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Title: Active Shooter and 4th/5th Generation Warfare


1
Active Shooter and 4th/5th Generation Warfare
  • How to minimize loss of life
  • as crime and terrorism blend
  • A Resource for Law Enforcement

2
Credits
  • People Chief Bert DuVernay, Sergeant Michael
    Conti, John Giduck, Colonel Thomas Hammes, LTC
    Dave Grossman, John Holschen, Captain Al Sharon,
    Chuck Remsberg, Chief Richard Fairburn, Todd
    Rassa, Lt. Frank Borelli, Paul Howe, Nick
    Minzghor, Keith Jones, Sgt. Allan Garcia, Dr.
    Laurence Miller
  • Organizations PoliceOne.com, LAPD, AIS/Prism,
    NTOA, ILEETA, IL SP Academy, NC DOJ

3
Purpose
  • The purpose of this resource is to
  • Familiarize law enforcement officers and command
    staffs about trends in active shooter/terrorist
    events
  • Help them to understand the nature of emerging
    threats
  • Suggest plans and training that will minimize the
    loss of life in these events
  • This resource is not meant as training in and of
    itself. Training for these events is a complex
    endeavor in which there is no substitute for
    hands-on work. There are many good organizations
    that can provide such training.
  • We arent trying to tell you how to train and
    plan, but rather what to plan and train for.

4
How to use this resource
  • There is a lot of information here!
  • In some cases you may want to use this as a
    presentation as it is, but in most cases you will
    probably want to use this file as a resource as
    you construct your own material for a specific
    audience.
  • Cut, paste and modify slides and the information
    on them as you wish.

5
Part 1
  • Active shooter as we know it
  • A review of basic principles and issues

6
What is an active shooter?
  • A situation where one or more people are in the
    process of causing death or injury or posing an
    immediate danger thereof
  • Not a hostage situation
  • Not a stand off
  • Not a barricaded perpetrator
  • But can transition to one of these

7
Whats different about it?
  • Danger is immediate
  • Cannot wait for SWAT
  • Must act now to save lives
  • A come as you are affair for responders
  • Weapons, equipment, skills, mindset, physical
    condition
  • You have less than a minute to act
  • Youre it! This is what they pay you for!

8
Rapid Deployment response
  • The Rapid Deployment (R/D) active shooter
    response came out of the Columbine tragedy
  • Pre Columbine, post SWAT establish perimeter and
    call SWAT
  • Post Columbine neutralize the threat
  • Theory originally out of LAPD/NTOA
  • Many variations on the theme exist today

9
Active Shooter priority change
  • Normal LE priorities
  • Officer safety
  • Hostage/public safety
  • Perpetrator apprehension
  • Perpetrator safety
  • Active shooter LE priorities
  • Neutralize perpetrator
  • Hostage/public safety
  • Officer safety
  • Perpetrator safety

10
Rapid Deployment concept
  • Imperative
  • Stop the violence NOW
  • Theory of operation
  • Enter structure with minimally safe team
  • Move quickly to sounds/source of violence
  • Search only when source of violence unknown
  • Move past victims and threats (IEDs, etc.)
  • Engage and neutralize perpetrators

11
Responding to scene
  • Describe situation to dispatch
  • Position vehicle to take in information and
    communicate with facility authority- preplan who
    that is
  • Activate ICS
  • Wait for more officers?

12
Ideal situation
  • First officer on scene is initial commander
  • Has most information
  • Directs other responding units
  • Hands off command to supervisor
  • Entry team(s) 4 officers
  • Larger buildings have multiple teams enter
    different entrances (note comms issue)
  • Rescue team 4 later-responding officers
  • Ad-hoc ICS-commander outside
  • Everyone can communicate with each other ?

