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Governance, Multilevel Governance and Europeanization

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Title: Governance, Multilevel Governance and Europeanization


1
Governance, Multilevel Governance and
Europeanization
European Social Policy Course4 May 2009 J. R.
Grote
2
Governance
  • Where does it come from?
  • What does it mean?
  • How has been conceptualized?
  • What are the nain types?
  • Which are the scientific disciplines devoted to
    its study?
  • Is there something like an overall definition
    that would be shared by everybody?
  • What are its pre-requisites and what its
    obstacles?
  • What is it expected to achieve?

3

Worldwide governance indicators
  • The most widely diffused notion of the
    governance term is probably the various
    governance indices produced by international
    organizations to measure the performance and
    development capacity of countries in the first,
    the second and the third world. The aim is, in
    most cases, to arrive at something being called
    good governance.
  • Most of these studies make use of compound
    indices whose number, in principle, is unlimited.
    For example
  • Gross Domestic Product
  • Levels of Poverty
  • Levels of Education
  • Government effectiveness
  • Rule of law
  • Political stability and so forth
  • Whether this really adds up to reflect
    governance and governance capity is questionable.
    Yet, at least, it provides for interesting
    comparative information that has not been
    available in previous periods
  •  

4
Control of corruption 2007
Political stability 2007
Voice and accountability 2007
5
Government effectiveness 2007
Rule of law 2007
Regulatory quality 2007
6
Governance design or emergence?
  • Governance is a method/mechanism for dealing with
    a broad range of problems or conflicts in which
    actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory
    and binding decisions by negotiating with each
    other and cooperating in the implementation of
    these decisions.
  • Governance as institutional cybernetics or
    governance as an emergent phenomenon that
    develops behind the backs of the people.
    Governance as a quasi-natural response to
    increasing problems of coping with complexity in
    politics, in technology, in social life, etc.
    Governance as a self-equlibrating process.

7
John Stuart Mill, 1862. Considerations on
Representative Government. New York Harper
Brothers.
  • Central question To what extent are forms of
    government a matter of choice?
  • All speculations concerning forms of government
    bear the impress, more or less exclusive, of two
    conflicting theories respecting political
    institutions or, to speak more properly,
    conflicting conceptions of what political
    institutions are. By some minds, government is
    conceived as strictly a practical art, giving
    rise to no questions but those of means and an
    end. Forms of government are assimilated to any
    other expedients for the attainment of human
    objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of
    invention and contrivance. Being made by man, it
    is assumed that man has the choice either to make
    them or not, and how or on what pattern they
    shall be made. () To find the best form of
    government, to persuade others that it is the
    best and, having done so, to stir them up to
    insist on having it, is the order of ideas in the
    minds of those who adopt this view of political
    philosophy. They look upon a constitution in the
    same light (difference of scale being allowed
    for) as they would upon a steam plow or a
    threshing machine.

8
  • To these stand opposed another kind of political
    reasoners, who are so far from assimilating a
    form of government to a machine that they regard
    it as a sort of spontaneous product, and the
    science of government as a branch (so to speak)
    of natural history. According to them, forms of
    government are not a matter of choice. We must
    take them, in the main, as we find them.
    Governments can not be constructed by
    premeditated design. They are not made, but
    grow. Our business with them, as with the other
    facts of the universe, is to acquaint ourselves
    with their natural properties, and adapt
    ourselves to them. The fundamental political
    institutions of a people are considered by this
    school as a sort of organic growth from the
    nature of life of that people a product of their
    habits, instincts, and unconscious wants and
    desires, scarcely at all of their deliberate
    purposes. Their will has had no part in the
    matter but that of meeting the necessities of the
    moment by the contrivances of the moment (). It
    is difficult to decide which of these doctrines
    would be the most absurd, if we suppose either of
    them held as an exclusive theory. But, though
    each side greatly exaggerates its own theory, out
    of opposition to the other, and no one holds
    without modification to either, the two doctrines
    correspond to a deep-seated difference between
    two modes of thought and though it is evident
    that neither of these is entirely in the right,
    yet it being equally evident that neither is
    wholly in the wrong, we must endeavour to get
    down to what is at the root of each, and avail
    ourselves of the amount of truth which exists in
    either.

