On Selfish Routing In InternetLike Evironments - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 38
About This Presentation
Title:

On Selfish Routing In InternetLike Evironments

Description:

Will the system reach a state with both low latency and low network cost, as ... Future Work. Study impacts of multi-AS nature of the Internet ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:50
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 39
Provided by: msp98
Learn more at: http://www.cs.utexas.edu
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: On Selfish Routing In InternetLike Evironments


1
On Selfish Routing In Internet-Like Evironments
  • Lili Qiu (Microsoft Research)
  • Yang Richard Yang (Yale University)
  • Yin Zhang (ATT Research)
  • Scott Shenker (ICSI)

2
Motivation
  • Practical front
  • Recent studies (e.g., Detour/RON) showed that
    default routing path is often sub-optimal
  • Possible causes of routing inefficiency
  • Routing hierarchy
  • Routing policy
  • Different routing objectives used by ISPs
  • Stability problem in routing protocols, such as
    BGP
  • A recent trend end hosts choose routes
  • Source routing (e.g., Nimrod)
  • Overlay routing (e.g., Detour or RON)
  • Characteristics of routing by end hosts
  • Improve over todays IP routing (e.g., delay,
    loss rate)
  • Selfish by nature (i.e., optimize user-centric
    performance without considering system-wide
    criteria)

3
Motivation (Cont.)
  • Theory front
  • Roughgarden et al. showed selfish routing can
    result in serious performance degradation due to
    lack of cooperation

4
Example Selfish Routing May Yield Sub-Optimal
Performance
  • Selfish routing
  • All traffic go through the lower link
  • Total latency 1
  • Optimal routing (i.e., minimize total latency)
  • Traffic split equally between the two links
  • Total latency ¾
  • The performance degradation can be unbounded for
    non-linear latency functions

L(x)1
src
dest
L(x)x
5
Open Issues
  • How does selfish routing perform in Internet-like
    environments?
  • Realistic network topologies
  • Realistic traffic demands
  • Realistic network delay functions
  • How does selfish overlay routing perform?
  • How does selfish traffic co-exist with the
    remaining traffic that uses traditional routing
    protocols?
  • How does users selfish routing interact with
    underlying network control process (e.g., traffic
    engineering)

6
Outline
  • Overview
  • Network model
  • Evaluation Methodology
  • Performance results
  • Physical routing
  • Overlay routing
  • Multiple overlays
  • Interaction with traffic engineering
  • Summary and future work

7
Overview
  • Approach
  • Use a game-theoretic approach to answer the above
    open issues
  • Focus on intra-domain scenarios
  • Recent advances in topology mapping and traffic
    estimation
  • Compare with theoretical results
  • Focus on equilibrium behavior
  • Compare the performance of traffic equilibria
    with the global optima and default IP routing
  • Based on realistic topologies, traffic demands,
    latency functions

8
Network Model
  • Physical network
  • Directed graph G(V,E)
  • Latency of each edge is a function of its load
    (e.g., M/M/1)
  • Demands
  • demand(i,j) the amount of traffic from a source
    i to a destination j
  • Overlays
  • A set of overlay nodes, overlay links, and a set
    of demands
  • The physical route corresponding to an overlay
    link is dictated by network-level routing
  • Consider mesh-like overlay topologies
  • Users
  • Each user decides how its traffic should be
    routed
  • Objective min latency

9
Network Model (Cont.)
  • Route controller
  • Uses network-level routing
  • OSPF shortest-path with equal-weight splitting,
    with the following weight settings
  • Hop-count
  • Random-weight
  • Optimized-compliant weight minimize network cost
    when assuming all traffic is compliant (i.e.,
    following the routes determined by the network)
    FRT02
  • Network cost a piece-wise linear convex function
    of network load over all links
  • MPLS general multi-commodity flow routing

10
Evaluation Methodology
  • Network topology
  • A large tier-1 ISP topology, referred as ISPTopo
  • Rocketfuel topologies
  • Random power-law topologies
  • Traffic demands
  • Real traffic demands from the ISPTopo
  • Synthetic traffic demands
  • Link latency functions
  • M/M/1, M/D/1, P/M/1, P/D/1, BPR
  • Performance metrics
  • Average latency
  • Maximum link utilization
  • Network costs piece-wise linear, increasing,
    convex function FRT02