13
Reality
  • It may be you or 2 of you
  • You cant wait for ICS or supervisor
  • Your radio talks to whomever it does
  • No rescue team
  • Chaos will reign
  • Your Job 1 is to neutralize the perpetrator

14
Moving to structure
  • Do not be in tight formation
  • Spread out patrol-like
  • Utilize cover and leapfrogging
  • Do you know how?
  • Maintain areas of control with muzzle
  • No hard rules
  • Form up at breach point

15
Movement formations
  • Most R/D instruction is based on officers moving
    through the structure in one or more teams of 4
    officers
  • Most R/D instruction spends most of its time on
    teaching officers to move effectively as a team,
    either searching as they go or moving to the
    sound of gunfire
  • A lot of emotional energy is spent defending one
    movement formation vs. another

16
4 officer movement
  • Diamond formation
  • Looks cool, military like
  • Front officer exposed going by doors
  • Often falls apart at corners
  • Most everyone moves into a T anyway
  • T formation probably the best of a bad
    situation
  • Long gun ideally at front center and rear
  • Team leader
  • In center or at wing
  • Designates a comms officer

17
Diamond formation
Direction of travel
officer
18
T formation
Direction of travel
officer
19
1-2 officer movement
  • Fewer officers more risk
  • You go with what you have
  • Formation is fluid and dependent on environment
  • All officers need to have basic
    searching/clearing/movement training
  • Both alone and as part of a team

20
Principles, not specific tactics
  • Use normal building clearing techniques when
    searching
  • Only faster
  • Structure movement principles
  • Muzzle orientated to general area of danger
  • All areas of responsibility (AOR) covered
  • Scan areas as you pass them
  • ALWAYS with a high or low readymuzzle not
    pointed at innocents!
  • T intersections wings pie both ways lead pies
    in direction of travel
  • X intersections make a choice!
  • Stairs normal clears for type
  • Emphasis on flow and speed

21
Room entry principles
  • Stack if door open
  • Wings enter or wing/point entry
  • Door closed get one PO to try door knob
  • Pie through door glass if you cross
  • Entry
  • Structured criss-cross vs. button hook
  • Unstructured whatever the other officer doesnt
    do
  • Maintain AOR
  • Drive to corners (often advisable)
  • Triangulate on suspect
  • Speed AVOID FATAL FUNNEL

22
As you move
  • Students/workers will be running past you
  • Detain them and gather intel
  • Where? How many? Race? Sex? Weapons? Clothing?
  • Pass by injured, dead and dying
  • Might be your friends, relatives, or even
    children
  • Pass by IEDs
  • Sprinklers will be spraying, noises will be loud,
    chaos will be everywhere
  • Focus on your goal
  • Communicate your progress

23
Contact team
  • If bad guys are shooting, you know where they are
    move to them quickly
  • Bypass other rooms and areas
  • If they are not shooting
  • A. Use your intel (verbal, visual, radio) to
    move quickly to them, or
  • B. Slow down and do quick entries/searches as
    you move
  • Challenge or engage when you encounter them
  • If life not in imminent danger, transition to
    SWAT mode

24
Rescue team
  • Follows entry team
  • Removes victims (including officers)
  • Must be capable of becoming contact team if
    perpetrators encountered
  • Fire/EMS personnel rescue team issues
  • Non-sworn
  • No tactical skills
  • No training
  • Armed?
  • Not likely to enter an un-secured area anyway
  • TEMS exceptions

25
Typical movement mistakes
  • Not moving smoothly
  • Getting too tense
  • Moving too fast moving too slow
  • Failing to communicate with each other
  • Every officer trying to command the team
  • Moving into each others line of fire
  • Not maintaining areas of responsibility
  • Breaking role
  • Training is the key!

26
Non-active shooter events
  • Life NOT in imminent danger
  • Isolate and contain subject
  • Call in specialized resources
  • Use the 4Cs Contain/Control/Communicate/Call SWAT

27
Multiple jurisdictional response
  • Issues to be sorted out AHEAD of time
  • Notification mechanism
  • Command structure
  • Communication capability
  • Legal agreements/MOUs
  • Tactics commonality
  • Roles and responsibilities
  • Joint training exercises
  • And so on

28
To ponder
  1. In SWAT, making entry is the last option. In
    R/D, were asking minimally trained officers to
    use SWATs last option as their first.
  2. These skills are perishable. Do you have a
    policy and schedule for regular training?
  3. Do other responding agencies?

