Intentions in Dialogue

1
Intentions in Dialogue
Approaches to dialogue
Part XI
Peter Kühnlein
2
Intentions in dialogue
Characteristic of intentionalist approaches The
chief explanatory notion is that of a certain
type of mental state of a discourse participant
the intention she has.
3
Intentions in dialogue
Michael Bratman, Faces of Intention, 1999,
Cambridge UP
4
Intentions in dialogue
Dialogue example situation
"Inst." refers to an instructor "Cnst." refers to
a constructor Common task is to build a
toy airplane Both Ss are separated by a screen.
5
Intentions in dialogue
Dialogue example situation
"Inst." refers to an instructor "Cnst." refers to
a constructor Common task is to build a
toy airplane Both Ss are separated by a screen.
The current stage of the construction (constructo
r side)
6
Intentions in dialogue
Dialogue example situation
"Inst." refers to an instructor "Cnst." refers to
a constructor Common task is to build a
toy airplane Both Ss are separated by a screen.
(A) Inst So, jetzt nimmst du Well, now you
take Cnst eine Schraube a screw. Inst eine lt-gt
orangene mit einem Schlitz. an lt-gt orange one
with a slit Cnst Ja. Yes
7
Intentions in dialogue
Dialogue example situation
(A) Inst So, jetzt nimmst du Well, now you
take Cnst eine Schraube a screw. Inst eine lt-gt
orangene mit einem Schlitz. an lt-gt orange one
with a slit Cnst Ja. Yes
Available Bolts
8
Intentions in dialogue
Dialogue example situation

• (B)
• Inst Und steckst sie dadurch, also
• And you put it through there,
• lets see
• Cnst Von oben.
• From the top.
• Inst Von oben, daß also die drei festgeschraubt
  werden dann.
• From the top, so that the three bars get fixed.
• Cnst Ja.
• Yes.

Intended Junction
Intended Result
9
Intentions in dialogue
Dialogue example situation

• (A)
• Inst Well, now you take
• Cnst a screw.
• Inst an lt-gt orange one with a slit
• Cnst Yes.
• (B)
• Inst And you put it through there, lets see
• Cnst From the top.
• Inst From the top, so that the three bars get
  fixed.
• Cnst Yes.

10
Intentions in dialogue
By uttering x U meant that ?p is true iff
(?A) (?f ) (?c) (a) U uttered x intending
1. A to think x possesses f 2. A
to think f correlated in way c with ?-ing that
p 3. A to think, on the basis of the
fulfillment of 1. and 2. that U
intends A to think that U ?s that p 4. A,
on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think
that U ?s that p and (for some cases) 5. A, on
the basis of the fulfillment of 4., himself to ?
that p
? in the above formulae names an appropriate
propositional attitude, e.g., belief . is a
mood marker.
11
Intentions in dialogue
By initiating DS ICP meant that ?p is true iff
(?OCP) (?f ) (?c) (a) ICP initiated DS
intending 1. OCP to think DS
possesses f 2. OCP to think f correlated
in way c with ?-ing that p 3. OCP to
think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and
2. that ICP intends OCP to think that
ICP ?s that p 4. OCP, on the basis of the
fulfillment of 3. to think that ICP ?s that
p and (for some cases) 5. OCP, on the basis of
the fulfillment of 4., himself to ? that p
? in the above formulae names an appropriate
propositional attitude, e.g., belief . is a
mood marker.
12
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Gricean intentions as
parts of plans
Gricean intentions amount to bringing about the
right-hand conditions of the meaning definition.
But these intentions are bound up with
single utterances, i.e., short periods of time.
Recall the following slide from the talk on Grosz
Sidner (1986)
13
Intentions in dialogue
Discourse structure a structure of intentions
GS 199
The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural
extensions of the intentions that Grice (1969)
considers essential to developing a theory of
utterer's meaning. There is a crucial difference,
however, between our use of discourse- level
intentions in this paper (and the theory, as
developed so far) and Grice's use of
utterance-level intentions. Discourse level
intentions appear to be similar to
utterance-level intentions in kind, but differ in
that they occur in a context in which several
utterances may be required to ensure
their comprehension and satisfaction.