9
  • Governance in the economy and in industrial
    sectors

10
The variety of mechanisms for the governance of
sectorsby P.C. Schmitter
  • Up to now, scholars have emphasized the
    importance of simple dichotomies
  • Charles Lindblom Market and State
  • Oliver Williamson Hierarchy and Market
  • Hybrid forms may exist according to these
    authors, but they are regarded as intrinsically
    unstable
  • Schmitter argues that there are many of such
    hybrids and that they may be more stable than
    suggested by the standard literature
  • Alliances
  • Networks

11
  • Figure 1 distinguishes between
  • a vertical axis two generic types of exchange)
    and a
  • horizontal axis three means of enforcing
    whatever mechanism comes about)
  • The figure generates six partially overlapping
    boxes
  • Markets spontaneously equilibrating (unvisible
    hand),
  • Hierarchies based on enforcement mechanisms
    (guarantee of property rights) which can be
    internalized within a company,
  • Communities self-equilibrating (normative
    consensus among their members),
  • States (or public hierarchies) external units of
    enforcement par excellence and have a sovreign
    status
  • Alliances
  • Networks.

12
Fig. 1 The governance of economic sectors

13
  • Governance in politics and society

14
  • However, the problem can also be addressed from
    the more encompassing perspective of Overall
    Modes of Societal Order in modern societies and
    nation states.
  • Several of such modes have been said to exist
    and are frequently addressed by different social
    science disciplines
  • - The Market
  • - The State
  • - The Society
  • While state and market are generally accepted as
    ordering mechanisms by virtually all scholars, it
    happens that some use the notion of Civil Society
    (rather than just society) while others insert
    Networks into the menu of orders. Others again
    have suggested that the market and the state are
    complemented by the Community as a third and the
    Association as a forth mode of societal order.
  • Independently from what is ultimately prefered,
    the most important thing is that, to speak of
    governance, these orders need to overlap to some
    extent thus partly complementing and partly
    contradicting each other.

15
Is Governance able of solving the problems
resulting from the incompatibility or
complementarity of different types of orders?
(from Streeck/Schmitters essay on PIGs)
  • Modern societies, polities and economies can
    only be analyzed in terms of a specific mix of
    these institutions and principles. Each of them
    can in principle undermine but also strengthen
    the existence of adjacent institutions and
    principles.
  • Communities can undermine markets (informal
    collusion, clientelist arrangments) but can also
    encourage mutual confidence and good faith
    necessary for stable economic exchange.
  • Markets can decompose community bonds and erode
    common values but can also provide for
    opportunities for extended reproduction.

16
  • State intervention can distort markets but can
    also provide for a legal framework that guides
    and makes economic exchange viable.
  • Free contracts and competition may contradict
    state policies but even the most etatist state
    requires markets as a supplementary mechanism of
    allocation.
  • State growth and government intervention may lead
    to a disintegration of communities but, at the
    same time, communities without a state would
    always be in danger of losing their identity and
    independence.
  • Communitarian tribalism can frustrate the
    development of a stable nation state while, at
    the same time, a state without some degree of
    spontaneous solidarity among its citizens is no
    more than a bureacratic or military conspiracy.

