retain hope for the
perfectibility of the world. But they remain
realists in the limited sense that they still
believe in the necessity of power in a world that
remains far from perfection. Such law as there
may be to regulate international behavior, they
believe, exists because a power like the US
defends it be force of arms.
34
Q22.
Does the US need to focus on courting European
support in order to gain legitimacy in its role
as global hegemon ?
Ikenberry Yes. Today, all roads lead to the
UN and away from the neo-conservative vision of a
unilateral America remaking the Middle East. The
Challenge over the medium run will not be to
resist UN and allied involvement, but rather, how
to induce them to get invovled in the perilous
Iraqi occupation.
  • KupchanYes. rather than practicing and
    striving for preeminence, we should practice
    strategic restraint. A country that is as
    powerful as this country, if it is unrestrained,
    scares the hell out of the rest of the world. I
    fear that we Americans are today compromising our
    most precious commodity, our international
    legitimacy -- the sense that we are a benign
    power who plays by the rules.

35
Q22.
Does the US need to focus on courting European
support in order to gain legitimacy in its role
as global hegemon ?
Ikenberry Yes. Today, all roads lead to the
UN and away from the neo-conservative vision of a
unilateral America remaking the Middle East. The
Challenge over the medium run will not be to
resist UN and allied involvement, but rather, how
to induce them to get invovled in the perilous
Iraqi occupation.
  • KupchanYes. rather than practicing and
    striving for preeminence, we should practice
    strategic restraint. A country that is as
    powerful as this country, if it is unrestrained,
    scares the hell out of the rest of the world. I
    fear that we Americans are today compromising our
    most precious commodity, our international
    legitimacy -- the sense that we are a benign
    power who plays by the rules.

Kagan No. By providing security from outside,
the United States has rendered it unnecessary for
Europes supranational government to provide it.
Europes rejection of power politics, its
devaluing of military force as a tool of IR, have
depended on the presence of US military forces on
EU soil. Europes new Kantian order could
flourish only under the umbrella of American
power exercised according to the rules of the old
Hobbesian order. And now, in the final irony,
this fact allows Europeans today to believe
that US military power, and the strategic
culture that has created and sustained it, are
outmoded and dangerous.
36

Q32.
Does the US need international intelligence and
operational support in the global war on
terrorism in particular?
Ikenberry Yes. In an age when terrorism is the
overriding security threat, offering or
withholding American security cooperation does
not mean as much as it did during the Cold
War…Current threats are less geographically fixed
and the United States feels more at risk than its
major Asian or European allies. Yet the US needs
those allies for assistance in intelligence, law
enforcement and a thousand small cooperative
gestures every week in the war on terrorism.
Contrary to new fundamentalist thinking, the US
does not hold all the cards. Indeed, in many ways
other countries -- notably those in the EU -- may
have a stronger hand when it comes to terrorism.
  • Kupchan Yes.
  • …we need Europe. We need Europe partly because
    some of the mosteffectivetoolsagainst terror are
    the quiet ones intelligence sharing, freezing of
    assets, law enforcement. I have no evidence to
    say that this Europe-U.S. split will make
    cooperation in taking anti-terrorism measures
    harder to come by, but I bet it will be the case.

37

Q32.
Does the US need international intelligence and
operational support in the global war on
terrorism in particular?


Ikenberry Yes. In an age when terrorism is the
overriding security threat, offering or
withholding American security cooperation does
not mean as much as it did during the Cold
War…Current threats are less geographically fixed
and the United States feels more at risk than its
major Asian or European allies. Yet the US needs
those allies for assistance in intelligence, law
enforcement and a thousand small cooperative
gestures every week in the war on terrorism.
Contrary to new fundamentalist thinking, the US
does not hold all the cards. Indeed, in many ways
other countries -- notably those in the EU -- may
have a stronger hand when it comes to terrorism.
  • Kupchan Yes.
  • …we need Europe. We need Europe partly because
    some of the most effective tools against terror
    are the quiet ones intelligence sharing,
    freezing of assets, law enforcement. I have no
    evidence to say that this Europe-U.S. split will
    make cooperation in taking anti-terrorism
    measures harder to come by, but I bet it will be
    the case.

