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COLLABORATION NETWORKS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE EFFECT OF FIRM AND PARTNER POSITIONING ON INNOVATIO

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Title: COLLABORATION NETWORKS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE EFFECT OF FIRM AND PARTNER POSITIONING ON INNOVATIO


1
COLLABORATION NETWORKS AND FIRM PERFORMANCETHE
EFFECT OF FIRM AND PARTNER POSITIONING ON
INNOVATIONHans Frankort(Organization
Strategy)METEOR / April 4, 2007
2
Outline
  • Introduction
  • Firm and partner positioning
  • Relevance
  • Hypotheses
  • Methods
  • Results
  • Conclusions

3
Introduction
  • PhD project, September 2005-now
  • Alliance networks, knowledge flows and
    innovation
  • (Advisors John Hagedoorn / Wilko Letterie)
  • Today one of the thesis papers work in progress
  • Goal testing an extended concept of network
    positioning in an RD alliance network

4
Firm positioning Connecting direct ties
(B)
(A)
  • Focus on direct contacts (e.g., Burt, 1992
    Coleman, 1988)
  • Timely information
  • Access to others knowledge
  • Building reputation

5
Partner positioning Indirect ties
(A)
(B)
Singular focus on direct contacts possibly
insufficient (e.g., Baum et al., 2006, on hybrid
partner positions Burt, 2007, on secondhand
brokerage)
6
Relevance in RD networks (1)
  • Extant work considers several
  • Firm-level (e.g., Ahuja, 2000 Hausman et al.,
    1984 Sampson, 2005),
  • Relational (e.g., Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006
    Phelps, 2005 Sampson, 2007), and
  • Partner-level (e.g., Baum et al., 2000 Stuart,
    2000) antecedents to firm-level innovation.
  • In terms of networks
  • Dominant focus on direct ties and numbers of
    indirect ties (e.g., Ahuja, 2000 Gulati, 1995
    Soh, 2003)
  • Partner-level network positioning in terms of
    brokerage or closure lacking so far

7
Hypotheses (1) Firm positioning
(A)
(B)
  • Hypothesis 1. In an interfirm RD network, a
    firms subsequent innovative performance
    increases with the amount of structural holes it
    spans.

8
Hypotheses (2) Partner positioning
  • Competing hypotheses for partner network
    positioning
  • Hypothesis 2a. In an interfirm RD network, a
    firms subsequent innovative performance
    increases with the amount of structural holes
    spanned by its partners.
  • Hypothesis 2b. In an interfirm RD network, a
    firms subsequent innovative performance
    decreases with the amount of structural holes
    spanned (i.e., increases with the amount of
    redundant ties maintained) by its partners.

9
Data
  • RD alliance network in IT (technological
    subcategories 21-24 and 26 Hall et al., 2002)
  • Alliance data from CATI (1970-1999 Hagedoorn,
    2002)
  • Patent data from NBER / USPTO (1975-2002 Hall et
    al., 2002)
  • Data for other variables from SPs Compustat,
    Datastream, etcetera (1975-1999)
  • Basic database matching done for Gomes-Casseres
    et al., 2006
  • Result 152 unique firm entities in 455
    horizontal RD alliances

10
Dependent variable Innovative performance
  • Measured as the firm-level count of patents
    granted, based on years of application (cf.
    Ahuja, 2000 Rothaermel Hess, 2007 Sampson,
    2007)
  • Modeled using a conditional fixed-effects
    negative binomial panel specification (Hausman et
    al., 1984)
  • Innovative performance takes a one-year lead to
    all independent variables

11
Explanatory control variables
  • I applied a 3-year moving window to construct the
    network measures and all relational and
    partner-level controls 1988-1990, 1989-1991,
    1990-1992, etcetera
  • I checked the results against a specification
    using a dynamic window results identical
    (consistent with extant work by e.g. Gulati
    (1995), Gulati Gargiulo (1999), Bae Gargiulo
    (2004))

12
Explanatory variable (1) Firm structural holes
  • Firm is investment in contact j pijt (1/nit)
    (nijt)
  • Constraint on firm i (Burt, 1992 54-55)
  • Firm structural holes of i fshit (9/8 cit)

13
Explanatory variable (1) Firm structural holes
Firm structural holes low Firm structural
holes high
14
Explanatory variable (2) Partner structural
holes
  • Partner structural holes to firm i (Burt, 2007)
  • where Ait is the set of is alters in t, and Ait
    is the number of is alters in t

15
Explanatory variable (2) Partner structural
holes
Partners structural holes Partner structural
holes low high
16
Results (1) Models (n 752)
p lt .05 p lt .01 p lt .001 year fixed
effects included
17
Results (2)
  • Hence, the optimal
  • network structure in
  • terms of innovative
  • output to firm A

18
Conclusions Main findings
  • A network broker benefits most if its direct
    contacts are well-embedded in their respective
    networks, net of (1) firm positioning and (2) a
    set of firm-level, relational, and partner-level
    effects
  • This reinforces work that assumes structural
    holes allow a firm to tap into distinct chunks
    of social structure
  • Uncertainty-reducing role of partners
    embeddedness to the focal firm

19
Conclusions Limitations
  • The usual suspects
  • Generalizability to other sectors and across
    networks, i.e. those that are not high-tech, is
    limited
  • Performance limited to innovation other purposes
    may be served by firms alliance networks

20
Conclusions Future research
  • Replication in different sectors, using
    alternative performance measures
  • Direct measurement of distinct knowledge in dense
    groups
  • Consider interactions of structural and
    relational / node-specific contingencies
  • Questions?
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