29
R/D largely untested
  • R/D used but few times. Out of 80 active shooter
    events from 1966-2003, 44 had detailed info
  • Southfield, MI R/D positive outcome
  • Williamsport, PA moot outcome
  • Bethel, AK R/D positive outcome
  • LA, CA negative outcome friendly casualties
  • Spokane, WA R/D positive outcome (POSA source)
  • Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active
    Shooter Incident,
  • Illinois SP Academy, Richard Fairburn, 2003

30
ISP study conclusions
  • Most incidents over by the time first officers on
    scene
  • Immediate action by on-scene officers most likely
    to have positive effect
  • But SROs not usually chosen for their warrior
    qualities
  • Israel had similar problems
  • They arm the population
  • They arm the teachers
  • Schools are no longer targets
  • R/D success chances heightened by rifle
  • Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active
    Shooter Incident,
  • Illinois SP Academy, Richard Fairburn, 2003

31
Since 2003
  • Multiple active shooter incidents per year,
    including Virginia Tech (VT)
  • In most, all killing was done before the first
    officers got to the scene

32
Implications of the data
  • Training in Rapid Deployment/Active Shooter
    tactics, while necessary, is unlikely to minimize
    loss of life
  • The most important thing you can do to save lives
    is pre-event work with facilities, so that they
    take action immediately to execute their plan
    (details later in this resource)

33
Prepared school staffs the keycourtesy of School
Violence Solutions www.schoolviolencesolutions.com
  • The truth is the educational staffs can do more
    to mitigate the loss of life than the police, due
    to being on scene when the shooting starts
  • The need for training the educational staff in
    every school in how to recognize, react to and
    prevent active shooter events is CRITICAL
  • Passing out a comprehensive school safety plan to
    school staffs is simply not enough
    preparation/training for an active shooter event!
  • Training EVERY member of the school community is
    paramount!

34
The Rhode Island modelcourtesy of School
Violence Solutions www.schoolviolencesolutions.com
  • Governors Statewide Steering Committee formed
  • Curricula created to instruct educational staffs
    statewide
  • Multi-media learning modules are given to
    hundreds of educators throughout the state during
    six training sessions
  • Schools are now mandated to perform lockdown
    drills and training. Sanctions apply if not
    performed
  • Additional training for teachers and staff in
    schools continues

35
Part 2
  • Active shooter as a terrorist event
  • Where were headed

36
Crime to 4th gen. warfare
  • Until now in the U.S., active shooter incidents
    have been crimes perpetrated by individuals for
    their own purposes
  • But future active shooter incidents will include
    persons perpetrating 4G and even 5G warfare

37
What is 4G warfare?
  • One definition (there are many)
  • The loss of the state's monopoly on war and on
    the first loyalty of its citizens, and the rise
    of non-state entities that command peoples
    primary loyalty and that wage war. These entities
    may be gangs, religions, races and ethnic groups
    within races, localities, tribes, business
    enterprises, ideologiesthe variety is almost
    limitless
  • William S. LindStrategic Defense Initiative

38
Warfare generations
  • There are several different schemes that divide
    history into generational periods of warfare, and
    these schemes often differ in the characteristics
    of warfare that they use to define its
    generations.
  • What follows is one popular scheme, provided for
    context.