Kagan No. Can the US handle the rest of the
world without much help from Europe? The answer
is that it already does. The US has maintained
strategic stability in Asia with no help from
Europe. In the Gulf War, European help was token
so it has been more recently in Afghanistan,
where Europeans are once again doing the
dishes and so it was in an invasion of Iraq
to unseat Saddam. Europe has had little to offer
the US in strategic military terms since the end
of the Cold War -- except, of course, that most
valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace.
38
Data Questions
Q4.
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q5.
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q6.

Were factors besides the Strategic Defense
Initiative promoted by Reagan-era hardliners
(including the buildup of NATO, the World Peace
Movement and authentic ideological reform within
the USSR) significantly responsible for the
ultimate outcome of the Cold War?
39
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q42.
40
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q42.
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • …Fear is a dangerous and self-defeating
    strategy of global leadership. There is no
    persuasive evidence that the demonstration
    effect of the Iraq War is working with NK or
    Iran or other troublesome states. The more likely
    outcome is that these regimes will continue to
    seek and keep nuclear weapons so as to establish
    some deterrence against an American invasion.

41
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q42.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Opposing Data Libya - Dec. 16, 2003 --
Saddam Hussein is captured by US soldiers in
Iraq - Dec. 19, 2003 -- Libya announces its
decision to eliminate…materials, equipments and
programmes which lead to the production of
internationally proscribed weapons
The nuclear reactor at the Tajura Nuclear
Research Centre
Source International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004
42
Will the US policy of preemption, as demonstrated
in Iraq, make marginal revisionist powers more
likely to assert themselves by redoubling their
efforts to develop nuclear weapons?
Q42.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Opposing Data Libya -February 28,
2004 President Qhaddafi tells African Economic
Conference, Any national state that will adopt
this nuclear procurement policy cannot protect
itself. On the contrary, it would expose itself
to danger.
Libyan President and former Nuclear Pariah
Muammar Qhaddafi
Source VOA News 28 Feb, 2004
43
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q52.
44
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q52.
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • American power advantages -- massive, useable
    and enduring -- are the linchpin of the new
    fundamentalist go-it-alone strategy of
    maintaining global order through American
    domination…But this strategy is premised on a
    radically inflated view of American power. The
    United States is preeminent, not omnipotent…in
    economic and political realms the world is not
    really unipolar at all.

45
Does American unipolarity face any serious
challenges by other powers, in economic, military
or political terms ?
Q52.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Opposing Data Military Dominance
Source Globalsecurity.org 2004
46
Were factors besides the Strategic Defense
Initiative promoted by Reagan-era hardliners
(including the buildup of NATO, the World Peace
Movement and authentic ideological reform within
the USSR) significantly responsible for the
ultimate outcome of the Cold War?
Q6.
47
Were factors besides the Strategic Defense
Initiative promoted by Reagan-era hardliners
(including the buildup of NATO, the World Peace
Movement and authentic ideological reform within
the USSR) significantly responsible for the
ultimate outcome of the Cold War?
Q62.
  • Ikenberry Yes.
  • It was not engagement, détente, paper
    agreements and mutual interest that brought the
    Soviet Union down, but the Reagan admins
    hard-line policies…boosting military spending and
    putting ideological pressure on the evil
    empire.
  • This historical narrative provides the ultimate
    defense for hard-line fundamentalist policies.
    The problem is that it is flawed history. The
    real lesson of the end of the Cold War is that
    the West won because it was united. The United
    States led the way in building a multilateral
    economic and security order that generated
    historically unprecedented prosperity and
    alliance protection…The Reagan era experience
    shows that a single, consistent and unambiguous
    hard-line policy that of the USSR was
    structurally impossible to sustain within the
    Western order -- and this is why the Cold War
    ended as successfully as it did

48
Were factors besides the Strategic Defense
Initiative promoted by Reagan-era hardliners
(including the buildup of NATO, the World Peace
Movement and authentic ideological reform within
the USSR) significantly responsible for the
ultimate outcome of the Cold War?
Q62.
  • Ikenberry Yes.

Opposing Data From the horses
mouth source Cold War International History
Project, 2004 Gorbachev speaking to the
Politburo in 1986, before Reykjavic We will
be pulled into an arms race that is beyond our
capabilities, and we will lose it because we are
at the limit of our capabilities…If the new
round of arms races begins, the pressures on
our economy will be unbelievable.
49
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