14
Intentions in dialogue
Discourse structure a structure of intentions
GS 199
The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural
extensions of the intentions that Grice (1969)
considers essential to developing a theory of
utterer's meaning. There is a crucial difference,
however, between our use of discourse- level
intentions in this paper (and the theory, as
developed so far) and Grice's use of
utterance-level intentions. Discourse level
intentions appear to be similar to
utterance-level intentions in kind, but differ in
that they occur in a context in which several
utterances may be required to ensure
their comprehension and satisfaction.
15
Intentions in dialogue
Discourse structure a structure of intentions
GS 199
The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural
extensions of the intentions that Grice (1969)
considers essential to developing a theory of
utterer's meaning. There is a crucial difference,
however, between our use of discourse- level
intentions in this paper (and the theory, as
developed so far) and Grice's use of
utterance-level intentions. Discourse level
intentions appear to be similar to
utterance-level intentions in kind, but differ in
that they occur in a context in which several
utterances may be required to ensure
their comprehension and satisfaction.
This quite obviously implies that there is a
difference between the sorts of intention at hand
a difference in terms of impact on future
behavior.
16
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes.
17
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. In the case of Gricean
intentions, what makes it true that the speaker
intentionally utters x is that his so acting is
appropriately related to his desire to bring it
about that the audience perform r and his belief
that uttering x would make the audience perform r.
18
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. This leads to the
desire-belief theory of action we understand
intentional action, and action done with an
intention, in terms of the agents desires and
beliefs, and actions standing in appropriate
relations to those desires and beliefs.
19
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. This leads to the
desire-belief theory of action we understand
intentional action, and action done with an
intention, in terms of the agents desires and
beliefs, and actions standing in appropriate
relations to those desires and beliefs. How can
future-directed intention be understood in terms
of this theory?
20
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. This leads to the
desire-belief theory of action we understand
intentional action, and action done with an
intention, in terms of the agents desires and
beliefs, and actions standing in appropriate
relations to those desires and beliefs. The
strategy of extension consists of the idea that,
once there is an adequate account of acting
intentionally and acting with a certain
intention, it is plausible to assume that this is
all the main material for treating
future-directed intentions.
21
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. This leads to the
desire-belief theory of action we understand
intentional action, and action done with an
intention, in terms of the agents desires and
beliefs, and actions standing in appropriate
relations to those desires and beliefs. The
strategy of extension consists of the idea that,
once there is an adequate account of acting
intentionally and acting with a certain
intention, it is plausible to assume that this is
all the main material for treating
future-directed intentions. The latter two
assumptions lead to reduction of future-directed
intentions to appropriate desires and beliefs.
22
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. This leads to the
desire-belief theory of action we understand
intentional action, and action done with an
intention, in terms of the agents desires and
beliefs, and actions standing in appropriate
relations to those desires and beliefs. The
strategy of extension consists of the idea that,
once there is an adequate account of acting
intentionally and acting with a certain
intention, it is plausible to assume that this is
all the main material for treating
future-directed intentions. The latter two
assumptions lead to reduction of future-directed
intentions to appropriate desires and beliefs.
These assumptions lead to the belief-desire model
of intention
23
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. This leads to the
desire-belief theory of action we understand
intentional action, and action done with an
intention, in terms of the agents desires and
beliefs, and actions standing in appropriate
relations to those desires and beliefs. The
strategy of extension consists of the idea that,
once there is an adequate account of acting
intentionally and acting with a certain
intention, it is plausible to assume that this is
all the main material for treating
future-directed intentions. The latter two
assumptions lead to reduction of future-directed
intentions to appropriate desires and beliefs.
Intention to act consists of some complex of
desires and beliefs
24
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. This leads to the
desire-belief theory of action we understand
intentional action, and action done with an
intention, in terms of the agents desires and
beliefs, and actions standing in appropriate
relations to those desires and beliefs. The
strategy of extension consists of the idea that,
once there is an adequate account of acting
intentionally and acting with a certain
intention, it is plausible to assume that this is
all the main material for treating
future-directed intentions. The latter two
assumptions lead to reduction of future-directed
intentions to appropriate desires and beliefs.