39
1G to 3G Warfare
  • 1st Generation Warfare-up to WWI
  • Armies fought attrition-based battles at close
    range with individual and squad-level weapons
    (cannons)
  • 2nd Generation Warfare-WWI
  • Armies fought attrition-based battles at close
    range with large-scale weapons support
    (chemicals, bombs, etc.) and mechanized transport
    (e.g., railroads)
  • 3rd Generation Warfare-WWII
  • Large-scale maneuvers (e.g. the blitzkrieg)
  • Long range weapons targeting enemy infrastructure

40
4th generation warfare
  • Carried out by small cells that blend with the
    populationnot by armies
  • Fundamentally a political endeavor
  • Seeks to destroy the will of the enemies decision
    makersnot to defeat its military
  • Examples Mao, al-Queda I.R.A. Sandinistas
  • Terrorism is a tactic of, not a synonym for, 4GW
  • Co-opting the media is a crucial element of 4GW

41
5th generation warfare
  • There are many different definitions of 5th
    generation warfare, but they all agree that
    actions undertaken by individuals of their own
    initiative will be a salient characteristic of
    it.
  • That is the important attribute of 5GW for our
    purposes.

42
4/5GW and active shooters
  • Active shooter tactics are essentially the same
    as terrorist tactics kill a lot of innocent
    people indiscriminately
  • But a 4/5GW terrorist incident will be better
    planned and resourced than a lone (or a couple
    of) active shooter(s)

43
Self-deployment (5G warfare) examples
  • MD / VA snipers
  • LAX / El Al incident on 7-4-02
  • Richard Reed (the Shoe Bomber)
  • Vehicle attack at UNC-Chapel Hill, 3-3-06
  • Seattle shootings, 7-28-06
  • Vehicle attacks in SF-Fremont area,
    8-29-06

44
What to expect?
  • Our enemies freely tell us what they are planning
    and want to accomplish!
  • We have merely to pay attention
  • And come out of denial
  • Most public officials have taken a downplay,
    deny and deflect position

45
Captured al-Queda tapes
  • Produced for internal use, not propaganda
  • Included
  • Live-fire room entry
  • Live-fire/role-player scenarios
  • Any resistance was met with being shot
  • Assassination scenarios
  • Kidnapping training
  • No presumed compliance from victims
  • Explosives planting
  • Prisoner handling search, control and execution

46
al-Queda tapes (2)
  • Commands given in English
  • Prisoners begging for their lives in English
  • Distraction devices preceding entry
  • Multiple breach points
  • Targeting LE officers in ambushes using
    disabled vehicle as ploy, then sounding horn to
    initiate assault
  • Scenarios on 6-lane highways at clover-leafs (to
    facilitate exfiltration)
  • There are few such highways in the Middle East

47
al-Queda tapes (3)
  • Security/overwatch elements to shoot responding
    LE
  • Residential and golf course assassinations
  • Use of storm drains and sewers for exfiltration
  • Much practice on assault of buildings with a
    large number of occupants, including
    inconspicuous movement to entry points (weapons
    hidden)
  • Anyone giving any trouble at all is shot
  • Executing hostages in front of the media
  • Often no exfiltration plans for buildings they
    plan to kill everyone and die in place

48
Take-home lesson
  • While terrorist plans for large-scale events
    including WMD are certainly in place
  • They are preparing smaller-scale attacks by small
    groups with various small arms and planted
    explosives in populated buildings, particularly
    schools

49
Why schools?
  • Our Values
  • The most sacred thing to us are our children
  • Killing hundreds of children will boost the
    terrorists morale and lower ours, leaving us
    stunned
  • Our Lack of Preparation
  • Police deal with crime, but school attacks are
    war acts
  • Police are generally not prepared
  • Society hasnt come to grips with terrorism on
    U.S. soil

50
Why schools? (2)
  • al-Qaeda has said they have the right to kill
    millions of American children
  • al-Qaeda terrorists have been video-taped
    practicing school takeovers and issuing commands
    in English
  • Some Islamic religious literature condones
    killing children if it is done for the general
    good
  • Target scouting and infiltration efforts have
    already reportedly occurred

51
School assault model-Beslan
  • A dress rehearsal has already taken place in 2004
    in Beslan, Russia where 172 children were killed
  • Large buildings with complicated floor plans are
    preferredthey are harder to counter assault
  • In Beslan, over 1,000 people were held hostage by
    100 terrorists for three days without food or
    water