17
While until this point, hardly anybody would have
a problem with the description of virtues and
vices of these three modes of societal order,
Streeck and Schmiiter are convinced that there is
a forth mode which has so far been largely
neglected
  • Streeck and Schmitter introduce an additional
    and distinct institution (including these
    institutions guiding principles) which they call
    Association.
  • Association is more than a transient amalgam
    of the three other orders and is capable of
    making a lasting and autonomous contribution to
    rendering the behaviour of social actors
    reciprocally adjustive and predictable. The
    guiding principle of interaction and allocation
    of this mode of societal governance is
    organizational concertation.
  • But let us have a look at the other principles
    as well

18
Three or four modes of societal order
Communities, Markets, States and Associations?
19
  • Both in practice (empirical manifestations of
    it) and in theory (analytical reflection on it),
    governance needs to be/ can be
  • - approached from (at least) three
    analytical angles in a simultaneous fashion.
  • - understood in terms of an emergent
    phenomenon that tends to develop
    everywhere within a given political system and
    tends to achieve equilibrium points which
    reflect highly specific situations in
    political, societal and in economic terms
  • - understood in terms of deliberate design.
    i.e. as a program or strategy elaborated by
    political practitioners and political analysts

20
The number of potential hybrids and of their
concrete overlap areas is in principle unlimited
S
M
A
C
Communitarian markets, New Public Management,
social economy, associative democracy,
public-private partnerships, etc.
21
Scientific order and disorder
In a situation where everything overlaps and
depends on each other, the established
disciplines dealing with these systems might run
into problems. It is today hardly imaginable that
any single of these disciplines will be able to
dealing with the complexity characterizing any
single of their analytical targets. Hence the
need for inter-disciplinary research!
22
Governance as network
23
There is of course also a network component
involved in discussions of governance. Imagine
the people represented below were political
institutions, organizations and different
organizational layers that are formally divided
by specific tasks and duties (e.g. the president,
ministerial offices, and public and private
organizations attached to these offices).
24
Rectangular matrix of advise relations (14 x 14)
director
head of division
book-keeper
secretaries
To whom do you turn with questions relevant to
your work? orTo whom do you turn for
information of strategic importance?
25
Simple network graph
26
Status analysis
27
Status indices
secretaryhead of divisiondirectorhead of
division head of division secretarysecretarybook
keeperbook keeper book keeper book keeper book
keeper book keeper book keeper book
keeper secretary
head of division
28
Governanceby Anne Mette Kjaer
  • On paradigm shifts and the meanings of
    governance
  • GOV in Public Administration/ Public Policy
  • GOV in International Relations
  • European GOV (and MLG)
  • GOV in Comparative Politics and economic
    development
  • GOV in Processes of Democratization and
    Transition
  • GOV and the World Bank

29
I. Paradigm shift in public policies
  • From hierarchy, sub-ordination and top-down
    control
  • towards
  • Policy networks
  • network management, self-organizing networks
  • Meta-governance
  • Managing the rules (of formulation,
    decision-making and implementation) and
    coordinating them across policy domains
  • Coordinating the plurality of hierarchies,
    markets and networks across domains

30
II. Paradigm shift in international relations
  • From the neo-realist assumption of states as the
    most important actors in world politics
  • versus
  • a growing importance of multinational actors and
    transnational networks
  • a growing importance of international regimes

31
III. Paradigm shift in European integration
studies
  • From a focus on European integration and
    institutions (as the explanandum)
  • towards
  • a focus on EU policy-making,
  • its effects on domestic policies and
  • on the management of complex inter-relationships
    in policy-making across all levels (subnational,
    domestic, supranational)

32
IV. Paradigm shift in political economy
  • From the neo-liberal position (the state should
    have no role at all and leave development to the
    market)
  • towards
  • a heterarchic conception of governance as the
    management of self-organizing networks that
    involve a plurality of organizational forms such
    as the state, the market or networks

33
V. Paradigm shift in democratization/ transition
research
  • From modernization and early transition theories
    (determinism and presumption of the existence
    of only one single path-way of development
    towards democracy)
  • towards
  • institutional governance approaches
  • that allow for a more open-ended vision
  • and argue that institutions circumscribe
    political agency in as much as agents themselves
    are capable of altering institutions

