ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: IS OUTSOURCING THE ANSWER TO STEER CLEAR OF U'S' PROSECUTORS - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: IS OUTSOURCING THE ANSWER TO STEER CLEAR OF U'S' PROSECUTORS

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Title: ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: IS OUTSOURCING THE ANSWER TO STEER CLEAR OF U'S' PROSECUTORS


1
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES IS OUTSOURCING THE ANSWER
TO STEER CLEAR OF U.S. PROSECUTORS?
TradeWindsMaritime Outsourcing Forum20-21
November, 2007, Hotel DAngleterre
Vincent J. Foley Partner Holland Knight LLP
2
I. Vessel Owner and Ship Manager Legal
Relationship
3
  • A. In-House Vessel Management governed by
    Master-Servant relationship.

4
Standard Ship Management Contract (e.g.
"SHIPMAN '98") establishes a principal and agent
relationship between Vessel Owner and Ship
Manager.
5
  • (i) Ship Manager, acting as agent, has a
    fiduciary relationship with Vessel Owner in which
    Ship Manager is authorized to act on behalf of
    Vessel Owner.

6
  • (ii) Ship Manager acts pursuant to scope of
    agreement. Degree of control over Ship Manager
    can vary depending on terms of the contract.

7
  • (iii) Under SHIP MAN '98, Ship Manger provides
    "management services as agents for and on behalf
    of the owners in accordance with sound ship
    management practice and to protect and promote
    the interests of the owners in all manners
    relating to the provision of services hereunder."
    ( SHIPMAN 98, Part 2, 4.1)

8
  • (iv) SHIP MAN 98 expressly provides "the managers
    shall not be liable for any of the actions of the
    Crew, even if such actions are negligent, grossly
    negligent or willful, except only to the extent
    that they are shown to have resulted from a
    failure by the managers to discharge their
    obligations" (SHIP MAN 98 Part II 11.2(ii))

9
II. Definitions of Outsourcing
10
  • A."Outsourcing entered the business world in the
    1980s and often refers to the delegation of
    non-core operations from internal production to
    an external entity specializing in the management
    of that operation". en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outsourc
    ing

11
  • B. "Outsourcing is the process by which a company
    retains a third party to perform some process or
    function that was or would be performed by the
    company itself." Recent Trends in Outsourcing
    Understanding and Managing the Legal Issues and
    Risk, Scott W. Pink, Practicing Law Institute
    2004

12
III. Corporate Liability for Environmental
Crimes In-House v. Outsourced Vessel Management
13
  • A. Responsibility of Vessel Owner

14
  • (i) Vessel Owner has a public duty to operate
    vessels in compliance with laws and regulations
    that prohibit pollution of the environment.

15
  • (ii) "One who owes a certain duty to the public
    and entrusts its performance to another, whether
    it be an independent contractor or agent, becomes
    responsible criminally for the failure of the
    person to whom he has delegated the obligation to
    comply with the law, if the non-performance of
    such duty is a crime." United States v. Parfait
    Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir.
    1947).

16
  • (iii) Ship Manager hired to carry out the Vessel
    Owner's public duty to avoid pollution of the
    environment is considered an "instrumentality" of
    the owner.

17
  • (iv) The liability associated with Vessel Owner's
    public duty cannot be shifted to the
    instrumentality to insulate the vessel owner from
    liability.

18
  • B. Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts of
    Agent/Servant

19
  • (i) the individual must be acting within the
    scope of his or her employment or contract

20
  • (ii) the individual must be acting to benefit the
    corporation (actual benefit not required if
    agent/servant believed actions would benefit
    corporation) and

21
  • (iii) the act and intent must be imputed to the
    corporation.
  • (American Criminal Law Review, Corporate Criminal
    Liability 1997, Vol. 25, at 550).

22
  • C. Imputing Knowledge to Corporation

23
  • NO ACTUAL BENEFIT TO CORPORATION NECESSARY
  • COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE
  • WILLFUL BLINDNESS or DELIBERATE IGNORANCE
    DOCTRINE
  • CORPORATION NOT LIABLE FOR AGENT or SERVANT
    BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

24
  • C. Vessel Owner responsible for failures of Ship
    Manager that result in illegal pollution from the
    Vessel.

25
  • (i.) IN-HOUSE MANAGEMENT Vessel Owner is
    responsible for its employee's actions with
    respect to environmental compliance, maintenance
    and upkeep of environmental equipment on board
    vessels, conduct and operation of vessel while
    trading in U.S. ports, territorial waters,
    Exclusive Economic Zone, and the High Seas

26
  • (ii.) OUTSOURCED SHIP MANAGEMENT Although Ship
    Manager assumes responsibilities of vessel owner
    for compliance with environmental laws and
    regulations, Vessel Owner remains responsible for
    failures in complying with environmental laws and
    regulations that result in illegal pollution.

27
  • (iii.) RATIONALE Criminal liability is imposed
    on the Vessel Owner despite the hiring of a
    competent Ship Manager because of the owner's
    knowledge that its vessel if improperly handled
    would violate the public duty to avoid polluting
    the environment.

28
  • "The rationale presumably lies in preventing
    corporations from avoiding liability by simply
    contracting out the more risky elements of their
    business." (Corporate Criminal Liability,
    American Criminal Law Review at page 553).