52
Beslan (2)
  • Started as at least 4 vehicle, 36 person active
    shooter attack
  • Additional 40 terrorists in crowd
  • One police officer, one security officer present,
    both armed only with handguns, both killed
    immediately
  • Secured building in 15 minutes with over 1000
    hostages

53
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54
Beslan (3)
  • Terrorist snipers and RPGs were immediately
    positioned in strategic locations once the school
    was taken
  • Terrorists weapons included AK-47s, sniper
    rifles, rocket propelled grenades and explosives
  • Hostages cell phones were taken
  • Adults and teachers were separated from children
    to keep complete control
  • Intel spotters were in crowd

55
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56
Beslan (4)
  • Attempts at negotiation by responders were used
    by the terrorists to buy time to fortify the
    school
  • All entrances and many stairwells were booby
    trapped with explosives
  • Children were used as shields by snipers
  • The terrorists used amphetamines to stay awake

57
Beslan (5)
  • 11 hours of fighting, 8 hours of heavy fighting
  • Women and older children were repeatedly raped
  • Adult males and large boys were made to help
    fortify the school, then they were shot
  • Over 330 persons killed and over 660 persons
    injured

58
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59
Beslan (6)
  • When troops stormed the school, troops and
    children were gunned down
  • Explosions started many fires
  • Trip wires connected to explosives slowed the
    assault
  • Terrorists broke into three groups
  • One group attempted to escape by dressing in
    hostages clothing
  • One group attempted to fight off the rescue teams
  • One group focused on killing the hostages by
    shooting them and detonating explosives

60
The dead children
61
Beslan lessons
  • Terrorists were well prepared
  • Reconnaissance started months in advance
  • Gained tactical superiority quickly
  • Excellent tactics were employed
  • Terrorists were well trained

62
Beslan lessons (2)
  • Terrorists had effective communication equipment
  • Terrorists were well funded reports indicate
    al-Qaeda funding
  • Had learned from prior incidents
  • Had gas masks
  • Broke out windows to negate gas effects

63
Schools are real targets
  • bin Laden has promised that Beslan will happen to
    the U.S. many times over
  • First 6 months of 2006 alone 204 schools
    attacked in Afghanistan
  • 1984-1994 more than 300 schools attacked in
    Turkey
  • Floor plans for schools in VA, TX and NJ have
    been recovered from terrorists in Iraq

64
Whats likely here?
  • Terrorists striking simultaneously at multiple
    schools, or
  • a Beslan-type attack with fewer terrorists but
    better bombs
  • Middle schools without a police presence are
    preferred
  • The girls are big enough to rape the students
    are not big enough to fight back staffed largely
    by females
  • Preferred targets are states that do not allow
    concealed carry of firearms, have no hunting
    culture, and where the police do not carry rifles
  • Rural areas are favored because of the delayed
    response time for police to arrive in force
  • Schools with external surveillance cameras are
    preferred so terrorists can observe the LE
    response

65
Whats likely here? (2)
  • As they seize the school, the attackers will
    initially kill every teacher and many of the
    students they see
  • They will rape, murder and toss the bodies
    outside, as was done in Beslan
  • They will plant bombs throughout the school, and
    on students
  • Emergency responders and fleeing children will be
    blown up by car bombs in the parking lot
  • 100 to 300 children could be killed on the first
    strike
  • The terrorists are likely already here, many
    having crossed over the border with Mexico

66
Whats likely here? (3)
  • Fully automatic weapons placed in over-watch
    positions
  • Faux negotiations to buy time for fortification
    and PR value
  • They expect to fight and die there, not negotiate
    their way out
  • They know that Americans will not assault if
    negotiations are going well
  • Logical SWAT entry points heavily fortified with
    bombs
  • Will force SWAT entry by starting to kill children

67
Skewed priorities
  • U.S. schools extensively guard against fire
  • Fire drills
  • Sprinkler systems
  • Building codes, etc.
  • Yet not one child had died from fire in any U.S.
    school in over 25 years (excluding dorm fires)
  • Well over 200 deaths have occurred by active
    shooters in the same period here
  • But training and preparation for these events
    meets with stiff resistance and denial