34
VI. Paradigm shift in the international economy
  • From a selective policy followed by the World
    Bank (granting help to those that already have
    good governance)
  • towards
  • a critique of the WBs dependency on its largest
    shareholder (the US)
  • a focus on accountability versus a global public

35
Governance and political design
36
Attributive requisites of governance
arrangements (from PC Schmitter, 2002)
  • a. List of potential pro-governance policies
    supported and implemented by public authorities
  • b. List of necessary attributes on the part of
    (organized) civil society
  • c. List of principles for the chartering,
    composition and decision-rules of governance
    arrangements

37
I. Pro-governance policies
  • 1. freedom of association, petition and assembly
  • 2. legal recognition
  • 3. special fiscal treatment
  • 4. arenas for functional representation
  • 5. guarantees of access to decision-making
  • 6. protection from non-intromission in internal
    affairs
  • 7. subsidization with public funds
  • 8. obligatory membership and/ or member
    contributions
  • 9. legal extension of contracts
  • 10. devolved responsibility for policy
    implementation

38
II. Attributes of (organized) civil society
  • 1. class, sectoral, professional or corporate
    consciousness
  • 2. voluntarism
  • 3. moral sentiments
  • 4. sociability
  • 5. trust
  • 6. altruism or other-regardingness
  • 7. universalism
  • 8. sense of personal efficacy
  • 9. organizational skills

39
III. Principles for the chartering, the
composition and the decision-rules of Governance
Arrangements
a) Chartering
  • 1. mandated authority (clearly circumscribed
    mandate by the EU establishing its composition
    and rules)
  • 2. sunset principle (not for an indefinite
    period pre-established date of expiry with
    possibility of renewal)
  • 3. functional separability (no overlap in tasks
    with existing EU institutions)
  • 4. non-supplementarity (no displacement of
    existing EU institutions)
  • 5. request variety (EGA can narrow or widen the
    range of participants and modify internal rules
    as long as it does not violate the general
    charter)
  • 6. anti-spill-over (no EGA should exceed the
    tasks for whose solution it has originally been
    designed)

40
b) Composition
  • 1. rights (membership in a national political
    community)
  • 2. spatial location (all those living on a
    regular basis within a demarcated territory)
  • 3. knowledge (person or organization possessing
    indispensible knowledge for solution of problem)
  • 4. share (holders of property rights in those
    assets being affected by EGA)
  • 5. stake (all those that could materially or
    spiritually be affected by operation of EGA)
  • 6. interest (anybody representing a constituency
    who demonstrates sufficient awareness about the
    issue at stake)
  • 7. status (each organization having an official
    status in the representation of social, economic
    or political categories)

41
Composition continued (different types of
holders)
  • primary citizens
  • 1. rights holders citizens/voters
  • secondary citizens
  • 2. space holders residents
  • 3. knowledge holders experts
  • 4. share holders owners
  • 5. stake holders beneficiaries AND victims
  • 6. interest holders spokespersons
  • 7. status holders representatives

42
c) Decision rules
  • 1. putative equality (irrespective of size,
    each participant should be considered as equal
    no first, second, third class participants)
  • 2. horizontal interaction (avoidance of hierarchy
    such as stable delegation of tasks, formalized
    leadership, etc.)
  • 3. consensus principle (no majority voting, no
    imposition but deliberation, persuasion and
    regular interaction)
  • 4. open-door (possibility of exit-option without
    subsequent retaliation)
  • 5. proportionality (outcomes are roughly
    proportional to the specific assets of each
    participant)
  • 6. shifting alliances (avoidance of rigid
    cleavages permanent re-composition of groups and
    actors)
  • 7. checks and balances (no decision on matters
    concerning outside organizations)
  • 8. reversibility (no decisions that cannot be
    annulled by right holders, i.e. citizen/ voters