29
  • (iv.) CAVEAT Civil Responsibility exception
    under OPA '90 for a "truly passive" Owner, e.g a
    Lender that "holds indicia of ownership primarily
    to protect a security interest in a vessel or
    facility" 33.U.S.C. 2701 (26). Not clear that
    this Caveat would extend to Criminal Liability
    for Oil Pollution.

30
  • D. In-House Management Benefits

31
  • (i) In-house management allows for more direct
    control by Vessel Owner over environmental
    compliance programs.

32
  • (ii) Effective environmental compliance programs
    implemented by in-house staff can reduce
    penalties and fines imposed as a result of
    illegal pollution.

33
  • E. Outsourcing Advantages

34
  • (i) Outsourced Ship Manager is expert in
    International Safety Management ("ISM") code, ISO
    Quality Management Standards (IS0 9000 Series),
    ISO Environmental Management Standard (ISO
    14001), and can coordinate various programs to
    establish effective Maritime Compliance program.

35
  • (ii) Delegation of Environmental Compliance to
    Outsourced company permits In-House management
    staff to focus on core company business.

36
  • IV. U.S. Statutes Used to Prosecute Vessel Owners
    for Environmental Crimes

37
  • A. Prosecution of Environmental Crimes Primary
    U.S. Environmental Statutes for Vessel Pollution
    (NOT All-Inclusive)

38
  • (i) The Clear Air Act, ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7401
    et seq. Imposes a penalty for knowingly
    violating federal or states regulations design to
    achieve ambient air quality standards established
    by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
    ("EPA")

39
  • (ii) The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
    U.S.C. 1319(c)(1) (1994) ("CWA" or "Clean Water
    Act") - Imposes a criminal penalty for willfully
    or negligently discharging pollutants into
    navigable waters.

40
  • (iii) The River and Harbor's Act of 1899
    ("Refuse Act"), 33 U.S.C. 407, 411- 412 -
    Strict liability for release or discharge of
    pollutant into navigable waters.

41
  • (iv) Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships
    ("APPS"), 33 U.S.C. 1908(a) - Imposes criminal
    penalty for knowingly violating MARPOL protocol.

42
  • V.Penalties for Environmental Crimes U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines and Use of Outsourcing to
    Steer Clear of U.S. Prosecutors or Reduce Fines
    and Penalties

43
  • (i.) The U. S. Sentencing Guidelines are followed
    by Department of Justice ("DOJ") prosecutors in
    order to ascertain a fine and penalties imposed
    upon Corporations for criminal violations of the
    law.

44
  • (ii.) Sentencing Guidelines are an effort by the
    U.S. sentencing commission to establish sound and
    consistent policies for corporate crimes.

45
  • (iii) Sentencing Guidelines adjust sentences "to
    account for the efforts of some corporations to
    ferret out a crime and the total indifference to,
    or encouragement of it by other corporations."
    Corporate Criminal Liability, 35 Am. Crim. L.
    Rev. at 557 (1998)

46
  • A. Calculation of Penalties Base Fine and
    Culpability Points

47
  • (i) For sentencing, the Court determines the
    initial fine by calculating a "base fine" level,
    which is then adjusted up or down based on the
    corporation's "culpability score."

48
  • (ii) A company with an effective compliance
    program may be entitled to a reduced sentence
    (i.e. reduction of culpability points).

49
  • (iii) Favorable consideration is granted with
    regard to both the bringing of criminal
    indictments and the settling of charges. See
    Dennis L. Bryant, The Maritime Compliance
    Program Foghorn Protection for the Shipowner, 24
    Tul. Mar. L.J. 591 at 596 (2000).

50
  • B. Elements of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for
    Effective Compliance Program

51
  • 1. Establish compliance standards to "reasonably
    capable of reducing the prospect of criminal
    conduct."

52
  • 2. High level personnel "must be given overall
    responsibility to oversee compliance."

53
  • 3. Ensure that "substantial discretionary
    authority" is not given to agents who possess a
    propensity to engage in illegal activities.

54
  • 4. Communicate compliance standards to employees
    with effective training and monitoring programs.

55
  • 5. Auditing steps to achieve compliance designed
    to detect criminal conduct in operation of
    vessel.

56
  • 6. Establish effective corporate response to an
    offense once detected with disciplinary measures
    to prevent further occurrences.

57
  • VI. Conclusions

58
  • A. Vessel Owner can not insulate itself from
    exposure to criminal liability for environmental
    pollution from its vessel by outsourcing to Ship
    Manager.

59
  • B. Outsourcing allows Vessel Owner to bring in
    particular expertise that can reduce cost of ship
    operation and enhance effectiveness of
    environmental compliance programs.

60
  • C. Outsourcing Environmental Compliance Programs
    can result in Favorable Consideration for Vessel
    Owner to Avoid U.S. Prosecutors bringing
    indictments, settling charges or reducing
    penalties for environmental crimes.

61
  • D. Outsourcing expertise assists Vessel Owner to
    keep current on multiple and complex regulations
    applicable to environmental pollution, oily
    discharges, air emissions and other potential
    criminal liabilities associated with operation of
    a vessel.
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