68
Overall response plan
  • Four elements
  • Deter
  • Detect
  • Delay
  • Destroy

69
Deter
  • An armed police presence in a school is a strong
    deterrence against attack
  • The terrorists are willing to die, but they dont
    want to die without completing their tactical
    objective. They want a high body count
  • Unarmed security in a school is pointless

70
Detect
  • They have to live among us, plan the event and
    recon the facility. Alert police officers are
    essential.
  • Follow good patrol procedures on traffic stops
  • Ask probing questions, be alert for
    contradictions, inconsistencies, unduly nervous
    behavior. Be aware of the inside of the vehicle
    and the people in it
  • Watch for signs of surveillance on potential
    targets. Terrorists always conduct recon and may
    use cameras and camcorders
  • Some terrorists are blue-eyed blonds who may not
    fit the usual profile
  • Have the school report any inquiries about
    security practices. It could be a recon event.

71
Detect (2)
  • In order to avoid failure or embarrassment, they
    will plan extensively
  • Info gathering (libraries, public records, etc.),
    recon, dry runs
  • For example, in Miami, two Saudi students who
    spoke English well, climbed onto a school bus and
    refused to get off. When the police arrived,
    they said they thought is was a public transit
    bus. They were probably seeing how long it took
    police to respond.
  • Report all suspicious activities to your fusion
    center
  • Beware of groups renting halls/schools, and
    people videotaping the interior during the event.
  • Most non-police incident intell will come in the
    form of gossip and stories
  • Make friends with mail carriers, landlords, store
    clerks, and so on to receive these intell nuggets

72
Delay
  • One police officer firing from behind effective
    cover inside a school may hold off a group of
    attackers for several minutes and save lives by
    buying time for help to arrive and to let
    students evacuate
  • At the first hint of trouble, the school should
    engage in a three step lock-down model
  • Lockdown is to violence what fire drills are to
    fire
  • Move away from the violence. Dont be paralyzed
    by the event.
  • Move to a pre-selected secure location(s) to wait
    for police
  • Move again when in danger. Lock-down does not
    mean hunker down and die.

73
Destroy
  • Police officers must be fully prepared, mentally
    and physically, to aggressively use deadly force
    to stop the threat
  • Act immediately. Every minute the Russians
    waited, the target got harder.
  • If you hesitate, people will die

74
Infrastructure/personal issues
  • Officers need to be trained to essentially go to
    warmany are not physically, mentally or
    emotionally prepared
  • Your ICS capabilities incorporating other
    agencies will be criticalare you prepared?
  • Your comms capability is criticalis it capable?
  • Inter-agency plans and roles/responsibilities are
    crucialare they in place?

75
Where to start?
76
Getting started - pick ten
  • Concentrate on the ten most likely
    structures/locations in your jurisdiction or
    precinct
  • Schools
  • Businesses
  • Municipal offices
  • Shopping districts, malls, theatres
  • Visitor attractions
  • Outdoor venues fairs, sporting events, etc
  • Assign an officer to be responsible for each

77
Getting started (2)
  • Initiate a relationship with the facilities
    manager and top business manager there CEO,
    Principal, etc.
  • Develop an active shooter and/or 4/5 Gen takeover
    plan with them
  • There are many good active shooter plans out
    there
  • IACP, ASIS, NEA, US Dept. of Education, NASRO,
    Etc.
  • Even Google will return many good plans
  • Pick one for a starting point with each of your
    10 facilities
  • Develop a custom plan for each with the
    facilities personnel

78
Stakeholders involved
  • Involve in planning
  • Primary LE agency
  • Assisting LE agencies
  • Fire/EMS
  • Facility management
  • Professional societies/organizations
  • EMS
  • Hospitals
  • Crisis resources Red Cross, etc.
  • Mediadont forget them!

79
Facility planning issues
  • Once youve selected a plan template from an
    appropriate source and identified representatives
    from each stakeholder group, youll need to
    develop a specific plan for each of your top 10
    facilities.
  • The following slides are examples of issues that
    youll have to address this is not an exhaustive
    list, but simply examples.