Intention in action consists in the relation of
the action to desires and beliefs
25
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The priority of
intention in action
The methodological priority of intention in
action is founded in the idea that what makes it
true that an action was performed intentionally,
or with a certain intention, are just facts about
the relation of that action to what the agent
desires or believes. This leads to the
desire-belief theory of action we understand
intentional action, and action done with an
intention, in terms of the agents desires and
beliefs, and actions standing in appropriate
relations to those desires and beliefs. The
strategy of extension consists of the idea that,
once there is an adequate account of acting
intentionally and acting with a certain
intention, it is plausible to assume that this is
all the main material for treating
future-directed intentions. The latter two
assumptions lead to reduction of future-directed
intentions to appropriate desires and beliefs.
Consider the Grice-case again
26
Intentions in dialogue
By initiating DS ICP meant that ?p is true iff
(?OCP) (?f ) (?c) (a) ICP initiated DS
intending 1. OCP to think DS
possesses f 2. OCP to think f correlated
in way c with ?-ing that p 3. OCP to
think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and
2. that ICP intends OCP to think that
ICP ?s that p 4. OCP, on the basis of the
fulfillment of 3. to think that ICP ?s that
p and (for some cases) 5. OCP, on the basis of
the fulfillment of 4., himself to ? that p
? in the above formulae names an appropriate
propositional attitude, e.g., belief . is a
mood marker.
How does this example have to be changed?
27
Intentions in dialogue
By initiating DS ICP meant that ?p is true iff
(?OCP) (?f ) (?c) (a) ICP initiated DS desiring
1. OCP to think DS possesses f
2. OCP to think f correlated in way c with
?-ing that p 3. OCP to think, on the basis
of the fulfillment of 1. and 2. that
ICP intends OCP to think that ICP ?s that p
4. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to
think that ICP ?s that p and (for some
cases) 5. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of
4., himself to ? that p and (b) believing that
initiating DS is a good means to achieve
the fulfillment of ICPs desire
? in the above formulae names an appropriate
propositional attitude, e.g., belief . is a
mood marker.
28
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The ontological status
There is a problem that can be formulated as Can
intentions be reduced to other types of mental
states? Beliefs and desires are good candidates.
A typical attempt at reducing the notion of
intention to the notions of beliefs and desires
could look like this A intends to f just in
case A wants G to hold and A believes that fing
is a good means to achieve G There is, however,
a very obvious problem with this attempt
29
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The ontological status
There is a problem that can be formulated as Can
intentions be reduced to other types of mental
states? Beliefs and desires are good candidates.
A typical attempt at reducing the notion of
intention to the notions of beliefs and desires
could look like this A intends to f just in
case A wants G to hold and A believes that fing
is a good means to achieve G There is, however,
a very obvious problem with this attempt While
it is possible without being inconsistent to want
both G to hold and some incompatible H to hold,
one cannot consistently intend to f and to ?
unless ? is compatible with f.
30
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The ontological status
There is a problem that can be formulated as Can
intentions be reduced to other types of mental
states? Beliefs and desires are good candidates.
A typical attempt at reducing the notion of
intention to the notions of beliefs and desires
could look like this A intends to f just in
case A wants G to hold and A believes that fing
is a good means to achieve G
G
H
f
?
F
31
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The ontological status
There is a problem that can be formulated as Can
intentions be reduced to other types of mental
states? Beliefs and desires are good candidates.
A typical attempt at reducing the notion of
intention to the notions of beliefs and desires
could look like this A intends to f just in
case A wants G to hold and A believes that fing
is a good means to achieve G Example You could
want to have Pizza and think that it is a good
idea to go to Tonis to get some
32
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The ontological status
There is a problem that can be formulated as Can
intentions be reduced to other types of mental
states? Beliefs and desires are good candidates.
A typical attempt at reducing the notion of
intention to the notions of beliefs and desires
could look like this A intends to f just in
case A wants G to hold and A believes that fing
is a good means to achieve G Example You could
want to have Pizza and think that it is a good
idea to go to Tonis to get some you could want
to watch the new StarTrek movie and think it is a
good idea to go to the cinema to watch it at the
same time.
33
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention The ontological status
There is a problem that can be formulated as Can
intentions be reduced to other types of mental
states? Beliefs and desires are good candidates.
