Under Pressure: PC Insurance in 2003 An Overview

1
Under Pressure P/C Insurance in 2003An
Overview Outlook forthe US New Mexico

• New Mexico Insurance Issues Legislative Luncheon
• Independent Insurance Agents of New Mexico
• Santa Fe, NM
• February 7, 2003

Robert P. Hartwig, Ph.D., CPCU, Senior Vice
President Chief Economist Insurance Information
Institute ? 110 William Street ? New York, NY
10038 Tel [phone] ? Fax [phone]
? bobh_at_iii.org ? www.iii.org
2
Presentation Outline

• Pressure to Improve Performance
• Profitability
• Underwriting
• Pricing
• Capacity Crunch
• Investment Overview
• The Challenge of Terrorism
• Credit in Personal Lines Underwriting
• Q A

3
PRESSURE TO IMPROVE PROFITABILITY
4
Highlights Property/Casualty First 9 Months 2002
( Millions)
Comparison with year-end 2001
5
P/C Net Income After Taxes1991-2002E ( Millions)

• 2001 was the first year ever with a full year net
  loss
• 2002 9-Month ROE 4.4

I.I.I. estimate based on first 9 months of 2002
data. Sources A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance
Information Institute.
6
ROE P/C vs. All Industries 19872003F
Source Insurance Information Institute Fortune
7
ROE U.S. P/C vs. New Mexico P/C All Industries
Profits in NM were reasonable during the
mid-1990s but have since fallen off
Source NAIC, Insurance Information Institute
Fortune
8
ROE for Major Commercial Lines in NM, 1991 - 2000
Source NAIC
9
ROE for Personal Lines in NM1991 - 2000
10-Year Average Auto 10.8 Home 3.7
Source NAIC
10
2000 Return on EquityNM Nearby States PP Auto
2000
Source NAIC, Insurance Information Institute
11
2000 Return on EquityNM Nearby States HO
2000
Source NAIC, Insurance Information Institute
12
PRESSURE TO IMPROVE UNDERWRITING
13
Underwriting Gain (Loss)1975-2002
Billions
P-C insurers paid 22 billion more in claims
expenses than they collected in premiums in 2002
Annualized estimate based on first 9 months of
2002 data. Source A.M. Best, Insurance
Information Institute
14
P/C Industry Combined Ratio
Combined Ratios 1970s 100.3 1980s 109.2 1990s
107.7 2000s 110.4
2001 115.7 2002E 106.1 2003F 102.9
Based on January 2003 III survey of industry
analysts. Sources A.M. Best III
15
Combined Ratio Reinsurance vs. P/C Industry
2001s combined ratio was the worst-ever for
reinsurers
Figure for first 9 months of 2002. Source A.M.
Best, ISO, Reinsurance Association of America,
Insurance Information Institute
16
U.S. InsuredCatastrophe Losses
Billions
CAT losses continue to be a problem, though 2002
was much better than 2001
Estimate. Note 2001 figure includes 20.3B for
9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes
only business and personal property claims,
business interruption and auto claims. Source
Property Claims Service, Insurance Information
Institute
17
Cost of U.S. Tort System( Billions)
Tort costs consumed 2.0 of GDP annually on
average since 1990, expected to rise to 2.4 of
GDP by 2005!
Tort costs equaled 636 per person in
2000! Expected to rise to 1,000 by 2005
Source Tillinghast-Towers Perrin Insurance
Information Institute estimates for 2001/2002
assume tort costs equal to 2 of GDP. 2005
forecasts from Tillinghast.
18
Reserve Deficiency, by Line(AY 1992-2001, as of
12/01)
Estimated Deficiency Total Excluding AE 64
Billion AE Deficiency 55 Billion Total
Including AE 120 Billion
Occurrence and claims made Source Morgan Stanley
19
Outlook for Personal Lines2002-2004
PERSONAL AUTO
HOMEOWNERS
97 98 99 00 01 02E 03F
04F
97 98 99 00 01 02E 03F
04F
Source A.M. Best, Conning Co.
20
Outlook for Commercial Lines2002 - 2004
Sources A.M. Best, Conning Co.
21
12 After Tax ROE Requires Underwriting Profit
Source Dowling Partners
22
HOW DOES THIS HARD MARKET STACK UP TO PREVIOUS
HARD MARKETS?
23
Hard Markets Since 1970
1975-78
1985-87
2001-03
There have been 3 hard markets since
1970 1975-1978 1985-1987 2001-200?
Source A.M. Best, Insurance Information
Institute
24
GDP Growth vs. Net Written Premium Growth
(1987100)
Hard Market
The gap between cumulative GDP and Net Written
Premium growth hit a maximum of 52.5 pts or 33.7
in 2000. In 2003, the estimated gap is 29.0 pts
or 15.2.
29.0 pts
52.5 pts
Note Shaded area denotes hard market. Source
Insurance Information Institute
25
THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEMIS OUT OF CONTROLU.S.
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM RULED BY THEORY OF JACKPOT
JUSTICE
26
TORT-ure