80
Facility planning issues (2)
  • Distribute to appropriate personnel
  • Floor plans
  • Keys
  • Facility personnel lists and telephone numbers
  • Understand which suspects are there
  • People with records
  • Suspicious people you know
  • Probation involvement
  • Intel from regional intel task forces
  • Info shared by other agencies
  • Info sharing with facility personal department

81
Facility planning issues (3)
  • People dont just snap
  • Typical active shooter has longstanding histories
    of involvement with legal, mental health, and/or
    substance abuse services
  • Most of these people will not be murderers, but
    they form a pre-event suspect pool

82
Facility planning issues (4)
  • Facility personnel rules and regulations
  • Visitor sign-in and out procedure
  • How will you know whos in the building at any
    time?
  • Physical security and monitoring
  • Suspicious activity reporting mechanism
  • Monitoring of suspended/fired persons
  • Employee screening criminal, substance abuse,
    etc.
  • Counseling services involvement
  • Threat identifications and assessments

83
Facility planning issues (5)
  • Establish crisis team at each facility
  • Establish chain of command
  • Establish communication chains and mechanisms
  • Who has control over what? Keys, controls,
    entrances
  • Involve maintenance staff sprinklers, plumbing,
    electrical
  • Determine evacuation or lockdown decision process
    and procedures (address disabled persons, too)
  • Establish evacuation holding sites use safe
    room?
  • Determine how to take student/employee/visitor
    inventory
  • Make up crisis kits radios, floor plans,
    student/employee lists, etc

84
Facility planning issues (6)
  • How will first observers communicate the threat?
    To who?
  • How will the threat be communicated to everyone
    in the facility? Code words?
  • Lockdown or evacuate? When? How?
  • Consider a kit in each room including color-coded
    signs with room numbers on them to post under
    hallway door and outside windows (e.g., red sign
    means help needed, green sign means no one hurt)
  • Each room should have 2 exits, even if a window

85
Facility planning issues (7)
  • How/when will the facility communicate to family
    members of people involved? When?
  • Should all doors have locks on them?
  • Have busses respond to evacuate students/building
    occupants to a reunification/debriefing/counseling
    area
  • Plan to shut down streets for emergency vehicle
    access

86
Lockdown vs. Escape
  • Currently, a lockdown is often advocated in an
    active shooter situation. That is, secure the
    potential victims in a locked room(s). But if it
    was you or your child, wouldnt you want (them)
    to break a window and get out of the potential
    kill zone?
  • Consider evacuation and escape as alternatives to
    lockdown

87
LE recommendations-officers
  • Obtain patrol rifles, ballistic shields,
    ballistic helmets and other tactical gear
  • Get every officer comfortable with a rifle
  • Learn how to use AK-47 type weapons
  • Train to shoot while moving
  • Train officers in
  • Bomb awareness
  • Basic crowd management
  • Basic riot control
  • Ballistic shield tactics
  • Team firing drills,
  • And other response skills needed for a mass
    school takedown

88
LE recommendations-officers (2)
  • Make sure every officer is familiar with all of
    the likely target structures interiors in their
    jurisdiction/precinct
  • If you are a police parent, consider changing
    your personal data at the school to something
    more generic (city employee versus police
    officer) so that your child wont be as valuable
    a hostage
  • Encourage all police officers to always carry a
    weapon off duty. What if you were off duty
    visiting your childs school and you were the
    only one there to save them?