A typical attempt at reducing the notion of
intention to the notions of beliefs and desires
could look like this A intends to f just in
case A wants G to hold and A believes that fing
is a good means to achieve G Example You could
want to have Pizza and think that it is a good
idea to go to Tonis to get some you could want
to watch the new StarTrek movie and think it is a
good idea to go to the cinema to watch it at the
same time. But you cant intend to do both
simultaneously without becoming inconsistent.
34
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Bratmans alternative is the planning theory of
intention.
35
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Bratmans alternative is the planning theory of
intention. All four assumptions of the
belief-desire model of intention are rejected.
36
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Bratmans alternative is the planning theory of
intention. All four assumptions of the
belief-desire model of intention are
rejected. Bratman adopts a functionalist
approach to philosophy of mind. Mental states are
viewed as being identified by the functional role
they have in a web of norms as well as perception
and action.
37
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Bratmans alternative is the planning theory of
intention. All four assumptions of the
belief-desire model of intention are
rejected. Bratman adopts a functionalist
approach to philosophy of mind. Mental states are
viewed as being identified by the functional role
they have in a web of norms as well as perception
and action. One of these norms is rationality
We have already seen that intentions can be
inconsistent in the same sense as beliefs.
38
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Bratmans alternative is the planning theory of
intention. All four assumptions of the
belief-desire model of intention are
rejected. Bratman adopts a functionalist
approach to philosophy of mind. Mental states are
viewed as being identified by the functional role
they have in a web of norms as well as perception
and action. One of these norms is rationality
We have already seen that intentions can be
inconsistent in the same sense as beliefs. Viewin
g states as functional is easily compatible with
intention in action. But what about
future-directed intentions?
39
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Bratmans alternative is the planning theory of
intention. All four assumptions of the
belief-desire model of intention are
rejected. Bratman adopts a functionalist
approach to philosophy of mind. Mental states are
viewed as being identified by the functional role
they have in a web of norms as well as perception
and action. One of these norms is rationality
We have already seen that intentions can be
inconsistent in the same sense as beliefs. Viewin
g states as functional is easily compatible with
intention in action. But what about
future-directed intentions? If there is no action
performed, a purely functionalist account does
refuse to state the corresponding intention.
40
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Bratmans alternative is the planning theory of
intention. All four assumptions of the
belief-desire model of intention are
rejected. Bratman adopts a functionalist
approach to philosophy of mind. Mental states are
viewed as being identified by the functional role
they have in a web of norms as well as perception
and action. One of these norms is rationality
We have already seen that intentions can be
inconsistent in the same sense as beliefs. Viewin
g states as functional is easily compatible with
intention in action. But what about
future-directed intentions? If there is no action
performed, a purely functionalist account does
refuse to state the corresponding intention. This
is one of the problems to be solved.
41
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Bratmans alternative is the planning theory of
intention. All four assumptions of the
belief-desire model of intention are
rejected. Bratman adopts a functionalist
approach to philosophy of mind. Mental states are
viewed as being identified by the functional role
they have in a web of norms as well as perception
and action. One of these norms is rationality
We have already seen that intentions can be
inconsistent in the same sense as beliefs. Viewin
g states as functional is easily compatible with
intention in action. But what about
future-directed intentions? And what role does
intention play in an overall statement of bounded
rationality?
42
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Agents like humans depend on the pursuit of
plans. This is what distinguishes humans from
species that can act purposively, but the actions
of members of which are present-bound.
43
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Agents like humans depend on the pursuit of
plans. This is what distinguishes humans from
species that can act purposively, but the actions
of members of which are present-bound. There is
pressure for being a planning agent from two
sources.
44
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Agents like humans depend on the pursuit of
plans. This is what distinguishes humans from
species that can act purposively, but the actions
of members of which are present-bound. There is
pressure for being a planning agent from two
sources. The first is resource limitation we
cannot strive for coordination by determining at
each moment what is the best to do given our
up-to-date assessment of what others are likely
to think is best for them to do
45
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Agents like humans depend on the pursuit of
plans. This is what distinguishes humans from
species that can act purposively, but the actions
of members of which are present-bound. There is
pressure for being a planning agent from two
sources. The second source is the need for
coordination itself In order to coordinate in
the face of equally desirable actions, it is not
enough to know the beliefs and desires of each
other, but also their intentions.