43
Multilevel Governance (MLG)
  • 1. MLG visualized
  • 2. MLG and jurisdictions

44
A simple circuit of functional political exchange
State authorities Representatives of labor
unions Representatives of business associations
45
A simple circuit of territorial political exchange
Government at level A
Government at level A
Government at level A
46
A more complex representation of Multilevel
Governance and of the positioning of different
actor categories
government
NGOs
International suprantional
associations
National
Sub-national(regional, local)
47
Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of
Multi-Level Governanceby Liesbet Hooghe and Gary
Marks
  • Type I Governance
  • The intellectual foundation for Type I
    governance is federalism, which is concerned with
    power sharing among a limited number of
    governments operating at just a few levels.
    Federalism is concerned chiefly with the
    relationship between central government and a
    tier of non-intersecting sub-national
    governments. The unit of analysis is the
    individual government, rather than the individual
    policy. In the words of Wallace Oates (1999,
    1121), dean of fiscal federalism, "The
    traditional theory of fiscal federalism lays out
    a "general normative framework for the assignment
    of functions to different levels of government
    and the appropriate fiscal instruments for
    carrying out these functions." The framework is
    system-wide, the functions are bundled, and the
    levels of government are multiple but limited in
    number.

48
  • Type II Governance
  • An alternative form of multi-level governance is
    one in which the number of jurisdictions is
    potentially vast rather than limited, in which
    jurisdictions are not aligned on just a few
    levels but operate at numerous territorial
    scales, in which jurisdictions are task-specific
    rather than general-purpose, and where
    jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather
    than durable. This conception is predominant
    among neoclassical political economists and
    public choice theorists, but it also summarizes
    the ideas of several scholars of federalism,
    local government, international relations, and
    Europeanstudies.

49
  • Type I governance constrains the number of
    jurisdictions according to the following design
    principles
  • Nonintersecting memberships. Jurisdictional
    memberships at the same territorial level do not
    overlap. Nonintersecting membership limits the
    need for jurisdictional coordination horizontally
    at any level and, vertically, across levels.
  • Cascading jurisdictional scale. The territorial
    scale of jurisdiction decreases sharply across
    levels. European Union countries have between two
    and five subnational levels, described by the
    European Commission in terms of a common rubric,
    the Nomenclature des unitis territoriales
    statistiques (NUTS) (Eurostat 1999, 27). The
    median population represented in the first level,
    NUTS 1 jurisdictions, is 3.89 million that in
    the second level, NUTS 2 jurisdictions, is 1.42
    million NUTS 3 jurisdictions have a median
    population of 369,000 the median population in
    NUTS 4 is 48,000 and at the lowest level, NUTS
    5, it is 5,100. In the United States, the
    corresponding median population is 3.76 million
    for states, 69,600 for counties, and 8,800 for
    subcounties. A cascading jurisdictional scale
    spreads governance across vastly different scales
    but limits the total number of sub-national
    levels to three, four, or, at most, five tiers.

50
  • General-purpose jurisdictions. A logical
    corollary is that authoritative competencies are
    bundled into a small number of extensive packages
    at each level. Type I governance disperses
    authority across widely different levels and
    constrains the number of levels by making the
    jurisdictions at each level multipurpose.
  • Systemwide architecture. The pyramidal structure
    of Type I governance lends itself to hierarchical
    direction. Most Type I governance systems are
    bound together by a single court system with
    ultimate authority to adjudicate among contending
    jurisdictions.

51
  • Type II governance is alternative to Type I.
  • It limits coordination costs by constraining
    interaction across jurisdictions. Type II
    governance sets no ceiling on the number of
    jurisdictions but spawns new ones along
    functionally differentiated lines. As a result,
    externalities across jurisdictions are minimized.
    This is an exact corollary to Herbert Simon's
    (1996,178) notion of "nearly decomposable
    structures. Simon argues that tasks within an
    organization should be distributed so that the
    share of internal interactions within constituent
    units is maximized and the share of external
    interactions minimized. The idea, applied to
    jurisdictional design, is to distribute tasks so
    that the short-run behavior of actors across
    different jurisdictions is more or less
    independent from that of others, while their
    long-run behavior is connected only in the
    aggregate.' How can decomposability be attained
    in policy provision? How, in other words, can one
    break up policymaking into discrete pieces with
    minimal external spillover?

