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Panda-Hunter Game. Once panda is detected, sourc

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Title: Panda-Hunter Game. Once panda is detected, sourc


1
CSC 774 Advanced Network Security
  • Enhancing Source-Location Privacy in Sensor
  • Network Routing (ICDCS 05)
  • Brian Rogers
  • Nov. 21, 2005

2
Introduction and Motivation
  • Major challenge to deployment of sensor networks
    is privacy
  • Two types of privacy
  • Content-oriented privacy (e.g. packet data)
  • Contextual privacy (e.g. source location of
    packet)
  • Important use of future sensor network
    applications is asset monitoring
  • Source-location privacy is critical

3
Example Scenario
source
sink
4
Outline
  • Panda-Hunter Game
  • Formal Simulation Models
  • Baseline Routing
  • Routing with Fake Sources
  • Phantom Routing
  • Privacy for Mobile Sources
  • Conclusions Future Work

5
Panda-Hunter Game
  • Once panda is detected, source periodically sends
    data to sink through multi-hop routing
  • Assume single panda, source, and sink
  • Attacker
  • Non-malicious
  • Device-Rich
  • Resource-Rich
  • Informed
  • Privacy cautious routing technique prevents
    hunter from locating source

6
Formal Model
  • Asset monitoring network sixtuple (N, S, A, R,
    H, M)
  • N set of sensor nodes
  • S network sink
  • A asset being monitored
  • R routing policy of sensors to protect asset
  • H hunter with movement rules M to capture
    asset
  • Two privacy metrics for a routing strategy R
  • F safety period of an R given M
  • L capture likelihood of R given M
  • Network performance
  • Energy Consumption ( messages sent)
  • Delivery Quality (avg. msg. latency, delivery
    ratio)

7
Simulation Model
  • N 10,000 nodes
  • Panda appears at random location, and closest
    sensor periodically sends packets to the sink
  • Simulation ends if hunter gets close to panda
    (i.e. within ? hops) or hunter fails to catch
    panda within a threshold time

8
Baseline Routing Techniques
  • Two most popular routing techniques for sensor
    networks
  • Flood-based Routing
  • Source node forwards packets to all neighbors
  • When a neighbor receives a packet, if it has not
    already seen this packet, it forwards the packet
    to all its neighbors with probability Pforward
  • Single-path (Shortest-path) Routing
  • Initial configuration phase sets up lists at
    sensor nodes so each node knows which neighbor is
    on the shortest path to the sink

9
Patient Adversary Model
  • Hunter starts at sink
  • When hunter hears a message, it moves to the
    messages immediate sender
  • Process repeats until hunter reaches source

10
Baseline Routing Performance
11
Baseline Routing Performance (2)
12
Routing with Fake Sources
  • Flooding and single-path routing have poor
    source-privacy
  • Add fake sources to inject fake packets
  • Lead hunter away from real source
  • Two Issues
  • How to choose the fake source?
  • How often to inject fake packets?

13
Routing with Fake Sources (2)
14
Routing with Fake Sources (3)
  • Fake sources still not enough
  • Smarter Adversary can detect zigzag pattern
  • Pick one of the two directions and follow to the
    source
  • If this is not the real source, backtrack to
    reach the other source
  • Fake messaging increases energy cost for little
    increase in source-location privacy

15
Phantom Routing
  • Problem with baseline and fake messaging
    techniques
  • Sources provide a fixed route so adversary can
    trace each route
  • Goal of phantom routing
  • Direct hunter away from source to phantom source
  • Two Phases
  • Random walk direct msg. to phantom source
  • Flooding/single-path routing direct msg. to sink

16
Phantom Routing (2)
17
Phantom Routing (3)
  • Random Walk Phase
  • Source-location privacy depends on phantom source
    being far from real source after hwalk hops
  • True Random Walk
  • Not good Message tends to hover around real
    source
  • Proof in paper using central limit theorem
  • Directed Random Walk
  • Sector-based Each node knows east/west
  • Hop-based Each node knows toward/away from
    source
  • Pick one direction randomly and each node during
    random walk sends the msg. to another node in
    that direction

18
Phantom Routing (4)
19
Phantom Routing (5)
  • New adversary Cautious Adversary Model
  • Since hunter may be stranded far from true source
    and not hear any messages for some time
  • If no message heard for some time interval,
    backtrack one step and wait again
  • Results worse for cautious adversary, so it is
    better for hunter to be patient and wait for
    messages to arrive

20
Privacy for Mobile Sources
  • How does source location privacy change if asset
    is mobile (e.g. panda walks around)
  • Tests using a simple movement pattern
  • a governs direction
  • d stay time at each location
  • d distance of each movement
  • T reporting interval

21
Privacy for Mobile Sources
  • Impact of pandas velocity

22
Privacy for Mobile Sources
  • Impact of hunters hearing range

23
Conclusions Future Work
  • Conclusions
  • Flooding and single-path routing have poor source
    location privacy
  • Phantom routing can be used with either routing
    protocol to greatly enhance privacy at a small
    cost of communication overhead
  • Future Work
  • Authors Investigate stronger adversarial models
    and multiple asset tracking scenarios
  • Multiple hunters Could they collude to find
    panda faster
  • Multiple sinks Sensors transmit to randomly
    chosen sink
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