GENOCIDE: The Role of Bystanders

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GENOCIDE The Role of Bystanders

• UM, Studium Generale
• 9 December 2008
• Fred Grünfeld

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GENOCIDE DAY 9-12-1948

• 1. What is Genocide ?
• 2. What/who is the Bystander ?
• 3. Failure of Bystanders in Rwanda, Srebrenica
  and Darfur.
• 4. Faces of Genocide.

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Raphael Lemkin 1900-1959

• GENOS means in Greek race or tribe
• CIDE means in Latin killing
• Churchill Crimes without a name
• Crime of all Crimes, the most serious

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Destruction

• Genocide is the deliberate destruction of a
  specific group
• Destruction because of their birth, their
  existence, their being
• Not because of their views, opinions or actions

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Deliberate annihilation

• Genocide is the deliberate, planned and
  systematic annihilation of a specific group of
  people
• SPECIFIC GROUP
• BY THE STATE
• WITH INTENT
• Politicide refers to political opponents
  (democide both but excluding war)

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Seven stages

• 1. definition of the target group
• 2. registration of the victims
• 3. designation of the victims
• 4. confiscation of goods
• 5. exclusion from working activities
• 6. systematic isolation
• 7. mass extermination
• All stages in the Holocaust and in Rwanda

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GENOCIDE CONVENTION

• Article 3
• The following acts shall be punishable
• ( a ) Genocide
• ( b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide
• ( c ) Direct and public incitement to commit
  genocide
• ( d ) Attempt to commit genocide
• ( e ) Complicity in genocide.

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• Article 2
• Genocide means any of the following acts
  committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
  part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
  group, as such
• ( a ) Killing members of the group
• ( b ) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
  members of the group
• ( c ) Deliberately inflicting on the group
  conditions of life calculated to bring about its
  physical destruction in whole or in part
• ( d ) Imposing measures intended to prevent
  births within the group
• ( e ) Forcibly transferring children of the group
  to another group.

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Genocides in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur

• Why did the international bystanders fail to act
  to prevent or to stop the genocides in Rwanda,
  Srebrenica and Darfur?
• In what way would the international bystander
  have been able to act with the available
  instruments?
• Why were all the warnings not translated into
  action or, more precisely, what are the reasons
  for non-action or the ineffectiveness of the
  action that was undertaken?

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Each case

• 1. WARNINGS
• 2. INSTRUMENTS
• 3. DECISION-MAKING

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DARFUR
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DEATH TOLL

• Rwanda 1994 800,000 in 100 days 8,000 a day
• Srebrenica 1995 8,000 in 5 days 1,600 a day
• Darfur 2003-2005 200,000 in 1000 days 200 a day

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R2P

• Sovereignty (STATE SOVEREIGNTY NOT AS A BARRIER
  BUT AS A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ITS PEOPLE)
• 1.PROTECT OWN POPULATION
• 2.HELP GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT OWN POPULATION
• 3.COLLECTIVE ACTION, EXTREEM NEED AND LACK OF
  WILL (RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT, HUMANITARIAN
  INTERVENTION, CHAPTER VII DECISIONS)

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RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
1 Before
Prevent
2 During
React
3 After
Rebuild
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EARLY WARNING

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NEVER AGAIN

• EARLY WARNING DOES NOT LEAD AUTOMATICALLY TO
  EARLY ACTION OR ANY ACTION
• AT THE MOMENT WHEN DECISIONS ARE MADE, PREVIOUS
  NEVER AGAINS ARE FORGOTTEN

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WARNINGS INSTRUMENTS

• BOTH IN RWANDA AND IN SREBRENICA
• WARMINGS WERE AVAILABLE
• INSTRUMENTS WERE AVAILABLE
• THIRD PARTIES (BYSTANDERS) COULD HAVE PREVENTED
  IN BOTH CASES THE GENOCIDE

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The bystander

• the third party that will not act or that will
  not attempt to act in solidarity with the victims
  of gross human rights violations.
• COLLABORATOR OR RESCUER IN THE END

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The Atrocity Triangle
C Bystanders

• A Perpetrators

B Victims
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Neutral countries/bystanders Sweden

• Only Norway and Denmark were nearby, and their
  combined Jewish populations were less than ten
  thousand.
• Sweden offered sanctuary to both, saving about
  half of Norwegian Jewry and almost all the Danish
  Jews.