• Asbestos
• Toxic Mold
• Medical Malpractice
• Construction Defects
• Lead
• Fast Food
• Arsenic Treated Lumber
• Guns
• Genetically Modified Foods (Corn)
• Pharmaceuticals Medical Devices
• Security exposures (workplace violence, post-9/11
  issues)
• Whats Next?
• Slavery
• Sept. 11??

27
Average Jury Awards1994 vs. 2000
Source Jury Verdict Research Insurance
Information Institute.
28
Cost of U.S. Tort System( Billions)
Tort costs consumed 2.0 of GDP annually on
average since 1990, expected to rise to 2.4 of
GDP by 2005!
Tort costs equaled 636 per person in
2000! Expected to rise to 1,000 by 2005
Source Tillinghast-Towers Perrin Insurance
Information Institute estimates for 2001/2002
assume tort costs equal to 2 of GDP. 2005
forecasts from Tillinghast.
29
Trends in Million Dollar Verdicts
Very sharp jumps in multi-million dollar awards
in recent years across virtually all types of
defendants
Verdicts of 1 million or more. Source Jury
Verdict Research Insurance Information Institute.
30
Where the Tort Dollar Goes(2000)

• Tort System is extremely inefficient
• Only 20 of the tort dollar compensates victims
  for economic losses
• At least 58 of every tort dollar never reaches
  the victim

Source Tillinghast-Towers Perrin
31
PRESSURE TO IMPROVE PRICING
32
Growth in Net Premiums Written (All P/C Lines)
2001 8.1 2002 14.2 (est.) 2003 12.7
(forecast)
The underwriting cycle went AWOL in the
1990s. Its Back!
Estimate/forecast based on January 2003 III
survey of industry analysts. Source A.M. Best,
Insurance Information Institute
33
Council of Insurance Agents Brokers Rate Survey
Fourth Quarter 2002
Rate Increases By Line of Business
No Change
Up 1-10 10-20 20-30 30-50
50-100 gt100 Comm. Auto 6
14 42 25
8 1 0 Workers Comp
8 17 25 24
10 2 2 General
Liability 7 13 29
37 11 0
0 Comm. Umbrella 8 3
21 21 26 10
5 DO 6
4 22 23 18
9 3 Comm. Property 8
16 25 25
18 3 0 Construction
Risk 4 8 17
18 23 9
4 Terrorism 12 5
8 12 5
0 6 Business Interr. 13
19 36 14
4 0 0 Surety Bonds
8 16 16 15
6 1 1 Med Mal
1 5
6 6 12 12
16
34
Cost of Risk per 1,000 of Revenues 1990-2002E

• Cost of risk to corporations fell 42 between
  1992 and 2000
• Estimated 15 increase in 2001, 25 in 2002
• About half of 2002 increase due to 9/11