11
Different Routing Schemes
  • Physical routing
  • Source routing (i.e., selfish routing studied in
    previous theoretical work)
  • Optimal routing
  • Overlay routing
  • Overlay source routing (i.e., selfish routing
    with routing constraints)
  • Overlay optimal routing
  • Compliant routing (i.e., normal Internet routing)

12
Approach to Computing the Traffic Equilibria
  • General approach
  • Simulation-based too expensive
  • We use a game-theoretic approach to compute the
    traffic equilibria directly
  • Computing the equilibria of physical routing
  • linear-approximation algorithm, a variant of
    Frank-Wolfe algorithm
  • Computing the equilibria of overlay routing
  • Symmetric Modified linear approximation
    algorithm
  • Asymmetric Jacobs relaxation algorithm
  • Computing the equilibria of multiple overlays
  • Use the relaxation algorithm to guarantee the
    convergence

13
Outline
  • Overview
  • Network model
  • Evaluation Methodology
  • Performance Evaluation
  • Source routing
  • Overlay routing
  • Multiple overlays
  • Interaction with traffic engineering
  • Summary and future work

14
Selfish Source Routing
  • Questions
  • Are Internet-like environments among the
    worst-case?
  • What is the system-wide cost for selfish source
    routing?
  • Dimensions
  • Performance metrics latency network load
  • Effects of network topologies
  • Effects of network load
  • Effects of latency functions

15
Selfish Source Routing Latency
  • Effects of network topologies (M/M/1, load scale
    factor1, OC3 bandwidth)

Selfish routing yields close to optimal latency,
much better than compliant routing
16
Selfish Source Routing Network Load
  • Effects of network topologies

Selfish routing tends to overload links.
17
Summary Selfish Source Routing
  • The performance is qualitatively the same as we
    vary latency functions and network load
  • Unlike the theoretical worst cases, selfish
    source routing yields close to optimal latency
  • Selfish routing tends to overload links on the
    shortest paths

18
Outline
  • Overview
  • Network model
  • Evaluation Methodology
  • Performance results
  • Source routing
  • Overlay routing
  • Multiple overlays
  • Interaction with traffic engineering
  • Conclusion and future work

19
Selfish Overlay Routing
  • Questions
  • Does selfish overlay routing perform well?
  • How does the coverage of overlay network affect
    the performance?
  • Dimensions
  • Effects of network topologies
  • Effects of amount of overlay coverage
  • Effects of how overlay nodes are selected (e.g.,
    random or edge nodes)

20
Difference between Source Routing and Overlay
Routing
  • Even if the overlay includes all network nodes,
    routing on an overlay is still different
  • Network-level routing can prevent overlay traffic
    from using a link by setting the corresponding
    entry in routing matrix to 0 (in OSPF this is
    achieved by assigning a large weight)
  • Certain physical routes cannot be implemented by
    any overlay routing
  • Routing flexibility is further reduced when only
    a fraction of nodes belong to an overlay

21
Selfish Overlay Routing (Full Overlay Coverage)
  • overlay-src with opt-weight and hop-count
    performsimilarly as source routing
  • overlay-src with random-weight performs much
    worse.

22
Selfish Overlay Routing (Full Overlay Coverage)
  • Direct Link Shortest DLS
  • For any physically adjacent nodes A and B, all
    the traffic from A to B is routed through the
    direct link AB without involving any other links.
    (e.g., hop-count-based OSPF)
  • For an overlay that covers all network nodes and
    satisfies DLS
  • routing on the overlay routing on the underlay
  • Hop-count-based OSPF and optimized OSPF weights
    satisfy DLS ? they perform similarly as source
    routing
  • Random OSPF weights violate DLS ? some links are
    pruned, and performance degrades