89
Individual officer response bag
  • Police officers should have a response bag for
    these events
  • Multiple spare rifle and pistol magazines
  • Floor plans for every structure in their AOR
  • Locations of utility shut-offs, HVAC vents, etc.
  • Facility contact numbers, including cell phones
  • Keys
  • Self-rescue medical supplies
  • Chemlites to mark IEDs
  • Glass punch (to breach building)
  • Door wedges
  • Breaching rounds if shotgun carried in cruiser
  • Can be incorporated into a vest with extra
    ballistic protection

90
LE recommendations-agency
  • Expand active shooter training to include large,
    complicated, multi-adversary scenarios and
    exercises with multiple responding agencies
  • Train for open-air encounters, not just within a
    structure. The incident may transition to or
    include the outdoors.
  • Practice against a booby trapped environment
  • Practice counter-assault on school buses.
    Terrorists may hijack several buses and drive
    them to a school
  • School Resource Officers will be specifically
    targeted by terrorists. They will probably be the
    first casualties. SROs need training in
    surveillance awareness and the real-life testing
    tactics of terrorists.

91
LE recommendations-agency (2)
  • Incorporate suicide-bomber shooting drills into
    firearms training for every police officer
  • Teach effective CQB skills that integrate
    empty-hands techniques with the firearm
  • Make sure that who makes the enter decision and
    when has been addressed, simulated and trained

92
LE recommendations-agency (3)
  • Get the name and phone number of every private
    helicopter in your area and coordinate with them
    ahead of time to deploy in an emergency. News
    helicopters can be great allies when transporting
    troops into a siege site in exchange for news
    footage. Practice landing personnel on flat
    roofs.
  • Practice frequent incident command training and
    exercises using multiple jurisdictions and
    multiple disciplines (EMS, Fire, Police, Public
    Works, etc)

93
LE recommendations-agency (4)
  • Integrate the fire service into your tactical
    training. A fire hose can be a crew-served
    weapon at the scene of a terrorist attack. They
    not only put out fires but they can knock a
    combatant out of a window 50 yards away.
  • Have a policy for officer parents of hostage
    children/spouse/etc.
  • Have a plan for a parent siege of an attacked
    school
  • Have a plan for handling the media

94
LE recommendations-agency (5)
  • Develop breaching capability
  • Barricading/securing facility prior to starting
    to kill people is a trend with recent shootings
  • VT shooter chained doors shut
  • White lights for weapons are necessary facility
    may be dark
  • Shotgun breaching rounds in each cruiser
  • Frangible buckshot or slugs
  • Other breaching capability for specific
    structures
  • Develop sniper capability, and ability to get
    several on scene fast
  • Plan for a siege ammo, water, first aid, etc.

95
LE recommendations-aftermath
  • Include immediate aftermath planning and
    training
  • Treating injured
  • Consolidating victims
  • Managing the scene
  • Training facility personnel to maintain crime
    scene
  • Managing any prisoners
  • Protecting/moving all from additional IEDs and
    other threats
  • Notifying victims families

96
EMS issues
  • EMS wont enter an area until its secure
  • After you neutralize the shooter, it will still
    take a long time to secure the facility
  • Designate a causality collection point to bring
    casualties out to
  • Use uninjured subjects (victims, bystanders,
    etc.) to hold pressure on bleeding victims

97
If you are captured
  • Aggressively escape if you can
  • You will be killed immediately if you dont
  • You will be killed eventually anyway
  • The intelligence you provide will be invaluable

98
Final thought
  • If not me, who?
  • Thats the motto of the Russian Special Forces,
    but it applies to every police officer, and by
    extension to every public safety official and
    government executive.

99
Required Reading
  • Terror at Beslan, John Giduck
  • www.terroratbeslan.com
  • The Sling and The Stone, Col Thomas X. Hammes

100
Resources
  • Prevention and Response To Suicide Bombing
    Incidents, New Mexico Tech, Energetic Materials
    Research and Testing Center, www.emrtc.nmt.edu/
  • Many incident critical event/active shooter
    simulation software packages available
  • Rural Law Enforcement Technology Centerseveral
    training DVDs/discs, www.nlectc.org/ruletc/
  • Terrorist Screening Centerinformation on using
    the nationwide database of terrorist watch
    subjects(866) 872-5678
  • School Violence Solutions, www.schoolviolencesolut
    ions.com
  • National Terrorism Center, http//www.nctc.gov/sit
    e/index.html
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