46
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Agents like humans depend on the pursuit of
plans. This is what distinguishes humans from
species that can act purposively, but the actions
of members of which are present-bound. There is
pressure for being a planning agent from two
sources. The second source is the need for
coordination itself In order to coordinate in
the face of equally desirable actions, it is not
enough to know the beliefs and desires of each
other, but also their intentions. Intentions,
however, are building blocks for plans.
47
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Agents like humans depend on the pursuit of
plans. This is what distinguishes humans from
species that can act purposively, but the actions
of members of which are present-bound. There is
pressure for being a planning agent from two
sources. The second source is the need for
coordination itself In order to coordinate in
the face of equally desirable actions, it is not
enough to know the beliefs and desires of each
other, but also their intentions. Intentions,
however, are building blocks for plans. The
individual intentions that make up a plan are
filled in as time progresses. In that sense, the
intentions that are pursued by an individual must
be coordinated over time as well.
48
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Agents like humans depend on the pursuit of
plans. This is what distinguishes humans from
species that can act purposively, but the actions
of members of which are present-bound. There is
pressure for being a planning agent from two
sources. The second source is the need for
coordination itself In order to coordinate in
the face of equally desirable actions, it is not
enough to know the beliefs and desires of each
other, but also their intentions. Intentions,
however, are building blocks for plans. The
individual intentions that make up a plan are
filled in as time progresses. In that sense, the
intentions that are pursued by an individual must
be coordinated over time as well.
Remember what Clark says in that context
49
Coordination approaches to dialogue
Joint activities joint actions coordination
of content
C 319
Although people talk in order to get things done,
they dont know in advance what they will
actually do. The reasons are obvious They cannot
get anything done without the others joining
them, and they cannot know in advance what the
others will do. ... Conversations, therefore, are
purposive but unplanned. ... To complete these,
the participants have to work at the level of
minimal joint projects ... What emerges are
sections and, ultimately, the conversation itself.
50
Coordination approaches to dialogue
Joint activities joint actions coordination
of content
C 319
Although people talk in order to get things done,
they dont know in advance what they will
actually do. The reasons are obvious They cannot
get anything done without the others joining
them, and they cannot know in advance what the
others will do. ... Conversations look planned
and goal-oriented only in retrospect.
51
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Agents like humans depend on the pursuit of
plans. This is what distinguishes humans from
species that can act purposively, but the actions
of members of which are present-bound. There is
pressure for being a planning agent from two
sources. The second source is the need for
coordination itself In order to coordinate in
the face of equally desirable actions, it is not
enough to know the beliefs and desires of each
other, but also their intentions. Intentions,
however, are building blocks for plans. The
individual intentions that make up a plan are
filled in as time progresses. In that sense, the
intentions that are pursued by an individual must
be coordinated over time as well.
52
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
A slight deviation
53
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
54
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished First, there is a volitional
dimension of commitment. This dimension
distinguishes the pro-attitudes desire and
intention.
55
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished First, there is a volitional
dimension of commitment. This dimension
distinguishes the pro-attitudes desire and
intention. Both of them can, in concert with
suitable beliefs, move one to act.
56
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished First, there is a volitional
dimension of commitment. This dimension
distinguishes the pro-attitudes desire and
intention. Both of them can, in concert with
suitable beliefs, move one to act. But
intentions, though not desires, are
conduct-controlling pro-attitudes. Desires are
only potential influencers.
57
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished First, there is a volitional
dimension of commitment. This dimension
distinguishes the pro-attitudes desire and
intention. Both of them can, in concert with
suitable beliefs, move one to act. But
intentions, though not desires, are
conduct-controlling pro-attitudes. Desires are
only potential influencers. In this sense,
intention involves commitment to action desires
dont.
58
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished First, there is a volitional
dimension of commitment. This dimension
distinguishes the pro-attitudes desire and
intention. Both of them can, in concert with
suitable beliefs, move one to act. But
intentions, though not desires, are
conduct-controlling pro-attitudes. Desires are
only potential influencers. In this sense,
intention involves commitment to action desires
dont. Second, there is a reasoning-centered
dimension of commitment.