Source 2001 RIMS Benchmark Survey Insurance
Information Institute estimates.
35
Average Price Change of Personal Lines Renewals
III estimates Source Conning, III
36
Average Price Change of Personal Lines Renewals
III estimates Source Conning, III
37
Average Expenditures on Auto Insurance US vs. NM
Countrywide auto insurance are expected to rise
8-10 in 2003
38
Average Expenditures on Homeowners Ins. US
Average HO expenditures are expected to rise by
8-10 in 2003
39
Auto Homeowners Insurance Expenditures as a of
Median Household Income
The cost of auto and homeowners insurance
relative to the typical households income has
remained stable over the years
40
Homeowners Insurance Expenditure as a of Median
Home Price
The cost of homeowners insurance relative to the
price of a typical home is falling!
HO Expenditure as of Sales Price
Median Home Sales Price
Source Insurance Information Institute
calculations based on data from National
Association of Realtors, NAIC.
41
Change in Cost of Homes vs. Change in Cost of
Homeowners Insurance
Recent increases in the cost of homeowners
insurance are miniscule in comparison to the
soaring cost of homes
August 2002 Source Insurance Info. Inst.
calculations based on data from Natl. Association
of Realtors, NAIC.
42
Composition of Monthly Homeowners Payments
2002 Total Monthly Payment 1,095
1997 Total Monthly Payment 945
38
46
116
144
791
905
Annual basis.
1Assues 90 of purchase price is financed (i.e.,
10 down payment).
Sources Mortgage interest rates Freddie Mac
Median Home Price (existing homes) National
Association of Home Builders Property Taxes US
Census Bureau Homeowners Insurance III and NAIC.
43
Homeownership Rates,1985 to 2002
Homeownership is at a record high. Because you
cant buy a home without insurance, insurance is
clearly available and affordable, including to
millions of Americans of modest means and all
ethnic groups.
Third Quarter Source U.S. Census Bureau
44
CAPACITY CRUNCH
45
Policyholder Surplus 1975-2002

• Surplus (capacity) peaked at 336.3 Billion in
  mid-1999 and has fallen by 18.7 (63 billion) to
  273.3 billion since then.
• Surplus fell 5.6 during first 9 months of 2002
• Surplus is now lower than at year-end 1997.

Billions (US)
Surplus is a measure of underwriting capacity.
It is analogous to Owners Equity or Net Worth
in non-insurance organizations
As of September 30, 2002 Source A.M. Best,
Insurance Information Institute
46
Global P/C Insurance Capacity is Falling
Dramatically
Global non-life capacity is down 25 over the
past 2 years
Sources Insurance Information Institute, Swiss Re
47
Capital Raising by P/C Insurers Since September
11, 2001
Capital Raising by P/C Insurers Since 9/11 Totals
53.2B
27.9 Billion
25.4 Billion
14 Pending
38 Pending
40 Completed
33 Completed
As of September 13, 2002. Source Morgan
Stanley, Insurance Information Institute.
48
Capital Myth US P/C Insurers Have 300 Billion
to Pay Terrorism Claims
Total PHS 298.2 B as of 6/30/01 282.9 B
as of 6/30/02
Only 33 of industry surplus backs up target
lines
Target Commercial includes Comm property,
liability and workers comp Surplus must also
back-up on non-terrorist related
property/liability and WC claims Source
Insurance Information Institute
49
INVESTMENT OVERVIEW
50
Net Investment Income
Investment income in 2002 is expected to fall 5
to 6 due primarily to historically low interest
rates
Billions (US)

• Facts
• 1997 Peak 41.5B
• 40.7B
• 37.7B
• E 35.2B

Annualized estimate based on first 9 months of
2002 data. Source A.M. Best, Insurance
Information Institute
51
Interest Rates Lower Than Theyve Been in Decades

• Historically low interest rates are the primary
  driver behind lower investment yields.
  Nevertheless, overall insurer investment
  performance outpaces all major market indices and
  almost every major category of mutual fund.
• 66 of the industrys invested assets are in bonds

Average for week ending December 27,
2002. Source Board of Governors, Federal
Reserve System Insurance Information Institute
52
Total Returns for Large Company Stocks 1970-2003

• 2002 was 3rd consecutive year of decline for
  stocks
• Will 2003 be the 4th?

