Lessons from numerous acts of terror and violence against civilians in Jerusalem

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Lessons from numerous acts of terror and violence
against civilians in Jerusalem

• Ami Pedahzur
• Gady Paran

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Status Quo Research objectives

• Since the second half of the 20th century most
  terrorist acts worldwide were carried out in
  urban centers.
• New terrorists aspire to inflict as much damage
  as possible Mass Casualty Terrorism.
• Israeli Police holds all responsibility but no
  authority.
• What are the factors affecting Jerusalems coping
  efficiency versus the constant threat posed by
  the various Palestinian terrorist organizations?

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The three stages approach

• (1) the prevention of the act, (2) managing the
  event in real time, and (3) the stage of
  evacuation and rehabilitation of people and
  infrastructure. At every stage, the study
  examined the current written procedures,
  identified the bodies responsible, and tried to
  detect the focus of their main activity through
  the course of events.
• Based on the Australian case study, Behm
  Palmer (1991) claimed states must adopt three
  additional steps (1) The introduction of
  integrated and coordinated preventive measures
  designed to minimize the scope of any incident to
  occur, (2) A comprehensive capability for
  response to any incident that might occur, and
  (3) A positive enhancement of the national
  security environment, which is to suggest that
  all elements of society regard security as a
  cooperative endeavor in which each element has a
  particular contribution to make.

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Stage 1 a theoretical introduction

• The introduction of integrated and coordinated
  preventive measures designed to minimize the
  scope of any incident to occur(Behm Palmer,
  1991).
• Target - Prevention of the attack, or
  minimization of loss of property and life in the
  event of an attack.
• Means - Securing the objective, creating
  deterrence, creation of infrastructure for aid
  and response.

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Stage 1 PreventionMain Findings

• secrecy separating security forces from local
  authority and local services.
• Jerusalem county police, holds no counter
  terrorism intelligence gathering capability, and
  relies solely on intelligence provided by the
  internal security service.
• Severity of current Al Aqsa Intifada events,
  forced the formation of new intelligence sharing
  procedures and stronger cooperation.
• The actual responsibility for the protection of
  most targets within the urban arena was left in
  the hands of private security companies.
• The quality of routine operation of the private
  security companies protecting urban targets, is
  left to the mercy of governmental, local and
  private budgeting.

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Stage 2 a theoretical introduction

• A comprehensive capability for response to any
  incident that might occur(Behm Palmer, 1991).
• Target - Fast and efficient treatment of victims,
  prevention of further attacks and casualties.
• Means - Classification, treatment and evacuation
  of victims, securing the arena and prevention of
  further attacks, situation assessment and
  management.

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Stage 2 AbsorptionMain Findings

• Alerts of potential approaching dangers are not
  transferred by the police to any other players
  with lower security clearance.
• Other players respond without any ability to plan
  even one step ahead.
• The absence of a cooperative operational
  framework including all players, leads to the
  increase of confusion and disarray at the scene
  of event, and promotes resentment among players
  forced by the power of situation into cooperation
  under extreme conditions.
• That very same absence, creates an opening for
  players to try and expand their power on the
  expense of other players.
• In most cases uncertainty leads to unnecessary
  overcrowding of the scene and creating a
  potential hazardous situation.

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Stage 3 a theoretical introduction

• A positive enhancement of the national security
  environment, which is to suggest that all
  elements of society regard security as a
  cooperative endeavor in which each element has a
  particular contribution to make(Behm Palmer,
  1991).
• Target - Efficient return to normality of both
  the victims and the place of events.
• Means - Treatment and rehabilitation of the
  victims and their families (medical,
  psychological, and social aspects).

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Stage 3 ReactionMain Findings

• The deployments reaction within the hospitals
  can lead to confusing situations when a
  coordinated involvement on behalf of municipality
  welfare dep. And hospitals social dep. is
  requested.
• At the end of the first 24 hours, the treatment
  of the families is transferred to the social
  security institution, without any physical
  connection between representatives of both
  bodies.
• No follow up on families condition is being
  conducted by welfare dep. and no data is being
  transferred from the social security institution
  to the welfare dep. to allow the examination of
  welfare dep. Effectiveness in reducing post
  traumatic effects.
• In most cases, injured civilians will wait for a
  final decision on their case by medical review
  boards, for at least two years.
• I.R.S division of property taxing arrives at the
  scene of event and performs its duty
  independently.

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Main problems

• The absence of judicial means for control.
• The chronic absence of immediate and adequate
  resources.
• The absence of an intelligence sharing procedure.
• The absence of an urban cooperative operational
  framework.
• The absence of a clear and distinct division of
  responsibilities.
• The absence of clear and steady policy
  guidelines.
• The absence of a systematic lesson learning
  process.
• The absence of conclusion application at the
  system level.

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Conclusions (1)

• Judicial steps must be taken in order to form a
  body that will incorporate representatives of all
  existing players and will have the absolute
  control over the management of response to
  terrorism events in Jerusalem.
• The formation of such a body, will reduce
  existing tensions between players and insure
  intelligence sharing among restricted personnel
  from the various bodies.
• The use of resources as of today in the
  management of terrorism events in Jerusalem, is
  frequently disproportionate to the number of
  casualties. The formation of the Jerusalem urban
  response deployment, will insure players the
  ability to perform actions not used today, that
  will increase the chance of a faster and more
  efficient response in the first critical moments
  to the occurrence of a terrorism event.

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Conclusions (2)

• Most fatally injured civilians in events In
  Jerusalem, are evacuated to the Hadasa Ein
  Karem hospital but only 15.5 of all mass
  terrorism casualties in Jerusalem in 2002 were
  evacuated to Bikur Cholim. In the Sbaro
  terrorism attack on the 9th of aug. 2001 that
  occurred on the door step of Bikur Cholim, only
  4 casualties with minor injuries out 79
  casualties were evacuated to Bikur Cholim.
• The establishment of a large and sophisticated
  trauma unit at the city center, might reduce
  death toll among fatally wounded.
• More then any other factor, the coordination
  factor, internally inside each body and
  externally between bodies working the scene,
  carries devastating implications for efforts made
  to minimize and absorb the effects of a terrorism
  event in Jerusalem of 2003, and one must remember
  a single minute is eternity for the fatally
  wounded.