59
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished First, there is a volitional
dimension of commitment. This dimension
distinguishes the pro-attitudes desire and
intention. Both of them can, in concert with
suitable beliefs, move one to act. But
intentions, though not desires, are
conduct-controlling pro-attitudes. Desires are
only potential influencers. In this sense,
intention involves commitment to action desires
dont. Second, there is a reasoning-centered
dimension of commitment. This comprises the fact
that someone intending to x considers a certain
course of action to be settled on. Intentions,
though not desires, are stable to a certain
degree.
60
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished First, there is a volitional
dimension of commitment. This dimension
distinguishes the pro-attitudes desire and
intention. Both of them can, in concert with
suitable beliefs, move one to act. But
intentions, though not desires, are
conduct-controlling pro-attitudes. Desires are
only potential influencers. In this sense,
intention involves commitment to action desires
dont. Second, there is a reasoning-centered
dimension of commitment. This comprises the fact
that someone intending to x considers a certain
course of action to be settled on. Intentions,
though not desires, are stable to a certain
degree. It also comprises another fact
Intentions play a role in reasoning from prior
to subsequent intentions, and for reasoning from
ends to means.
61
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Taken together these two dimensions
of commitment help explain how intentions play
their role in supporting coordination, both
intrapersonal and social. Both the inertia and
the fact that it is a conduct-controlling
pro-attitude provide support for the expectation
that when the time for action comes, an agent
will at least try to do what she intends to. The
disposition to figure out how to do what one
intends, and to settle on preliminary steps,
provide support for the expectation that an agent
will both be in a position to do what she intends
and succeed in doing it.
62
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Taken together these two dimensions
of commitment help explain how intentions play
their role in supporting coordination, both
intrapersonal and social. Both the inertia and
the fact that it is a conduct-controlling
pro-attitude provide support for the expectation
that when the time for action comes, an agent
will at least try to do what she intends to. The
disposition to figure out how to do what one
intends, and to settle on preliminary steps,
provide support for the expectation that an agent
will both be in a position to do what she intends
and succeed in doing it. Thus both dimensions
support the belief that if an agent intends to x,
she normally will x.
63
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Taken together these two dimensions
of commitment help explain how intentions play
their role in supporting coordination, both
intrapersonal and social. Both the inertia and
the fact that it is a conduct-controlling
pro-attitude provide support for the expectation
that when the time for action comes, an agent
will at least try to do what she intends to. The
disposition to figure out how to do what one
intends, and to settle on preliminary steps,
provide support for the expectation that an agent
will both be in a position to do what she intends
and succeed in doing it. Thus both dimensions
support the belief that if an agent intends to x,
she normally will x. What can the desire-belief
model of intention say concerning this points?
64
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of commitment. For
the desire-belief model of intention, first the
reasoning-centered dimension poses a problem
Even though one might have a predominant desire
to x, whether or not one acts so need not be
settled. One can frequently reconsider whether or
not to x.
65
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of commitment. For
the desire-belief model of intention, first the
reasoning-centered dimension poses a problem
Even though one might have a predominant desire
to x, whether or not one acts so need not be
settled. One can frequently reconsider whether or
not to x. Equally, the volitional dimension poses
a problem just as was shown with respect to
contradicting desires.
66
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Could one extend the desire-belief
model to include intentions as mental states, but
insist that they are not relevant for rationality?
67
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Could one extend the desire-belief
model to include intentions as mental states, but
insist that they are not relevant for
rationality? But the rationality of some later
decisions depends on earlier intentions It is
rational to take the bus to the cinema only if
you do not intend to go to Tonis.
68
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Could one extend the desire-belief
model to include intentions as mental states, but
insist that they are not relevant for
rationality? But the rationality of some later
decisions depends on earlier intentions It is
rational to take the bus to the cinema only if
you do not intend to go to Tonis. The planning
theory distinguishes two kinds of rational
actions It is internally rational to A only if
the intention to A is consistent with both the
agents prior intentions/plans and belief-desire
reasons.
69
Intentions in dialogue
Dialogue example situation
"Inst." refers to an instructor "Cnst." refers to
a constructor Common task is to build a
toy airplane Both Ss are separated by a screen.