As of February 5, 2003. Source Ibbotson
Associates, Insurance Information Institute
53
P/C Industry Investments,by Type (as of Dec. 31,
2001)
Common stock accounts for about 1/5 of invested
assets
Bond Holdings, by Type Industrial Misc.
32.5 Special Revenue 30.5 Governments
18.0 States/Terr/Other
15.4 Public Utilities
3.1 Parents/Subs/Affiliates 0.5
Source A.M. Best, Insurance Information
Institute
54
Property/Casualty Insurance Industry Investment
Gain
Investment gains are simply returning to
pre-bubble levels
Investment gains consists primarily of interest,
stock dividends and realized capital gains and
losses. Source Insurance Services Office
Insurance Information Institute estimate
annualized as of 9/30/02.
55
Geopolitical Instability Increased in 2002,
Boiling Over in 2003
Terrorists Terrorism
War on Terrorism
North Korea Nukes Kooks
Iraq War Jitters
56
THE CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM
57
Sept. 11 Industry Loss Estimates( Billions)
Consensus Insured Losses Estimate 40.2B Source
Insurance Information Institute
58
Structure of Proposed Federal Backstop
Max Loss
Federal Government covers 90 above 7 retention
to 100B max
10 Industry Co-Reinsurance above 7 Retention
Federal Government covers 90 above 10 retention
to 100B max
Federal Government covers 90 above 15 retention
to 100B max
10 Industry Co-Reinsurance above 10 Retention
10 Industry Co-Reinsurance above 15 Retention
15 billion 12.5 billion 10 billion
10 Retention
15 Retention
7 Retention
Company retention based on direct premiums
written. Source U.S. Congress, Insurance
Information Institute.
Government recoups payouts below 10B in Year 1,
12.5 Year 2, 15B Year 3 with 3 max surcharge
on policy premium.
59
Industry Losses Under Proposed Federal Backstop
Using 9/11 Scenario(as interpreted on date of
enactment, Nov. 26, 2002)
Total Ind. Loss
14.25B
19.675B
10.875B
0.925B Industry Co-Share
1.75B Industry Co-Share
2.0B Industry Co-Share
0.125B Industry Co-Share
Assumes 30B Commercial Prop WC Loss, 125B At
Risk Commercial DPE
Source Insurance Information Institute.
60
Terrorism Act Summary

• Terrorism Risk Insurance Act signed into law Nov.
  26, 2002
• Capping of risk allows insurers to estimate PMLs
• Enhances ability to price
• Industry maintains significant retentions FF
  exposure
• Company 7, 10, 15 Comm. DPE in Years 1, 2, 3
• Aggregate industry cap of 10B, 12.5, 15B in
  those years
• 10 co-reinsurance above industry aggregate
• Government liability capped at 100B
• Legislation requires mandatory offer of terror
  coverage
• Reinsurers/Life insurers NOT eligible under the
  program
• UPSHOT
• Bill will help a bit (expectation may be too
  high)
• Laws of insurance economics are not suspended
• Price/availability still a function of risk and
  capital available

61
Terrorism Act Summary

• Mechanics of the Bill
• Bill immediately creates/reinstates coverage for
  all commercial policyholders (even those that
  declined or purchased sub-limited coverage)
• Mandatory offer of coverage within 90 days (Feb.
  24, 2003)
• Policyholder has 30 days to accept/reject (can
  negotiate after rejection)
• Charge for terrorism must now appear as a line
  item
• Claims must be processed in accordance with
  appropriate business practices
• Law Sunsets in 3 years (12/31/05)
• State authority to disapprove rates if excessive,
  inadequate or unfairly discriminatory retained
• Civil liability can exist as federal cause of
  action
• Federal definition of terrorism applies

62
CREDIT IN PERSONAL LINES UNDERWRITING
63
Why Do Insurers Use Credit Information?
64
Why Insurers Use Credit Information in Insurance
Underwriting

• There is a strong correlation between credit
  standing and loss ratios in both auto and
  homeowners insurance.
• There is a distinct and consistent decline in
  relative loss ratios (which are a function of
  both claim frequency and cost) as credit standing
  improves.
• Produces a more accurate and fair pricing system
• The relationship between credit standing and
  relative loss ratios is statistically
  irrefutable.
• The odds that such a relationship does not exist
  in a given random sample of policyholders are
  usually between 500, 1,000 or even 10,000 to one.