23
Selfish Overlay Routing (Partial Overlay
Coverage)
  • Overlay is formed from all edge nodes in ISPTopo

The effects of partial overlay coverage is
small in backbone topologies.
24
Summary Selfish Overlay Routing
  • For full overlay coverage
  • Overlay has full routing control when the
    underlay satisfies DLS
  • The only way in which OSPF affects overlay
    routing is by violating DLS, which could reduce
    available network resources
  • Overlay source routing reduces latency at the
    expense of higher network cost
  • The effects of partial overlay coverage are small
    in backbone topologies

25
Outline
  • Overview
  • Network model
  • Evaluation Methodology
  • Performance results
  • Source routing
  • Overlay routing
  • Multiple overlays
  • Interaction with traffic engineering
  • Conclusion and future work

26
Interactions among Competing Overlays
  • Question
  • Can multiple overlays share network resources
    fairly and effectively?
  • Dimensions
  • Effects of network topologies
  • Effects of network-level routing schemes
  • Effects of network load and traffic distribution
    among overlays
  • Effects of the number of competing overlays

27
Interactions among Competing Overlays (Cont.)
  • Effects of network-level routing

28
Summary Interactions among Competing Overlays
  • With reasonable OSPF weights (e.g., hop-count)
  • Different routing schemes co-exist without
    hurting each other
  • With bad OSPF weights
  • Selfish overlay improves both for themselves and
    for compliant traffic

29
Outline
  • Overview
  • Network model
  • Evaluation Methodology
  • Performance results
  • Source routing
  • Overlay routing
  • Multiple overlays
  • Interactions with traffic engineering
  • Conclusion and future work

30
Selfish Routing vs. Traffic Engineering
  • So far we assume network is dumb (i.e., static
    underlay routing)
  • In practice, the network is smart due to traffic
    engineering (i.e., underlay routing adapts to
    varying traffic)
  • Question
  • Will the system reach a state with both low
    latency and low network cost, as selfish routing
    and traffic engineering each tries to optimize
    their objective by adapting to the other process?

31
Specification of Vertical Interactions
  • Interactive process between two players
  • Traffic engineering
  • Given traffic matrix Tt, where Tt(s,d) denotes
    traffic from source s to destination d in time
    slot t
  • Compute routing matrix Rt for the underlay
  • Objective avoid overloading network
  • Selfish routing
  • Given routing matrix Rt for the underlay
  • Produce new traffic matrix Tt
  • Objective minimize latency

32
One Round during Vertical Interaction
  • T(t) Traffic matrix when routing matrix is
    R(t-1)
  • R(t) OptimizedRoutingMatrix(T(t))
  • Traffic engineering installs R(t) to network
  • Selfish routing redistributes traffic to form
    T(t1)

33
Vertical Interaction with OSPF Optimizations
OSPF route optimization interacts poorly with
selfish routing
34
Vertical Interaction with MPLS Optimization
MPLS optimization interacts with selfish routing
more effectively
35
Summary Selfish Routing vs. Traffic Engineering
  • OSPF route optimization interacts poorly with
    selfish routing
  • MPLS interacts with selfish routing more
    effectively
  • Despite the encouraging results from MPLS,
    several challenges exist
  • How to estimate traffic matrices accurately in
    presence of adaptive selfish traffic?
  • Large optimization problems

36
Conclusion
  • Formulate and evaluate selfish overlay routing
  • Unlike the theoretical worst cases, selfish
    routing in Internet-like environments yields
    close to optimal latency
  • The above result is true for both source routing
    and overlay routing
  • Selfish routing can achieve good performance
    without hurting the traffic that is using default
    routing

37
Conclusion
  • Mismatch between selfish routing and traffic
    engineering
  • Different objectives
  • Selfish routing minimize e2e delay
  • Traffic engineering aim to balance load
  • Selfish routing reduces latency at the cost of
    increased congestion
  • The adaptive nature of selfish routing makes
    traffic demands less predictable and reduces the
    effectiveness of traffic engineering

38
Future Work
  • Study impacts of multi-AS nature of the Internet
  • Study dynamics of selfish routing (i.e., how
    traffic equilibria are reached?)
  • Improve the interactions between selfish routing
    and traffic engineering
  • Study other selfish routing objectives (e.g.,
    loss and throughput)
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com