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• In 1944, Sweden involved herself more heavily in
  the heart of Europe, particularly in Budapest,
  where, along with Switzerland, Portugal, and the
  Vatican, the Swedish legation issued protective
  passports, established safe houses, and
  generally attemted to restrain the German
  occupants and their Hungarian puppets from
  killing more Jews on Hungarian soil in the final
  hours of the war

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Early Warnings 1991-1993

• Reports Existence Akazu
• AI / HRW Persecution, extrajudicial
  executions, disappearances Tutsi Influx of
  weapons
• Int. Commission Killing 2.000 Tutsi, 10.000
  detainees
• CIA/NIE Likelyhood of large scale ethnic
  violence
• UN Rapporteur Possible genocide
  

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From Arusha to SC Decision

• Arusha Accords
• 4.260 troops
• UN force should guarantee the overall security of
  the country
• Assist in the tracking of arms
• UN mandate according to SC resolution
• 2.500 troops
• Contribute to the security of Kigali
• Not provision to track arms

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Content Genocide Fax

• Aim demonstration to provoke RPF to arouse civil
  war, kill several Belgian peacekeepers to
  guarantee the Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda
• Interahamwe trained 1.700 troops in 40 cells in
  Kigali
• Informant ordered to list all Tutsi in Kigali,
  expected to be for their extermination
• Personnel informant ability kill 1.000 Tutsi 20
  minutes
• UNAMIR will act in 36 hours

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Secretariats Response to Genocide Fax

• Annan/Riza to Dallaire - Seizure of weapons is
  beyond the mandate
• - Inform embassies and President Habyarimana
• - Avoid entering into force
• UN Secretariat- We heard it before
• - Did not interpret the fax in the light of the
  highly tense political and security
  situation, the intelligence and earlier signals

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Warnings January April 1994

• Security situation detoriated in all aspects
• No progress in the political negotiations to
  install the transitional government
• Extremists gathered more and more influence and
  destabilized the situation
• UN Secretariat threats to withdraw UNAMIR
• Trust in the Rwandan President
• Trust in the Arusha Peace Accords and the classic
  peacekeeping force

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Request to Search for Weapons

• Six official requests by Dallaire for a stronger
  mandate to seize weapons (Jan - April)
• Belgium endorses Dallaires requests for a
  broader mandate in order not to remain passive
  to genocide
• All requests were rejected by the UN Secretariat
  without forwarding these to the SC
• April 5 SC prolongs the mission, uninformed of
  all requests to strengthen and broaden the
  mandate

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Response Security Council

• April 14 DPKO 3 options to the SC and Dallaire
  - UNAMIR minus Belgian contignent - Small
  political presence - Combination of option 1
  and 2
• April 18 DPKO favours a total withdrawal
• April 20 SG suddenly comes up with an option to
  reinforce
• April 21 Unanimous decision to leave only a
  symbolic number of 270 troops behind

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON Warning IN RWANDA

• HATE PROPAGANDA PRIOR TO GENOCIDE PUNISHED AS
  INCENTIVE TO GENOCIDE
• WEAKER MANDATE UNAMIR THAN NEEDED BECAUSE OF
  FEASABILITY
• OUTSPOKEN RELIABLE EARLY WARNINGS NOT FORWARDED
  TO SC
• ANY DECISION-MAKING BY SC WAS PRECLUDED
• the withholding of this information from the
  members of the security council by the un
  bureaucracy precluded any security council
  decision in this field.

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Immediate Evacuation Nationals

• Western countries immediately started evacuating
  their nationals in Rwanda
• 1.700 well-equipped evacuation troops might have
  been able to prevent the genocide

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AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN RWANDA

• THE OPTION TO LINK THE EVACUATION FORCE WITH
  UNAMIR WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN ANY WESTERN CAPITAL
  OR AT THE UN.
• RIZA WAS NOT PREPARED ON APRIL 14 TO PROPOSE AN
  ENFORCEMENT POWER TO SC (DUTCH ARCHIVES).
• SC VOTED UNANIMOUSLY FOR FORCE REDUCTION TO 270
  PERSONS ON April 21.