52
  • The following design principles characterize
    Type II governance.
  • Functional specificity. Specific, functionally
    distinct competencies are hived off and
    insulated. In this way, externalities-and
    therefore interdependence-among jurisdictions are
    minimized. The assumption that all significant
    costs and benefits are internalized within the
    jurisdiction is a foundation of Type I1
    governance theory, including Tiebout's (1956)
    theory of jurisdictional competition, Buchanan's
    (1965) theory of clubs, and Oates analysis of
    metropolitan competition (Oates and Schwab 1988).
  • Flexible, policy-specific, architecture. Type I1
    governance is designed with respect to particular
    policy problems-not particular communities or
    constituencies. Institutional design-the scope of
    a jurisdiction, its mode of decision making,
    adjudication, and implementation-can thus be
    adapted to particular policy problems.

53
  • The two types of governance share one vital
    feature They are both radical departures from
    the centralized state. However, they diffuse
    authority in contrasting ways.
  • Type I governance bundles competencies in
    jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial
    levels. These jurisdictions form part of a
    system-wide plan They are mutually exclusive at
    each territorial level, and the units at each
    level are perfectly nested within those at the
    next higher level. Jurisdictional design
    generally corresponds to communal identities
    Each jurisdiction caters to an encompassing group
    or territorial community. These jurisdictions are
    oriented to voice rather than to exit. Type I
    governance reflects a simple design principle
    Maximize the fit between the scale of a
    jurisdiction and the optimal scale of public good
    provision while minimizing inter-jurisdictional
    coordination by (a) creating inclusive
    jurisdictions that internalize most relevant
    externalities and (b) limiting the number of
    jurisdictional levels.

54
  • Type II governance also limits the transaction
    costs of inter-jurisdictional coordination, but
    it does so in a fundamentally different way, by
    splicing public good provision into a large
    number of functionally discrete jurisdictions.
    But these jurisdictions do not conform to an
    overarching blueprint. Rather, each is designed
    to address a limited set of related problems.
    Type II jurisdictions are task-driven. Hence, the
    same individual may be part of several
    overlapping and intersecting jurisdictions.
    Membership in Type II jurisdictions tends to be
    conditional and extrinsic. Type II jurisdictions
    are often designed to have low barriers to entry
    and exit so as to engender competition among them.

55
3. Europeanization
  • 1.Conceptualizing and measuring it
  • 2. Europeanization in comparative perspective

56
3.1 The domestic effect of Europeanization
57
3.2 Two logics of domestic change
58
3.3 Degrees of domestic change
59
Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Policy
Makingby Vivian A.Schmidt
1. Policies
60
3. Patterns of policy formulation and
implementation
Member states along a continuum from statist to
corporatist processes
61
Corporatist countries
62
Statist/ etatist countries
63
Pluralist countries
64
National patterns of policy-making and the impact
of the EU
65
Conclusions Policies
66
2. Politics
67
Representative politics of simple and compound
polities
68
Simple and compound polities along a continuum
betweenmajoritarian and proportional electoral
systems
69
Percentage of people who said they were very or
fairly satisfied with their domestic political
system
70
Percentage of people who said they trusted the
European Union
71
Percentage of people who feel their countrys
membership in the European Union is a good
thing
72
Percentage of people who see themselves as both
their nationality and European
73
Percentage of people who feel their country
benefits from EU membership
74
Conclusions Politics
75
2. Polities
76
Simple and compound polities along a continuum
betweenunitary, regionalized and federal
structures
77
Institutional structures of simple and compound
polities
78
The differential effect of the EU on national
executives powers, projection of preferences
and compliance patterns related to institutional
structure
79
Conclusions polity
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