(A) Inst So, jetzt nimmst du Well, now you
take Cnst eine Schraube a screw. Inst eine lt-gt
orangene mit einem Schlitz. an lt-gt orange one
with a slit Cnst Ja. Yes
It is rational to demand that Cnst take the bolt
only on the background of having planned to build
a toy airplane
70
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Could one extend the desire-belief
model to include intentions as mental states, but
insist that they are not relevant for
rationality? But the rationality of some later
decisions depends on earlier intentions It is
rational to take the bus to the cinema only if
you do not intend to go to Tonis. The planning
theory distinguishes two kinds of rational
actions It is internally rational to A only if
the intention to A is consistent with both the
agents prior intentions/plans and belief-desire
reasons. This can make some otherwise irrational
actions rational, as even in the presence of
irrational prior intentions some actions become
rational by being consistent with them and the
relevant belief-desire reasons.
71
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Could one extend the desire-belief
model to include intentions as mental states, but
insist that they are not relevant for
rationality? But the rationality of some later
decisions depends on earlier intentions It is
rational to take the bus to the cinema only if
you do not intend to go to Tonis. The planning
theory distinguishes two kinds of rational
actions It is internally rational to A only if
the intention to A is consistent with both the
agents prior intentions/plans and belief-desire
reasons. It is externally rational to A only if
Aing is consistent with the relevant
belief-desire reasons if it is an admissible
option and there is no alternative admissible
option that would be preferred.
72
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intention and commitment
Intention involves a certain kind of commitment.
Two dimensions of commitment can be
distinguished a volitional dimension and a
reasoning-centered dimension of
commitment. Could one extend the desire-belief
model to include intentions as mental states, but
insist that they are not relevant for
rationality? But the rationality of some later
decisions depends on earlier intentions It is
rational to take the bus to the cinema only if
you do not intend to go to Tonis. For the
planning theory, it seems that one could say it
is rational of S to A only if it is rational of S
to have the present-directed intention to A, and
by successfully performing A thereby
intentionally Aing.
This is the intention-action principle
73
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentionally acting
and intending to act
Thus far, a planning theory of intention was
sketched. The question how intending to act and
intentionally acting are related was omitted.
74
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentionally acting
and intending to act
Thus far, a planning theory of intention was
sketched. The question how intending to act and
intentionally acting are related was omitted. The
traditional view is that intentionally Aing
implies having the intention to A.
75
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentionally acting
and intending to act
Thus far, a planning theory of intention was
sketched. The question how intending to act and
intentionally acting are related was omitted. The
traditional view is that intentionally Aing
implies having the intention to A. This view is
rejected by the planning theory of intention,
according to which intentionally Aing implies
intending something that might be, but not
necessarily is, A.
76
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentionally acting
and intending to act
Thus far, a planning theory of intention was
sketched. The question how intending to act and
intentionally acting are related was omitted. The
traditional view is that intentionally Aing
implies having the intention to A. This view is
rejected by the planning theory of intention,
according to which intentionally Aing implies
intending something that might be, but not
necessarily is, A. The schema is the
following S As intentionally if S intends to B
and S As in the course of executing his intention
to B and ________.
77
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
78
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia
79
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers
80
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning.
81
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. They
are just more complex, and hence have further
properties First, they typically are partial.
(Which is good, because they can be adapted to
changes in the environment and this will
frequently be necessary.)
82
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. They
are just more complex, and hence have further
properties First, they typically are partial.
(Which is good, because they can be adapted to
changes in the environment and this will
frequently be necessary.) Second, they are
hierarchical. That is, plans consist of sub-plans
which can be changed without necessarily changing
the whole plan.
83
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. They
are just more complex, and hence have further
properties First, they typically are partial.
(Which is good, because they can be adapted to
changes in the environment and this will
frequently be necessary.) Second, they are
hierarchical. That is, plans consist of sub-plans
which can be changed without necessarily changing
the whole plan. This gives many intentions and
actions hybrid character in that they
are deliberative in the sense that the agent
spent some deliberation on them
84
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. They
are just more complex, and hence have further
properties First, they typically are partial.