Source Insurance Information Institute.
65
What You Might Not Know About Insurance Scoring

• Insurers have been using credit since early 1990s
• Credit has been used in commercial insurance for
  decades
• Insurance scores do not use the following
  information
• Ethnicity Nationality Religion Age
• Gender Marital Status Familial Status Income
• Address Handicap
• Insurance scoring is revenue neutral
• Increased use of credit information is a fact of
  life in the 21st century (Why? Works for
  trust-based relationships)
• Loans Leases Rentals Insurance
• Utilities Background Checks Empl. Screening
• NEXT Preferred airport screening for frequent
  fliers

Source Insurance Information Institute
66
Intuition Behind Insurance Scoring

• Personal Responsibility
• Responsibility is a personality trait that
  carries over into many aspects of a persons life
• It is intuitive and reasonable to believe that
  the responsibility required to prudently manage
  ones finances is associated with other types of
  responsible and prudent behaviors, for example
• Proper maintenance of homes and automobiles
• Safe operation of cars
• Stability
• It is intuitive and reasonable to believe that
  financially stable individuals are like to
  exhibit stability in many other aspects of their
  lives.
• Stress/Distraction
• Financial stress could lead to stress,
  distractions or other behaviors that produce more
  losses (e.g., deferral of car/home maintenance).

This list is neither exhaustive nor is it
intended to characterize the behavior of any
specific individual. Source Insurance
Information Institute
67
Risk LossAccounting for Differences in Losses
by Risk Characteristics Makes Insurance Pricing
More Equitable
68
Age of Drivers Involved in Auto Accidents, 2000
Interpretation Drivers age 16-20 are 2 to 3
times more likely to be involved in auto
accidents. Should this be ignored with better,
more experienced drivers subsidizing
teenagers? OF COURSE NOT!
Source National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Traffic Safety Facts 2000.
69
Gender of Drivers Involved in Fatal Auto
Accidents, 2000
Interpretation Males are 69 more likely to be
driving in fatal auto accidents. Should this be
ignored and females be forced to subsidize
males? OF COURSE NOT!
Source National Safety Council
70
Credit Quality Auto Insurance
Interpretation Individuals with the lowest scores
have losses that are 32.4 above average those
with the best scores have losses that are 33.3
below average. Should those who impose less
cost on the system be forced to subsidize those
who impose more?
Actual data from sampled company. More examples
are given later in this presentation.
Source Tillinghast Towers-Perrin
71
Credit Quality Homeowners Insurance (Sample
Company)
Probability that Correlation Exists 99.32
Source Tillinghast Towers-Perrin
72
Actual ExampleHow Insurer Use of Credit
Benefits Consumers What Consumers Stand to Lose
73
Example Insurance Savings from Use of Credit
Information

• Insured lives in Westchester County, NY (NYC
  suburb)
• 2 fully insured vehicles (250K/500K liability,
  1000 deductible)
• 2000 Nissan Xterra 1994 Honda Civic
• Insureds biannual premium was 862 (Sept. 2002
  renewal)
• No accidents or moving violations on record
• Insureds credit-related discount for the 6-month
  period was 148 out of 410 in total discounts.
• Credit-related discount saves consumer nearly
  300/year
• Effectively lowers premium by 14.7
• Should this (and millions of other) consumers be
  denied this discount? Some regulators and
  consumer groups want you to pay more
  unnecessarily and subsidize bad drivers.
• August 2002 FICO Score 777 (out of 850) ( 72nd
  percentile)
• i.e., 28 have better (higher) scores, 72 have
  lower (worse) scores

74
Example (contd) Credit Discount Can Save 100s
per Year

• Credit discount lowered annual premium by 14.7
• Policyholder saved nearly 300
• Credit was single largest discount
• Opponents of credit will force people to pay more
  for coverage

Total Annual Savings from Discounts 820
154
296
196
174
Annualized savings based on semi-annual data
from example Source Insurance Information
Institute
75
Some Groups Want to Ban C.L.U.E. Too!

• Ad run by realtors in AZ in January 2003 But how
  would homeowners be helped if CLUE is banned?
• CLUE helps protect homebuyers by letting them see
  what problems a house has had before they buy it
• A house without problems or that has been
  properly repaired will command a premium,
  benefiting sellers
• A house can be made safer and less expensive to
  insure if repairs have been made properly
• Dont YOU want to know what youre buying before
  you make the biggest investment of your life???