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CONTINUING MAIN CONCLUSIONS

• DOMINATING TRUST IN PRESIDENT AND PEACE PROCESS
• SHIFT IN PERCECEPTION NEEDED
• FROM PROMOTING PEACE TO EMERGING GENOCIDE

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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE26 February 2007

• CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION
  ON THE
• PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF
  GENOCIDE
• (BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA v. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

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Obligations to prevent

• it is clear that the obligation to prevent is one
  of conduct and not one of result. The obligation
  of States parties is rather to employ all means
  reasonably available to them, so as to prevent
  genocide so far as possible.
• A State does not incur responsibility simply
  because the desired result is not achieved
  responsibility is however incurred if the State
  manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent
  genocide which were within its power, and which
  might have contributed to preventing the
  genocide.(430)

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Prevention awareness of danger

• a State may be found to have violated its
  obligation to prevent even though it had no
  certainty, at the time when it should have acted,
  but failed to do so, that genocide was about to
  be committed or was under way
• it is enough that the State was aware, or should
  normally have been aware, of the serious danger
  that acts of genocide would be committed.(432)

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Duty to act

• a States obligation to prevent, and the
  corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant
  that the State learns of, or should normally have
  learned of, the existence of a serious risk that
  genocide will be committed.(431) (see art. 8 for
  UN)

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS ON WARNING IN SREBRENICA

• In May 2005 SC Members and UN Officials knew
  about intended Serbian Attack but they did not
  share this information with the Dutch.
• A preventative military enforcement attack was
  excluded by the UN and the major powers
• No SC debate on maintaining safe area Srebrenica

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AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS IN SREBRENICA

• NORDIC peacekeepers successful with tanks to
  deter Serbian aggressor in safe area at Tuzla.
• DUTCH peacekeepers not only missed military
  enforcement power but they did not try in any way
  to deter or resist Serbian aggression.
• NATO AIR support was available but not used at
  the moment of the attack on Srebrenica.

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LESSONS LEARNED

• RECOGNITION OF ANNAN OF MISTAKES IN PERCEPTION IN
  2004 (CHANGING MINDS)
• CHAPTER VII MEASURES (USE OF FORCE AUTHORIZED)
  WHEN national authorities are manifestly failing
  to protect their populations from genocide
  sept.05
• INVOLVEMENT OF SC WITH GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS
  VIOLATIONS HAS INCREASED TREMENDOUSLY

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DARFUR

• PRIORITY FOR NORT-SOUTH CONFLICT SUDAN
• GENOCIDE OR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
• STRONG PUBLIC OPINION

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WARNINGS FROM THE START

• UN RAPPORTEUR
• UN HEAD HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
• NGOs
• USA INQUIRY
• http//www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darfur/

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INSTRUMENTS DARFUR

• DIPLOMACY CEASE FIRE
• ARMS EMBARGO
• AFRICAN PEACE KEEPERS, NO UN!
• ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
• PROSECUTION

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R2P

• Sovereignty (STATE SOVEREIGNTY NOT AS A BARRIER
  BUT AS A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ITS PEOPLE)
• 1.PROTECT OWN POPULATION
• 2.HELP GOVERNMENTS TO PROTECT OWN POPULATION
• 3.COLLECTIVE ACTION, EXTREEM NEED AND LACK OF
  WILL (RESPONSIBILITY TO REACT, HUMANITARIAN
  INTERVENTION, CHAPTER VII DECISIONS)

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From outsiders to local actors

• The concept of responsibility to protect
  demands more assertive action including, when
  necessary, military intervention in situations
  marked by mass atrocities.
• This new concept focuses on the importance of
  authorities to protect those who are being
  victimized, and if local actors cannot or choose
  not to do so, then external action is
  legitimized.

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CONCLUDING QUOTE

• The bystanders at the state level and at the
  international level did not act in solidarity
  with the victims. They did not attempt to rescue
  the victims by rescuing or halting the genocide.
• Evaluating afterwards, we may conclude that
  these bystanders turned into collaborators who
  facilitated the genocidaires by not acting
  against continuing atrocities.