(Which is good, because they can be adapted to
changes in the environment and this will
frequently be necessary.) Second, they are
hierarchical. That is, plans consist of sub-plans
which can be changed without necessarily changing
the whole plan. This gives many intentions and
actions hybrid character in that they
are deliberative in the sense that the agent
spent some deliberation on them and at the same
time being nondeliberative in that they are set
up against prior plans that need not be
deliberated.
85
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. There
are consistency constraints upon plans To
coordinate my activities over a stretch of time a
plan should be internally consistent.
86
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. There
are consistency constraints upon plans To
coordinate my activities over a stretch of time a
plan should be internally consistent. And it
should be consistent with beliefs it should be
possible to execute the plan, given the beliefs
are true.
87
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. There
are consistency constraints upon plans To
coordinate my activities over a stretch of time a
plan should be internally consistent. And it
should be consistent with beliefs it should be
possible to execute the plan, given the beliefs
are true. There is a demand for means-end
coherence Partial plans must be filled in
appropriately as time goes by.
88
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. There
are consistency constraints upon plans To
coordinate my activities over a stretch of time a
plan should be internally consistent. And it
should be consistent with beliefs it should be
possible to execute the plan, given the beliefs
are true. There is a demand for means-end
coherence Partial plans must be filled in
appropriately as time goes by. Failure in this
respect leads to incoherence.
89
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating.
90
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. They also
constrain further intentions and plans by the
requirement of means-end coherence.
91
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. They also
constrain further intentions and plans by the
requirement of means-end coherence. Actions and
intentions that help preserve or establish
means-end coherence are considered relevant for
the current plan. Thus plans help filter out
actions and intentions from the space of
possibilities.
92
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Intentions as parts of
plans
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. They also
constrain further intentions and plans by the
requirement of means-end coherence. Actions and
intentions that help preserve or establish
means-end coherence are considered relevant for
the current plan. Thus plans help filter out
actions and intentions from the space of
possibilities. That way prior intentions and
plans build a background framework against which
desire-belief reasons and options must be weighed.
93
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Stability of
intentions Reconsideration
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. Prior plans
provide a background framework.
94
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Stability of
intentions Reconsideration
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. Prior plans
provide a background framework. Consideration or
nonreconsideration of prior intentions is not
usually the product of deliberation. (Due to
resource restrictions.)
95
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Stability of
intentions Reconsideration
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. Prior plans
provide a background framework. Consideration or
nonreconsideration of prior intentions is not
usually the product of deliberation. (Due to
resource restrictions.) Typically, they are
grounded in general habits and other
nondeliberative mechanisms.
96
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Stability of
intentions Reconsideration
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. Prior plans
provide a background framework. Consideration or
nonreconsideration of prior intentions is not
usually the product of deliberation. (Due to
resource restrictions.) Typically, they are
grounded in general habits and other
nondeliberative mechanisms. When is it rational
to reconsider a prior intention?
97
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Stability of
intentions Reconsideration
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. Prior plans
provide a background framework. Suppose
Bel(t1,t2,p) and Des(t1,t2,A) are good reasons to
Int(t1,t2,A)
Bel(t2,t2,p) Des(t2,t2,A)
Bel(t1,t2,p) Des(t1,t2,A)
Int(t2,t2,A)
Int(t1,t2,A)
reconsideration is not reasonable
t2
t1
98
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Stability of
intentions Reconsideration
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. Prior plans
provide a background framework. Suppose
Bel(t2,t2,p) and Des(t2,t2,A) are good reasons
not to Int(t2,t2,A)
Bel(t2,t2,p) Des(t2,t2,A)
Bel(t1,t2,p) Des(t1,t2,A)
Int(t2,t2,A)
Int(t1,t2,A)
reconsideration is reasonable
t2
t1
99
Intentions in dialogue
The notion of Intention Stability of
intentions Reconsideration
Plans are intentions writ large. They share the
properties of intentions just noted they resist
reconsideration, and in that have inertia they
are conduct controllers, not merely potential
influencers and they provide crucial inputs for
further practical reasoning and planning. Prior
plans thus pose problems for further
deliberation, as partial plans have to be filled
in and this requires deliberating. Prior plans
provide a background framework. Suppose
B