76
Insurers Support Good Public Policy in the Use of
Credit Information in Insurance
77
Insurers Support Good Public Policy on Credit
Issue

• Major insurers endorse these principles in Texas
  (and elsewhere)
• Require insurers to notify costumers that credit
  used to help assess risk.
• Require insurers to
• Provide applicants an explanation of why coverage
  not offered if due to credit and
• Provide existing customers a written statement of
  reason, upon request, why they received a premium
  increase or cancellation notice if due to credit
• Prohibit insurers form using credit as the sole
  factor in denying, canceling or not renewing a
  home or auto insurance policy.

Source Texas Coalition for Affordable Insurance
Solutions (TCAIS), www.tcais.org.
78
Insurers Support Good Public Policy on Credit
Issue

• Major insurers endorse these principles
  (contd.)
• Protect those that have little or no credit
  history by limiting how insurers use a lack of
  credit history as a determining factor in denying
  coverage.
• Prohibit insurers from using certain credit
  informationsuch as medical collection and
  disputed information under investigation by a
  credit bureauto assess risk.
• Require insurers to reevaluate policyholders, at
  their request, if they discover errors on their
  credit report.
• Require insurers that use credit on renewal to
  reassess consumers credit information
  periodically and, when necessary, adjust their
  premiums accordingly.

79
Consequences of Banning Use of Credit in
Insurance Underwriting

• Banning the use of credit information will
• Force good drivers and responsible homeowners to
  subsidize those with poor loss histories by
  hundreds of millions of dollars each year.
• Decrease incentives to drive safely
• Decrease incentives to properly maintain cars and
  homes
• Force insurers to rely on less accurate types of
  information, such as DMV records.
• Make non-standard risks more difficult to place
• Increase size of residual market pools/plans
• Create disparate impacts on groups such as older
  drivers, people who file few claims, and millions
  of minorities and low income people who benefit

80
Average Omission Rate for Selected Convictions in
DMV Records
Source Insurance Research Council, Accuracy of
Motor Vehicle Records (2002).
81
Washington State Study on Credit Scoring in Auto
UW Pricing

• STUDY DESIGN
• WA State study released in January 2003 required
  under ESHB 2544, which also restricted the use of
  scoring
• Conducted by Washington State University (WSU)
• Objective was to determine who benefits/is
  harmed by scoring, impact of scoring on rates,
  disparate impacts on the poor or people of
  color
• Sampled about 1,000 auto policyholders from each
  of 3 insurers age, gender, zip, inception date,
  score/rate class.
• Studys models typically explain only 5 - 15 of
  variation
• WSU contacted policyholders asked ethnicity,
  marital status, income, details of experience if
  cancelled

82
Washington State Study on Credit Scoring in Auto
UW Pricing

• SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
• Statistically the findings are extremely weak,
  leading even the studys author to conclude The
  models only explain a fraction of the variance
  in score or discount found in the sample
  population and that while there are
  statistically detectable patterns in the
  demographics of credit scoring, most of the
  variation among individual scores is to due to
  random chance or other facts not in this data.
• Studys models typically explain only 5 - 15 of
  variation.
• Strongest and most consistent finding is that
  credit score is positively associated with age
• Implication banning on scoring creates disparate
  impact on older, more experienced drivers

83
Problems With Such Studies

• Already statistically irrefutable evidence that
  scoring works. This fact is ignored in WA study.
• Ignores fact that scoring is 100 blind to
  ethnicity, color, gender, marital status, income,
  location, etc.
• Introduces the divisive issue of race into an
  issue where it does not belong (and doesnt exist
  today)
• Perpetuates false stereotype that minorities and
  the poor are incapable of managing their finances
  responsibly
• Puts regulators in awkward position of
  determining who is a minority, who is poor
• Lead to disparate impacts on groups such as older
  drivers, people who file few claims, and millions
  of minorities and low income people who benefit
  today
• Lead to poor public policy decisions that produce
  perverse economic incentives (e.g., subsidies to
  drivers who have higher relative losses)

84
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